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Abstract 
This exploratory research is based on an objectivist epistemology with a 
positivist theoretical perspective that deployed concurrent mixed methods 
(MMR) design through a quantitative administered survey alongside an in-depth 
qualitative analysis through interviews exploring the perspectives of leaders on 
EHS leadership and governance.  
 
The research literature review focused on EHS leadership, corporate 
governance and strongly related topics. This MMR research employed both an 
expert panel-validated survey and a semi-structured interview protocol which 
explored 9 themes which emerged from the literature review including 
EHS/Safety Leadership; Risk Management; Influence and Accountability. Due to 
pragmatics relating to the number of leaders accessed (N=30) the statistical 
analysis is limited to descriptive type statistics. 
 
Almost all respondents supported the monitoring role of the Board of Directors 
(BoD), but disagreed that the BoD should play an active role in risk 
management. Comparisons are drawn between the Oil and Gas and non-Oil and 
Gas organizations with interesting results especially in matters relating to risk 
management.  
 
Structured thematic content analysis yields that Safety Culture; Leadership; 
Influence and Accountability were the three leading themes accounting for just 
over 50% of the responses analysed. Many sub-themes have also emerged and 
are discussed.  
 
A Model of EHS Leadership and Governance was created and is presented 
which positions themes and factors that influence monitoring of EHS 
performance and ultimately risk management.  The research can be considered 
as a unique contribution as a relatively small body of currently published work in 
this subject area, both globally and more so in the GCC.  
 
Key Words: Safety, Leadership, EHS, Corporate Governance, High Reliability 
Organisations, EHS Culture, High Risk Organisations. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 General Introduction 
 
The Gulf Corporation Council States (GCC) in the Middle East has seen 
great developments since the discovery of oil resources. Oil is said to have 
been first struck on the 1st June 1932 in the Kingdom of Bahrain, location of 
the GCC’s oldest oil refinery which started operating in 1936 [Clarke, 1991]. 
Today Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE, is extremely oil rich with a current 
estimated daily production of 2.8 million barrels per day with reserves 
estimated beyond 180 years. Saudi Aramco in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
is the largest oil company in the world, producing 12.5 Million Barrels per 
day, employing more than 56,000 people and with revenues of 360+ Billion 
USD per year. (see http://www.saudiaramco.com). In the Sultanate of Oman, 
Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) operates a concession area of 
114,000 Km2 operating some 100 fields with 54,000+ employees.  
(Source: www.gulfoilandgas.com). The State of Qatar has one of the highest 
per capita incomes in the world. Although a small state, it is one of the largest 
gas producers in the world, while the State of Kuwait, also significantly oil-
rich, is a major investor in many significant international investments.  
 
In the GCC the industries relating to upstream, midstream and downstream 
oil and gas, petrochemicals, manufacturing, fabrication and heavy 
construction and aviation are mostly government supported if not government 
owned and operated.  
 
Oil wealth has inspired industrial and commercial growth and much 
urbanization and infrastructure development. Much of the trade going from 
East to West or West to East passes through the Middle East’s air and sea 
ports. Dubai is an excellent example of this. It has the world’s largest man-
made port, a massive industrial free zone, and as of February 2013 the 
second busiest international passenger airport in the world, in terms of 
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passenger movement (Griffiths, 2013). Emirates Airlines, the Dubai-based 
International Airline Company carries more passengers than any other airline 
(Mohring, 2013).  
 
Given this context of considerable wealth through gas and oil stocks, the 
potential impact of incidents that can disrupt continuity of supply can be 
detrimental not only to production but to country and regional economies 
more generally. This is especially the case with high risk/high reliability 
organizations. The management of corporate risk is a key issue for all 
directors and senior managers and so effective corporate governance to 
ensure the effective management of health and safety is vitally important.  
This thesis’s focus is upon corporate governance in high risk/high reliability 
organizations in this region.  
 
1.2 Research Focus  
 
There has been much research into corporate governance strategies and 
activities in the UK, South Africa and the European Union. The GCC has 
emerging regulations, laws and practices that are moving towards leadership, 
stewardship and governance rather than the more traditional ‘command and 
control’ model.  Little is known about these emergent strategies, so this 
thesis is an exploratory study of the closely overlapping areas of EHS, 
Leadership and Corporate Governance, outlined in the following conceptual 
diagram. Figure 1 depicts these overall research areas diagrammatically.  
 
3 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The EHS-Corporate Governance-Leadership Conceptual 
Research Areas Diagram 
 
This thesis explores the interaction of Compliance, EHS Leadership and 
Performance Standards and Expectations, and in particular that area located 
in the very heart of this conceptual diagram.  It studies the perspectives, 
views and points of view towards corporate governance of EHS held by the 
organisational leaders.  
 
A pilot study conducted in late 2011 (see AlHashmi (2011)2) identified that it 
is the actions of the BoD that have an impact of EHS leadership and 
governance. Furthermore, the very senior leadership generally govern much 
organizational behaviour, culture, performance and focus. The convictions 
and values of the most senior managers influence EHS performance in high 
risk/high reliability organizations, so the study‘s focus is on the oil and gas, 
aviation, shipping, heavy construction and manufacturing industries. 
 
 
 
4 
 
1.3 Purpose and Key Objectives  
 
Directors, in accordance with the IoD best practice guidelines (IoD, 1999) 
must play a role in shaping policies and as primarily a supervisory body they 
have the key role in monitoring and helping improve organizational 
performance which includes EHS performance. They must therefore play a 
proactive in higher-level supervisory and investigatory roles. One of their key 
drivers should be compliance both to the statutory laws and regulations of the 
jurisdiction in which their company operates, and to the company’s 
established policies and procedures. Investigating the perceptions of CEO or 
board directors regarding these roles, their accountabilities and their safety 
leadership performance could help develop a code for corporate governance 
of health and safety that is applicable to the local norms of the Middle 
Eastern or at least Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state organizations. The 
study addresses such practices as policy setting mechanisms; procedural 
controls; the relationship between health and safety and other 
operational/financial/commercial aspects; organizational dynamics and 
structure, etc., and their place in corporate governance practice more 
generally.  
 
1.4 Research Question, Aims and Objectives 
 
The research question for this thesis: 
 
What are the perspectives of the senior leaders in high risk and high 
reliability organizations operating in the GCC region on Environment, Health 
and Safety (EHS) leadership and governance matters?   
 
The Aims and Objectives are proposed to being: 
 
1. Develop a basic framework for understanding corporate EHS 
leadership and governance. 
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2. To undertake exploratory research to understand EHS leadership 
and governance in HROs in the GCC region.  
 
3.  Develop an exploratory research methodology to best investigate 
the current themes and evaluate if there are any other themes that 
exist with respect to EHS Leadership in the context of Corporate 
Governance.  
  
• Using quantitative research methods to assess the focus of 
senior leader’s perception  
• Using qualitative methods to examine the rationale, reasoning 
and underpinning discourses of senior leadership 
• To combine qualitative and quantitative research methods and 
demonstrate the utility of such an approach 
• To explore and demonstrate how these two methods of study 
provide a better contextual understanding of senior leadership’s 
views on EHS governance 
 
4. To contribute to the development of research in EHS leadership 
/governance studies in the GCC and where such findings may add 
value to other such industries in other regions in the world. 
 
5. To explore the potential of developing a new framework and a 
model for EHS Leadership and Governance which helps explain 
the key components. 
 
1.5 Research Approach/Description/Methodology   
 
The research explores the main themes driving EHS at leadership levels in 
high risk/high reliability organizations. It is very much exploratory research, 
with an objectivist epistemology with its theoretical perspective that uses a 
mixed methods approach including surveys and semi-structured interviews 
used in-parallel. The focus is predominantly on the “qualitative” enquiry so as 
to obtain a rich, in-depth understanding.   
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1.6 Significance of this Study/Research 
 
In exploring the current literature, there is very little work which has been 
undertaken looking at perceptions of senior managers in organisations on the 
role that CEO’s and directors in health and safety governance and 
leadership. 
 
The growing importance of EHS in organizations and the significance of 
corporate governance standards especially in high risk and high reliability 
organizations, notably in the Middle East and the GCC States, cannot be 
underestimated. Not only is there a scarcity of studies connecting corporate 
governance and EHS leadership in organizations in general, the very few 
standards that have been developed have been drafted mainly by specialists 
and then phased through consultation cycles. Very little engaged scholarship 
type research has been undertaken in the areas which connect EHS, 
leadership and corporate governance (O’Dea and Flin (2001); Olive et al 
(2006); Cooper (2006) etc.). It is essential that we develop models that may 
explain the links, modalities and relationships between different drivers and 
perspectives that can be tested in practice. In particular the relationship 
between the first order relationships of EHS, Leadership and Corporate 
governance, and the second order relationships of compliance, performance 
standards and expectations and the various EHS Leadership Models, must 
be understood. 
 
The author of this study is an EHS practitioner and has been working within 
the field of EHS for more than 16 years in various functional and leadership 
roles. Previous studies undertaken by the author led to his belief that 
directors need to take the time to better understand what the EHS key 
performance measures mean, to study the impacts, direct and root causes of 
incidents, and to become engaged in general. It was those earlier studies 
that inspired the research undertaken in this thesis. The author is in a 
position to use the findings from this study to conduct further development 
work.  
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It was established in previous work that the drivers behind the policy setting 
mechanisms is significant and may be one of the most important aspects that 
should be explored further with directors and CEOs. In addition, exploration 
of the legislative and corporate governance debates are essential to better 
inform the right level of knowledge and engagement expected from directors 
in the policy setting mechanisms and how they directly impact on effective 
safety performance, loss prevention and operational excellence on an 
organization.  
 
In that context the author explores further these various aspects as well as 
the impact of organizational structure and risk management in an elaborated 
thesis study. It was felt even at the time that further research and literature 
review was required to better design what was most probably going to be an 
exploratory inductive-type mixed methods study which will involve 
investigating some of the work findings from the pilot study undertaken with 
senior managers with a more focused group of CEO/MDs and board 
directors directly.  
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
 
The structure of this Thesis is conventional as follows: 
 
 Chapter 1: Is a general introduction about the regional focus and the 
practical context of this research work; discusses the conceptual 
model developed for this study; discusses in some detail high risk and 
high reliability organizations; explains the research questions of this 
work; describes the methodology briefly; and explains the value and 
significance of this research. 
 Chapter 2: Is an in-depth enquiry using desk-based research into the 
historical development of corporate governance and EHS leadership 
and organizational EHS culture development. This chapter addresses 
the changing face of organizations operating within high risk and high 
reliability environments. 
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 Chapter 3: Continues the desk-based research and addresses the 
more contemporary issues for EHS leadership in organizations. It 
addresses the aspects related to EHS and its relationship with 
corporate social responsibility, social accountability, sustainability and 
voluntary reporting on EHS performance. It also discusses effective 
company boards and the relationship with CEO/MDs; organizational 
structure and effective safety communication and risk management. It 
concludes with a reflective discussion section and suggests the 
themes that have emerged from the literature review that create the 
foundational framework for this research.  
 Chapter 4: Discusses methodology. It is perhaps one of the most 
interesting parts of the study for the author as it defines doctoral 
practice from standard engaged scholarship and discusses with some 
detail the role of mixed method research and its real importance in the 
context of this exploratory research work.   
 Chapter 5: This chapter presents the data and data analysis from the 
quantitative part of the research.  
 Chapter 6: This chapter presents the data and data analysis for the 
qualitative research.  
 Chapter 7: Brings the whole research together. Whilst the focus is on 
the discussion of the results, other aspects such as implications of the 
research findings; demonstrating the importance, significance and true 
value of engaged scholarship in exploratory management studies; and 
the researcher’s reflections are also added to add both robustness 
and in light of the author’s personal professional experience context to 
the research work. The chapter ends with the presentation of the 
Model of EHS Leadership and Governance. 
 Chapter 8: Summarizes the whole research findings, discusses the 
limitations of this research, explains the contribution it makes to both 
academia and management and explores where scope for further 
research and engaged scholarship exists. 
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Chapter 2: The Changing Face of Organisations Operating 
within High Risk/High Reliability Environments 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This research thesis explores Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) 
leadership in organisations through the perception of the leaders themselves 
from the context of corporate governance and leadership. The thesis has two 
literature review chapters that explore current understanding about this topic. 
The findings of the literature review are summarised in a model that 
illuminates how the 9 themes that have been established are related to 
each other as factors. Chapter Two explores corporate governance and 
provides a historical review of its development; EHS management and EHS 
leadership in organizations and the legal and regulatory imperatives and 
organizational EHS leadership issues. Chapter Three explores the board’s 
leadership role and the relationship between the chairman and the CEO/MD. 
Not only academic and professional publications, research papers and 
research reports are reviewed, but also best practice standards and some of 
the guidance and articles from professionals working in these areas.  
A very wide range of literature is therefore analysed although much of it is 
from outside the GCC region.  Chapter Three’s conclusion brings together 
the themes from this wide-ranging literature review into a model that 
encapsulates current thinking about EHS leadership in high-risk 
organisations. This model is not one that will be tested, but rather will 
later be compared with a model that emerges from empirical research 
of EHS leadership in high-risk organisations in the GCC.   
  
Setting the scene 
 
EHS has become more critical for organizations because of negative impacts 
including both direct financial effects with immediate losses and longer term 
business effects such as shareholder confidence, public distrust, class-action 
and financial compensations and penalties [Lukic et al, 2010].  However, 
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EHS developments have become too complex for business managers to 
understand at times. Even the links of incidents with their direct, related and 
root causes as well as the cause and effect of business decisions made 
which may have attributed to the losses and impacts are not fully understood. 
The same probably applies to Sustainability, Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). MacLean (2001) explains 
that it is because of this growing complexity and interactivity that EHS 
professionals and managers/directors are finding themselves working ever 
more closely with the strategic business planning functions in corporations.  
 
The costs of HSE incidents to industry are great. They encompass Direct 
Costs, including: Medical; Compensation Insurance; Legal Fees etc. and 
Indirect Costs: Uninsured costs; Employee Morale; Time Lost at work; Loss 
of experience; Economic Loss due to injured person’s family; lost time in 
investigations as well as many others [Al-Ahmari, 2010]. To put things into 
global context: between July – December 2012 (i.e. over a span of 6 months) 
alone there have been; 6 Major Petrochemical Explosions and Fire; 6 Major 
and Serious incidents in E&P Offshore Incidents; 1 Very Serious Onshore 
incident; 2 serious incidents in Fertilizer Plants; 3 Major and Serious incidents 
in Gas Plants; 19 Refinery incidents ranging from significant to Major 
incidents. The losses combined are in hundreds of millions and there have 
been fatalities and major injuries. [Marsh, 2013].  
 
There have been many changes in the Arab World and the GCC states in the 
past 30 years. Those of the past 3-4 years are probably most significant 
partly because of the strong tides of socio-political changes with 
underpinning socio-economic drivers (e.g. younger population seeking job 
opportunities) [PRB, 2007]. At the same time much more focus is placed on 
matters such as CSR, nationalization, transparency and national and 
international companies are expected to clearly show their (mainly socio-
economic) contribution as corporate citizens. These changes can be 
regarded as risks. Other major risks are talent management matters (or 
human capital development); business continuity and more holistic enterprise 
risk management. In the energy sector alone, the expectations are that 
11 
 
energy demand in the Gulf region will increase by 150% by 2030 and this will 
place even greater pressures on energy supply companies and other 
associated secondary industries such as manufacturing, power and utilities, 
aviation and the transport and logistics sectors [Mckellar, 2011]. An emerging 
risk is the requirement to apply HSE standards, but these vary between 
jurisdictions, and the lack of uniformity has deterred organizations from 
entering and operating in certain markets [Richardson, 2013].  
 
Globalization has also had an impact on Arab and specifically the GCC 
economies. Traditionally these economies have been centrally controlled, but 
with a breakdown of economic boundaries have come an increase in power 
of markets driven by multinationals, technology and changing economic 
factors. This has led to the need for a more informed leadership within the 
major industries within the GCC, with perhaps more engaged and informed 
boards [Major, 2005]. A major benchmarking study undertaken in the O&G 
sector shows even very large National organizations such as the Abu Dhabi 
National Oil Company (ADNOC) has seen great development of reform in 
terms of corporate governance [Booz & Co, 2001]. In 2010 the GCC - Board 
Directors Institute (GCC-BDI) was established as a not-for-profit organization 
dedicated to making a positive impact on the economies and societies of the 
GCC states and region through promotion of professional directorship and 
raising the level of board effectiveness. The founding members are from both 
the financial and industrial sectors and there are professional content 
partners representing four of the most well-known international business 
consultancies, regulatory partners and corporate affiliates representing both 
the financial and industrial sectors. Their workshops focus on raising Board 
Directors’ awareness on matters including strategic risk management, legal 
imperatives for board directors and leadership matters [see 
http:///www.gccbdi.org].   
 
This also has led to an emerging risk where organizations have to apply HSE 
standards which vary in different jurisdictions, so even applying a particular 
“best practice” may not be suitable in a certain jurisdiction. This has even 
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deterred organizations from deciding to enter and operate in certain markets 
[Richardson, 2013].  
 
Carey and Patsalos-Fox (2006), explain that after many serious corporate 
governance standards have come into effect such as the US based 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SoX) the demand for academics, non-profit 
organization executives, and retired executives to be engaged as Board 
Directors has increased dramatically. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) in 2012 developed a voluntary standard 
on Corporate Governance and Process Safety Management (PSM) that 
focuses on high risk industries [OECD, 2012]. The document concludes with 
a model in which leadership is the heart of the model. Progressive 
companies now seek to fill 30% of Board seats with seasoned professionals 
and specialists with expertise in corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
 
Literature Review 
 
The literature review addresses corporate governance, law, EHS leadership 
and EHS culture, as all are necessary for understanding the topic of this 
thesis. The aim of this review, in this chapter and the next, is to develop a 
basic framework of key themes emerging from current work around safety 
leadership and culture; corporate governance; legal imperatives for EHS; risk 
management, sustainability etc. 
 
2.2 High Risk & High Reliability Organizations (HROs)  
 
The concept of High Reliability Organizations sits very much in the theory 
that accidents can be prevented through good organizational design and 
management/leadership [Bibbings, 2010]. One of the most comprehensive 
studies undertaken recently defining High Reliability Organizations is the 
HSE Laboratory (2011) study “High Reliability Organizations – a review of the 
literature”. In this work the definitions start from the context of the two 
(competing) prominent schools of thought that seek to explain accidents in 
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complex, high hazard organizations: (1) Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and 
High Reliability Organization Theory (HROT).  
 
In NAT, the definition is very straight forward and depicts the tight coupling of 
various aspects and system components (e.g. people, equipment, 
procedures) and that due to the complex relationships and interdependencies 
of these tightly coupled and often highly automated systems whereby the 
timing of tasks does not even allow for human intervention. The authors 
quote Perrow (1984) who explains that when a failure occurs in one part of 
the system that quickly spreads to another part of the system and you have a 
massive failure. Interestingly, Perrow classified petroleum/petrochemical 
plants such as refineries as lower risk when compared to military systems 
and aircrafts etc. This theory was highly criticized mainly for its failing to be 
consistent in accurately capturing and differentiating between the design 
features of systems in these industries and ignoring the conditions in which 
complex systems do not fail. Also others have identified the weakness in the 
definitions of the theory itself through its coupling and complexity 
terminologies. Its currency is also of little value to practitioners as it fails to be 
able to help advise and suggest how accidents can be reduced [HSL, 2011].   
 
In essence, the NAT describes more the consequences of the human-
machine interface actions where the source of failure is more physical and/or 
technological. In contrast, the HRO can be described as more “in response 
to” uncertainty, complexity, risks and here the focus is more on the 
behavioural and socio-physical aspects [see http://high-reliability.org]. The 
socio-physical dimension is created from the tight coupling between the 
human being and the machine/physical processes.  
 
The definition of HROT addresses the criticisms of NAT. This theory focuses 
mainly on the position that accidents in complex systems are neither not 
avoidable nor invertible. This is because of the processes in place that 
enable high hazard organizations to effectively prevent incidents and contain 
catastrophic errors from actually occurring and thus maintaining a consistent 
record of safe operations. In fact HRO researchers maintain a positive view 
14 
 
with regards to the nature of accidents in complex systems by arguing that 
organizations can become more reliable by creating or engineering a positive 
safety culture and reinforcing safety-related behaviours and attitudes. What is 
very interesting here is that HRO researchers maintain that such 
organizations are not error-free as much as they are pre-occupied with failure 
and prevention of that failure and how to deal with failing systems. As such, 
and most significantly such organizations exhibit strong learning 
orientation, prioritization of safety over other goals, continual training 
and development and an emphasis on checks and maintaining the safety 
performance. To this end, they also explain that HRO perspectives have 
much in common with resilience engineering which are systems employed 
extensively in the aviation, petrochemical and the nuclear industry. However, 
the HROT has also had its fair share of criticisms for its ignoring of the 
broader social and environmental contexts to learn from errors. Examples 
quoted included the (corporate) political implications of errors that may 
impact on the extent to which errors can be openly reported. It is important to 
understand the actual characteristics of HRO which are summarized in the 
table below. 
 
Table 2.1: Attributes of a HRO (Adapted from HSE Laboratory, 2011) 
No Characteristic Implication 
1 Dynamic Leadership 
Shift 
Whilst decision making is hierarchical during 
routine periods with clear responsibilities during 
emergencies, the organization does migrate to a 
structure which leverages on the members within 
the organization who have the expertise. 
2 Systematic Intervention They manage by exception and thus managers 
focus of strategic and tactical decisions and 
interfere seldom with operational issues which are 
delegated and covered by clear processes. 
3 Learning Organization Climate of continuous training and learning. 
4 Multi-Communication Several channels are used to communicate safety 
critical information – timely communication of 
information during normal and emergency 
situations 
5 Redundancy In-built redundancy and the provision of back-up 
systems in case of a failure. 
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One recently published definition of HROs is one “that produces product 
relatively error-free over a long period of time” [OECD, 2012; Page 12]. Two 
key attributes are described including having “a chronic sense of unease” 
and therefore lacking the sense of complacency. They as such can be 
described as believing that an incident can happen at any time even if no 
incidents have taken place for a very long time. The second important 
attribute is to “Make strong responses to weak signals” and therefore to set a 
low threshold for intervention. This generally means that they will go to the 
extent of shutting down operations to investigate effectively more often which 
whilst may mean financial losses, they see this as an essential risk control 
measure to prevent a much bigger potential loss.  
 
HSL (2011) have noted that resilience in HRO can be engineered by 
incorporating the following characteristics that include: (1) Just Culture 
promoting transparency in reporting of incidents and improvements with a 
great balance between supporting the reporting culture and tolerating 
unacceptable behaviours; (2) Management commitment which balances the 
pressures of production with safety and management behaviour/allocation of 
resources; (3) Increased flexibility through supportive systems and 
empowerment; (4) Learning culture in which information is shared, regular 
effective training is undertaken and there is development of critical safety 
information; (5) Preparedness through proactive safety management 
systems; (6) Opacity/Awareness through organizational collection and 
analysis of information that enables the organization to identify hazards and 
risk early and deal with prevention and finally (7) Resources – if the form of 
competent staff, systems, technology and additional resources to help 
prevent incidents and deal with them when they happen.  
 
This is consistent with AlHashmi (2012) model of Safety Culture in which 
Awareness borne from Information Sharing and Training as well as 
Autonomy/Management Support factors are all indicators of a Safety Culture. 
More is discussed with respect to Safety Culture later in this chapter, 
because it seems that there are similarities between Safety Culture and High 
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Reliability within an organization. They share many similar attributes, only 
that the HRO definition is probably more encompassing.  
 
Al Hajri (2008), in a case study paper about Al Jubail Petrochemical 
Company (KEMYA) explains how that management commitment and 
leadership are the key drivers for the KEMYA BBS behavioural based safety 
program.  Linked the safety performance, management performance to PSM 
and the Operational Integrity Management System leading to their Safety 
Excellence Program (SEP). Operational Excellence is a function of high 
reliability and will be discussed later. 
 
Because the process, manufacturing, aviation industries etc. are not only 
inherently risky but also highly dynamic and with risks arising all the time with 
changing conditions and environments, maintaining high reliability becomes a 
fundamental cornerstone of the very viability and sustainability of that 
business. HRO generally develop their strengths through the actions of 
individuals who share highly aware and safe attitudes within their 
organizations which in turn over time creates an organizational culture which 
can be described as a High Reliability Culture.  
 
http://high-reliability.org offer four fundamental organizational characteristics 
which help HROs control the number of incidents that take place. These 
include (1) an organizational prioritization of safety and the share 
performance goals throughout the originations; (2) An organization culture of 
reliability (as described above); (3) The learning organization which uses 
higher orders of learning to continually improve; and (4) “a strategy of 
redundancy beyond technology”.  
 
But there is a real difficulty with defining HROs mainly because of the very 
fact that incidents occur all the time in organizations as near-hits or as 
commonly referred to in the industry as near misses. The majority do not 
eventually become an accident i.e. these incidents do not result in loss of 
some kind. The question of defining HROs quantitatively raises this issue 
with many of the definitions as an industry benchmark is required, be it in the 
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aerospace, aviation, oil and gas, manufacturing or other industries. So 
statistically if a near-accident free performance is achieved then perhaps that 
particular organization can be described as a HRO. 
 
The above does also mean that statistically, reliability can be “calculated” but 
this would be a function of uncertainty. This is a fundamental issue in this 
whole study. If and when HRO’s are defined statistically there is a degree of 
engineering/technical/mathematical accuracy, but the factors related to 
organizational and social matters bring about greater uncertainty to some 
extent [Marais et al, 2004]. This probably explains why at the heart of the 
OECD PSM/CG model were both leadership and (organizational) culture.  
 
Hopkins (2002) reviewed extensively the five characteristics of HROs defined 
by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001): (1) preoccupation with failure; (2) reluctance to 
simplify interpretations; (3) commitment to resilience; (4) sensitivity of 
operations; and (5) deference to experience with the encouragement of a 
fluid decision-making system which they had described collectively produced 
a collective state of mindfulness which was key. Whilst Hopkins (2002) 
supported their views he also said that the challenge in defining HROs thus 
lies in the very fact that a detailed enquiry looking at these five areas would 
be required and this was highly dependent on the industry within a context of 
time.  
 
Rooksby (2010) explains that Managers in HROs work closely with their 
subordinates about their work actions rather than just focusing on figures 
related to bottom-line performance. Therefore in a way it is enhancing 
performance through creating learning organizations. It is worthy to note that 
given the above some researchers have found that the HRO researchers 
have oversimplified to some extent what complexity and difficulties are faced 
by engineers and scientists and have suggested an alternative systems 
approach to safety which tries to overcome the limitations of both the NAT 
and HRO theories [Marais et al, (2004)].  
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The human element remains critical and as noted by Bridges (2010) weak 
management systems compounded with human errors are what causes 
incidents. Therefore, human factors must be understood very clearly in the 
prevention of incidents. OH performance standards, Training and 
Competency, Task Design; workforce rationalization and time motion studies 
to determine the safe manning levels; task-human-system interaction etc. all 
help strengthen PSM system.  
 
In a recent and dynamic study of an oil refinery in the UK which apparently 
was actively working towards achieving higher levels of reliability and safety 
(which was in part a reaction to the review of the Texas City explosion in 
2005); the researchers identify four fundamental areas or themes emerged 
from both 1-to-1 and focus group interviews which included Training and 
Technical Competence; Hazard Identification and Awareness; Learning 
Orientation and Strong Management Commitment to Safety [Lekka & Sugden 
(2011)]. The same study concluded that whilst there were some highly 
progressive practices – management commitment and more importantly 
high levels of management visibility remained the two most critical 
challenges faced by organizations striving to implement high reliability 
practices.  
 
Finally, if it is the case that HROs have a migratory decision making 
processes that allow those who are closer to an incident to react to prevent 
escalation or otherwise “the empowerment within the hierarchy” to those who 
would be better informed (or more knowledgeable), the leadership model 
within these organizations would have to be highly empowering. However, 
under normal conditions it would also need to be highly engaged and have 
an appreciation of the risks and challenges faced within the day-to-day 
operations of the organization [HSL (2011)].  
 
The leadership from the top must then be very trusting, but would, within the 
context of operational integrity, need to expect inherently highly reliable 
operations. This is particularly the case with operations such as oil and gas; 
power and utilities, aviation etc. This would mean that operations are 
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managed within a reliable integrated management system, where the 
changes in response can be rapid enough to deal with any fast occurring 
developments. This also requires that managers at all levels starting from the 
top of the organization are trained to manage and respond and this can only 
be achieved through structured systems, training and drills.  
 
It could be argued in conclusion that a culture of high reliability must be 
driven by the Executive Management Team and the Board of Directors who 
would set the tone as an expectation.  
 
2.3 Corporate Governance & Historical Review of Developments  
 
The increasing importance of Corporate Governance was noted above, 
especially following the collapse of ENRON and investors’ concerns about 
their investment. Dunlop, (1998) explains that the systems of Corporate 
Governance and Control have also come under great scrutiny in recent years 
with organizational investors demanding effective controls to be put in place 
to ensure the discipline required to prevent the risk of loss of their 
investments. After the collapse of ENRON, Breeden (2003) presented an 
extensive report to the US Government with 78 individual recommendations 
covering many issues including directors’ qualifications and risk 
management.  
 
Recent developments which Michael Jensen (1993) [quoted in Chew & 
Gillan, 2005 – Page 16] explains “has changed the economic landscape as 
rapidly as within the 19th Century Industrial Revolution”. These are the rapid 
changes in technology and organizational aspects which completely altered 
many models in production and labour markets. Companies have grown in 
size necessitating new forms of management (Kendall & Kendall, 1998), 
more sophisticated systems, explain that this was attributed to the growth in 
the size of companies and with much higher production scales which led to 
shareholders ceasing to manage these organizations and hiring professional 
managers instead. Technological advances also brought about economies of 
scale which contributed to this growth in organizations. These professional 
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managers moved to eventually becoming board members with time; and 
changes in the board member’s role towards an important “advisor” to the 
shareholder.  
 
Another important observation is that organizations have moved over the 
years from being small and medium size enterprises and as organizations 
become bigger they start to require a greater degree of planning, accounting, 
operational management and systems in all its various functionalities [Leavy 
& McKieranan, 2009]. This has led to the development of more regimented 
systems with process mapping, procedures and checklists. As Collins (2001) 
explains, these systems are usually employed in response to a senior person 
within the organization and generally when a company board demands that a 
hierarchical and systematized organization is to operate, one in which better 
corporate monitoring and control can be exercised. This carries the threat of 
inhibiting innovation as many of the operations become so systematic and 
need to follow strict guidelines and procedures that bureaucracy is brought 
into being.   
 
These systems generally emerge to compensate for incompetence, 
inconsistencies (which cannot be tolerated in certain high risk industries such 
as aviation and oil and gas) and generally what can be described to be a lack 
of discipline.  To become a “great” organization a balance between a high 
Ethic of Entrepreneurship and a High Culture of Discipline has to be created. 
It may be considered significant that “The good-to-great companies built a 
consistent system with clear constraints, but also gave people freedom and 
responsibility within the framework of that system. They hired self-disciplined 
people who didn’t need to be managed, and then managed the system, not 
the people” [Collins, (2001), page 125].   
 
Governance and control systems by their very nature are constraining, or at 
the very least establish certain requirements and expectations that have to 
be fulfilled by people who are then measured against these performance 
criteria. This creates accountability and even a culture of responsibility. A 
greater degree of clarity is now demanded of managers and directors. Zukis 
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et al (2010) explain that the internal control framework provided by the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
(COSO, 2004) has led to organizations in the US now leveraging this 
framework and recommendations beyond financial reporting. They must: 
“(1) Develop a functional model identifying business processes (i.e. a 
Process Classification Framework) so that a well-defined policy and 
procedure framework exists then (2) Support the framework with established 
processes to continually evaluate, update and communicate policy changes 
throughout the organization and (3) Leverage this framework consistently 
across the organization in support of various business processes” [Zukis et al 
(2010), Page 2].  
 
The “focus on fulfilling objectives through better risk management” is at the 
heart of the risk management process [IoCA, 1999]. The Turnbull guidance 
on the Combined Code Corporate Governance requires that companies have 
robust systems of internal control going beyond financial risks but 
looking more holistically at risks relating to the environment, health and 
safety and also business reputation [HSE/IoD, 2008].  
 
Many boards have now established ethics subcommittees (sometimes called 
supervisory committees) to overview the behaviour of board members and 
ensure the highest standards of compliance [PWC, 2005].  
 
Defining Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate Governance has been defined differently in different countries 
(Kendall & Kendall, 1998). One definition is that Corporate Governance: 
“….is to be seen to be acting responsibility, and informing all interested 
parties, or stakeholders, of decisions which will affect them” [Kendall & 
Kendall (1998), Page 18-19]. McGregor (2000), page 11 offers an alternative 
definition: “Governance is the process whereby people in power make 
decisions that create, destroy or maintain social systems, structures and 
processes” [McGregor, 2000, page 11]. 
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Bain & Band (1996) have not given an exact definition but have explained 
that it is about ensuring that “the proper standards are installed within an 
organization”. In their survey work respondents (managers) came with many 
different definitions including “Having an appropriate pay policy for senior 
people in industry”; “providing checks and balances to avoid excesses of top 
bosses”; “A set of procedures to protect the organization from fraud or loss 
due to poor practice”; “Providing checks on the management thus protecting 
shareholders”; “Curbing the worst excesses of a greedy managing class”; 
and “Providing a control climate suitable to the organization”.  
 
They go on to quote “Instead of episodic, confrontational challenges for 
control, CEOs and directors will find themselves subjected to continuous, on-
going scrutiny from both active investors and major long term institutional 
investors, who will seek to engage in substantive debate about specific 
corporate policies and overall corporate performance….The new governance 
process is based on continuing dialogue and debate among key, long-term 
institutional and other investors about specific, substantive aspects of 
corporate policy.” [Bain & Band, 1996, pages 2-3]. 
 
Another definition is “Corporate Governance is the process of serious 
decision-making at the controlling heart of the organization. For most 
practical purposes, this means the board and the CEO and the ultimate 
arbiters.” [Leavy & McKieranan, 2009, page 46]. 
 
In the UK, in 1992 the Government-commissioned Cadbury Committee 
Report on Financial Corporate Governance of Companies focused on the 
role of the Chairman, CEO and directors (especially the role of independent 
directors), but it also reflects some of the aspects that relate to the non-
financial aspects of the decisions made by organizations [Clutterbuck & 
Waine, 1993].  
 
The simplest and most comprehensive definitions: “Corporate governance is 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled”. Boards of 
directors are responsible for the governance of their companies; 
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shareholders appoint the directors and auditors and must satisfy themselves 
that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of 
the board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the 
leadership to put them into effect, supervising the management of the 
business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship. The board’s 
actions are subject to laws and regulations [Cadbury Committee Report 
1992, Page 14]. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, (SoX Act) and other reforms have tried to 
encourage greater Boards involvement in the understanding of management 
performance and other best practices including: 
 
(a) Having independent directors in the majority; 
(b) Tightening the standards for independent directors; 
(c) Restricting the audit committee composition and expanding its 
responsibilities; 
(d) Requiring that compensation and nominating/governance committees 
are comprised entirely of independent directors and granted specific 
responsibilities; 
(e) Convening regular executive sessions restricted to the non-
management directors; 
(f) Performing regular Board and Committee evaluations; 
(g) Others. [Millstein & MacAvoy (2003)] 
 
On initial review of the various codes that have been developed in various 
countries (e.g. UK, The Cadbury Code 1992; then later the Turnbull 
Committee Report 1999 and in the USA, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002; 
South Africa, The King, I, II and III (King 2009) it is clear that the concept of 
Corporate Governance has grown in importance in the past 20 years, with 
greater transparency being demanded by stakeholders as well as 
shareholders. Countries such as South Africa which applied an effective code 
of practice (see King I, King II and King III), have seen companies enjoying 
greater foreign direct investment (FDI) with the benefits of greater confidence 
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of the investor. There has been much discussion and also debate in the USA 
between various institutions regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) which 
was passed soon after the Enron collapse/scandal. The Act operates in a 
“Comply or Else” principle which has been very much argued to be ineffective 
in adding a holistic value to corporations. It is said that for instance the cost 
of compliance to SOX in the USA amounts to what is greater than the total 
write-off amounts on Enron, World Com and Tyco combined. [King, 2009].  
 
Chew & Gillan (2005), in reference to Brinkley et al (2002), explain that 
corporate governance can be described through its most important facet – 
organizational design and architecture. It has three key elements: (1) The 
assignment of decision-making authority i.e. who gets to make what 
decisions; (2) Performance Evaluation i.e. how is the performance of 
employees and their business units measured and; (3) Compensation 
Structure i.e. how are employees (including senior managers) rewarded or 
penalized. But there is growing appreciation of the softer issues of 
governance, requiring a greater understanding of human nature and 
behaviour [McGregor, 2000]. This subject is discussed below.  
 
Thomsen (2005) studied variances in corporate values. He concluded that 
structure and governance impact on corporate values, and there is little 
relationship between values and profitability.  However, Ayuso et al 2007 
drew different conclusions, finding evidence of a positive relationship 
between CSR, country location, board diversity and stakeholder engagement 
and a firm’s financial performance.   
 
Millstein & MacAvoy (2003) recommend many reform proposals to Boards to 
strengthen their purpose and make them more effective. Below is an action 
table developed based on their 9 initiatives suggested: 
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Table 2.2: Initiatives Suggested to Improve Board Performance 
Initiative Description* Implementation 
1 Separation of the Role of the Chairman and 
the CEO and designate an independent 
Director as Chairman.  
Shareholder/ 
Stakeholders 
2 Determination of the satisfaction that 
management has appropriate processes in 
place to prepare the certification required by 
the SoX Act. 
The certification is a 
legal requirement by the 
Act – but it is good 
practice – Action for the 
Board of Directors 
3 Boards should take responsibility for their 
company strategy, risk management and 
financial reporting based on the company’s 
business environment, challenges, and 
opportunities and should carefully construct 
compensation arrangements to reward 
extraordinary company (no market) 
performance.  
Action for the Board of 
Directors under clear 
leadership of the 
Chairman.  
4 Boards should assure themselves of the 
integrity of management.  
Primary Action by Board 
Committee’s appointed 
Chairmen with the Board 
Chairman.  
5 Board should structure meetings so as to 
ensure that issues central to the 
performance of the company are given 
sufficient time, and that management 
presentations concerning such issues 
present options and not simply reports.   
Board Secretary under 
clear leadership of the 
Chairman.   
6 Boards should assure themselves that the 
Board agendas prioritize and carry out the 
forgoing rules of practice.  
Action for the Board of 
Directors under clear 
leadership of the 
Chairman.  
7 Company Internal Auditor should be hired 
and report to the Board Directly.  
Action for the Board of 
Directors under clear 
leadership of the 
Chairman.  
8 Boards should feel free, without the consent 
of management, to retain such consultants 
and advisors as they deem necessary to 
carry out their responsibilities.  
Action for the Board of 
Directors under clear 
leadership of the 
Chairman.  
9 Boards should expand their definitions of 
management and establish procedures for 
familiarizing themselves with business 
leaders below the level of senior 
management.  
Action for the Board of 
Directors under clear 
leadership of the 
Chairman.  
*Note as adapted from Millstein & MacAvoy (2003)   
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Ultimately the board of directors (BoD) play a critical role in setting the 
operating rules for an organization because they have the ultimate 
responsibility for appointing the CEO and signing off the organization’s 
business strategy. Boards are becoming more and more concerned with 
sustainability issues such as environment, health and safety and social 
accountability where the risk for legal non-compliance and/or failing to meet 
their social obligations can have a long term lasting negative impact eroding 
quickly the organization’s value. As the primary shareholder representatives, 
they are getting to better understand that the stakeholder’s position is 
becoming stronger and they are under greater scrutiny in today’s business 
world as opposed to even a decade ago. 
  
However, McDonald (2010) explained the disappointing reality that the 
surveys conducted on UK directors on the HSE/IoD 2008 Code over two 
years showed little improvement in awareness, leadership and 
implementation of Code. 
 
In fact BoD members often lack sufficient diversity to deal effectively with the 
shifts from the exclusive focus on the shareholder’s interests to one of 
meeting the expectations of a wider, more diverse group of stakeholders. As 
corporate sustainability has wide ranging implications on corporate 
governance, the diversity of knowledge and experience of the BoD has to 
move from the traditional appreciation of only financial and industry-related 
knowledge to a wider and more stakeholder informed competence [Dunphy 
et al, 2003]. Williams (2008), explains that even investors take greater 
interest today in ensuring that the organizations they invest in deal effectively 
with ethics, environmental and social issues positively. Socially Responsible 
Investments (SRI) are being demanded by some pension fund members 
putting pressure on fund trustees to ensure that fund managers engage in 
SRIs.  
 
In the next section, the author seeks to explain how and why leadership 
within the context of corporate governance is so critical and then later 
explores its impact on safety and EHS performance in organizations.  
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Lastly Williams (2008), explains that even investors take greater interest 
today in ensuring that the organizations they invest in deal effectively with 
ethics, environmental and social issues positively.  
 
2.4 Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) in Organizations  
 
In this section, the author explores how EHS management drives the safety 
culture, to explain how organizations in high risk/high reliability industries 
have changed in the past few decades. 
 
There has been significant growth in interest in EHS in the past 3-4 decades 
driven by various factors. These include the impact of legislation aimed to 
protect employees, contractors and the public from poor EHS practices [HSE, 
2001]. For example, The Health and Safety Commission (HSC) in the UK 
adopted the recommendations of the Turnbull Report [see IoCA, 1999]. 
Comprehensive advice was provided in “Implementing Turnbull” [CBP-IoCA, 
1999]. 
 
EHS is directly related to principles of loss prevention. Applicable in almost 
any business, it is perhaps more significant for the Oil and Gas and other 
high-risk/high-reliability industries where accidents can lead to considerable 
destruction to people and property, and so EHS has become a significant 
business concern (MacLean, 2007). It must become a core personal value at 
the individual’s level if a safety culture is to be embedded (Al Hamoud, 2010). 
It is important to appreciate that whilst financial losses can be insured to a 
great extent, other significant impacts on reputation, customer loyalty, and 
stakeholder confidence (including public trust) can lead to considerable and 
irreparable damage. Accidents cost companies money both directly and 
indirectly. The indirect costs of an incident can be estimated as being up to 
30 times the direct losses caused [DNV, 1996]. Insurance may not cover lost 
production time, loss of highly trained personnel, impacts on employee 
morale and productivity and time and resources spent investigating the 
incident. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the UK estimates that for 
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every 1 Pound Sterling of insured loss there is an estimated uninsured loss of 
between 8 to 36 times of that [HSE-96, 1996]. 
 
This is exemplified in recent examples from the oil industry. The BP Texas 
Refinery incident in 2005 resulted in 15 fatalities, more than 170 injuries and 
cost BP both significant financial and reputational loss [Baker et al, 2007]. 
The 2010 disaster off the Gulf of Mexico in BP’s offshore operations, which 
was one of the most serious in terms of impact on economy, the environment 
and people, led to the CEO’s removal from his post for failing to demonstrate 
safety leadership [Al Hashmi, 2011]. In the past 5-10 years it is probable that 
no company has felt the crippling impact on its reputation (and shareholder 
confidence) and share-price (company value) like BP since the deep-water 
Horizon incident in late April 2010. The share price on 25th June 2010 (1 
week after the congressional hearing with BP’s CEO) had dropped from 
654.6 p to 304.6 p (i.e. it lost about 46.5% of its original value). Even on the 
20th of October 2011 (more than 18 months on) the share-price remained 
just over 460 p (http://www.lse.co.uk).  
 
But, as Haefeli et al (2005, page 5) explain, “Most organizations were 
concerned about potential cost implications of major incidents, but were less 
concerned about actual costs incurred as a result of more frequent, minor 
events. The majority of respondents reported that they did not know how 
much either accidents or work related illnesses were costing their business. 
Few attempts had been made to quantify the cost of health and safety 
failures. Limited time and resources, perceived complexity and lack of 
expertise were the most commonly cited barriers to conducting 
accident/work-related ill health cost assessments.”  
 
This is an important finding given extensive research that links statistically 
near-miss and minor incidents with major incidents including fatalities. The 
US Labour Force Survey in 1990 established ratios relating minor incidents 
to lost-time (more than 3-days off-work) and major incidents. In the UK the 
RIDDOR regulation links lost-time incidents to fatalities with a ratio of 400:1. 
Earlier Frank Bird established a ratio of 600:1 in terms of near-misses to 
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major incidents. Heinrich’s Domino Theory established in the 1960’s explains 
that an incident is caused by a failing of barriers to control or eliminate unsafe 
conditions and acts. If these persist and thus near miss incidents occur, it is 
statistically significant that at some point a major incident will occur. Theory 
places ancestry and social environmental factors as root causes, thus 
including recklessness, stubbornness and greed [British Safety Council, 
2005]. 
 
This would mean that although managers interviewed in the Haefeli et al 
(2005) study were concerned about the major accidents, they may not have 
realized that controlling or reducing minor incidents prevents the major 
incidents they were concerned about, and that they need to focus on 
achieving “behavioural changes among staff at lower levels within 
organizations, as well as tapping into the moral obligations of senior 
managers and boards of directors” [Haefeli et al (2005) page 170]. This is 
difficult given incorrect reporting lines of HSE practitioners and the lack of 
appropriately competent and trained staff [Maclean, 2011].  
 
Many of the major investigation reports into some of the most significant 
recent accidents, such as The BP Texas Refinery Explosion, 2005 [see 
Baker et al, 2007]; the Piper Alpha Incident in the 1988 [Kumar 2007, Cullen, 
1990] and the explosion/fire at Buncefield Oil Terminal in 2005 [Allars, 2007; 
MIIB, 2011], have emphasised the failure of management more broadly and 
the company leadership most particularly in preventing such incidents.  
 
As explained earlier accidents cost companies money both directly and 
indirectly. Certain insurance protects employers and these include 
Employer’s Liability, Public Liability, Workman’s Compensation, Fire and 
Perils and so on. It is to be noted that losses cannot always be recovered for 
matters such as lost production time, loss of highly trained personnel, 
impacts on employee morale and productivity and time and resources spent 
investigating the incident etc.  
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So what is this safety culture which needs to be developed and driven from 
the top of the organization? Past disasters have shown the need for a real 
and strong commitment from the corporate and senior management [Patel, 
2012]. Thus the Bahraini Petroleum Oil Company (BAPCO) developed 
effective Risk Assessment (RA) and Quantitative RA (QRA) programs after 
an in-depth review and investigation of the Texas Refinery incident of March 
2005. Driven from the top, changes include using Port-a-cabins that are blast 
proof [Goyal and Menon, 2012]. One of Saudi Aramco’s affiliates changed its 
focus to make leadership and accountability the most important element of 
the company’s safety management system [Al-Kudmani, 2008]. DuPont’s 
PSM system considers EHS a business issue - not an operational and 
manufacturing issue - to ensure that management commitment to uncertainty 
avoidance. Dupont developed a global contract management system which 
includes 6 elements – (1) Contractor Selection; (2) Contract Preparation; (3) 
Contract Award/Establish Expectations & Standards; (4) Orientation & 
Training; (5) Monitoring Safety Activities; and (6) Evaluate Safety 
Performance against contractual expectations [Van der Westhuyzen, 2012].   
 
A just culture is the foundation of any effective safety culture as noted by Bu-
Allay (2010). Error Management and Total Error Reduction Management 
(TERM) systems is a very effective tool for managing incidents by identifying 
a series of contributing factors for an incident – i.e. A collection of causes. A 
“just culture” allows for the reporting of incidents openly and reduces the 
number of accidents by limiting the incidents through effective prevention by 
not penalizing the reporting party or otherwise. Reporting Near-misses can 
help identify where the next incident will most probably occur. There is a 
great misunderstanding of near-misses, it is about organizational culture – 
Management must follow up positively and see how things are being 
addressed. High potential near-miss incidents (HPNMI) should be 
investigated in the same way as actual incidents leading to serious damage 
and loss [Vasudeven & Dutta, 2010]. 
 
Near-misses are ultimately a great opportunity to learn for an organization 
and very specific to what is happening on that site – although a blame-culture 
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can inhibit this [Basson, 2010]. Further, in the Middle East most PSM 
incidents which are caused by contractors, who have workforces comprising 
many different nationalities and languages. Gaining compliance of 
contractors in training their workforce effectively; and in monitoring and 
documenting etc., is therefore challenging [Snakard & Hazzan, 2010]. 
 
One major issue is that contractors with substandard safety performance 
may be appointed to a project based on cost considerations. In almost all 
organizations such large contracts require the review/approval of the Board 
or at least investment committees with BoD members. It is in these “due-
diligence” forums that safety performance and standards must be challenged. 
This explains Dolphin Energy’s Management system emphasis during 
prequalification of contractors as elaborated by Al-Rahbi (2008) where in 
Contractor Questionnaires and Pre-qualifications, 2 of the key elements out 
of 12 are Contractor’s Management Commitment to Safety and HSE Aspects 
and also the allocation of Resources and organization to projects. 
  
Senior managers must appreciate that the driving motivation for contractors 
is profitability. In the GCC contractors are driven mostly by price and the risks 
of operating within live plant can be exponential.  Unless clients/employers 
set a higher standard, contractors will continue to be the biggest and weakest 
link [Drelaud, 2010]. Some are attempting to tackle this: Hemler (2010) 
explains that Saudi Aramco’s Contractor Safety Management System 
requires contractors to establish a program to establish accountability; 
communications requirements; performance measures; standard 
maintenance through compliance and monitoring activities.  He emphasizes 
that this can only start with effective pre-qualification; Pre-job safety 
discussions; facility safety orientation; site safety performance monitoring. He 
goes on to explain that none of this can be truly implemented without top 
management commitment.  
 
The relationship between safety and leadership is discussed further in this 
chapter. But a good safety culture requires clearly a just and fair 
organizational culture; strong management commitment and leadership with 
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strong governance systems; a clear understanding that eliminating major 
incidents starts with eliminating the smaller incidents and near-misses; and a 
strong focus on the weakest links such as contractors.  
 
2.5 EHS Management & Leadership in Organizations  
 
Senior management plays a significant and pivotal role in shaping 
organizational culture. They do this by promoting both organizational safety 
and proactive safety culture and achieve this through their: (1) active 
involvement in safety activities; (2) integrated safety management approach; 
(3) continuous open communication with the workforce; (4) consistent 
prioritization of safety and (5) consistent support for safety [Roger et al, 
2010]. 
 
A cultural change to focus on EHS must be seen as a long-term strategic 
objective. In most organizations safety is a necessary chore rather than a 
business focus [Williamson, 2008]. CEOs and MDs must be able to instil 
safety as a core value rather than a necessary evil, and leadership is vital in 
this [Barling et al, 2002)]. But EHS is a competitive weapon in business, 
critical to customer satisfaction and company success through improvements 
in (1) processes; (2) integrity; (3) rapport with regulators – allowed latitude to 
operate; (4) risk management excellence; (5) establishing accountability and 
leadership in areas and activities; (6) employee engagement levels (better 
safety culture development is a result); and (7) payback and operational 
excellence model [Al-Mowalad, 2010]. 
 
Chevron’s Operational Excellence Model sees leadership as the core thread 
which holds the whole system together. The model has 5 key elements 
anchored around leadership:   
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Fig 2.1: Chevron OE Leadership Model 
(Adapted from [Chevron 2010 – OE Leadership Guide]) 
 
Qadir (2010) explained that the development of the Responsible Care© 
System along with the American Chemical Council (ACC) was one of the 
most significant developments in the Chemical industry in the past 10 years. 
The system is founded mainly on the fundamentals of product stewardship; 
from sourcing raw materials to transportation, then to production, then 
packaging and finally delivery to customers. Chemicals are inherently risky, 
necessitating such a system. The ACC and RC place a great deal of 
emphasis on communicating through effective product information and 
training all the stakeholders in the supply chain. Dolan (2012) explains that 
this system creates the foundation for world-class operational performance 
and an “evergreen process of continual improvement” [Dolan (2012), Page 
26].   
 
Enhancing safety through preventative maintenance management of assets 
and operating integrity are at the heart of operational safety and resilience 
[Al-Harbi (2010)]. In the process industry especially in the oil and gas sector, 
the consideration of inherent safety comes from lowering the risks by 
designing safer plant. Risk is reduced progressively as the design 
progresses, even at the building and pre-commissioning phases risk studies 
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such as what is known as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) can 
further reduce risk. Overcoming the inevitable residual risk requires 
commitment from the leadership as engineering out risk usually incurs costs. 
Sustained leadership is required as the plant goes into the operational phase 
and later starts to age, bringing about new risks [Hinson, 2013]. 
 
In The Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) after various major incidents the senior 
management made changes namely: (1) Decentralize the HSE function to 
allow good on-site support; (2) Formation of asset teams; and (3) 
Involvement of the top management in the HSE tours – this went a long way 
in establishing accountability [Roy, 2010].  
 
In another case study of a GCC based Oil Company; - BAPCO uses multi-
level safety committees for the Refinery; Marketing; and Oil Fields Business 
Steering units which all report into the Executive Committee of BAPCO. The 
committee selected possessed credible; committed; open-minded; learning; 
optimistic and responsible members [Ahmed, 2008].  
 
To this end, the primary purpose of a Safety Committee is to develop safety 
accountabilities for all levels of our organization that will help eliminate 
injuries. The team must be led by a senior manager who must be able to 
cascade, volunteer and share and ultimately get people involved and 
empower them to show their leadership [Williamson, 2012]. A safety 
management system is vital [Khan, 2012]. 
 
Anderson (2008) notes that Senior Management’s role begins by setting the 
direction for a safety strategy in 6 fundamental steps: 
 
(1) Demonstrating safety is a core value vs. a priority; 
(2) Establishing clear and compelling safety vision; 
(3) Communicating consistently with a strong personal belief in safety; 
(4) Creating a working environment that encourages people to provide 
feedback; 
(5) Measure, communicate and reward progress in achieving the company 
safety vision; 
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(6) Display the courage to make difficult decisions needed when well 
performing managers violate safety. 
 
There is a strong link between Strategic Quality Management (or Business 
Excellence - BE) and leadership [Al Mowalad, 2012]. Roger et al (2009) 
identified 6 authentic leadership characteristics that impact on safety: (1) 
Authenticity; (2) Self-regulation; (3) Self-awareness; (4) Ethics/Morality; (5) 
Transparency; and (6) Balanced processing of being just and fair in not 
blaming people yet holding them accountable when appropriate. Executive 
Leadership’s role should include walk-around; tracking, attending safety 
committee meetings, and basically showing that they care [Sims, 2010]. 
 
Peters (2008) presented a Blue-print for safety transformation in which 
leadership is responsible for the: 
 
(1) Provision of a Safety Enabling System;  
(2) Organizational Culture; and  
(3) Organizational Sustaining Systems Leadership Qualities which includes: 
Inspiring Vision; Influencing; Challenging and Engaging; Looking for Best 
Practices to Implement ; Credibility; Action-Oriented; Communication; 
Collaboration; Feedback and Recognition and Accountability.  
 
He went on to explain the need for greater direct involvement of the safety 
specialist with direct leadership engagement. 
 
Management commitment is also needed in Project Management as there 
are issues of costs and schedules which create huge pressures on safety 
and performance [Al-Jaffar, 2010].  
 
In terms of top management commitment at Board level, Olive et al (2006) 
suggests that commitment comes in two ways; first of all the appreciation that 
investment in safety could not be treated in the conventional “rate of return” 
review and secondly as the “trickle-down effect” of the actual actions of the 
management, because employees do what they see the management do, 
rather than what they say. They also stress that free and open 
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communication was paramount in an effective safety culture, i.e. a culture 
where employees did not feel intimidated by negative retribution for reporting 
safety concerns.  
 
2.6 Legal and Regulatory Imperatives and Organizational Leadership  
 
As in other areas of the business, legal or regulatory compliance may drive 
organizational behaviour. The risk of not complying can have devastating 
impacts of the business as a whole. Therefore one of the key roles of the 
CEO and the BoD of an organization is, whilst remaining focused on 
commercial needs and growth, to act responsibly towards all stakeholders 
[IoD, 1999].  
 
All Health and Safety Law (i.e. the Health and Safety at Work Act 1975 
(HASWA-1975); UAE Labour Law 1980 and Ministerial Order 32 (1992) – 
UAE and the Singaporean Health and Safety Act (1997) etc. requires some 
degree of protection to employees’ health and safety. There is thus a clear 
legal binding expectation of organizations to protecting employees (in fact 
contractors, sub-contractors and the public at large are expected to be 
protected) from adverse health and safety impacts. In the UK for example 
that legal protection to all (including employer, employee, contractors and the 
public etc.) is provided through the HSAWA-1975. However, regardless of 
there being legislation with respect to health and safety, under international 
common law principles such as the duty of care, reasonable care and 
protection of all is expected from the employer. Even in emerging or less 
matured areas of the world employees are protected by the ILO conventions 
and common law principles.  
 
When we address the issue of organizational behaviour and the law, we start 
to understand the immense complexity that is created. Common law was 
created to govern the actions of individuals. As such when organizations act, 
one can presume that this is the action of an individual or otherwise 
collectively a group of individuals. In a long and very insightful discussion 
Metzer (1987) explains the major problem with the application of punishment 
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to corporations. He explains that under common and civil law the application 
of punitive damages for an organization’s wrong doing creates a dilemma. In 
most cases for a profit-making organization these costs are either eventually 
passed on to the consumer or otherwise borne by the shareholders who may 
have not had any control over the reasons for the omission in the first place. 
More critically in larger and very serious incidents where the damages can 
lead to corporate bankruptcy, the harm is to an even wider circle of innocents 
such as employees, creditors etc. and even the communities that rely on that 
business.  
 
Even with criminal corporate liability the problems are no less. Once again, 
the punishment is mostly financial and depending on the market conditions 
either the customer or the shareholders will end up paying. The underlying 
assumption is that organizations tend towards value-maximization and 
therefore try to spend a great deal of effort on limiting the financial impact 
upon them. However, the law is moving towards punishing senior managers 
responsible for the wrong-doing. Forlin (2011) explains that in the first case in 
the UK of a successful prosecution under the Corporate Manslaughter Act 
2007 (CMA-2007) where a young unsupervised worker died as a result of 
working in a pit which collapsed where the walls were not sufficiently 
supported for its depth, the managing director was charged with 
manslaughter with a suspended jail sentence only due to his ill-health. The 
company was fined 385,000 GBP which was 250% of its turnover and it 
inevitably went into liquidation.  In another case in July 2011 involving a Steel 
Factory in Manchester, using the CMA-2007 and the HASWA-1975 three 
company directors were charged with gross negligence, manslaughter and 
failing to provide a safe working condition for their workers.  
 
Grey (2006) outlines two dichotomous approaches to the management of 
legal non-compliance especially in occupational health and safety. The first is 
a school of thought that self-regulation is best, using legal punishment as a 
last resort. The second argues for more policing, enforcement and 
punishment in line with typical legal management of crime. The compliance 
scholars argue that those violating safety are different from common 
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criminals because, organizational employees (at all levels) engage with 
socially productive activities and therefore have the capacity to be socially 
responsible, unlike common criminals who are less inclined towards socially 
responsible behaviour. The enforcement scholars argue that violations take 
place less due to incompetence and more to do with weighing up the impact 
of non-compliance against economic gains and even incompetence in the 
workforce. The debate continues, but in both models the onus for 
occupational health and safety falls on both employees and employers.   
 
Another two recent significant developments have been; (1) “the 
internationalization of the law” and therefore even in the UK judges are 
starting to see that if international standards are grossly breached there is 
greater room for court action, and (2) greater professional liability is imposed 
on those who are advisors on risk such as EHS Managers and Consultants. 
Likewise failing to act on recommendations from risk assessments or health 
and safety advice exposes organizations and managers to serious liability if 
something goes wrong [Forlin & Smail, 2011]. For example, the US’s Federal 
Rule 404 explicitly excludes evidence of prior acts or occurrences to prove a 
person’s (including a company’s) character. In the case of the Deep Water 
Horizon oil spill, the prosecution wished to argue that BP’s past failures and 
its motives for failing to take costly steps to prevent the oil spill meant that the 
Deep-water Horizon Spill could not be considered an accident or mistake” 
[Brainich & Harris, 2012, Page 2]. The court did not allow the evidence but 
left open the possibility that such evidence would be admissible at a later 
stage of the trial [Brainich & Harris, 2012]. 
 
In terms of the law, organizations must generally be able to demonstrate that 
they have taken the correct and reasonable steps to prevent incidents. 
Therefore they should conduct a risk assessment sufficient to the appropriate 
level required to address the risk [e.g. HSE-1996 – Defining best practices 
etc]. The lack of compliance even to basic safety requirements such as 
breach of fire escapes can bring both civil and criminal liabilities on to 
organizations [Forlin, 2012]. For example, a survey of 164 Fleet Operators 
(employers) found 91% felt eye-tests for their drivers were important only 
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38% actually had a policy on eye-tests in place for their drivers [Roberts, 
2012]. Eye-tests are not mandatory, but in terms of liability, an organization 
responsible for the transport of dangerous goods would be held liable for 
both civil and criminal charges if a driver employed by them was involved in a 
major accident leading to multiple deaths and injuries if they could not prove 
the driver’s occupational fitness. Would failing to have a policy mean that the 
CEO/MD and Board would then also be liable? 
 
There are as yet few successful criminal prosecutions (in case law) of senior 
directors and CEOs or MDs, but developments in the law show the need for 
them to have greater involvement in tackling organizational EHS risks. 
 
The question of how staff more generally can be held responsible for EHS 
risks is an important one. Grey 2009, explains that although employers are 
the primary target of regulatory enforcement, in a neo-liberal sense health 
and safety responsibilities are equally shared between employers and their 
employees, but employees are in fact more responsible as they are closer to 
the risk. The “responsibilization” for safety by motivating workers to behave 
more safely and giving them greater empowerment to undertake tasks safely 
has corporate political problems associated with it. The trade unions have not 
favoured this as it puts greater onus on workers, alleviating the supervisors 
and other employer representatives from responsibility. In an immature 
organization and one where the workers are not knowledgeable enough, this 
may impact on productivity and it has to be appreciated that for both workers 
and supervisors compliance to safety norms and taking full responsibility is 
linked to a complex set of social and institutional relationship which are 
created through labour-market and workplace dynamics. 
 
Various Laws such as the Labour Law No. 8 of 1980 and various Ministerial 
Decisions in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may lead to prosecution of 
employers who fail to provide basic Health and Safety measures including 
preventative measures; first aid facilities and associated equipment; safe 
access and egress on to sites and industrial facilities; and suitable living 
accommodation, etc. The Environment, Health and Safety Laws in the UAE 
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are more far-reaching than many other laws with regards to jurisdiction in the 
sense that no particular area is exempted (except perhaps the armed forces 
in the Ministry of Interior) and as such even Free Zones which enjoy many 
exemptions from various regulations must comply with EHS laws and 
regulations [Kelly & Chicken, 2011].  
 
In the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (the capital of the UAE), the establishment of the 
EHS Centre borne from the Environment Agency in 2009, brought a Decree 
which launched the second version of the EHS Management System on 30th 
March 2012. This system, which covers all Sector Regulatory Authorities for 
Power and Water; Hospitality; Agriculture, etc. in Abu Dhabi, brings a 
common policy and manuals, and unifies terminologies. The elements help in 
the establishment of different regulatory instruments such as Codes of 
Practice, Standards and Trigger values and mechanisms. These processes, 
starting with transparent and effective reporting on incidents, will help with 
improve EHS performance [Kelly & Chicken, 2012].  
 
The State of Qatar published its National Development Strategy in March 
2011, emphasizing the need for a robust health, safety and environment 
(HSE) regime. In the same year the National Committee on Occupational 
Health and Safety (OHS) was formed which was to propose a national policy 
and system for OHS; devise and revise the OHS rules and regulations 
currently in force; and propose a mechanism for enforcing compliance. This 
led in May 2011 to a HSE Legal Framework document for the Oil and Gas 
Sector which brought together all the rules and regulations currently 
promulgated [Salt & Early, 2011].  
 
The Kingdom of Bahrain, established more than 15 years ago the Supreme 
Health and Safety Council to develop and harmonize many of the rules, 
regulations and practices. Its member’s representing, Industry, the 
Government and Non-Government Organizations. Independent members 
were included for their wealth of knowledge and expertise [Note 1: Meeting 
with MoL in Bahrain, March 2013, Manama, Bahrain].  
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In the Sultanate of Oman, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and State of Kuwait, 
many laws, rules and regulations have been developed although 
implementation is complicated by many regulations falling under different 
jurisdictions. Given developments in Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
consolidation of EHS rules and regulations is expected in the future.   
 
The increase in regulations brings clarity to the judicial (and penal) system 
when allocating blame, especially when employers failing to fulfil their duties 
under these codes. This will lead to more change. A good example is the 
UAE Fire and Life Safety Code 2011 which is being ratified by all the GCC 
States who may adopt it, is very much an interesting development. To this 
end, EHS laws and regulations may not be driving a real and serious change 
in Directors and CEO/MDs as yet, but with the increasing involvement of the 
public prosecutor’s office and judges the whole system is becoming more 
and more aware of the efforts that must be exerted to prevent incidents. This 
puts greater pressures on organizations and their leadership to establish 
preventative policies and strategies. Generally, one single piece of legislation 
does not cover all jurisdictions, but company duties and liabilities are often 
covered under common law, that is judge-established case law.  
 
Recent developments such as the Corporate Manslaughter Act (2009) in the 
UK are further developing liability issues and putting more emphasis on direct 
personnel liabilities of directors and managing directors. Antrobus (2013) 
gives a comprehensive review of the challenges in the implementation of the 
Corporate Manslaughter Act (2009) and explains that in law to charge a 
director under section 37 of the Health and Safety at Work Act (1975) and 
also Corporate Manslaughter Act (2009), the prosecution must prove that: 
 
(1) The defendant (Director) owed a duty of care to the deceased; 
(2) The defendant breached that duty; 
(3) The breach caused the death.  
 
In larger firm Directors are generally not directly involved in the business and 
proving the above is challenging. Thus most cases that have gone to trial so 
42 
 
far have been of smaller firms with executive directors who are more involved 
in the day-to-day operations. It may be extremely difficult therefore to 
prosecute Directors for gross negligence. Moreover, complying with 
regulations can be restrictive for a business, and there may be risks involved 
in what some regard as over-compliance. CEO/MDs themselves have 
expressed a wish to contribute by helping shape more risk-based or 
performance based regulations [Richardson, 2013]. An independent review 
of the state of H&S legislation in the UK suggests there is sufficient regulation 
in place and the challenge now is to enable businesses to reclaim ownership 
of the management of health and safety and see it as a vital part of the 
business rather than unnecessary bureaucracy [Lofstedt, 2011].  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter addressed in some length the historical developments of 
corporate governance. Changing socio-economic factors in the Arab World, 
Middle East and the GCC are significant and, compounded with globalisation, 
have brought about many changes in organisational development and 
workings.  
 
The demand for energy is increasing, there is a growing population and many 
of the large high risk/high reliability organisations are government owned 
entities. The importance generally of corporate governance globally has 
increased in the past 15-20 years and in more recent years corporate 
governance standards have recommended going beyond financial reporting 
to reporting the non-financial performance of organisations. With a fast 
changing world and greater complexities the function and effectiveness of the 
board of directors as a body has come under greater scrutiny.  
 
Organizational leaders’ role in defining and continually improving the safety 
and EHS culture is vital. Just, fair and transparent organisational cultures 
plays a very big role in ensuring better EHS cultures, and EHS in general 
should be led from the top.  
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The development of EHS management systems, operational excellence 
systems and overall the integration between organisational EHS 
management systems emphasises the importance of the management 
system as an effective tool to maintain and improve EHS performance. Legal 
and regulatory imperatives are increasing. One of the key roles of internal 
policies/standards of practice in an organization is that they help ensure 
compliance with statutory regulations. Whilst it may be debatable to what 
extent MDs/CEOs and Board Members are responsible for omissions of 
shop-floor employees, executive and board management must ensure 
appropriate policies, processes and procedures are in place to reduce risk 
and ensure compliance to both regulations and good practices from the 
industry. The following chapter explores the board’s leadership role and the 
relationship between the chairman and the CEO/MD.   
 
The impact of leadership on the performance of organizations and their 
sustainable growth is critical. Sustainability has become a central theme in 
organizations. Asbury and Ball (2009) give an excellent overview of the 
development of this aspect of sustainability focusing on the rise of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), which is discussed further in the next chapter, as 
an important component of organizational dynamics.  
 
Many negative impacts which are related to EHS they quote are habitat 
destruction, use of resources, waste generation, noise, local safety issues 
and other pollution issues. They explain how stakeholder expectations have 
started to set a tone for overt organizational behaviour and where other 
stakeholders other than shareholders have begun to have a greater impact. 
They identify 5 main types of stakeholder including (1) Customers; (2) 
Employees; (3) Suppliers and Contractors; (4) Shareholders and (5) Society 
at large. Of course within society non-government organizations (NGOs) 
have in more recent years played a very important role especially after 
certain environmental and safety incidents where significant damage like 
environmental pollution and or fatalities/injuries has occurred. 
 
In the next chapter, contemporary issues with EHS leadership are discussed. 
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Chapter 3: Contemporary Issues for EHS Leadership in 
Organisations 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The historical issues relating to the development of corporate governance, 
EHS leadership and EHS cultures and organisations were discussed in the 
last chapter along with the legal and regulatory imperatives for EHS. This 
chapter discusses the more contemporary issues that relate to EHS 
leadership and governance in organisations.  
 
This includes the relationship of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Social 
Accountability (SA) and sustainability with EHS. It addresses the 
effectiveness of the board of directors and their relationship with the CEO/MD 
in the context of EHS governance. Sections on organizational structure and 
effective safety communication in organisations and then a review of the risk 
perception, risk management and risk tolerance discussions and debates 
with enterprise risk management follow.  
 
The chapter concludes with a discussion which brings together the concepts 
and research discussed in both chapters 2 and 3, i.e. the body of literature 
review.  The conclusions are very important and it provides the 9 key themes 
which define the initial framework themes of the concepts that this research 
is built upon.  
 
3.2 Relationship of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Social 
Accountability (SA), Sustainability  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Social Accountability (SA) and 
Sustainability, all have a bearing on the integration of management systems, 
the positioning of organizations in the market and are interlinked in certain 
elements to EHS [Bibbings, 2008]. With CSR, the community work that 
organizations do to improve the safety and security of people’s lives within 
regions in which they operate is important. O’Connor & Young (2008), 
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explain that HSE are key business concerns which impact on costs and give 
a competitive edge – Risk Management as they see it sits on a foundation of 
commitment from the organisation’s corporate leaders. 
 
With social accountability standards, safety and security elements are 
fundamental in the very basic standards of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). Sustainability reporting relates to environmental 
protection and the safety of the greater environment and that of employees 
and public alike.   
 
In implementation of CSR and EHS systems getting employees engaged is 
very important. Employee engagement such as lower absenteeism 
(injury/illness rates are lower) explaining also that more than 50% of injuries 
that employees have are off work, thus engaging them and even their 
families in safety has immense benefits to the organization as well as society 
at large Al Hajri (2012).  
 
Voluntary reporting has increased in present years as organizations want to 
present themselves as good corporate citizens and charity must start at 
home – when protecting their own employees. There is significant literature in 
these areas which addresses the involvement of leadership and company 
boards in driving these initiatives, endorsing the reporting and enhancing 
transparency within their organizations, the industry and the general public. 
This is also becoming very important in the rapidly transforming context 
borne by the new socio-economic realities in the Middle East. 
 
The Safety and Health Sustainability Taskforce set up by the American 
Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) had developed a Safety and Health 
Sustainability Index (SHSI). This index was built on six key elements: 
Values: (1) Safety and Health Responsibility Commitment; (2) Codes of 
Business Conduct; Operational Excellence; (3) Integrated and Effective 
Safety and Health Management System; (4) Professional Safety and Health 
Competencies; and under Oversight and Transparency: (5) Senior 
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Leadership Oversight and Safety and Health and, (6) Transparent Reporting 
of Key Safety and Health Performance Indicators [ASSE, 2010]. 
 
The inception of the ISO 9001 Quality Management System Standard in the 
early 1990’s (which started as the British Standard BS 5750) followed by the 
ISO 14001 Environmental Management System (EMS) and OHSAS 18001 
Health & Safety Management System Standards have all brought about 
change in organizational behaviour towards self-driven compliance. These 
certifications, it may be argued, have given organizations an effective brand-
value proposition and marketing edge against their competitors – with their 
stakeholders more inclusively rather than just their shareholders. This 
perhaps reflects the appetite to invest and comply with a standard when an 
organisation feels it adds value from an external perspective.   
 
The “Rewarding Virtue” document recommended 6 areas in order to reinforce 
the UK’s Combined Code. These included (1) setting of clear values and 
standards by the leadership; (2) Thinking strategically about corporate 
responsibility; (3) Being constructive about regulation by being self-regulating 
and supporting the authorities; (4) Aligning performance management 
systems to encourage rewarding a more longer term out-look/behaviours 
rather than shorter term and narrow financial targets; (5) Creation of a culture 
of fairness and integrity in which the tone is set right at the top; and finally (6) 
Using internal controls to secure responsibility and thus through effective 
governance systems [HSE, 2006]. 
 
Kotler & Lee (2005) explain the shift that has taken place in the past 50-60 
years from an obligation to a strategy. The links between the profit making 
organizations and the more philanthropic ones has matured and emerged to 
become more symbiotic supporting the greater development of resources 
such as marketing, technical and employee volunteerism. This meant more 
personal involvement of the organization’s staff with support from their 
employers rather than just paying into NGO’s cash contributions.  
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Good companies continue to fail to do what is perceived to be the right thing. 
They fail to be able to clearly prevent things happening and things or 
situations deteriorating and Schwatrz and Gibb (1999) conclude their book 
“When good companies do bad things” with the following reasons why 
companies fail: 
 
(a) They fail to create a culture that tolerates dissent or one in which the 
planning processes are encouraged to take nonfinancial risks 
seriously; 
(b) They focus primarily on financial performance; 
(c) They discourage their employees to thinking about their work as whole 
people, from using their moral and social intelligence as well as their 
business intelligence; 
(d) They focus on people and organizations that think and behave the 
same way and avoid those who do not agree with them or criticize 
them.  
(e) They let their commitments to certain projects and products 
overwhelm all other considerations and decisions; be they financial, 
ethical or social etc.  
(f) The senior management consider social issues as those for others to 
have to worry about as this is not really part of their necessary 
operability and existence.   
 
The notion that such companies do not really have a long term view or vision 
in a social context and they expose themselves to more bad incidents 
occurring is evident. Firstly because their risk assessments are flawed, and 
secondly when there is a failure they have very little to show for doing 
anything to have effectively prevented it. As they must invest in emergency 
and crisis management they become classified as highly unreliable 
organizations. 
 
In discussion with a Senior Legal specialist (see Note 2 in references) of a 
firm in the GCC, the concept of the “doing good to look good” is at odds with 
the more prevalent culture in the GCC and Middle East. More rooted in a 
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tradition dated back to the Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) conduct; 
metaphorically describing the fact that the right hand should not know (what 
charity) the left hand has given. This means that it is quite a foreign concept 
in the Arab/Muslim world to over-advertise the kind of CSR /charitable work. 
The concept is of course that the reward is in the hereafter. 
 
In terms of environmental protection, social responsibility and EHS at work, 
these aspects have become of significant importance to corporations. Many 
organizations within the Oil and Gas sector, for example, will be very clear 
and vocal in their commitment to these issues. Maclagan (1998) explains that 
trust in organizations by all its stakeholders including the employees, 
customers and the public is essential for its longevity and sustainable 
existence and growth. This has led to the development of audit committees, 
codes of ethics and CSR-type policies etc. The value of corporate 
governance goes beyond control, in that it creates an environment of 
enterprise and best professional practice to extract the long term-value from 
a commercial enterprise [Bain & Band (1996)]. 
 
In 1997 a standard was issued (later updated in 2001) as a guide to 
companies in addressing worker rights. This was the Social Accountability 
Standard SA 8000 which was developed by Social Accountability 
International based in NY, USA [see SAI, 2012]. However, whilst the 
standard is novel as it is easily addressable within organizations it really 
distilled the main norms of the ILO’s conventions relating to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Convention of the Rights of a Child. 
The standard looks at issues from child labour, to forced labour, freedom of 
association and right to collective bargaining as well as EHS and working 
hours. It remains a voluntary standard but has driven many large 
organizations which operate and engage with businesses in third world 
countries to get them prequalified and continually compliant with certain basic 
SA standards. This prevents organizations being blamed for exploitation 
and/or even subsequently boycotted.  Epstein, 2008 explains that whilst the 
Global Compact has helped in shaping human rights expectations of 
employers it has had its fair share of criticism due to the failing or lack on 
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monitoring, accountability and enforcement. Perhaps one of the resources 
was that much of this drive has been overwhelming for organizations who 
wanted to comply as they understood the importance, but in all fairness 
perhaps did not expend enough effort in initiating/inducting (also sometimes 
called “on-boarding”) effectively all the leadership teams within these 
organizations, starting with the Board of Directors.  
 
When organizations address the issue of sustainability, it is critical to 
understand three key reasons; (1) Greater Environmental Awareness in the 
Public; (2) Greater Expectation from the Shareholder for the Board and 
Management of an organization to ensure long-term (sustained) value 
proposition and; (3) the significantly increased “customer power” in that the 
customer has a greater choice to go to the extent of boycotting a product or 
service. 
 
Bell and Morse (2008) explain that “Greening the Strategy” is essential for 
many organizations today. This means things including risk reduction, 
reducing environmental stresses and in turn the human vulnerability to 
environmental stress and in fact if not mitigated and controlled at source, 
risks in general impact greater on the societal and institutional capacity to 
respond to EHS challenges notwithstanding the ethical need for global 
stewardship. As such the creation of a quantitative value in the form of an 
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) was created several years ago. The 
index is perhaps more subjective although represents itself as an objective 
figure – its value lies in the awareness it brings about (especially to 
executives who frequently work with numbers), brings about some specific 
rationalization of a globally complex issue to digest, and at the very least can 
help if used effectively to get leadership in organizations to make better 
informed/aware objective judgments.  
 
These sentiments are also shared with Hart (2007) who talks of the new 
“sustainable global economy”. He proposes that organizational leadership 
may consider three stages of implementing a green strategy starting with 
pollution prevention; followed by product stewardship and looking at product 
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lifecycle impact; and then the investment in cleaner/environmentally 
sustainable technologies. This commands a longer term view-point on risks 
and opportunities, especially for organisations involved in manufacturing and 
production.  
 
The above is consistent with the growing notion of the shift from “traditional 
industrialism” to “natural capitalism” as described by Lovins et al (1999). A 
real financial value in optimization of resources with available technology 
improvements and the rising price of both raw materials and waste 
management/disposal means that Environmental Stewardship goes beyond 
doing the right thing – it makes business sense.   
 
In a thought provoking publication by Luikenaar and Spinley (2007), CSR, 
EHS, Sustainability and SA issues have led to the emergence of a new 
profession “the Chief Sustainability Officer”.  Significantly high level issues 
that organizations have to address and the pressures for change are driven 
by EHS, sustainability and the regulations which put greater vicarious liability 
on the organization. On the other hand there are good incentives to changes 
which include: enhanced brand image/reputation; decreased costs 
associated to insurance, losses and fines; a greater protection of assets; and 
increased efficiency in both plant and people. 
 
In conclusion, it would seem that matters that relate to the organisation 
behaving like a good citizen, showing that it is socially accountable and 
corporate social responsibility in general have a positive impact on EHS 
which is part of protecting people and the environment. This is true in 
developed and also developing economies. With greater globalisation of 
business in general around the world, it seems that the standards or better 
still the expectations for corporate social responsibility are also becoming 
very similar.  
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3.3 The Effective Board and its relationship with the CEO/MD of an 
organisation 
 
To understand more how effectiveness of EHS leadership is defined, the 
need to understand where EHS actually resides in policy, principles and 
mandates becomes critical. It is equally important to understand not only how 
the shareholders (and stakeholders) define these standards, but how they 
ensure that such individuals are prepared to take on such responsibilities. 
What are the competencies required for this? What is the knowledge they 
should have? This is especially important in the context of high risk/high 
reliability organizations.  
 
Whilst we see development of standards for Boards; perhaps what may have 
been a more ceremonial, prestigious and less functional role of the BoD in 
the not so distant past is fast changing. These changes included the 
structuring of the Board, the processes and behaviour; managing the board; 
the board role; and understanding the board’s role in corporate strategy and 
finally the corporate board and the law [HBR, 1981].  
 
Nicholson and Kiel (2004), explain that the concept of “independence” of the 
Board Director and its inevitable value to the corporation may be contested. 
They explain that the less independent but more experienced, 
knowledgeable and connected directors would be of greater value to the 
CEO/MD and the organization. Drawing on two studies [Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978) and Hung (1998)] they explain that the roles have changed over the 
last 20 years from being directors serving as a co-optive mechanism to 
access vital resources; as boundary spanners; and enhancing organizational 
legitimacy towards more linking the organization to the external environment; 
coordinating the interests of stakeholders; controlling the behaviour of 
management to ensure the organization achieves its objectives; strategy 
formulation; and so on.   
 
Millstein & MacAvoy (2003) propose strongly that the first step of reform in 
Corporate Governance was to separate the role of the CEO and Board 
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Chairman (where the Board Chairman is an independent Director). This is 
with respect especially to listed companies. They explain that independence 
is critical to the Board’s objectivity especially in three key areas: 
 
(a) To identify the issues it should focus on and the strategic issues of 
importance; 
(b) To obtain information that it needs to assess management 
performance – with respect to the chosen strategy which includes 
adherence to codes of conduct; 
(c) To ensure that the management’s efforts, as they put it, “obfuscate” 
important issues or information needed and thereby hindering the 
Board’s ability to fulfil its responsibilities, be effective as it should. 
 
Furthermore, in their “Intellectual Capital Model of the Board” model 
developed they define the 4 key Board Roles to include (1) Monitor and 
Control; (2) Access to Resources; (3) Strategizing and (4) Advice and 
Counsel [Nicholson and Kiel, 2004].  
 
This is consistent with Al Hashmi (2014)2 whose pilot study work determined 
that most managers saw the top 4 roles of the BOD to be (1) Vision, Mission 
and Strategy Setting; (2) Governance and Oversight (Financial & Non-
Financial); (3) Monitoring Company Performance - Internal Controls; (4) 
Business Continuity Planning and Monitoring. The differences seem to be 
more supportive role in the Western context as opposed to a more 
governance and oversight role in the more Middle Eastern context. This is an 
issue which is developed and explored further in this thesis research.  
 
Heidrick & Struggles (2010) see a central and pivotal role of the Chairman. 
The Chairman’s role has changed to become one subject to greater scrutiny 
from stakeholders. Shifting from a prestigious, yet gentle way to complete a 
successful business career to a more involved, engaged, empowering and 
highly critical leadership role. Chairmen need to provide strategic counsel to 
the CEO and encourage Board Members to engage in productive critical 
discussions. They need to develop that dynamic partnership between the 
53 
 
CEO (and management team) and the BoD. They need to develop a strong 
talent bench ensuring that the senior executive team are working effectively 
with the CEO and enabling them and in time also mentoring them or ensuring 
that the right environment exists to develop the executives (and non-
executives) of the future.  They need to exercise authority with empathy 
recognizing the governance is as much about people as it is about process.  
 
Finally one very important skill of the Chairman is to command respect to 
ensure that an effective balance of collective Board strength and prevailing 
executive culture. Naturally executives will concentrate on areas of 
opportunities to improve performance in their own areas and careers, the 
Chairman needs to ensure that the Board maintains an effective long-term 
analysis view on such actions and not get too close to the operational details 
that they obscure their objectivity.  
 
If some view the CEO as the “Chief Risk Officer” then the Chairman can be 
considered the “Chief Risk Governor” for the organizations. More recent 
thinking as suggested by Favro (2011) is for CEOs to work with a Board 
regardless of structure as a strategic partner. Bauer & Schmidt (2008) 
explain that when reviewing literature on the strategic role of Boards, at times 
inconsistent resource allocation creates the role conflicts between Board 
Members and Executive Leadership and this can have a significant impact of 
an impaired view/judgment on strategy implementation. This is because there 
is no validation of action against strategy and this can lead to a greater issue 
of a longer term value-proposition of the organization. This is particularly 
significant when resources in terms of manpower and finances are required 
for improvements that relate to EHS which can be in many cases business 
continuity/risk management related and require the commitment of the 
leadership teams both at the Board and Executive levels.  
 
Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2007) identify 9 different demographic factors that 
affect role pursuit. They include the distinctly personal and idiosyncratic 
approach towards chairmanship. Interestingly here Chairmen focus on Board 
dynamics and affairs and leave the enterprise matters to the CEO. Another 
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factor is accountability spread in which the differences between UK and 
US/Australian companies are mainly accountable for Board performance vis-
à-vis accountability for Board and company performance. They admitted that 
all persons interviewed explained that the role of the lead independent 
director (LID) or senior independent director (SID) was relatively too new to 
the Board concepts in the USA and UK respectively. Many agreed that their 
existence did help balance Board dynamics especially those relating to the 
tension on certain issues between the Board and the Executive Team due to 
their independence. This is important in the context of critical risk 
management issue-related decisions which can become quite subjective and 
require a well facilitated debate.  
 
The study concluded that the CEO/Chairman relationship remained the 
single most important determining factor that ultimately impacted on the 
performance of the Board and Company.   
 
In terms of Board effectiveness there are four types/levels suggested by 
Gwin & Vavrek (2011) – the “Basic Board” which satisfies the minimum 
requirements for governance and compliance. They ensure the 
implementation of key Board processes. The second type is the “Developed 
Board” which goes beyond governance and compliance and develops the 
more forward looking philosophy which develops the member’s 
competencies and capabilities and ensures alignment with company strategic 
objectives. The third type is the “Advanced Board” which additionally looks at 
High Performance and has members with not only a forward thinking outlook, 
but those who have a better global mind-set and operate within the global 
networks. These boards have generally higher levels of emotional 
intelligence, greater organizational strategic engagement and ERM. 
 
There is a significant step change from the second to third type as the 
behavioural leadership development and diversity of exposure of individuals 
is required. In the fourth type, a “World Class Board” encapsulates the traits 
of governance, compliance, forward looking and high performance only that 
they also have a Board with a breadth of insights, depth of knowledge, 
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diversity of ideas, and strength of processes and ultimately they create 
greater sustainable shareholder value. This Board is very rare and both at an 
individual and collective level are able to add great synergetic value to the 
CEO, the Executive Team and the whole organization – especially with their 
insightfulness and continual improvement. 
 
Ultimately “A Board should possess enough collective knowledge and 
experience to promote a Board perspective, open dialogue, and useful 
insights regarding risk” Delloitte (2011) Page 4 explains.  
  
Heidrick & Struggles (2009) suggest that the average number of members in 
a typical British Board is 8; in France is 14; in Germany it is 19 and the 
average membership in the GCC has shifted from an average of 8 in 2009 to 
9 in 2011. In the GCC the shift from 2009-2011 has gone from 46% to about 
65% respectively.  In an extensive benchmarking board study undertaken on 
the Oil and Gas Sector by PWC (2010), they noted that between International 
Oil Companies (IOC) and National Oil Companies (NOC) the Boards varied 
in size ranging from 9 to 15 and the range of finance specialists on Boards 
ranged from 15 to 40% whereas industry experts ranged from 10 to 50% with 
the higher number of industry experts in the NOCs which is interesting. IOCs 
had in general a greater number of independent directors appointed as 
opposed to Institutional or Government appointed Directors.  
 
An important balance is required as whilst the independent (i.e. non-
executive director and one who has not been appointed by a partner in a joint 
venture or private joint stock company) brings in a “less-biased” view, a level 
of harmony is required between Board directors who should all bring different 
perspectives based on their experience, specialist knowledge and market 
views are they global or local. 
 
It is highly recommended however, that at least two members of the Board 
are executives and this is generally the CEO and the CFO. This ensures a 
greater connection between the business operations and the strategy 
development and is referred to as the “Mixed Board” [Heidrick & Struggles, 
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2011]. It would follow that high risk/high reliability organizations should 
consider having Boards with a sound understanding of operational risk 
management.  
 
Boards have a very complex role of being simultaneously entrepreneurial and 
exercising prudent control; sufficiently knowledgeable about the business 
whilst standing back from the day-to-day workings in order to retain an 
objective and long term view; sensitive to the short-term pressures whilst 
being informed on the longer-term implications; knowledgeable of the local 
issues whilst maintain clear understanding of the more international aspects; 
and focusing on the financial performance whilst acting responsibly towards 
all stakeholders [IoD, 1999].  
 
As such a certain degree of care and diligence is expected from all directors 
who must carry out their functions with reasonable skill, care, diligence and 
they may be liable if they are negligent and higher standard of performance is 
required of a director who may possess particular skills or professional 
qualifications. 
 
It is good practice for boards to have clearly stated in the Memorandum 
and/or Articles of Association (MoA) and/or (AoA) the powers of the board 
directors and the chairman. This is important as this is where executive and 
non-executive roles may overlap. The CEO should be allowed to 
demonstrate their leadership and management whilst the board should be 
able to “interfere” should they feel this is part of the prudent corporate control. 
Whilst many examples may be cited especially when it comes to financial 
decisions, our focus in this thesis is more on the operational and non-
financial performance of organizations.  
 
In defining the “new energy executive”, Csorba (2010) explains that 
executives especially in the high risk energy industry (oil and gas etc.) must: 
 
(1) Be effective Risk Managers; 
57 
 
(2) Develop integrated decision making skills with a balanced approach to 
operational, financial and EHS decisions; 
(3) Be Accountable and self-effacing like any leader who must accept 
responsibility – to see leadership as a responsibility rather than a 
privilege. Leaders at both CEO/MD and Board Level must accept 
accountability for things when they go wrong; 
(4) They must be authentic communicators, and this includes being 
honest, transparent and clear in their communication.  
(5) Be involved and committed to continuous people improvement and 
continuous development and improvement comes with a culture 
developed within an organization driven by the people at all levels.  
(6) Poses high levels of Emotional Intelligence and this is important in 
dealing with people with sensitivity and empathy.  
 
Interestingly, Walaski (2012) explains that communication during and after a 
crisis is an important skill of spokespersons, HSE professionals and very 
senior managers and explains by using the Deep-water Horizon case study. 
The ability of leadership to stand before tribunals after an incident emphasis 
the point that leadership must be ready to answer questions otherwise they 
will fail, and this will have implications not only on them or their organizations, 
but surely as was seen with the BP incident an impact on the whole industry. 
In a personnel discussion with a senior director of a major upstream (see 
Note 3 references) operation based out of India, the delay in the 
commissioning of deep-water upstream exploration was more than 16 
months when the Sir Lankan Government withdrew their approval to operate 
until, this organization was able to re-assess independently and re-submit 
updated risk assessment studies in the wake of the Deep-water Horizon 
incident and the losses this caused were in many Millions of Dollars.   
 
Integrating the governance, risk, and compliance functions to align with 
business objectives and drive efficiencies is a critical success factor of 
modern organizational leadership [PWC, 2005]. More is discussed under the 
section on Risk Management, but it is critical to note that whilst the process 
of integration may seem straight forward and simple, getting the functional 
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heads and all these departments to work with each other must be something 
that is driven from the Board.  The reasons for this are some of these 
committees work directly with the Board and whilst the functions report 
operationally to the executive management, they functionally report to the 
Board.  
 
3.4 Organizational Structure and Effective Safety Communication  
 
 
In this section, the author explores organizational structures and how they 
can have a direct bearing on how safety is managed and led within an 
organization. Communication is a crucial aspect of informing, reporting, 
monitoring and eventually engaging leadership in supporting initiatives and 
change as and when needed to control risks which can arise.  
 
Safety must be managed throughout the organization and led from the top 
where strategic risk reviews must be undertaken of all the operations 
involving the leadership team and preferably involving the Board Directors 
[MacLean and Row, 2001]. Defining the key EHS responsibilities and 
accountabilities within the corporation is critical. The role of the EHS 
managers/advisors must be defined. They are responsible in the context of 
high risk/high reliability organizations to help manage risks in such a way that 
they bring sustainability to the business.  
 
The impact of major incidents due to lack of any safety controls of for 
example intoxicated workers on the site of plants in the late 1800’s and early 
1900’s, drove DuPont for example to develop better safety regulations.  
Enhanced safety provision has arisen from improvements in the past 50 
years to both physical (technology related) and procedural methods. This 
was further enhanced throughout the industry through effective sharing of 
incident investigation findings within the industry [Freibott, 2012].  
 
However, many of the employees surviving the blow-out incident in the Deep-
water Horizon incident with BP indicated that management routinely 
dismissed warnings and documented procedures to hasten making the well 
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productive. So it was an unsafe company culture which developed [Sullivan, 
2010].  
 
Katoty (2012), explains that the EHS Data is very important to collect and 
analyse in organizations, and that organizations must use this information to 
make improvements.  These collect both passive and active, leading and 
lagging key performance indicator (KPI) related activities and data. Industry 
must be able to effectively measure, monitor and control. That is why KPI 
reporting is one of the best EHS communication methods and helps senior 
leadership make decisions [Travers, 2012]. EHS KPI summarized data 
reports with trends go to the BoD of all major high risk/high reliability 
organizations.  
 
Good EHS performance is attributed to this a particular practice or initiative 
from the management team [Freibott (2010)]. To balance between leading 
and lagging indicators is important; building the KPI system on the basis of 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) or the Balanced Score Card (BSC) 
integrated management systems and making it part of the business 
management systems and intelligence rather than a standalone system 
[O’Connor et al (2), 2010]. 
 
In the Eastern Petrochemical Company (located in Saudi Arabia), EHS 
performance is a key performance measure of the organizational 
performance. Senior Managers are held accountable for safety performance 
as any incident is caused by a lack of effective risk management and control. 
[Al Fardan, 2008]. 
 
Moore (2008) notes that using the Centre for Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS) definitions explains the differences between the Lagging - 
retrospective metrics – based on incidents that meet a threshold of severity 
that should be reported; and Leading - A forward looking set of metrics which 
indicates performance of the key work processes, operating discipline, and 
layers of protection that prevent incidents.  In the Baker Panel 
recommendations an improvement in the PSM in all industries with 
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benchmarking was a fundamental improvement requirement [Baker et al, 
2007]. 
 
Reporting EHS performance can be a contentious issue for managers. 
Whitaker (2007) explains the importance of the reporting lines and structures 
within organizations when it comes to EHS managers. EHS managers must 
also try to acquire the right business acumen in order to better present data 
and information in such a way that management be it operational or 
executive better relate EHS to the business itself. He tackles the issue of 
reporting of EHS within an organization and discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of centralization, decentralization, and hybridization as well as 
matrix organizations. His emphasis is on that models work best depending on 
the organizational structure, size and locations of operating sites. The 
importance of EHS reporting to the highest authority within an organization to 
ensure the right information is sent up in a timely manner is reconfirmed. 
 
McLean (2003) stresses that practitioner’s must report to the organizational 
leaders. This is not only so that he may help in directly implementing their 
said commitments but also as this reporting line in itself demonstrates to 
everyone with the organization that this position is a senior one, carrying 
equal importance to all the other operational, technical and financial 
functions.  
 
Risk management governance frameworks for national O&G industry should 
be a management process whilst HSE is a business support function 
requiring the involvement of committees to help direct efforts effectively 
within an organization [Booz & Co, 2010].  
 
Finally on the matter of effectively communicating the safety message 
Bibbings (2003), explains that the EHS practitioner has a key role is this and 
that practitioners must be able to do this with visual and organizationally felt 
support. Therefore leaders in organisations must be seen and heard 
supporting EHS. Moreover, the BoD must monitor the performance of an 
organization in every way. This includes EHS performance as the impact on 
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sustainability of the business, reputation, assets and most importantly people 
can be very high. 
 
3.5 Risk Perception, Risk Management and Risk Tolerance  
 
In this section probably one of the most significant areas to be explored, is 
risk management. The literature has a significant abundance of studies and 
articles that talk about risk and the role of risk management in organizations. 
The definition of risk and risk control is important to establish. Equally as 
important is the very understanding and appreciation of how risk perception 
at the senior management and leadership levels can impact on the type, 
quality and speed of decision-making in high risk/high reliability 
organizations. The concept of loss prevention, loss control in the context of 
the wider Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) will be explored. 
 
The management of risk concerns itself with the prevention of loss, 
preventing being negatively impacted by issuance of enforcement, 
improvement or prohibition notices from the ‘local authority having 
jurisdiction’ for health and safety. It also helps avoid punitive action in which 
both civil and criminal courts may impose fines and compensation claims, 
and imprisonment for breaches of legal duties respectively and which can 
affect companies or individuals and thus their operations and reputation 
[Lukic et al, 2010]. Riaz-ul-Hassan (2012) makes reference to the Deep-
water case study and says: “Better management of decision-making 
processes within BP and other companies, better communication within and 
between BP and its contractors and effective training of key engineering and 
rig personnel would have prevented the Macondo incident”. [Riaz-ul-Hassan, 
2012, Page 83]. 
 
A cost value analysis of safety incidents must be studied by the senior 
management. This was based on a study that was undertaken under Board 
guidance for a high risk chemical company which used quantitative loss 
evaluation methods to manage risks [Bardy et al, 2008]. 
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Mandel (2012) talks of the stages of the development of management of risk 
in organizations, and argues that over time the value of risk management has 
been mainly driven by the changing business needs perspective from 
financial to operational to management to strategic. He offers an explanation 
which has been summarized in the table below. 
 
Table 3.1: Corporate Enterprise Risk Management  
Perspective Corporate 
Value 
Focus Scope Type of Risk 
Management 
Financial Low Hazard and 
Casualty 
Risks 
Risk Transfer, 
Insurance, Loss 
Prevention or 
Mitigation of Insured 
Risks 
Defensive 
Operational 
Management 
Medium Individual 
Business 
Risks 
Mitigation of 
controllable risks 
and management of 
risk as an expense 
Advanced 
Strategic 
Management 
High Strategic 
and 
Operational 
Risks 
Support Business 
Objectives, 
Consistent, 
Systematic Risk 
Management 
Practices and Risk 
as a Differentiator 
Enterprise 
  
Risk Management is one of the primary responsibilities of Directors and as 
such they are required to provide leadership within the framework of prudent 
and effective controls which enable risk to be assessed and managed. The 
Combined Code states: “Are the significant internal and external operational, 
financial, compliance and other risks identified and assessed on an on-going 
basis? (Significant risks may, for example, include those related to market, 
credit, liquidity, technological, legal, health, safety and environmental, 
reputation, and business probity issues” [HSE, 2006, Page 10]. By leading 
through setting the strategic direction; setting values and standards of 
business conduct and objectives; holding management accountable for 
actions; upholding obligations to all stakeholders and by overseeing the 
internal controls and assessing their effectiveness.  
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To define risk firstly in some context Mandel (2012) defines strategic risk as 
“those internal or external uncertainties, whether event to trend driven, which 
impact an organization’s strategies and or the implementation of its 
strategies” [Mandel, 2012, Page 11]. An example of dealing with external 
risks would be if security risk to installations is considered, in general high 
risk operations are well-security managed to ensure they control any kinds of 
imported risks. Gregory (2011) discusses the issue of the changing face of 
security in becoming more integrated as part of the installation enterprise 
safety management system. He argues that this is also being demanded by 
many insurers of risk who end up carrying the burden of organizationally 
transferred risk.  
 
Cavanagh et al (2008), showed through using a multi-variable frequency 
analysis of different HSE incidents and prove cost control can be achieved by 
better HSE risk management, thus good safety equals good business.  
 
In reference to one of the widely used Risk Management (RM) standards 
across the industry today, Newbery (2012) explains that is a structured 
process to manage risks arising from operations include environment, health, 
safety, quality and security, financial as well as reputational.  He goes on to 
explain that the ISO 31000 International RM Guidelines and tries to address 
the question “Is the level of risk acceptable, and does it require further 
considerations and actions?” This raises issues relating to uncertainty and 
risk appetite. He also explains that RM must be integrated within the 
organizational management systems and built on continual improvement and 
dynamic reviews. Clarke (2010) on the other hand explained in detail the 
concept of “As low and reasonably practicable – or ALARP” as the way that 
many organizations today deal with rationalizing their risk appetite decisions.  
 
Dufort (2013)1 makes a compelling case for risk governance at the board 
level and explains that Directors have to be concerned about risk which 
include the fiduciary duties; contribution to an organization’s strategy; 
constructively challenging management’s proposals; due diligence and risk 
awareness; and so on. He goes on to explain that there are five key oversight 
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responsibilities which are common to many of the leading corporate 
governance codes. These are summarized in the 3.2 below: 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of Directors Risk Oversight Responsibilities 
No Theme Action 
1 Strategy Approve strategic planning processes and the 
organizations strategic plan which includes 
sustainability of operations, opportunities and risks. 
2 Risk 
Management 
Review and approve the main risks associated with 
the organization’s activities.  
3 Compliance Ensure that processes and systems exist and are 
being implemented to manage those risks – including 
systems of internal control.  
4 Processes Define at a high level and approve processes in which 
the BoD or one of its committees evaluates the 
company’s main risks (periodically).  
5 Structures Review and approve organization’s structures and 
processes to manage both existing and emerging 
risks.  
 
Trends show that Boards are moving toward the following best practices 
when it comes to risk management [Dufort, 20132]: 
 
Table 3.3: Risk Management – Emerging Best Practices 
No. Best Practice Action Description  
1 Risk Appetite Develop a risk appetite statement (developed by 
the executive management and approved by the 
board) and expresses the attitude of the 
organization towards risk-taking and at times 
setting lower and upper limits.  
2 Risk Culture As studies have shown that catastrophic losses 
have arisen from a lack of risk management, a 
culture which pays little attention, tolerates or 
worst encourages risk talking behaviour. A 
culture of risk management needs to be set and 
this has to be set by both the Executive and BoD 
and this needs to percolate throughout the 
organization.  
3 Risk Committee Many best practice codes has required that 
Boards set up Audit (and Risk) Committees. Risk 
committees looking more holistically at internal 
and external risks and involving a wider base of 
professionals is where newer risk management 
guidelines are moving.   
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No. Best Practice Action Description  
4 Chief Risk Officer In especially large and more complex 
organizations, the role of a chief risk officer with a 
direct reporting to the CEO and access to the 
Board is where larger, more progressive and 
higher reliability organizations have been moving.  
5 Internal Audit 
Function 
A separation of the Risk and Audit has become 
more accepted. Even between these two 
functions due to the invertible internal/external 
focus which develops a possible conflict of 
interest may arise and thus these functions in 
more complex and progressive organizations 
have been physically separated.  
 
O’Conner (2010) defines ERM as: “A Process, affected by an entity’s Board 
of Directors, Management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect 
the entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives” 
[O’Conner (2010), Page 46]. 
 
In another definition by Delliote (2008), Page 12: “ERM is an enabler of risk 
intelligence, and its true value may lie in its ability to enable a systematic 
identification of possible causes of failure – failure to protect existing assets 
and failure to achieve future growth, i.e. manage both rewarded and 
unrewarded risk. Unrewarded risks are typically associated with lack of 
integrity in financial reporting, non-compliance with laws and regulations, and 
operational failures – i.e. there is no premium to be obtained for taking these 
types of risks. Rewarded risks are those that typically have to do with 
strategy and its execution”. Whilst this may be true, it must also be equally 
appreciated that it is not always easy to differentiate between them as they 
are at times interconnected. To give an example, an overall strategy to 
reduce cost of maintenance, may lead to a rapid deterioration of integrity and 
thus lead to a serious incident that cripples an operation.  
 
Yousif (2010) explains that between 2008 and 2010 economies were in the 
midst of a global financial crisis, organizations started looking more closely at 
66 
 
enterprise risk management. In fact quoting a study undertaken by Delloite, 
he explains that the top three risks facing the energy sector (i.e. power and 
utility; system operators and oil and gas) in the Middle East included 
Regulatory Risks; Asset Performance (Integrity); Operating Integrity; 
Business Continuity and People/Talent. Whilst these are not EHS risk directly 
they can have both a direct and indirect impact on EHS.  
 
The Jaipur October 2009 fire incident in India killed 11 people, injured 
another 45 and destroyed the Oil Storage Terminal and damaged properties 
up to 2 km away. The incident was a result of a routine operation. Six major 
recommendations to the management committee of the Indian Oil 
Corporation were made which included in-depth Board level reviews on a 
quarterly basis focusing on safety in the different sections within the 
organizations with a primary focus on risks and mitigation measures. It also 
recommended that the executive management at the Group’s level undertake 
at least 2 inspections of every major installation with in their areas of 
responsibilities per annum to look at risk control measures and emergency 
response preparedness and report this back to the CEO. Major safety 
reviews and audit findings must be personally reviewed by the CEO [IOC, 
2010].  
 
Cavanagh et al (2) (2008) recommended that higher management’s outlook 
to managing plant life-cycle risk must integrate with both the EHS risk profile 
the organisation’s investment portfolio and must address the supply chain 
impacts. Running scenarios and looking at the risk more holistically as a 
model rather than just the plant risk.  
 
Risk can be extremely subjective and must be considered in a wider context 
of environment, people, organization and cost-benefit analysis [Iskandar, 
2010]. Al Nakib & Jackson (2008) explain that in a case study in upstream 
O&G operations the HSE Philosophy was built on various drivers of which 
the first is to identify the high risk areas.  The main driver for the executive 
management team was to bring about a consistent review process focusing 
on the high risk areas in a performance-based approach. 
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McKinnon (2012) explains that in the domino theory, the causality between 
underlying factors and the sequence of events is governed by good 
management system practices to control loss. However, Bibbings (2001) 
maintains that the future of Boards will mean expectation for greater 
competency to give stakeholders “Control Assurance”.  
 
In a Global Risks 2012 report issued by the WEF’s Insight report, it 
concludes that leadership at both a national and organizational level need to 
improve the real and perceived risks within the industries with respect to 
public safety and in the tools of communication. Another critical 
recommendation is that transparency needs to improve in such a way that 
sharing information on risks must be improved to in turn improve public 
perception of the risk – i.e. give them better understanding. Many of the risks 
discussed in the report are macro such as the impact of global climatic 
changes etc. Whilst these are very high level risks and little can be done at 
an organizational level, whatever little can be done should be done and at the 
very least Directors and Executives of organizations need to understand 
them better in this ever-fast globalizing world. 
 
Delliote (2008) defines 6 major areas of risk management which must be 
considered by major organizations which include: 
 
(1) Defining the Board’s risk overview; 
(2) Fostering a risk intelligent culture; 
(3) Integration and incorporation of risk intelligence into strategy; 
(4) Defining the risk appetite; 
(5) Executing the risk intelligence governance processes; and 
(6) Benchmarking and evaluating the governance processes. 
 
They argue that these 6 areas of focus would reflect the view that risk taking 
for reward and growth is as important as risk mitigation to protect current 
assets and operations. Once this becomes part of the considerations always 
looked at in the decision making processes by Boards, generally a more risk 
averse strategy. This in turn will effectively ensure more a sustainable and 
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robust business model for any high risk organization following that as such 
this would in-build effectively reliability in the strategy.  
 
Because the more complex organizations have interconnected processes 
whilst an operational risk may be credible and accepted by a Board, such as 
a fire in a plant – the magnitude of the impact of the direct damages is by far 
less than the implications of the stoppage of operations and the 
repercussions on the supply chain and business continuity. The Buncifield Oil 
Storage facility (UK) is a great example where in 2005 it was completely 
incapacitated after an explosion/fire and which took 7 days to control with 
immense environmental damage. The terminal supplied 25-30% Heathrow 
Airport, Jet Fuel (the busiest international airport in the world) and when 
those supplies were interrupted there were serious operational and financial 
implications to Heathrow [MIIB, Report No. 3, 2007].  
 
According to O’Dwyer (2013) – National Oil Companies (NOC) survey 
results, one of the top three risks along with political instability and rising 
operating costs are the environmental (EHS) risks and concerns according to 
NOCs, International Oil Companies (IOC) and Independents. The oil service 
companies also see EHS as a top-three risk.   
 
3.6 Summary  
 
The GCC states require a good and solid framework going forward for good 
EHS practice and governance. This is particularly important with fast 
changing socio-economic drivers where the region’s economy relies heavily 
on high risk/high reliability businesses. This thesis will contribute to that 
framework. 
 
The BDI-GCC as discussed in section 2.1 was established to develop and 
improve and influence the standard of Boards in the GCC. Whilst they have 
not really looked at EHS issues to date, they have in their programs 
addressed both financial and non-financial performance review and 
management. Their program also focuses on highlighting the legal and 
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fiduciary duties that boards carry and some of the aspects discussed in 
section 2.6 on the legal imperatives for EHS.  
 
The developments in corporate governance have become more profound 
with the economic challenges that have been faced in many parts of the 
world. This serious sense of ineffective corporate governance and control 
specifically in the context of financial issues has driven a transition from 
management system control philosophy in EHS to more HRO development, 
stewardship and engaged leadership. 
 
Much of the recent work on HROs has highlighted the importance of a more 
engaged leadership role in organizations. Many of the new corporate 
governance standards especially those highlighted by the IoD, UK-HSE and 
OECD have started to talk seriously about EHS risk management in a more 
pronounced and overt fashion emphasizing the need for leadership both at 
the executive and board level to play that engaged role. Whilst much of this 
development has been from a Western context these frameworks with 
respect to the legal context influenced many internationally based corporates 
working in the GCC area. These corporates have a direct influence on 
Boards, especially in the joint venture (JV) and joint stock companies of 
which many energy and energy related companies such as the Abu Dhabi 
National Oil Company (ADNOC) which has various shareholdings with Oil 
Majors in their different production subsidiaries, Tatweer (a JV between the 
Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain, Oxy and Mubadallah from the UAE), 
ASRY (A Major Heavy Construction JV involving 5 different Arab States) and 
there are many similar examples with large high-risk operation companies in 
the GCC region.   
 
In that sense the EHS leadership research and that relating to safety culture 
development in organizations continues to really drive this point very 
strongly, going to the extent in saying there cannot be a real effective control 
and development in an organization without the serious leadership 
involvement and engagement. Boards have to get involved in monitoring and 
managing EHS risks. To this end leading from the top and achieving a 
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company-wide buy-in and understanding process safety management (PSM) 
will decrease future financial liabilities [Fowler, 2011].  
 
The role of the Board Chairman as a chief risk governor and the CEO/MD 
playing the role of a chief risk officer has become more pronounced with 
corporate governance codes of practice. The relationship between these 
positions is important and the board members’ competence and board 
structure all play a role. There is very little in the way of corporate 
governance and EHS leadership/EHS management systems combined 
reviews and published papers. There are a few anchor references which 
have been discussed in this chapter such as the joint HSE-IoD and the 
OECD publications. As discussed in sections 1.5 and 2.2 their review is very 
much part of the fiduciary duties regardless where the enterprise actually 
physically operates.  
 
In saying this there is evidence that in more progressive companies in recent 
(best practice) research to trade experience with expertise when recruiting 
new board members [PWC, 2010]. This includes those who understand 
global environmental challenges, social responsibility and sustainability.  
 
The legal and regulatory imperatives and the more recent developments in 
taking persons in senior organizational roles and even boards to task is 
extremely insightful and will help shape a more informed leadership in the 
future. What must be explored further is to what extent have these 
developments brought about changes in the corporate leadership’s approach 
to wanting to understand more. In the GCC there are also interesting and 
rapid developments towards greater regulation and establishing of 
accountabilities. As discussed in section 2.6 the laws and regulations in the 
GCC with respect to EHS are becoming more structured and prescriptive to 
address EHS particularly from the perspective of the requirements for 
organisations to establish management systems.  
 
With increasing numbers of global cases being tried the degree of 
foreseeability in the industry which will in the future be put to the test. 
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Organizations will have to argue that the best practices they instituted are in 
fact so, and that they have learnt from other global incidents. Furthermore, as 
the lawmakers and jurists are learning more about the semi-technical 
concepts of risk management; boards and executives failing to demonstrate 
that they have been diligent in preventing losses will subsequently become 
more prone to potential liabilities both as organizations and as individuals.  
 
From becoming more green to demonstrating their responsibility as socially 
responsible organizations towards their employees, contractors and the 
society at large, organizations are having to play a proactive role in 
presenting themselves in that positive light [Phyper & MacLean, 2009]. 
Having EHS incidents where lives are lost, significant damage to the 
environment is caused or otherwise is very damaging to the bottom line and 
shareholder value. Moreover, the expectation from leadership to step up to 
the plate and expectations to demonstrate what they did to prevent 
something like this from happening is now for them a fact of life.  
 
In this chapter, the author also discussed communication, of being informed 
and the importance of effective reporting lines. The role of the EHS 
practitioner has changed from the discipline engineer or practitioner to an 
important technical risks’ advisor to the leadership be they executive 
managers or directors. Their role in prevention cannot be overstated given 
their knowledge and specialist expertise.  
 
Whilst this chapter concluded with a section on the research relating to risk 
management, it is clear from the research evidence that the concepts of ERM 
have become the new way that boards and executive leadership are able to 
manage risks which have been established to being some of the more 
serious in high risk/high reliability industry.  
 
Dufort (2013)2 explains that ultimately risks are an essential part of doing 
business and setting the appetite for risk and risk control strategies will help 
ensure organizations meet their objectives. To add value however, 
companies must go beyond compliance and look at how risks can be 
72 
 
integrated into every significant decision – the creation and dissemination of 
a sound risk culture. Thus be aware of risk and leverage it correctly. No 
doubt also that the BoD member must be a strategist as well as a 
constructive challenger aware of his/her fiduciary and higher organizational 
interests. They should be “competent” enough to understand the kind of EHS 
risks to add value to an overviewing of an organization’s performance over 
time in order to deliver a sustained business operation.  
 
Serious and systemic consideration of risks was of equal importance to the 
drive towards increasing performance and in general good governance. The 
role of the audit committee should be separated from that of the role of the 
risk committee which should have a different approach to looking more at 
Enterprise Risk Management and focus outwards (externally) on emerging 
and dynamic risks rather than the internal risks of non-compliance Coulson-
Thomas (2013).  
 
Ultimately “….managing a major hazard business should be a clear and 
positive process safety leadership with board level involvement and 
competence to ensure that major hazard risks are being properly managed”. 
[HSE, 2011, Page 11] 
 
It is critical that we therefore explore all these aspects with actual CEO/MD 
and other top leadership in organizations directly to understand how much 
their views are truly are aligned with the many academic and practitioner 
views presented in this literature.  
 
3.7 Conclusion: A Preliminary Model of EHS Governance & Leadership 
 
In this section the key concepts and ideas that feature strongly in the above 
literature review chapters are synthesised into themes. This allows 
development of a preliminary conceptual model of EHS leadership and 
governance, as discussed in chapter 1. Whilst this is exploratory research the 
model is expected to go through iterations and will be modified further when 
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emerging themes from the field research are added to complement the desk-
top literature review.  
 
Nine key themes connecting corporate governance with EHS leadership in 
high risk/high reliability organizations emerged from the Literature Review 
through the analysis of the anchor references as shown in Table 3.4 below. 
No-one has yet synthesised these 9 themes, that have been extracted from 
the various publications, research papers, research reports, best practice 
standards and some of the guidance and articles from professionals in the 
fields of corporate governance and EHS leadership.  They can be 
summarized in the following table 3.4: 
 
Table 3.4 Themes evolving from the Literature Review with Anchor 
References 
Theme Theme Title Theme General Definition Anchor References 
1 EHS Knowledge 
and Competence 
(of CEOs and 
Directors) 
Can be defined as the basic 
knowledge of EHS matters 
to lead as a CEO or direct 
as a Board Member and 
this defines the basic 
competence requirements 
for this job with respect to 
EHS.  
HSE (2006) – RR/506 
OECD (2012) 
HSE/IoD (2008) 
HSE (2011)-HSL 
Roger et al (2009) 
2 Safety (EHS) 
Leadership 
Can be defined as the 
leading actions driven from 
a sense of responsibility 
and accountability for EHS 
and Safety.  
Roger et al (2009) 
Roger et al (2010) 
HSE (2011)-HSL 
HSE (2006) – RR/506 
OECD (2012) 
HSE/IoD (2008) 
Bibbings (2008); (2010) 
CSS (2008) 
 
3 Risk Management This can be defined as the 
holistic evaluation, review 
and monitoring processes 
for the control of EHS and 
Safety risks that an 
organizations may face  
HSE (2011)-HSL 
HSE (2006) – RR/506 
OECD (2012) 
Roger et al (2010) 
Bibbings (2001); (2009) 
Booz and Co (2010) 
Hopkins (2002) 
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Theme Theme Title Theme General Definition Anchor References 
4 Influence and 
Accountability 
Can be defined as the 
appreciation to the impact 
of decisions and actions 
that a senior executive and 
board member may have 
and the accountabilities that 
carries as a consequence.  
CSS (2008) 
HSE (2006) – RR/506 
OECD (2012) 
HSE/IoD (2008) 
 
5 Developing a 
Safety (EHS) 
Culture and 
Communication 
Can be defined as the 
development of the 
organizational culture where 
safety is a core value and 
where open, transparent 
communications are a 
norm. 
HSE (2011)-HSL 
Roger et al (2009) 
Roger et al (2010) 
HSE (2006) – RR/506 
Hopkins (2002) 
6 Reporting 
Structure and 
Hierarchies 
Can be defined as the 
reporting levels and access 
to senior decision makers. 
This is for both persons and 
functions 
MacLean (2011)-1 
HSE (2011)-HSL 
HSE (2006) – RR/506 
MacLean (2007) 
7 Legal Imperative 
for Safety 
Can be defined as matters 
of EHS and Safety which 
have any legal bearing and 
impacts.  
HSE (2006) – RR/506 
OECD (2012) 
HSE/IoD (2008) 
Roger et al (2009) 
HSE (2011)-HSL 
8 Operational 
Excellence & 
Strong Integrated 
Management 
Systems 
Can be defined as the 
systematic management of 
safety, health, environment, 
reliability and efficiency to 
achieve world-class 
performance. 
HSE (2006) – RR/506 
OECD (2012) 
HSE/IoD (2008) 
Roger et al (2009) 
HSE (2011)-HSL 
Bibbings (2000) 
MacLean (2006) 
Booz and Co (2010) 
9 Monitoring of HSE 
Performance 
Can be defined as the 
processes of target setting, 
and monitoring EHS/Safety 
performance and 
subsequent management 
actions to improve and 
maintain performance.  
MacLean (2011)-2 
CSS (2008) 
HSE (2011)-HSL 
Bibbings (2010) 
Bibbings (2000) 
Bibbings (2005) 
HSE (2006) – RR/506 
OECD (2012) 
HSE/IoD (2008) 
 
A critical review was undertaken with the anchor references.  
 
75 
 
These 9 themes provide a comprehensive initial framework that will inform 
the empirical research.  The themes are not completely discrete or 
independent, yet they can be separated for the purposes of further structured 
exploration.  
 
However, the empirical research is designed to expand upon these themes, 
to provide insight into the existing themes and to explore other themes that 
arise from studying EHS in the unique environment of the GCC. The 
researcher at this stage develops an initial conceptual model to attempt to 
explain the inter-relatedness of these literature review established themes.  
 
Figure 3.1 splits the 9 themes in to 5 distinct groupings.  
 
Figure 3.1: Initial Thematic Conceptual Model of EHS Governance and 
Leadership 
 
 
 
Seven of the factors are grouped into three key areas of organisational 
(internal) factors, personal leadership factors; and socio-economic/socio-
political (external) factors, the themes are placed within these factor areas. 
This helps identify the relationship better between the themes.  The 
remaining two themes are considered more as output factors rather than 
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factors that fall into the three areas. So monitoring is influenced by the 
internal, external and personal factors and in turn influences the level of risk 
management.  
 
The researcher used a process context (i.e. of inputs, processes and 
outputs) to relate between the factors and the themes that belong to the 
factors. We find that the internal factors which include Safety (or EHS) culture 
and communications; Reporting structures and hierarchies; and Operational 
excellence and EHS management systems all seem to be related to the 
organisation directly and are to do with the workings of the organisation. The 
organisational culture and communication practices, the organisational 
structures and the management systems are all developed from within over 
time, are based on creating a governance structure and creating a culture of 
EHS compliance. Setting standards for example and ensuring there is 
adequate communication through a clearly defined organisational structure 
all within an organisational culture which believes and respects EHS, 
provides a good platform. 
 
The external factors to an organisation can be related to market (economic) 
dynamics, social aspects and political matters. As was seen in section 3.2 
above there is a relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
accountability and EHS. The literature review suggests these share many 
values and relate strongly to each other through the fact that EHS relates to 
worker welfare and that is where the social perspective comes in. However, it 
is yet to be seen if that is the factor that is driving EHS governance and 
leadership, or whether it is the legal imperatives that drive EHS governance, 
oversight and leadership. In this model we assume that the legal imperative 
from EHS is the key driver and this also takes into account the socio-
economic and socio-political aspects.  
 
The other themes including EHS knowledge and competence; EHS 
leadership and influence and accountability are all seen as personal factors 
of senior leaders within an organisation. The EHS knowledge and 
competency element seems to be something which is being addressed 
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through senior managers’ and directors’ codes of practices, information 
documents and perhaps some training. It should be appreciated that board 
directors and to a lesser extent CEOs/MDs duties are defined generically to 
overview, monitor, control and set a tone for an organisation. Therefore, in 
this context we view EHS knowledge and competence from the perspective 
that these persons lead and direct high risk organisations which need to be 
high reliability organisations.  
 
Following directly from the above, the sense of ownership and responsibility 
should drive that sense of accountability. The influence is very much inherent 
in the job of a senior leader, as they are looked to for direction and to 
emphasise the values and empathise with the challenges that the 
organisation face.  However, it is with EHS leadership, which we defined after 
the literature review as the leading actions driven from a sense of 
responsibility and accountability for EHS and Safety, that this influence and 
accountability becomes pronounced and effective.  
 
These three areas, internal (organisational) factors; external (organisational) 
factors and personal leadership factors all contribute to better effective 
oversight, overview and monitoring of EHS performance. It is assumed that 
the role is monitoring as much of the EHS performance matters are perhaps 
more operational in nature i.e. managing the risks at the operational and day-
to-day matters. Whilst a strategic direction for EHS is set by the leadership 
team both at Board and then at executive level, monitoring is the core 
responsibility of the leadership team.  
 
It is through this effective monitoring, which includes ensuring that the 
organisation implements corrective actions to ensure a continued acceptable 
level of EHS performance, that a better risk management and control is 
achieved, leading to safer and more environmentally friendly operations 
which protect the health, safety and welfare of employees, contractors and all 
the other organisational stakeholders.  
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To this end, because the key purpose of better EHS systems is to change 
organisational status from high risk, to high reliability organisations, the 
ultimate output of the combined organisational and personal efforts of the 
individuals leading these organisations both in an executive and non-
executive capacity is better risk management. This is what ensures continued 
profitable and ultimately a sustainable and reliable organisation.   
 
In the following chapter the author discusses the methodology and the 
underpinning philosophical assumptions for the approach undertaken in the 
methods selected. Whilst the model is not being tested in a conventional 
sense, the questions that are developed in a survey instrument and the semi-
structured questions using in the qualitative enquiry are somewhat based on 
interrogating the themes that have emerged in the literature review and in 
fact the basic conceptual model that has evolved inspired by the key themes. 
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Chapter 4 – Methodology and Methods 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter demonstrates how this research work has evolved starting with 
the broad concepts of organizational safety culture, safety (EHS) Leadership 
within the context of corporate governance in high risk/high reliability 
organizations. Guided and influenced by some previous academic and 
management research that the author has been involved in together with 
being a practitioner for many years – the exploration of how EHS leadership 
can have an impact on the performance of high risk/high reliability 
organizations seemed extremely appropriate.   
 
There are many challenges the industry faces with dynamic risks and what 
has become evident is that High Risk Organizations need to become High 
Reliability Organizations especially with fast changing macro and socio-
economic factors particularly in the Middle East and the GCC. Much of this 
was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3; where it was understood that it was 
imperative that an appropriate methodology was selected that would best 
address investigation into the perceptions of senior leaders on safety 
leadership and governance matters.  
 
One of the main issues with this research has been the scarcity of references 
on this subject directly. Much of the work on EHS leadership has been 
focused on EHS at an operational and perhaps tactical level rather than a 
strategic level. Perhaps this may reflect the view point that EHS matters 
remain very much an operational and perhaps at times tactical and less 
strategic in the minds of many leaders?  
 
This chapter explores the approach adopted within the research to data 
collection and analysis and the use of mixed methods to try to gain insights 
into the perception of senior leaders within high risk (and perhaps high 
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reliability) organizations. It seeks to better understand looking at “Directing 
EHS Matters” rather than merely “Managing EHS Matters”.  
 
The chapter contains the aims and objectives of the research; a very short 
discussion of the development of mixed methods within the philosophical 
epistemological grounds of mixed methods research; the rationale for the 
choice of mixed methods; the research design and research strategies and 
the details of how both the quantitative and qualitative enquiries are 
undertaken. It explains how the data were collected, interrogated and 
analysed and concludes with a reflective piece to highlight the researcher-
research relationship including an account of the advantages and 
disadvantages of being a seasoned practitioner in this field of study.   
 
4.2 Aims and Objectives  
 
This research is focused on engaged scholarship. Therefore there are 
multiple aims and objectives for the Thesis have the following objectives: 
 
What are the perspectives of the senior leaders in high risk and high 
reliability organizations operating in the GCC region on Environment, Health 
and Safety (EHS) leadership and governance matters?   
 
The Aims and Objectives are proposed to being: 
 
1. Develop a basic framework for understanding corporate EHS 
leadership and governance. 
 
2. To undertake exploratory research to understand EHS leadership 
and governance in HROs in the GCC region.  
 
3. Develop an exploratory research methodology to best investigate 
the current themes and evaluate if there are any other themes that 
exist with respect to EHS Leadership in the context of Corporate 
Governance: 
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• Using quantitative research methods to assess the focus of 
senior leader’s perception  
• Using qualitative methods to examine the rationale, reasoning 
and underpinning discourses of senior leadership 
• To combine qualitative and quantitative research methods and 
demonstrate the utility of such an approach 
• To explore and demonstrate how these two methods of study 
provide a better contextual understanding of senior leadership’s 
views on EHS governance 
 
4. To contribute to the development of research in EHS leadership 
/governance studies in the GCC and where such findings may add 
value to other such industries in other regions in the world. 
 
5. To explore the potential of developing a new framework and a 
model for EHS Leadership and Governance which helps explain 
the key components. 
 
4.3 Research Ethics Approval 
 
An application to the University of Bradford Research Ethics Committee was 
undertaken on 1st April 2012. After receiving formative feedback a re-
submission was required and this was undertaken on 1st June 2012. The 
approval to proceed with the research was obtained via an ethics approval 
committee meeting that was granted by the Humanities, Social and Health 
Sciences Research Ethics Panel at the University of Bradford on 25th June 
2012. 
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4.4 Philosophical Approach to this Research 
  
In any such in-depth research as presented in this thesis, and especially one 
which is so exploratory, it is critical at this point to address the philosophical 
approach of the researcher. As the researcher approaches this research as 
an engaged scholar, the researcher is a key instrument in the research itself. 
He collects data directly through both a questionnaire instrument and semi-
structured interviews and examines the data directly himself.  
  
The researcher holds a more scientific and objective approach to qualitative 
research, like that of an applied research methodologist. As such the focus is 
on the research design rather than philosophical assumptions, although it is 
appreciated that assumptions cannot be separated from the research design 
or procedures.  This research is directed towards more engaged scholars 
and academics in the field of management research.  
   
In saying this, this thesis is located within an objectivist epistemology and its 
theoretical perspective is positivism. Its methodological approach is 
qualitative positivism.  
  
An objectivist epistemology ‘Holds that meaning, and therefore meaningful 
reality, exists as such apart from the operation of any consciousness’ [Cotty, 
1998, Page 8]. The researcher located within an objectivist epistemology 
understands that meaning is inherent in what is studied, that the researcher’s 
aim is to discover that meaning, and that the researcher should not in any 
way influence what is studied [Crix, 2004]. Positivism requires the gathering 
of empirical data that allows the researcher to discover the true meaning of 
what is being studied. 
  
Research in management and business studies has been dominated by 
positivism as noted by Hassard and Kelemen (2002). Pfeffer’s (1993) highly 
influential paper argues strongly for its continued importance. In the last 20 
years or so, qualitative approaches to research have come to be dominated 
by interpretivist rather than positivist approaches [Crotty, 1998]. Here, the 
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researcher is interested in how ‘reality’ is constructed through language, 
discourse and interaction. The researcher’s subjectivity and influence upon 
the research is acknowledged. However, positivist qualitative methodologies 
continue to flourish although sometimes referred to as ‘postpositivist’ 
[Creswell, 2013]. The positivist qualitative researcher presumes that 
participants can describe a reality in which they participate, not one that they 
constitute. The words they speak in interviews are therefore regarded as an 
accurate reflection of that reality, and can be analysed using systematic 
procedures such as content analysis and grounded theory [Cresswell, 2013].  
  
The challenges of this research was for the researcher to spend more than 1-
2 hours with those who were being researched and try to objectively 
ascertain their position, their reality and determine their world views on 
questions that were created on the basis of certain themes and factors which 
were highlighted through the literature search.  
 
4.5 Mixed Methods Research – Research Approach/Description  
 
The use and application of mixed methods has seen substantial 
developments in the past decade or more and has also gained greater 
visibility within the past few years. It is recognized that rigorous mixed 
methods designs that are able to integrate effectively various procedures for 
the transfer of evidence amongst the two traditional methods of qualitative 
and quantitative methods [Castro et al, 2010].  
 
Whilst mixed methods are not completely new, its wider-spread use to a 
critical mass is a relatively recent development in social research [Bergman, 
2012]. For example the Journal of Mixed Methods only launched publications 
in 2007. There have also been some subsequent important anchor texts in 
Mixed Methods Research (such as Creswell and Plano Clarke (2011) first 
published in 2007; Creswell (2009) and even earlier with Tashakkori and 
Teddie (2003) to quote a few examples.  
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There has been marked growth in Mixed Methods Research (MMR) and it is 
the definition of mixed methods which seems to have created some 
inconsistencies in use. A project which involves both a qualitative and 
quantitative study may not be defined by some scholars as mixed methods 
as they focus more on how the two sub-studies relate to each other and if the 
study was initially designed as a mixed methods study (i.e. sequential, 
concurrent or otherwise) [Tashakkori and Creswell (2007)]. 
 
Mixed methods are at times called multi-strategy research methods as they 
use both qualitative and quantitative methods within the same research 
design strategy (Walker et al, 2004). Bergman (2011) explains that mixed 
methods perhaps should be called blended methods research and refers to 
the conflicting or separate paradigms which both Quantitative and Qualitative 
research methodologies sit within. Quantitative approaches have evolved 
from a paradigm based more on positivist philosophical worldviews in which 
social sciences are seen as phenomena having an objective reality. On the 
other hand whilst some Qualitative research can be based on a positivistic 
approach a significant amount is also based on another philosophical view in 
which the paradigm sees the social sciences phenomena that finds their 
meanings constructed by the people who are involved in using them rather 
than the external objects which are independent of them in clear contrast to 
the positivist’s view (Walker et al, 2004).  
 
Research is an exploration of the truths and realities through the gathering of 
data, information and facts etc. with the aim of enhancing knowledge. More 
exploratory research can be said at times to be more a process of 
interpreting a conclusion from particular instances which is generally more 
inductive rather than deductive. Deductive research is a process in which 
logical conclusions about particular instances are drawn from general 
premises and/or statements. As such the nature of the research methods 
which are more inductive tend to be at times qualitative and the nature of 
research which is deductive tends more at times be quantitative. Thus 
quantitative research uses the deductive methods through the general 
development of a hypothesis.  
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It is interesting to note the observations made by Johnson & Onwueghuzie 
(2004) in saying that positivist scientists may argue that science and the truth 
involves the confirmation and falsification and that as such methods and 
procedures are to be carried out objectively. However, there is still 
subjectivity in the whole process starting from the epistemological choice in 
the first place right through to the interpretation of the results which, 
especially in social sciences will inevitability carry some subjectivity.  
 
The debates continue as do the “paradigm wars” [Feilzer, 2010]. The concept 
of a single objective reality has been argued by positivist and post positivist 
researchers in their scientific approach to addressing research-based 
enquiry. On the other hand researchers from social constructionist and 
postmodern perspectives have argued and debated the significance and 
added value of qualitative enquiry in social science research which deals with 
a more complex set of relationships and dynamic changes within society 
[Johnson & Onwueghuzie, 2004]. This discussion has been central to the 
mixed methods research design debates [Creswell & Plano Clarke (2011)]. 
 
Mixed methods can be defined as “…research in which the investigator 
collects and analyses data, integrates the findings, and draws inferences 
using both qualitative and quantitative approaches or methods in a single 
study or program of inquiry”. [Tashakkori and Creswell (2007), Page 4].  
 
Another definition is: “Mixed Methods Research is a research design with 
philosophical assumptions as well as methods of inquiry. As a methodology, 
it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the collection 
and analysis of data and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative data in a 
single study or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches in combination provides a better 
understanding of research problems than either approach alone”. [Creswell 
and Plano Clarke (2011), Page 5]. 
 
Cameron and Molina-Azorin (2011), in reference to earlier work explain that 
mixed methods developed over four key periods/eras including the 1950’s to 
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1980’s which are known as the formative period; paradigm debate period 
which went from the late 1970’s until the early 1990’s; the procedural 
development era between the 1980’s and 2000; and then the beyond 2000 in 
which the era can be described as the “advocacy period” as a separate 
design period in which the more conceptual movement has evolved. Mixed 
methods continue to evolve and develop.  
 
Epistemologically, Feilzer (2010), supports the case that pragmatism as a 
research paradigm supports the use of a mix of different research methods 
as well as the “….analysis and a continuous cycle of abductive reasoning 
while being guided primarily by the researchers’ desire to produce socially 
useful knowledge” [Feilzer, 2010, Page 6]. 
 
Tashakkori and Teddie (2010), put it more simply using the utility value of 
data for the “Everyday Problem Solver”, by saying that if you were lost in the 
woods and only had a compass, mobile phone and flashlight, you would not 
throw away any of them and try to use all these methods to get yourself out 
of the woods! Their pragmatic approach highlights the value of using mixed 
methods to help a researcher solve a research problem through using the 
continuum that stretches across both methodological and philosophical 
dimensions.  
 
It is critical to be reminded that whilst MMR can be considered a third 
paradigm as opposed to the traditional mono-methods [Tashakkori and 
Teddie (2010)], the goal of mixed methods research is not to replace either of 
these approaches but rather to draw from the strengths and weaknesses of 
both in a single research study and across studies [Johnson & Onwueghuzie, 
2004]. 
 
Creswell and Plano Clarke (2011) explain that mixed methods research can 
be defined as more of an approach or methodology which combines the use 
of qualitative and quantitative methods including the data collection, analysis 
and inference stages. The methodology can be used to gain greater insights 
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and for the purpose of extending the breadth and depth of understanding and 
collaboration.  
 
The mixed methods research adopted within this study combines qualitative 
and quantitative approaches both from a positivist epistemological approach.  
Simply those who support this methodology argue that using mixed methods 
very much help the researcher increase the value through enhancing the 
validity and generalizability of the results. Easterby-Smith et al (2013) 
suggested that this in turn may lead to a greater potential theoretical 
contribution. The argument against the use of mixed methods by sceptics 
alludes greatly to the lack of competence in researchers in conducting 
different methods.  
 
And they may be right is saying this as in some original research by 
O’Cathein et (2008) on the quality of mixed methods studies in health 
services research, they concluded that out of 118 mixed methods studies 
many of the researchers ignored mixed methods design in both their 
proposals and reports; there was a lack of transparency of the individual 
methods in terms of clear exposition of the data collection as well as the 
analysis; and also in many cases there was very little or no attempt to 
integrate between the data from the two different studies. This leads me to 
suggest that the quality of mixed methods research will be critical to its 
development and more serious consideration in both academic and 
practitioner research in the future as research must be rigorous no matter 
what method or combination of methods are employed. 
 
Some scholars have commented that it would seem appropriate for 
pragmatism to be the natural choice of the mixed methods researcher 
[Harrits (2011); Johnson & Onwueghuzie (2004); Feilzer, 2010 etc.]. 
However, it is important for the mixed or multi-methods researcher to 
appreciate to what extent the study is mixed methods in the research 
strategy and design. Study design issues are explored further on but the 
acceptance levels of mixed methods research as discussed by Cameron and 
Molina-Azorin (2011) depend greatly on the design of the study and on where 
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the methods are actually being integrated. For example, it raises questions in 
relation to whether the mixed methods are being deployed in the framework, 
data collection, analysis and/or data analysis and making inferences on the 
whole study. This has been identified as a crucial issue in such mixed 
methods research studies (see Cameron and Molina-Azorin, 2011 and 
Molina-Azorin, 2010). 
 
The power of using a mixed method design can be said to be more far-
reaching in case study type and exploratory research in which either (i) we 
start with an in-depth qualitative enquiry and formulate an explanation or 
theory which can then be further tested using quantitative survey methods; or 
(ii) vice versa in which the methods can be employed to undertake a large 
scale survey, and then collect data which can then be further interrogated 
using more quantitative methods in order to gain a richer picture as described 
by Tharenou et al (2007).   
 
Parry et al (2011) give a very good example of how sequential mixed 
methods helped develop a quantitative tool from a qualitative enquiry using 
inductive content analysis. They used key words from interviews (as opposed 
to themes). Another good example is the Diaz-Garcia & Brush (2012) study 
on gender and business ownership where the opposite was done where a 
quantitative tool was developed and used initially and this was followed with 
a qualitative enquiry to explore and explain better the complex moderating 
effects of gender on performance etc. The study concluded with a call for 
using mixed methods research in these kinds of studies to gain insights that 
lead to the cumulative knowledge in this area.  
 
Returning to the issues relating to the dichotomy between qualitative and 
quantitative methods, Plowright (2012) rejects this on the basis of a need for 
as he describes it as “a fresh look” at social and educational research. The 
complete distinction between the methods is rejected and in fact an invitation 
for the researcher to combine between these methods to add greater value in 
management research by exploring the underlying meanings and concepts of 
the different methods is what Plowright (2012) describes.   
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Byran (2010) explains that mixed methods can be used for a variety of 
reasons or what he calls “rationale”. His long list of reasons include 
Triangulation which he defines as the results of an investigation from a 
research strategy are employed in the cross-checking of the method assisted 
with another research strategy; Offsetting where the implication is that the 
weaknesses and biases of one method can be used to compensate for 
another method etc. which is apparently rarely used; Completeness which 
implies the use of one method to compensate for the limitation of the other 
method such as using a structured questions protocol to compensate for 
information that cannot be obtained through observation in ethnographic 
methods etc.; Process in which we can use qualitative enquiry to give us a 
more process-ual picture of social life to help bring about greater value in the 
more static quantitative inquiry in social/management research; When using 
different Research Questions which are related to the same overall study; 
Explanation where we try to use qualitative enquiry to better understand for 
example variable and ascertain if they are dependent or independent etc.; 
when dealing with unexpected results especially from a quantitative 
enquiry and you want to use that data to understand better why; Instrument 
Development where we use in-depth qualitative enquiry to help in the design 
of quantitative instruments such as surveys/structured interview instruments 
and others such as sampling; to give research credibility when the potential 
respondents “expect” a certain method/instrument and to give greater context 
to the Research.  
 
In mixed methods research where we are trying to gain greater insights into 
the context we use the qualitative methods to provide greater depth to our 
quantitative data. This is extremely important as the surveys are limited in 
that they will give very good information about degree of 
agreement/disagreement to statements which can give us an indication of 
perception, but at times completely opposite views may impact greatly on 
statistical and quantitative analysis. An in-depth qualitative enquiry allows us 
to explain the differences and to some extent the reasons at times for the 
degrees of agreements/disagreements to statements.  
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There are also other reasons for using mixed methods which include 
Illustration in which data analysed even at different times from both 
quantitative and qualitative enquiry can be used to illustrate key findings from 
social type research; Utility which is very important in engaged scholarship 
as a mixed methods research study would be used in which the findings 
would have most value in application of findings, and at times not using both 
methods sequentially or even in parallel may not only not give us the right 
level of understanding, but we may not have enough depth of understanding 
to formulate effective solutions; Confirm and Discover  which is the most 
common rational for the use of mixed methods as when the methods are 
used sequentially, one method discovers the findings and then the other 
method is used to explore and test the same; Diversity of Views can be 
used when we want to study separately the opinions or persons say using 
qualitative interviews and then explore more scientifically issues  using 
quantitative methods – but more like having two studies at one time and this 
is usually done when researchers are trying to be opportunistic when they get 
access into an organizations to research etc. And finally Enhancement 
which is an advanced method of triangulation in which the researcher will go 
back and forth through the data to enhance and confirm key findings and this 
method is particularly valuable when using conceptual view investigations for 
example when relating focus group findings to both survey and interview 
findings etc. 
 
Design types for concurrent MMR approaches included triangulation; off-
setting; when determining a diversity of view or when trying to deal with 
different research questions. Other rationales were mainly for exploratory 
research designs [Harrison and Reilly, 2011]. 
 
Operationally mixed methods can also be very useful to investigate sensitive 
issues within organizations [Jehn and Jonsen, 2010]. They argue that when 
investigating sensitive organizational issues mixed methods can demonstrate 
a more accurate and thorough understanding of the organizational issues 
when mixed methods are used as opposed to a standard, mono-method 
approach and systematic manner. They explain that social desirability 
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answers and at times even dishonest answers to questions may occur which 
render the subject vulnerable to questions that may reveal details they may 
find very personal or intimate. Therefore the use of mixed methods can help 
obtain data in two ways also limiting the direct and difficult questions.  
 
Harrison and Reilly (2011) conducted a review of the use of mixed methods 
in marketing research and showed that even within MMR the way the multi-
method process was employed was different. In their review of 34 studies 
which employed mixed methods of data-collection and analysis, sequential 
mixed methods were used in the majority of cases (79%) and they mostly 
prioritized quantitative methods whereas in contrast concurrent mixed 
methods was employed in only 19% of cases. Concurrent studies looked at 
converging that data at the interpretation or analysis stage.  
 
There are predominantly six main types of research design in mixed methods 
or (as they may be called) protocols: The first three are Convergent Parallel 
Design, Exploratory Sequential Design and Explanatory Sequential Design 
[Creswell and Plano Clarke (2011)]. The latter two methods use one method 
to help develop the grounds for the next method. Explanatory Design starts 
with the quantitative method which then is followed by a qualitative method in 
order to “explain” better the results of the research, whereas in Exploratory 
Design a qualitative enquiry helps build a model for a quantitative data 
collection and analysis. In the Convergent Design use both methods, collect 
the data and compare and relate the same.  
 
The other three research designs include the Embedded Design related more 
to using one method within the framework of another predominant method to 
help enhance or test certain aspects in the research; the Transformative 
Design is similar to the Explanatory Design only that the decisions made by 
the researcher within a theoretical framework and the multiphase design in 
which the research may go through three stages, qualitative, quantitative and 
mixed method where one method findings informs on the next phase of the 
research [Creswell and Clarke, 2011].  
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This section covered the literature on the work that has been done on mixed 
methods research design. As can be seen, the mixed methods research 
design has developed over a period of time and has its functionality and 
support from various scholars. Methodologically some scholars have 
criticized it for technical reasons which relate very much to the level of 
competence of researchers in both methods. In the next section the choice of 
design of this MMR work is described with some justification to the selection 
of the design.  
 
4.6 Choice of Research Methodology/Research Design - Rationale for 
this Study  
 
This is a mixed methods study in which the rationale for using both the 
quantitative and qualitative methods concurrently was five-fold: 
 
(1) Greater Context: Given that this was exploratory research the 
development of the quantitative survey was really to test and compare 
between the degree of acceptance and more accurately to gauge the 
agreement of senior leadership to the emerging themes from the 
literature review. But this needed greater context and therefore the 
quantitative enquiry is used to gain understanding of the differences 
between the perceptions on themes and a broad comparison between 
these themes and also at a later stage to see if statistically more 
leading, dominant or overarching themes can be established. Here we 
use the qualitative methods to explain “Why?”. 
 
(2) Utility Value of this Research: This research is a piece of engaged 
scholarship work of action-based management research (i.e. one of 
the key objectives of the DBA), the mixed methods approach seems to 
give greater insights and findings which can be converted directly into 
workable solutions and thus recommendations for industry to take 
things forward.  
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(3) Instrument Development: Whilst the two methods were used, and 
both survey questions and the semi structured protocol related to the 
same emerging themes from the research, the use of the methods 
concurrently also served the quantitative method as a secondary 
validation, which in turn allows - at a later stage - for the refinement of 
the survey tool and thus this helps improve the survey instrument for 
its future/further employment.  
 
(4) Answering different Research Questions: The research in this way 
enables the researcher to answer more than one research question at 
a time. Whilst the themes emerging from the literature review may 
have seemed to be universal and potentially of equal importance, the 
perception-based survey enquiry using the quantitative method allows 
for better understanding of perception of importance (i.e. which 
themes are really key out of the 9 – stronger 
(agreement/disagreement) views denotes greater affinity to the 
theme). Whereas the qualitative enquiry gave a richer and deeper 
picture and also explained why at times there are completely opposite 
perceptions from different survey participants when certain questions 
were asked.  
 
(5) Enhancement: This research tries to best describe the area of 
contextual overlap between EHS, Governance and Leadership. There 
is triangulation here where both the method strategies are linked to 
one another. More importantly, it is through drawing conclusions from 
both sets of data that we are able to enhance and better confirm 
findings with more confidence and also perhaps greater 
generalizability where appropriate.  
 
As for the research design, a convergent parallel design (which is sometimes 
referred to as a concurrent mixed method design [Jogulu and Pansiri, 2012]), 
was felt to be best in this study. Whilst this is exploratory research to a great 
extent, the researcher identified that there was scope for doing the research 
concurrently through: 
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(1) Building on some of the strong concepts and themes that seemed to 
be coming out through the literature, the initial model could be tested 
using a quantitative instrument which could be face-validated; 
(2) The qualitative review using a semi-structured interview protocol 
would explore the same themes established in the literature review, 
yet it would also help to see if there were any other concepts or 
themes that may emerge at the same time; 
(3) The mixed methods approach as described briefly in (1) and (2) meant 
that it was possible to obtain this information from the same 
participants at the same time. Trying to do this concurrently would 
have proven not only challenging as this may have limited the 
accessibility to such senior leaders and their willingness to participate; 
one method could have influenced the next method if time was given 
between the two, especially if the qualitative method would have been 
used first as is commonly done in an exploratory design.  
 
In this study which is a concurrent mixed methods research study we look at 
converging that data at the interpretation or analysis stage as suggested by 
Harrison and Reilly (2011). Given the nature of the data collected in this 
study, this is felt, to be the best way to leverage on the mixed methods 
research mixed methods research methodology. However, the outcome 
was that the quantitative data set was small, so it has been used to 
provide descriptive statistical background for the qualitative aspect of 
the study.  
 
The researcher used the methodology as suggested by Onwuegbuzie and 
Leech (2006) which talks about conceptualizing MMR design in 13 steps that 
include: (1) Determining study Goals; (2) Formulating the Research 
Objectives which was done very early on in the thesis proposal development 
stages. (3) Determining the mixed methods rationale, which the researcher 
started to undertake once the literature review themes started to emerge and 
the complexity of this study become apparent. (4) Determining the mixed 
methods purpose and (5) developing the research questions; the researcher 
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has developed and refined the research questions significantly although the 
very purpose of the study has changed very little. (6) Selection of sampling 
design and (7) selecting the MMR design were practically done at the same 
time as it was governed to a great extent with the approach that was required 
for the respondents and this also informed step (8) the collection of data 
stage.  
 
In terms of (9) Data Analysis, this was done around the same time, moving 
from one set of data to the other (10) validating and legitimizing the data. The 
interpretation stage (11) was done concurrently with the discussion issues 
now emerging clearly from the enhanced picture which the two sets of data 
gave. (12) writing up the mixed methods research report or discussion and 
(13) reformulating the research questions was undertaken, but it is worthy to 
note that the continual word-smithing of the research questions was being 
done throughout the course of the research until the end.  
 
4.7 Scope of the Study  
 
Returning to the overall aim of this study, the GCC region is a generally oil 
rich region and much of the GDP profile has changed in the past few 
decades from an exploration and production region to a more diversified and 
mixed large and manufacturing-base industry region whilst retaining a great 
deal of its GDP still in oil-based exports. In exploration and production as well 
as other developing industries they generally share the commonality of being 
high risk industries. Therefore the drive has been to become industries of 
higher reliability in order to reduce incidents which have an impact on human 
life, assets, the environment at large and have better business resilience and 
continuity.   
 
This study is a cross-sectional design study in which data are collected over 
a 4 month-period. The surveys and interviews were undertaken within this 
time period in 4 different locations in the GCC. Two locations were in Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates; one location was in the 
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Kingdom of Bahrain and finally in Muscat the capitol of the Sultanate of 
Oman.  
 
The types of organizations that were involved in the study included: 
 
(1) Non-Oil and Gas - Aviation – Both Navigation and Airport Operations 
(Transport). 
(2) Oil & Gas – Upstream (Production & Exploration) including Oil 
Exploration and Production Services (Energy). 
(3) Oil & Gas – Midstream (Processing/Manufacturing). 
(4) Oil & Gas – Downstream (Retail, Marketing including Product Storage 
and Movement). 
(5) Non-Oil and Gas - Power and Utilities (Energy). 
(6) Non-Oil and Gas - Heavy Manufacturing (Manufacturing-Production). 
(7) Non-Oil and Gas - Major Construction (Construction). 
(8) Non-Oil and Gas - Shipping (Transport).  
 
Whilst the above industries do not include all the industry types, they cover 
the majority of the high risk and high reliability industry sector in the GCC. 
The only industry that was perhaps not covered was the petrochemical 
industry. This absence was due to accessibility and time constraints. Some of 
these industries were approached.  
 
In recognition that the key objective is to use research methods to assess the 
senior leadership’s perception on EHS from the corporate governance and 
performance perspective in high risk/high reliability organizations, a cross-
sectional design was deemed to be suitable for this purpose.  
 
Whilst a mixed methods study was undertaken, a concurrent data collection 
process was followed based on a survey research quantitative strategy and a 
thematic structured content analysis strategy for the qualitative strategy. This 
is discussed in greater detail in the following sections.  
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4.8 Study Design  
 
This study is approached in 7 key stages. They are as follows: 
 
(1) Conduct an in-depth literature review focusing on the various areas 
relating to the research questions and study objective; 
(2) Develop a list of key emerging themes from the literature review which 
relate the areas that connect leadership, corporate governance and 
EHS in High Reliability organizations.  
(3) Develop the survey questions based on the emerging themes and 
pilot/validate the same with a 15-20 person expert-panel from different 
areas of expertise including law, safety, governance and EHS 
practice, ERM and general management. 
(4) Develop in parallel based on the emerging themes up to 10 semi-
structured questions from the interviews to be planned. Interviews 
should be planned between 30-60 minutes in duration. These 
questions should be peer-reviewed by the supervisor and preferably a 
seasoned EHS professional as well.  
(5) Conduct the survey and interview with the respondents in one sitting – 
collect the data in the form of field questionnaires and recorded 
interviews or where consent is not given field notes (interview 
highlights) from the discussions would be recorded.  
(6) Undertake data analysis using descriptive and advanced statistics 
where possible with the survey data and use structured content 
analysis on all interview transcripts (qualitative data). 
(7) Draw conclusions, review and discuss and see if there are any other 
themes which emerge through the interviews.  
 
The conceptual diagram and the model of EHS leadership and governance is 
developed further to stage 7.  
 
These stages are described in Figure 4.1 below. Stage 5 is undertaken 
concurrently and data are collected at the same time and then analysed 
separately. 
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Figure 4.1 Research Design – Concurrent Mixed Methods Approach 
 
4.8.1 - Stages 1 & 2 – Literature Review & Developing a List of Emerging 
Themes  
 
An extensive literature review was needed to review examine the information 
and references which connected EHS leadership with both governance and 
other related matters. Whilst undertaking the reading, a list of key emerging 
ideas is noted. In the course of the reading more than 150 different ideas 
were listed from each of the references. These ideas were then grouped, 
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each group in effect creating an emerging theme. However, the themes that 
emerged were also strongly located within some of the key anchor 
references which numbered around 10 key references from the 200 plus that 
were reviewed.  
 
The themes are separate but perhaps there is overlap between them. A good 
example of this is safety leadership and influence and accountability. Some 
research showed that good safety leadership is visible leadership which 
played a very big role in influencing positive behavioural safety change within 
organizations [Roger et al, 2010]. However, visible leadership has the power 
to influence. It is in this sense that there becomes a pronounced 
accountability that the employees would see [O’dea & Flin (2001)].  
 
Another example of this is Risk Management and the Legal Imperatives for 
Safety. Non-compliance to statutory legal matters may lead to fines, 
prosecution and other negative consequences [Forlin, 2012; Brainich & 
Harris (2012) etc.]. It can at the very least be damaging to an organizations 
reputation [Richardson, 2013]. Therefore there is a clear risk when legal non-
compliance issues occur. Part of managing risk is ensuring that all the 
operations remain within permitted requirements and no incidents occur that 
may lead to prosecution, fines, notices and generally legal action.  
 
The above two examples help us understand that the themes are in no way 
completely independent from one another, however, they have to be studied 
separately as there are instances of risk management which are not related 
to legal compliance issues and there are legal drivers other than pure 
compliance such as performance-based design and self-regulation which are 
not directly related to risk management but perhaps more to operational 
excellence and sound and effective operations/EHS management systems.  
 
When the questions for both the surveys and the interviews were developed, 
they were developed to try to cover key themes and as a start the strategy 
was to work within the context of some of the anchor references which were 
used on the basis of their: 
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(a) Recent discussion of the latest issues relating to EHS governance and 
leadership matters and also subjects such as high reliability, risk 
management and organisational EHS management systems.  
(b) References which were directly addressing the research topic area 
and the title of the research and which address the research 
objectives.  
(c) Quality references which were from reputable organizations such as 
the UK HSE, OECD, IoD and others and/or authors who were known 
as areas specialists. 
(d) As the research was about the GCC region and to gain as much from 
more local context, many of the references came also from the largest 
and most important bi-annual EHS practitioner’s conference in the 
GCC which was the American Society of Safety Engineers – Middle 
East Chapter Conference proceedings over the past 8 years. This was 
also completed with information from presentations and papers 
published in GCC/ME practitioner EHS conferences as well.  
(e) As this is a relatively new subject most of the anchor references were 
a maximum of 15 years old.  
 
The anchor references against each theme are given in table 3.4 in chapter 
3. 
 
4.8.2 - Stage 3 – Pilot Study & Quantitative Study Stage 
 
Using a crude basis by drawing on the pilot study work survey developed in 
Module 7, the design was enhanced to develop questions against the 9 key 
themes that evolved from the Literature Review work. Whilst the questions 
were mostly newly generated, the questions from the 14-question survey 
developed previously were explored for their applicability in the newer 
survey. The newer survey ended up with 27 questions from 31 questions. 
Some of the questions were removed because they were too similar to other 
questions and some because they were redundant and others because they 
were too confusing.  
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The questions were initially developed by the researcher and related to one 
key theme. However, in the expert panel validation exercise conducted 
different practitioners (legal specialists, EHS practitioners, general managers, 
ERM specialist etc.) were asked to comment on each question and advise 
which themes related to which questions in their view. Given the diversity of 
the expert panel members, where more than 9 out of the 14 experts who 
participated (i.e. 60%+) linked to the questions to the themes, these 
questions were linked to the themes for the purpose of the final survey 
analysis.  
 
The rationale here was if the expert panel undertaking the survey to help in 
the validation of the same could see that the question related to more than 
one theme, they were to note that. They were not told that the questions 
were developed to address one theme to start with in order to ensure that 
this did not inhibit their views should they have felt that the questions related 
to more than one theme strongly enough.  
 
At the pilot study stage the total count of themes against each question was 
noted and where 9 or more of the expert panel located a theme to a certain 
question (there were a total of 14 persons who participated from the 16 
invited) these were incorporated in the final question matrix. So, eventually 
there was one question which was linked to more than one theme.  
Additional to the above, the respondents (expert panel) where asked about 
each of the questions (which they were asked to actually answer using the 
adjusted 7-point Likert scale where central tendency was removed) and what 
they understood from certain questions to ensure that a more or less 
common interpretation on each question, thus becoming effectively a 6-point 
scale. Their comments were noted and this helped further refine the 
questions before the actual quantitative instrument was finalized. The 
questions where eventually amended as follows: 
 
(1) Common terminologies were used. At times safety was used and at 
times EHS – these were all amended for all the questions to talk about 
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health and safety. The same went for HSE vs. EHS; senior manager 
or company leader was replaced with CEO/MD and so on; 
(2) Certain questions were reworded to remove any confusion with what 
the question was trying to assess. i.e. the English was improved; 
(3) Some questions which were written in a reversed form, i.e. where 
negatively scored where changed to positive scoring as they seemed 
to be convoluted and could be confusing for the respondent.  An 
example of this was “The HSE issues should be discussed in the Audit 
and Risk Committee of the Board” initially read “should not be”. Some 
of the panel members asked if the best practice was to or not, when 
the researcher responded with it should, they said, it is better to just 
assess if they would agree with best practice rather than not agree 
with something which contradicts best practice. In saying this some 
questions remained negatively scored for internal validation reasons.  
(4) In general questions were made shorter where possible to make the 
respondent pick up on the key issue and respond accordingly.  
(5) Double-barrelled questions were removed based on the discussion 
and advise of both the expert panel and the supervisor.  
 
It is worthy to note that the survey went through 5 key revision stages; 2 prior 
to the panel and 3 after the panel/pilot review.  
 
Appendix F contains the survey questionnaire with the results of the pilot 
study that was developed and employed in the research. It also contains all 
the Literature Review related themes. Appendix A contains the survey 
questions with the final list of themes.  
 
Quantitative Study Strategy 
 
The main study involved the collection of data using a validated survey of 27 
questions relating to 9 key themes (see section 3.7) and using a 7-point 
Likert scale with a removal of the central tendency (i.e. reduced to a 6-point 
scale effectively).  These questions were now validated using the pilot expert 
panel.  
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The concept of data transformation is applied in this case to undertake a 
reverse scoring. This is sometimes used when several questions are used to 
measure a single concept (Sekran & Bougie, 2010).   
 
Coding 
The respondents were not able to take a neutral stance and had to either 
partly agree or partly disagree to statements. These surveys were 
administered at the time of the interview, so respondents took an average of 
10-15 minutes to answer the questionnaire prior to starting the semi-
structured interview.  
 
The use of closed questions allows for the advantage of pre-coding [Byran 
and Bell, 2007]. Using a 7-point Likert scale there than a 5 point scale gives a 
greater insight into the overall level of agreement or disagreement with a 
particular concept or theme.  The scale was maintained in the survey as: 6 = 
Strongly agree; 5 = Agree, 4 = Partly agree; 3 = Partly disagree, 2 = 
Disagree, 1 = Strongly disagree. In the survey three important things were 
done: 
 
(1) The central tendency where not applicable or neither agree or 
disagree with a certain statement was removed. This was to ensure 
that a clearer picture to level the perception on the themes was 
obtained. Respondents could not have any strong feelings, but they 
would have to sit on one side of the fence; 
(2) Some questions were reversed and thus a higher level of agreement 
would mean a lower score rather than a higher score. This was done 
in order to check for somewhat of an internal validity and that 
respondents were consistent in their views; 
(3) The questions were mixed in terms of themes. That means that the 
questions are not clustered in sets which relate to a certain set of 
themes and also the questions are mixed in terms of positive and 
reversed (negative). Once again this was done to ensure that more 
accurate results were obtained. 
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The survey questionnaire is given in Appendix B.   
 
4.8.3 - Stage 4: Qualitative Study 
 
Qualitative Enquiry Strategy 
 
The qualitative enquiry design in this study was extremely important (as 
discussed earlier) to give the research the depth of understanding and 
enhance the rich picture required. The narrative structured content analysis 
strategy with this exploratory research was employed to try to: 
 
(a) Explore possible reasoning with agreement and disagreement with 
questions in general terms in the surveys conducted. Thus agreement 
or disagreement with best practices from the literature were 
addressed; 
(b) Understand better through dialogue with the respondents why perhaps 
the degree of agreement or disagreement with certain practices. This 
is to add depth of understanding of the survey responses. It is worthy 
to note here that this is not done directly whilst looking at the survey 
answers at the time but going through spin off questions as described 
in the next sub-section.  
(c) Investigate through using structured content analysis where the 
discussion eluded more to certain themes as opposed to others to see 
which themes those were more prevalent and more important or 
leading. Create a count of statements to see which themes are oft 
repeated and if there were any emerging trends in the interviews.  
(d) Using thematic content analysis, investigate through the various 
statements made and suggestions discussed by the respondents if 
there were other themes or even subthemes that were emerging. This 
was likely as the research was being undertaken in a different region 
of the world to the regions where the best practices guidelines, 
working documents and research was mostly made with particular 
reference to the anchor references.  
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(e) Item (d) above was significant as this is where new possible themes 
that relate to organizations in this region and also those which the 
recent literature has not explored in any depth are yet to emerge.  
 
Developing the Semi Structured Interview Protocol 
 
The questions that were developed for the semi-structured interview were 
related to each of the themes. The Table 4.2 below gives the questions and 
the rationale for each question.  
 
Table 4.1: Semi-structured Questions and their Rationale 
Question Theme Rationale Potential 
Further 
Probing/Spin-
off questions 
What kind of Role do 
you see if any does 
the Board of 
Directors play in 
providing health and 
safety leadership in 
their organization? 
Safety 
Leadership 
Explores views and 
perceptions on BoD safety 
leadership role. The 
question also allows the 
respondent to indicate there 
is also no or a minimal role 
should they feel that way.  
How important 
is their role in 
EHS? 
To what extent and 
how do you see the 
Board of Directors 
as company 
governors can and 
should engage in 
EHS development 
matters in an 
organization like 
yours? 
Developing a 
Safety Culture 
and 
Communication 
 
 
Explores views on 
demonstration of leadership 
and degree and nature of 
influence and involvement 
of the BoD member in EHS 
organizational matters.  
Do they need to 
engage in EHS 
matters at all? 
Does it really 
add value and if 
so how? 
What kind of 
accountabilities do 
you feel you have in 
comparison with the 
Board of Directors 
when it comes to 
influencing and 
directing the 
performance of EHS 
in your organization? 
 
Influence and 
Accountability 
Explores the contrast of 
accountabilities between 
both the BoD and the 
company management and 
investigates views on how 
much should BoD influence 
and direct for EHS 
performance. 
Do you think 
these are well 
understood?  
Do you see the 
BoD taking 
accountability? 
106 
 
Question Theme Rationale Potential 
Further 
Probing/Spin-
off questions 
In what ways are 
your risk 
management 
approaches different 
to those of the Board 
of Directors? 
Risk 
Management 
(RM) 
 
 
Investigates the RM 
practices and tries to see if 
there is a difference in RM 
practice between both 
levels to later compare with 
ERM best practice guidance 
for literature.  
Are EHS risks 
well 
understood? 
Are they 
reviewed as part 
of the company 
RM reviews? 
How often, how and 
why do you update 
the Board of 
Directors on the 
EHS performance of 
your organization? 
Do they expect from 
you periodic updates 
at all? 
  
Monitoring EHS 
Performance 
Gains understanding of the 
reporting and monitoring 
practices and tries to study 
if this is an institutionalized 
company practice and if it is 
borne from voluntary 
reporting or Director 
expectations.   
What kinds of 
KPIs are 
reported? 
Do you feel 
there is enough 
emphasis of 
proactive and 
leading 
performance 
indicators? 
 
Would you 
personally agree to 
have your most 
senior EHS 
representative report 
to anyone other than 
yourself as the head 
of the organization? 
If yes or no why? 
 
Reporting 
Structure and 
Hierarchies 
Explores if the MD/CEO 
(senior manager) sees the 
EHS function and 
representative as a role 
which he needs to be 
personally and directly 
engaged and to understand 
better why ? 
 
Is EHS 
considered a 
technical 
function within 
your 
organization? 
To what extent do 
the legal 
requirements for 
compliance to EHS 
influence/drive your 
approach to EHS 
performance 
development? Do 
you think your Board 
of Directors are 
driven in a similar 
way or is it different? 
If different how is it 
different?  
 
Legal Imperative 
for Safety 
Investigates how much the 
legal imperative is a driver 
to improve and sustain EHS 
performance in the 
organization and if the BoD 
look at compliance in a 
similar way and to 
understand better why so or 
not so. 
Has you 
organizations 
faced any legal 
issues relating 
to EHS? 
Do you not see 
that the BoD 
would see 
compliance as a 
key driver to 
prevent 
organizational 
exposure? 
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Question Theme Rationale Potential 
Further 
Probing/Spin-
off questions 
In what ways and 
what tools do you 
use to set an 
agenda to improve 
and maintain high 
standards of EHS in 
your organization?  
Operational 
Excellence (& 
EHS 
Management 
Systems) 
 
Try to understand how EHS 
is managed in an 
organization and how it is 
used to sustain and improve 
performance.   
Do you have an 
integrated EHS 
Management 
System? 
Do you have 
any certified 
EHS 
Management 
Systems.  
Do you feel that your 
current Board 
Directors have 
sufficient basic 
awareness training 
in EHS and Safety in 
your industry? If so 
what kind of 
knowledge do they 
have and if not what 
kind of knowledge 
do you think they 
should have? 
EHS Knowledge 
and 
Competence 
Tries to understand 
perception on knowledge 
and competence of BoD 
with regards to EHS within 
the industry? During the 
panel pilot discussions 
various experts said this to 
be perhaps one issue. Also 
tries to explore what 
knowledge it is felt they 
should have to add value in 
their roles.   
If a training 
program was to 
be set up what 
kind of issues 
would you think 
the BoD 
members 
should be made 
aware of? 
How long 
should this 
training or 
awareness be 
for? 
How do you see in 
your mind and from 
your experience will 
the governance of 
EHS issues change 
in the future 
especially at both 
the: 
Executive 
Management Level? 
Board Level? 
General 
Question 
(Personal 
Opinion about 
Future 
Developments 
 
Tries to see if there is 
anything in the context of 
the research topic that can 
be added from the 
respondent’s point of view 
and to also understand 
better from such senior 
leadership their outlook in 
this regard in the future.  
None identified.  
There are three 
types of Boards: 
Executive Board – 
i.e. with a CEO and 
Chairman 
Detached – i.e 
where the CEO is 
not part of the Board 
and all Board 
General 
Question (Board 
Structure) 
The debate about most 
effective Board structures 
has intensified in recent 
years to address which is 
the most effective system of 
governance. This question 
tries to investigate in the 
contest of EHS leadership if 
it makes a difference what 
None Identified. 
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Question Theme Rationale Potential 
Further 
Probing/Spin-
off questions 
Members are 
Independent 
Mixed – i.e. where 
the CEO and CFO 
are part of the Board  
Which Board Type 
would you say was 
most effective in 
governing EHS 
matters in High 
Risk/High Reliability 
Organizations?  
Board structure with serve 
better EHS governance and 
leadership matters.  
 
The semi-structured interview protocol was chosen as opposed to open 
ended questions for the following reasons: 
 
(1) Whilst the research is quite exploratory it is based on some emerging 
themes from the literature review and thus the structure of this 
research is supported by questions which are related to the themes; 
(2) The interview purpose is to investigate the emerging themes which are 
critical research topics which are used in the analytical framework for 
analysis; 
(3) The respondents are very busy senior leaders of organizations who 
have a limited amount of time to spend with the researcher. A semi-
structured approach means that better control over the interview 
timing is achieved whilst ensuring all the critical research topics are 
covered; 
(4) In the analysis strategy, a structured content analysis is more 
effectively done based on the results collected from a more structured 
interview transcript. 
(5) In the analysis and convergence of data with the quantitative survey 
data, linking the results together through the themes becomes more 
manageable and logical.  
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4.8.4 - Stage 5: Data Collection – Communicating and Meeting with 
Respondents  
 
Arranging Meetings for Survey Data Collection & Interviews  
 
The interviews were arranged directly in most cases and at times through 
peers from within the researcher’s professional network. A package was 
prepared which included two key documents which were shared with the 
prospective respondents (prior to arrival), they were: 
 
(1) Purpose of the Study – Standard Introduction letter which was 
addressed to them personally. This was called the “Information 
Sheet” and contained the name of the researcher; the title of the 
research topic; the details of the purpose of the research and the kind 
of data that needed to be collected; reference to the supervisor 
contact details and the confirmation that information related to persons 
and companies would be anonymised to protect confidentiality. A copy 
of a typical Information sheet is given in Appendix C.  
(2) Researcher’s Biography – in one page covering academic, 
vocational qualifications; research interests; occupational information 
and professional activities such as involvement in conferences, 
committees and professional memberships/affiliations.  This is 
attached to Appendix D. 
 
Meeting with the Respondents 
 
After the interview date and time was set, upon meeting the respondents (this 
was generally done in their offices or their meeting rooms on their premises 
with the exception of two respondents who arranged to meet in a public 
location over a coffee), three further pieces of information were given to 
them: 
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(1) Researcher’s Business Cards – both Employer’s Business Card with 
business title and Bradford University Researcher’s Business Card 
with DBA scholar title.  
(2) Consent Form - which contained at the bottom of the form and after 
all questions were completed the respondent and the researcher had 
to sign-off. The form read at the bottom as follows: “I give my consent 
to take part in the research and acknowledge that by signing this form 
I consent to information discussed to be used in this study and that the 
information provided will be anonymised”. A typical form is attached to 
Appendix E  
(3) The Survey Form – which they were asked to complete after the 
introduction and briefing on purpose of the study and prior to the start 
of the interview. Survey instrument is given in Appendix B.   
 
Undertaking the Survey Research  
 
The survey in the form of the completed 27-question questionnaire first and 
then undertake the interview.  We have already discussed the development 
of the semi-structured questions and how they were theme-based questions. 
Given the seniority of these respondents and the time they can make 
available to assist in this research, it was assumed that each interview 
question should take about 3-7 minutes to answer and therefore the total 
interview time should not exceed about 45-60 minutes.  
Conducting Semi-structured Interviews 
 
Interviews were conducted using the semi-structured questions. Where 
further clarifications were warranted or where there was interesting 
responses which could be explored further, the researcher asked some 
clarification or spin off questions – examples of which were discussed in table 
4.2 above.  
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Recording 
 
Recording interviews can be at times a sensitive issue. The consent form 
was given, completed and signed off before each interview, regardless if 
consent was given to record or not.  
 
Recording was undertaken using an electronic recording instrument 
“Olympus Digital Voice Recorder – Model WS-331 M” which does not require 
the use of external microphones. All recordings were checked after the 
interview and transferred to an electronic file which was coded to protect the 
name of the respondent and the organization.  
 
Transcription 
 
The transcription of interviews is a difficult and lengthy process if one is not 
experienced with the same. There are benefits to self-transcription of the 
researcher which includes a review whilst transcribing. This however, can 
also be counterproductive to the speed of transcription. The researcher 
conducted one full transcription in which it took more than 13 hours work to 
transcribe a recording of about 35 minutes.  
 
Third party transcription is more effective and required a financial investment. 
This was done with all the recordings with the same transcriber. The 
transcriber labelled in red the transcription of any words/sentences which 
were not understood and marked the recording time. These were reviewed at 
the stage of transcription cleaning and were finalized.  
Structured (thematic) content analysis: 
 
The analysis of the transcripts was undertaken in 6 stages: 
 
(1) The initial review of the transcript was to listen to the whole 
conversation once again and also with the purpose of “cleaning” all the 
transcripts and removing any missing words or correcting any miss-
heard words by the transcriber. This was important as some of the 
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acronyms used in the industry, some technical terms or short names 
for certain companies which the transcriber may not be aware of my 
be noted incorrectly.  
(2) Once corrected, the interview transcript was read once again fully; 
(3) In the third reading of the transcript, using 9 different coloured pens 
the statements relating to different themes were underlined. Some 
statements where they applied directly to more than one theme were 
underlined with more than one colour.  
(4) In the fourth reading was undertaken once all the transcripts were 
completed – to ensure that statements in all of the different transcripts 
were reviewed in a similar way, i.e. that the statements were labelled 
in the same way to maintain consistency. Also any emerging themes 
were noted for the reading of the transcripts. This was done in the 
fourth reading because all of the transcripts would have been 
reviewed already 2-3 times by then.  
(5) In the fifth, a count of the number of theme-related statements was 
undertaken ensuring tally was made against each theme in each 
transcript. One recount was undertaken to check the numbers against 
each transcript.  
(6) In the sixth and final reading which was taken at a later stage the 
transcript statements under each theme identified were analysed to 
explore what was the potential sub-theme for each of the 9 themes 
explored.  
 
During the reading of these transcripts, emerging theme-statements were 
also undertaken and selected statements which was felt highlighted an 
important aspect of the research were also noted on the transcripts.  
 
A list of emerging aspects was developed and this leads to the development 
of other emerging themes which are discussed in the results and discussion 
chapters. It is to be noted that some of the items that may emerge maybe just 
sub-themes of key themes already established or new emerging themes. An 
example of one marked up transcript is given in Appendix I.  
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4.8.5 - Stage 6: Analysis of Data  
Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis in this MMR was done independently for each method. The 
analysis is conducted as soon as the data sets have been completely 
collected. The analyses are then compared to determine: 
 
(1) Senior leadership perceptions as per the themes established early on 
in the research in both sets of data; 
(2) Determine if there are any emerging trends in both sets of data; 
(3) Determine if some of the themes are more dominant; 
(4) Comparisons between leadership perceptions between Oil and Gas 
and non-Oil and Gas industry in both sets of data; 
(5) Determine from the structured content analysis which themes seem to 
be emerging more than others – are thus more significant/important 
given that each question was based on one theme. Theoretically 
speaking if all the questions are answered in similar ways, there 
should be an equal balance between the statements per theme. If not, 
that would indicate that some themes are more dominant or important 
(or even overarching) than others. 
(6) Leveraging on this mixed methods research design compare the 
quantitative data and qualitative data to see if  
(a) Any similar trends appear and; 
(b) The data set may explain the other better to give the 
analysis greater enhancement.  
(7) From the qualitative data establish the emerging ideas, emerging 
themes and areas for further enquiry.  
 
Quantitative Data Analysis: 
 
The surveys are collected for all the respondents and the responses are 
analysed based on the coding. Where positive statements are given scores 
of 6 for Strongly Agree; 5 for Agree; 4 for partly Agree; 3 for Partly Disagree; 
2 for Disagree and 1 for Strongly Disagree. On the other hand the exact 
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opposite is done with negative statements which contradict best practice the 
scoring is reversed and thus they are given scores of 1 for Strongly Agree; 2 
for Agree; 3 for partly Agree; 4 for Partly Disagree; 5 for Disagree and 6 for 
Strongly Disagree. 
 
This means the higher the score out of 6 in each question and each group of 
questions relating to the coded theme the greater the agreement with best 
common practice under each theme.  The Statistics Software SPSS 20.0 was 
used to interrogate the date for the purposes of the Quantitative Analysis. 
The following was undertaken with the data: 
 
General Data Analysis: 
 
(1) Descriptive statistics is undertaken; validation is undertaken by 
running the descriptive statistics against each theme. This was 
undertaken with the two Groups of Data for Oil and Gas Respondents 
and non-Oil and Gas Respondents. 
(2) A regression was attempted to see if there were any trends emerging; 
 
As the data set was too small with no statistical tests such as t-tests to 
assess the differences between neither the groups, nor an analysis of 
variances or correlations and factor analysis was attempted.  
 
Qualitative Data Analysis: 
 
The transcripts of all the interviews are analysed by using a structured 
thematic content analysis. Statements throughout the transcripts are 
analysed against the 9 key themes.  As explained in the previous section in 
the fifth and final reading of the transcripts, a count of the number of theme-
related statements was undertaken ensuring tally was made against each 
theme in each transcript. This was done using 9 different colour pens. Each 
colour defined a certain theme. Some statements where it was felt related to 
more than one theme were marked with more than one colour. One recount 
was undertaken to check the numbers against each transcript. 
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Then the statements were further analysed to explore the sub-themes that 
emerged under the key 9 themes that were established at the earlier stage of 
the research.  
 
In addition to this, where emerging themes or strong ideas which are related 
strongly to the research questions was observed, these statements are also 
marked separately and a listing was created with the themes. Once all the 
transcripts are completed the listing is finalized and appropriate grouping of 
ideas for the list generated is undertaken in order to highlight emerging 
themes or important ideas which are worthy of further discussion and future 
further enquiry.  
 
Important statements are marked for incorporation in the discussion. A full 
Summery of the transcripts is tabulated and given in Appendix H.  
 
4.9 Engaged Scholarship: Researcher-Research Relationship  
 
Given that I am a practitioner in this field I need to address this matter of the 
research and researcher relationship. Being a practitioner and a senior EHS 
manager is both an advantage and a disadvantage at the same time. The 
main advantages lie in the greater depth of understanding that I have as a 
practitioner with working knowledge and experience of EHS matters, 
organizational dynamics when it comes to EHS and also the first-hand 
experience with observing over the years of my practice of the impact of 
senior leadership influence on EHS performance in organizations.  
 
I have also some deeper understanding of the themes that initially emerged 
from the literature and they are consistent with my experience and make a 
great deal of sense. This deeper understanding also borne for the 
establishment of the sub-themes under these themes that initially evolved 
from the literature review will thus help me in the analysis of the data and 
hopefully determining greater meaning and appreciating the deeper 
underpinning reasons for certain discourses with leadership.  
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The disadvantages lie in the bias that is inevitably introduced from my 
understanding and view-points on issues that relate to EHS performance in 
an organizational context and where the role of leadership in either managing 
or directing EHS is concerned. The only way to overcome this is (a) to be 
aware of the bias and continue to question my analysis and view-point to see 
if it can be objectively supported by the data and ensure it does and when 
there is little or no data to support claims that I clearly establish that this view-
point is based on my personal experience which would be fair enough as it is 
also acquired knowledge and; (b) maintain a reflective account of key stages 
in the research as the reading, investigation, data collection (including the 
pilot work), analysis and interaction with the data to understand where. 
 
To this end, I have tried to have some reflective dialogues with fellow 
seasoned practitioners in order to continue to locate myself in the research 
and once again ensure that my conclusions are clearly related to either the 
data and findings or my personal experience and disposition on matters.  
117 
 
Chapter 5 – Quantitative Results & Data Analysis 
 
5.1 General Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a mixed methods approach was carried out to 
collect data in this study. This was exploratory research and required an in-
depth literature review to establish some themes which are then investigated 
at a later stage using the mixed methods. This was particularly the case as 
we were investigating aspects relating to three very different spheres or 
areas of knowledge, governance, EHS and leadership.  
 
In this chapter the themes extracted from the main review of the literature are 
discussed. Then the results of the pilot study are explored with the discussion 
on the importance of that study to produce a validated survey which was then 
tested in the next stage. The survey results are then also presented in 
various ways with both descriptive statistics and analysis. 
 
The results of the qualitative stage which involved a structured thematic 
content analysis of the interviews is explored and also the general data 
including other emerging themes and ideas are also presented and are later 
discussed more extensively in Chapter 6.  
 
This chapter comes in two key parts, which represent the initial stages of the 
research process. The first is a relatively short discussion of the Pilot Study 
results and the validation of the survey using the expert panel. The second is 
the quantitative results from the survey and due to the sample size of data 
the analysis has been limited to descriptive statistics. In the third part, a more 
detailed review of the results of the qualitative interviews is given. In the last 
part, a short discussion of the results of the two methods is presented. The 
details of the impact of the results and what they may mean is reserved to 
Chapter 6, the extensive discussion.  
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5.2 Pilot Study Results – Validation of Survey and Themes 
 
An initial pilot study was conducted in late 2011. This study used some of the 
research conducted during the earlier part of my DBA modular studies. 
Based on the discussions and as explained in Chapter 4, the questions were 
created following the emerging themes from the Literature Review 
undertaken (discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). 
 
In table 5.1 below the questions are given along with the themes that 
emerged from the literature review and the themes that emerged from the 
pilot study.  
 
Table 5.1: Survey Questions against Literature Review and Expert Panel 
Themes 
Sr. No Question (Final Form) Themes  
(Additional themes suggested by 
more than 9 respondents* are in 
Italics and Bold ) 
1.  The Board of Directors (BoD) needs to 
accept both formally and publicly their 
collective role in providing health and 
safety leadership in their organization. 
· Safety Leadership;  
· Influence & Accountability 
2.  The consultative process and 
communication of the Health and Safety 
Policy to all stakeholders is a key role of 
the BoD and not only the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) or Managing Director (MD). 
· Developing a Safety Culture 
and Communication;  
· Safety Leadership 
3.  Health & Safety is the full line manager’s 
responsibility and accountability and not in 
any way the BoD. 
· Safety Leadership;  
· Legal Imperative for Safety;  
· Influence and 
Accountability 
4.  The role of the BoD in Health & Safety 
leadership should be minimal; 
responsibility should only be with those 
who have an expertise in Health & Safety. 
· Safety Leadership;  
· Influence and 
Accountability;  
· EHS Knowledge and 
Competence. 
 
5.  Each Board Member needs to accept their 
individual role in providing health and 
safety leadership for their organization 
 
· Safety Leadership 
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Sr. No Question (Final Form) Themes  
(Additional themes suggested by 
more than 9 respondents* are in 
Italics and Bold ) 
6.  Each Board Member needs to appreciate 
that their actions/decisions (where 
applicable) should reinforce the health and 
safety policies and statements with no 
contradiction. 
· Influence and Accountability 
7.  The CEO/MD should reinforce directives 
given by the BoD even when they may not 
be aligned with the Health & Safety Policy.   
· Safety Leadership;  
· Influence and Accountability;  
· Risk Management 
8.  The BoD needs to ensure that board 
decisions are aligned where applicable to 
the health and safety policy statement. 
· Legal Imperative for Safety;  
· Developing a Safety Culture 
and Communication 
9.  The CEO/MD must ensure that the 
Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) 
Policy and Management Systems of 
Business Partners are at a similar level of 
effectiveness as his/her own organization.  
· Developing a Safety Culture 
and Communication;  
· Risk Management;  
· Operational Excellence & 
EHS Management Systems  
10.  The role of the BoD is to ensure that the 
CEO/MD demonstrates there are 
processes to maintain business 
relationships with other companies, 
organizations and service providers to 
ensure they have at least equally as 
effective EHS policies and management 
systems. 
· Monitoring of EHS 
Performance;  
· Risk Management 
11.  Safety Culture is a sub-set of the Health 
and Safety Department’s work and not the 
Organizational Working Culture. 
 
· Developing a Safety Culture 
and Communication 
12.  I would support the appointment of one of 
the BoD members as a “safety champion” 
as the “Health and Safety Director”. The 
champion may be the CEO/MD or even 
the chairman of the Board, but he or she 
should be assigned formally. 
 
· Developing a Safety Culture 
and Communication;  
· Influence and Accountability;  
· EHS Knowledge and 
Competence 
13.  The CEO/MD must ensure that the internal 
controls are set-up to ensure legal 
compliance to regulations, prevention of 
any EHS incidents and Company EHS 
performance remains effective.  
· Monitoring EHS Performance; 
· Influence and 
Accountability;  
· Operational Excellence and 
EHS Management Systems 
14.  The Senior EHS Manager/Director should 
report directly to the CEO/MD. 
· Influence and Accountability; 
· Reporting Structure and 
Hierarchies 
120 
 
Sr. No Question (Final Form) Themes  
(Additional themes suggested by 
more than 9 respondents* are in 
Italics and Bold ) 
15.  The EHS issues should be discussed in 
the Audit and Risk Committee of the 
Board. 
· Risk Management;  
· Monitoring EHS Performance;  
· Operational Excellence and 
EHS Management Systems 
16.  A separate EHSEHS Risk Committee 
should be set up that focuses only on EHS 
Risks and Issues at the Executive 
Committee Level.  
· Risk Management;  
· Influence and Accountability;  
· EHS Knowledge and 
Competence 
17.  EHS Risk Committees should involve 
executive managers from the company but 
no Board Directors. 
· Influence and Accountability;  
· Risk Management 
18.  As EHS issues have very little to do with 
future growth, EHS risk management 
should focus only on present risks and 
those arising from existing 
assets/operations. 
 
· Risk Management;  
· Legal Imperative for Safety;  
· Safety Leadership 
19.  Executive management is principally 
accountable for setting an agenda to 
improve and maintain high standards of 
EHS and safety.  
· Safety Leadership;  
· Operational Excellence and 
EHS Management Systems;  
· Influence and 
Accountability; EHS 
Knowledge and 
Competence 
 
20.  Executive management must not combine 
between the activities of the EHS risk 
management and the Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) committees.      
  
· Risk Management;  
· Operational Excellence and 
EHS Management Systems 
21.  Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
should be managed at the Board Level 
and not the Executive Management Level 
in an Organization.  
 
· Influence and Accountability;  
· Risk Management;  
· Safety Leadership 
22.  Board Directors must receive some formal 
basic awareness training in EHS and 
Safety. Training would typically include the 
obligations and responsibilities of 
company executive officers, employee 
rights to safe working environments, legal 
obligations etc. 
 
· EHS Knowledge and 
Competence 
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Sr. No Question (Final Form) Themes  
(Additional themes suggested by 
more than 9 respondents* are in 
Italics and Bold ) 
23.  Board Directors must at least once a year 
review the EHS statistics, incident 
analysis, improvement programs and other 
critical information relating to safety culture 
development and related investments. 
· Monitoring EHS Performance 
24.  The BoD should expect that the CEO/MD 
has a dedicated quarterly meeting with all 
the senior managers and EHS specialists 
to review safety and EHS performance of 
an organization.  
· Influence & Accountability;  
· Monitoring EHS Performance 
25.  The Company EHS Policy should be 
reviewed and endorsed by the Board of 
Directors before they are signed by the 
CEO/MD.    
· Influence & Accountability;  
· Safety Leadership 
26.  The Board of Directors must push the 
CEO/MD and their team to apply a zero 
target for all EHS and Safety Key 
Performance targets regardless of 
historical data and performance. 
· Developing a Safety Culture 
and Communication;  
· Safety Leadership  
· Influence & Accountability 
27.  The Board agenda must include EHS 
performance  issues to be discussed, even 
if briefly at every Board Meeting 
· Safety Leadership;  
· Monitoring EHS Performance 
 
The feedback gathered from the majority of the pilot study respondents was 
positive with respect to the study overall. Some of the expert panel 
respondents identified that they saw some merit in the study and in the actual 
questions. As explained in Chapter 4, some suggested changes in some of 
the questions and this was undertaken.  
 
5.3 Survey Results – Quantitative Enquiry 
 
Based on the survey feedback, whilst initially a total of 43 respondents were 
targeted the researcher was able to successfully undertake 30 
meetings/surveys with respondents. A total of 30 respondents on the surveys 
data were collected and 29 interviews were conducted (of which 26 were 
recorded/transcribed/analysed). Due to the nature of the respondents being 
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CEOs and senior executives/managers and managing directors it was not an 
easy task to gain access to everyone.   
 
All 30 survey requests to the executives were returned, providing survey 
response rate of 100%. Out of the 30 respondents (29 were interviewed); 19 
(63.3%) were from the Oil and Gas Industry. The remaining 11 (36.7%) were 
from non-Oil and Gas industry including shipping, manufacturing, 
construction and aviation. All those results are included in the analysis. 
  
The questionnaire included 27 variables and was based on the insights 
gained from the extensive literature review conducted by the researcher 
together with inputs from the expert panel of specialists. The 27 variables on 
the questionnaire were grouped and organized under 9 themes including 
Safety Leadership (meaning EHS Leadership also with 12 questions); 
Influence and Accountability (14 questions); Safety Culture and 
Communication (4 questions); Legal Imperatives for Safety/EHS (4 
questions); EHS Knowledge and Competence (3 questions); Operational 
Excellence and Management Systems (8 questions); Monitoring EHS 
Performance (6 questions); Reporting Structures and Hierarchies (1 
question); and Risk Management (7 questions). As explained in section 4.2, 
the questions related at times to more than one theme.  
 
5.3.1 Reliability Analysis 
 
Reliability of the measurement scale used for the study is very important as it 
ensures internal consistency. Reliability refers to a condition where a 
measurement process yields consistent scores over repeated 
measurements. Researchers use various approaches to ensure reliability 
and one of the most widely used approaches are the Cronbach Alpha test. 
This approach also estimates internal consistency of items included in the 
scale and determines whether the scale has a homogeneous structure or not.  
The reliability analysis was conducted on the variables in the data set used. 
The result of the reliability analysis for the overall scale is presented below. 
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Table 5.2: Cronbach’s Alpha test Result 
Cronbach's Alpha 
 
0.727  
N of Items 
 
27 
 
The Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.727 indicates that there is high reliability 
and internal consistency in the data gathered and the scale items are 
homogenous.  
 
5.3.2 General Descriptive Statistics 
 
The general descriptive statistics contain information on the frequencies, the 
percentage agreement with the statements on the questionnaire, mean and 
standard deviation provides a quick snapshot of the perceptions of the two 
groups of respondents (O&G and non-O&G) on the survey statements. 
 
Below in Table 5.3 contains containing the Mean Average; Standard 
Deviation; Percentage Agreement for the whole Group (i.e. N=30) and for the 
O&G and Non-O&G Groups (N=21 and N=11 respectively).  
 
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
N     Valid 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
30 
5.70 
.596 
30 
4.97 
1.12 
30 
4.90 
1.29 
30 
5.00 
1.11 
30 
5.10 
.803 
30 
5.60 
.563 
30 
4.77 
1.27 
30 
5.50 
.682 
30 
5.13 
.730 
30 
4.77 
1.00 
Oil & Gas               
N 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
19
21 
74 
19 
42 
31 
19 
36 
31 
19 
42 
26 
19 
58 
31 
19 
37 
58 
19 
37 
26 
19 
26 
63 
19 
47 
26 
19 
47 
16 
Non Oil & 
Gas       N 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
11 
9 
81 
11 
27 
45 
11 
36 
45 
11 
45 
54 
11 
54 
27 
11 
27 
73 
11 
27 
54 
11 
36 
54 
11 
45 
45 
11 
9 
45 
Agree %    
Strongly 
Agree & 
Total %           
N = 30 
17 
77 
94 
37 
37 
74 
37 
37 
84 
43 
37 
80 
57 
30 
87 
33 
63 
96 
30 
37 
67 
30 
60 
90 
47 
33 
80 
33 
27 
60 
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 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
Oil & Gas 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
5.68 
.582 
 
5.00 
.882 
 
4.84 
.279 
 
4.68 
1.25 
 
5.11 
.875 
 
5.53 
.612 
 
4.47 
1.34 
 
5.53 
.697 
 
5.00 
.745 
 
4.68 
.946 
Non-Oil and 
Gas 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
5.73 
.647 
 
4.91 
1.51 
 
5.00 
1.48 
 
5.55 
.522 
 
5.09 
.701 
 
5.73 
.467 
 
5.27 
1.00 
 
5.45 
.688 
 
5.36 
.674 
 
4.91 
1.13 
 
 
 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 
N     Valid 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
30 
5.30 
.702 
30 
4.47 
1.16 
30 
5.80 
.407 
30 
5.40 
.855 
30 
5.17 
1.117 
30 
4.97 
1.15 
30 
3.10 
1.44 
30 
5.03 
1.12 
30 
5.07 
1.01 
30 
3.97 
1.40 
Oil & Gas          
N 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
 
47 
36 
 
36 
21 
 
36 
31 
 
21 
60 
 
47 
37 
 
42 
37 
 
10 
26 
 
47 
26 
 
37 
37 
 
16 
37 
Non Oil & 
Gas  N 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
 
36 
54 
 
27 
18 
 
18 
81 
 
27 
63 
 
18 
63 
 
45 
36 
 
27 
63 
 
27 
63 
 
36 
45 
 
54 
18 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
Total %     
N = 30 
43 
43 
86 
33 
20 
53 
20 
80 
100 
23 
60 
83 
37 
47 
84 
43 
37 
80 
26 
 
26 
40 
40 
80 
37 
40 
77 
43 
6 
49 
Oil & Gas 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
5.21 
.713 
 
4.58 
1.17 
 
5.79 
.419 
 
5.32 
.946 
 
5.16 
.834 
 
4.95 
1.17 
 
3.00 
1.49 
 
4.79 
1.18 
 
4.95 
1.12 
 
3.53 
1.389 
Non-Oil 
and Gas 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
5.45 
.688 
 
4.27 
1.19 
 
5.82 
.405 
 
5.55 
.688 
 
5.18 
1 .53 
 
5.00 
.1.18 
 
3.27 
1.42 
 
5.45 
.934 
 
5.27 
.786 
 
4.73 
1.10 
 
 
 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 
N     Valid 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
30 
3.63 
1.56 
30 
5.33 
.606 
30 
5.87 
.346 
30 
5.77 
.504 
30 
4.90 
1.06 
30 
5.10 
.960 
30 
5.57 
.568 
Oil & Gas % 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
 
37 
5 
 
58 
37 
 
16 
84 
 
21 
79 
 
47 
21 
 
37 
42 
 
37 
58 
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Non Oil & Gas % 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
 
27 
9 
 
45 
45 
 
9 
91 
 
9 
82 
 
64 
36 
 
36 
36 
 
36 
64 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
Total % 
33 
7 
40 
53 
40 
93 
13 
87 
100 
17 
80 
97 
53 
27 
80 
37 
40 
77 
37 
60 
97 
Oil & Gas 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
 
3.63 
1.57 
 
5.32 
.582 
 
5.84 
.375 
 
5.79 
.419 
 
4.63 
1.21 
 
5.11 
1.04 
 
5.33 
.612 
Non-Oil and Gas 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
 
3.64 
1.62 
 
5.36 
.674 
 
5.91 
.302 
 
5.73 
.647 
 
5.36 
.505 
 
5.09 
.831 
 
5.64 
.505 
 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the 4 most agreement question statements and the 
4 least agreed with questions respectively.  
 
Table 5.4: Top Four – Agreement Question Statements 
All Respondents Percentage Themes Related 
Q.13 The CEO/MD must ensure that the internal 
controls are set-up to ensure legal compliance to 
regulations, prevention of any EHS incidents and 
Company EHS performance remains effective. 
100% · Monitoring EHS 
Performance; 
· Influence and 
Accountability;  
· Operational 
Excellence and 
EHS 
Management 
Systems 
Q.23  Board Directors must at least once a year 
review the EHS statistics, incident analysis, 
improvement programs and other critical 
information relating to safety culture development 
and related investments. 
100% · Monitoring EHS 
Performance 
Q.24 The BoD should expect that the CEO/MD 
has a dedicated quarterly meeting with all the 
senior managers and EHS specialists to review 
safety and EHS performance of an organization.  
97% · Influence & 
Accountability;  
· Monitoring EHS 
Performance 
Q.27 The Board agenda must include EHS 
performance  issues to be discussed, even if 
briefly at every Board Meeting 
97% · Safety 
Leadership;  
· Monitoring EHS 
Performance 
 
From table 5.4 it would seem that there is strong agreement if not a near 
100% consensus from all respondents on issues that relate to matters that 
relate strongly to Monitoring of EHS Performance and the oversight 
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matters related to EHS leadership. The questions may be criticized as being 
possibly “socially desirable behaviour questions”; the reality is that they all 
ask simple and critical questions relating to best practice and in fact at times 
to minimum best practice rather than best in class actions.  
 
On the other hand Table 5.5 shows another very interesting finding. 
Practically less than 50% agree with 4 of the 27 questions. The common 
denominator between these questions is Risk Management. This may just 
be a reflection even within a relatively small Group of respondents how 
different organizations and industries manage enterprise (and EHS) risks. 
Thus, the great difference and disagreement with the questions can be seen 
here.  
 
 Table 5.5: Top Four – Least Agreement Question Statements 
All Respondents Percentage Themes Related 
Q.12 Executive management must not combine 
between the activities of the EHS risk management 
and the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
committees.       
53% · Risk 
Management;  
· Operational 
Excellence and 
EHS Management 
Systems 
Q.17 Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) should 
be managed at the Board Level and not the 
Executive Management Level in an Organization.  
26% · Influence and 
Accountability;  
· Risk 
Management;  
· Safety Leadership  
Q.20 Executive management must not combine 
between the activities of the EHS risk management 
and the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) 
committees.       
49% · Risk 
Management;  
· Operational 
Excellence and 
EHS Management 
Systems 
Q.21 Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) should 
be managed at the Board Level and not the 
Executive Management Level in an Organization.  
40% · Influence and 
Accountability;  
· Risk 
Management;  
· Safety Leadership  
 
Between the two Groups the biggest differences between the means are 
observable in Q4. The role of the BoD in Health & Safety leadership 
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should be minimal; responsibility should only be with those who have 
an expertise in Health & Safety where we had a significantly lower 
(corrected as this is a reversed question) agreement with best practice with 
the Oil and Gas Group with a mean of 4.68 (78%) with 68% of respondents 
agreeing or strongly agreeing, against 5.55 (92.5%) for non-Oil and Gas with 
99% of respondents agreeing. This may indicate that in the Oil and Gas 
sector more executives believe that health and safety should be driven by the 
specialists. This may reflect the industry realities and will be discussed 
further in Chapter 6.  
 
Lastly on the descriptive statistics, we see a marked difference between the 
mean scores in Q.20 Executive management must not combine between 
the activities of the EHS risk management and the Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) committees.  Here the Oil and Gas Group who had a 
mean of 3.53 (58.8%) with 53% of respondents agreeing or strongly 
agreeing, against 4.73 (78.8%) for non-Oil and Gas with 72% of respondents 
agreeing. Again as this is a corrected and thus reversed code-score 
question, it would seem that there is greater acceptance that at an ERM level 
there is greater integration of EHS risks into the organizational enterprise risk 
management system in the Oil and Gas sector’s leadership.  
 
The mean score for the 19 question statements out of 27 statements on the 
questionnaire was approximately 5.00 and the questions statements no. 17, 
20 and 21 as discussed above show a markedly lower mean of 3.10, 3.97 
and 3.63 respectively which indicates as discussed above a lower 
agreement. In terms of the Standard deviation (SD) values, across all the 
statements, there is no significant deviation from the mean as mostly the SD 
values range from 0.596 to 1.40. There percentage agreement ranges 
between 80-100% on 18 of the 27 question statements.   
 
5.3.3 Further Quantitative Analysis  
 
Limited by the fact that the population of CEOs and MDs is generally 
significantly smaller than other types of managers and employees within 
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organisations this limited the data points which meant that statistically 
significant analysis would be difficult to rely on within an acceptable level of 
accuracy to build further on. Therefore the statistical analysis using t-tests, 
ANOVA, correlations and factor analysis was not undertaken as the data, 
due to the sample size, would yield statistically unreliable data analysis.  
 
It is for this reason that further exploratory work is required as well. In the 
next chapter 6, a more in-depth and detailed qualitative review is undertaken.  
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Chapter 6 – Qualitative Inquiry - Results & Data Analysis 
 
6.1 Introduction: 
 
A total of 29 interviews were conducted in the course of this study. All were 
recorded except three interviews in which two respondents declined the 
recording and the recording device for the third respondent failed due to the 
battery running out. However, with 26 interviews a very good structured 
thematic content analysis was achieved.  In this section four key areas are 
explored: 
 
(1) The key differences and similarities between the perception of senior 
leadership in the O&G organizations as opposed to the non-O&G 
organizations. This is done through a quantitative analysis of the 
various transcripts reviewed; 
(2) Establish how senior leadership express their thoughts and ideas both 
directly and indirectly about the various emerging themes (and sub-
themes) from the literature review and through their explanation 
explore and evaluate their general views on best practice 
(standards/practices) as given in the literature; 
(3) Establish what the senior leadership see is the future of safety 
leadership and governance in their industry and the high risk/high 
reliability organizations; 
(4) Explore and seek to understand the rationale underpinning the senior 
leadership views on the impact of board structure on EHS 
performance in high risk high reliability organizations.  
 
Appendix H gives a comprehensive table of the structured content analysis 
data as collated and a summary table is given below in Table 6.1. 
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6.2 Overview of the Results  
 
Table 6.1: Summary Table for Facts about Interviews Conducted 
Date of First Interview 11th December 2012 
Date of Last Interview 10th August 2013 
Total Number of Interviews conducted 29 
Total No of recordings  26 
Total number of transcripts 26 
Total Recording Time from Interviews (approximate) 936 Minutes (15 Hours 
and 40 Minutes) 
Average Interview Duration (approximate) 36 Minutes 
Total No of words analyzed from all transcripts 159,536 words 
Average No of words per Transcript 6,136 words 
Longest Interview  Interview No. 12 – 
1’19”47’’’ 
Shortest Interview Interview No. 4 - 15’02” 
Total number of extracted statements relating to Lit Review 
Emerged 9 Established Themes 
2319 
Approx. Average number of extracted statements relating to Lit 
Review 9 Established Themes 
86 
Highest No of Extracted Statements (Group Average) 18.68% Developing a 
Safety Culture and 
Communications 
Lowest No. of Extracted Statements (Group Average) 4.13% Reporting 
Structures and 
Hierarchies 
No. of Additional Statements extracted relating to other 
potential emerging themes (Total) 
95 
No. of Additional Statements extracted relating to other 
potential emerging themes (Average per Interview /Max/Min) 
3.5; Max. 8; Min. 0 
 
Figure 6.1 below shows the average distribution of statements for the whole 
Group put together (i.e. O&G and Non-O&G).  
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Figure 6.1: Average Percentage of Statements out of the 9 Established 
Themes (Whole Group of Respondents – Total 26 Transcripts Analysis) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Average Percentage of Statements out of the 9 Established 
Themes (O&G Respondents – Total 17 Transcripts Analysis) 
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Figure 6.3: Average Percentage of Statements out of the 9 Established 
Themes (Non-O&G Respondents – Total 9 Transcripts Analysis) 
 
 
 
Clearly there is very little difference in the trends we see with the percentage 
of statements in both groups and the trends seem to be very similar with the 
exception of differences of nearly 2 percentage points with Risk 
Management, Monitoring EHS Performance, Influence and Accountability 
and Legal Imperatives for Safety. The number of statements ranks as 
follows: 
 
1. Developing a Safety Culture and Communication 
2. Safety/EHS Leadership 
3. Influence and Accountability 
4. Monitoring EHS Performance 
5. Risk Management 
6. EHS Awareness, Knowledge and Competence 
7. Operational Excellence & Systems 
8. Legal Imperatives for Safety 
9. Reporting Structures and Hierarchies 
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Overall, the differences we see between the two groups are more statements 
on Risk Management in the Non-O&G organizations (11% compared to 9%); 
Monitoring EHS Performance with O&G organizations with more statements 
(13% as opposed to 10%); Legal imperatives for safety high number of 
average statements in the non-O&G organizations (9% as opposed to 7% in 
O&G) and finally Influence and Accountability with more statements from 
O&G (i.e. 14% against 13%).  
 
6.3 Thematic Analysis – Exploring the Themes emerging from the 
Literature Review: 
 
In this section, the key themes and the subthemes are determined and 
further categorised with due reference to the various quotes extracted from 
the various interviews undertaken. These are tabulated and discussed. The 
data collected are very rich, supported by numerous quotations from the 
respondents. In the following sections a representative sample under each 
theme is reported and discussed.   
 
6.3.1 Developing a Safety (EHS) Culture and Communication 
 
This theme is very significant with most of the leaders interviewed. The 
lowest percentage of statements relating to this theme upon analysis of the 
transcripts was in one manufacturing company at around 9.38% and the 
highest was 25% from an Oil and Gas Storage Company. The average for 
the whole Group was around 18.68% which is the highest when compared to 
all other themes.  
 
A total of 8 sub-themes were established through a review of all of the quotes 
extracted that related to EHS Culture and Communications. These are 
represented in Figure 6.4. 
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Key 
Theme
Sub-
Themes
Safety/EHS 
Culture & 
Communication
1. Leadership 
Creates Culture
2. Foundation is 
Transparency 
Reporting & “No-blame” 
Culture
3. A Culture of Safe 
Behaviors 
4. A Culture where 
Safety/EHS is a Value
5. Compliance & 
Consequence 
Management Culture
6. High Reliability  
Culture
7. Learning 
Organization Culture
8. International 
Practices Influences  
EHS/Safety Culture –
Especially with Larger 
Organizations
 
 
Figure 6.4: Sub-themes of the Key Theme Safety Culture and 
Communication 
 
6.3.1.1 Leadership Creates a Culture and influences/sets agenda for change: 
 
The first and strongest sub-theme to emerge from the data analysis was that 
leadership creates and influences the effective development of a safety/EHS 
culture and communication. Some companies already have a flourishing 
safety/EHS culture, while others are still exploring how to develop one.  
 
Table 6.2 is a representative collection of some of the quotes extracted from 
the interview transcripts relating to this sub-theme. 
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Table 6.2: Sub-Theme - Leadership Creates a Culture and 
influences/sets agenda for change 
Representative Data Reference 
“…I can talk about my Board. EHS isn’t high of their agenda…yet. We’re 
trying as an organization to get a more EHS aware, especially from process 
safety”  
Respondent 5, 
O&G 
Downstream; 
Page 4 
“…..20 years ago we wouldn’t be having this discussion, because the only 
discussion we will be having is on financial performance and shareholder 
value. Everybody’s maturing down this path!”  
Respondent 5; 
O&G 
Downstream 
Page 8 
“It’s kind of like, it’s the first thing that we would talk about as I mentioned to 
you before in any of our meetings and as part of our business conduct is to 
be a safe partner in communities where we operate and in business that we 
conduct”  
Respondent 6: 
O&G Refining 
page 4 
“They should be directing, what I see they should be directing managers or 
senior manager towards leadership and enforcing that to be as apart of the 
culture in their organization. So they need to be…”  
Respondent 2, 
O&G 
Downstream 
Page 1 
“First EHS is there, the first thing you look at is the safety of your people. 
And that’s why that’s the most important part to start with and then yes the 
other issues and the legal compliances must be there.”. (Page 4). 
Respondent 2, 
O&G 
Downstream  
Page 4 
“So I think that they have to give direction to the executive powers within 
the company. That they have to integrate safety culture as part of the 
overall corporate culture. I have seen it that they play a very pivotal and 
strategic role when it comes to this sort of integration. So that’s basically 
see uh, they must ensure that the management of the company integrate 
overall business, ethics and culture and the way we do business and safety 
agro comes in with their guidance.”  
Respondent 3, 
O&G 
Downstream  
Page 1 
“It all improves the safety of the HSE culture of an organisation. It starts, it 
starts its bottom up and top down and if HSE has not been discussed at top 
level, at a top level meeting you don’t have to talk about details, you know 
you don’t have to talk about details. But in general you have to make sure 
that it’s being discussed there.”  
Respondent 28, 
O&G 
Downstream  
page 4 
“at the Board level any meeting will not start then unless the subject is on 
EHS then you have to start with a SHEQ moment”  
Respondent 8, 
O&G Refining 
page 2 
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“I mean one thing we have is the, like I said the trickle down culture. Um... 
we, everyone in our management. We always focus on safety first, 
whenever we discuss, we go visit a site, whenever we have meetings; we 
always start off with a safety. And we always end by reminding everybody 
of the safety. So there’s a trickle down culture from the top down, where we 
keep stressing to everyone that this is a key part of our business.”  
Respondent 10, 
Heavy 
Manufacturing, 
Page 16 
 
Some leaders recognized that they were at an early stage in their journey 
with their BoD include Respondent 5 from the Oil and Gas industry, who said:  
 
“…I can talk about my Board. EHS isn’t high of their agenda…yet. We’re trying as 
an organization to get a more EHS aware, especially from process safety” (Page 4).  
 
But he later observed that there is now no alternative to developing an EHS 
culture: “…..20 years ago we wouldn’t be having this discussion, because the only 
discussion we will be having is on financial performance and shareholder value. 
Everybody’s maturing down this path!” (Page 8).  
 
On the other hand, another respondent from the same industry indicates that 
such a culture is quite engrained in their management and leadership 
practice: 
 
“It’s kind of like, it’s the first thing that we would talk about as I mentioned to you 
before in any of our meetings and as part of our business conduct is to be a safe 
partner in communities where we operate and in business that we conduct” 
[Respondent 6: page 4]. 
 
This shows that even within the same industry there are different levels of 
maturity within the leadership team practices in different organisations, 
perhaps due to matters related to their relationship with other organisations, 
international operations and/or partners and stakeholders.  
 
On the very role of leadership in creating or otherwise influencing the 
development of a safety/EHS culture, some respondents, when asked 
directly about the role of the BoD report that they play a role in directing 
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managers to make EHS very much part of the culture of an organisation. An 
example is Respondent 2 in table 6.2.  
 
Another leader from the oil and gas sector notes that the integration of safety 
as part of the overall company culture is very critical and that the leadership 
plays that vital role:  
“So I think that they have to give direction to the executive powers within the 
company. That they have to integrate safety culture as part of the overall corporate 
culture. I have seen it that they play a very pivotal and strategic role when it comes 
to this sort of integration.” [Respondent 3: Page 1] 
 
Respondent 28 when probed on the issue of improving safety/EHS culture 
and the role of leadership responds that whilst the details are not discussed 
at the top the EHS matters need to be both a bottom up and top down 
approach.  
 
Here he makes reference to EHS matters being discussed at the top level of 
boards. But of those which have developed a safety/EHS culture, some 
thought it necessary that it start from the top. For example, in the oil and gas 
refining industry, Respondent 8 said that in his company: 
 
“at the Board level any meeting will not start then unless the subject is on EHS then 
you have to start with a SHEQ moment” [Respondent 8: Page 2] 
 
Note here that a SHEQ moment is a Safety, Health, Environment and Quality 
Moment which is a short 5 minutes briefing which all meetings in some 
organizations start with as part of the safety/EHS culture of that organization.  
 
A trickledown effect is described by one of the respondents, reinforcing the 
idea that the change in safety and EHS culture comes from the top of an 
organisations: 
 
“So there’s a trickle down culture from the top down, where we keep stressing to 
everyone that this is a key part of our business.” [Respondent 10, Page 16].  
 
138 
 
But it is the experience of these senior executives that, as Respondent 8 
observed, the culture had to be ‘at every level’ of the organization.  
 
“…..It’s almost on-going eh. Either by e-mail, by posters, on the company web-site 
er….meeting starts with HSE safety moment er so it’s, it’s just, its being drawn to be 
part of the day to day business”. [Respondent 8, Page 5]. 
The importance of participation in EHS events with the employees and 
workers helps shape the culture within an organisation. Some respondents 
explained that the involvement of senior leadership was critical to driving the 
change by participating actively in events and presenting with these EHS 
promotional activities. This was the opportunity for management to be part of 
making EHS issues very much alive and to demonstrate to the workforce that 
it is one of these important things they don’t only monitor and take interest in, 
but lead and personally engage with.  
 
“So, we conduct 4 times, safety gathering days, in each day in one place. And 
myself I attend these gatherings also, its gathering that having the employees of the 
company and the contractor’s employees. So it’s a, it’s a one family together in that 
day. And we address each element a lot, so we address health, we address safety, 
we address security, we address environment. And each one has got its own 
session, questionnaires, speeches and er…I’m also making sure that I am present 
in each event myself. And I will say my talk, maybe I take only 1 or 2 minutes per 
topic, for health and safety and so on. But also we speak it into several languages. 
We speak it Arabic, English, Malayalam, Tamil, Hindi to make sure that the 
message reaches to the er the lowest position in the contractors and the company.” 
[Respondent 20, page 7].  
 
6.3.1.2 Reporting, Transparency and “No-Blame” Culture 
 
The need to avoid blaming individuals for accidents drives this company’s 
policy of embedding safety throughout its day-to-day activities. But in 
maturing organisational EHS cultures it is noted that reporting, transparency 
and creating a “no-blame culture” are the foundations of a good and healthy 
culture.  
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Table 6.3: Sub-Theme - Changing the behaviours is key to changing the EHS 
culture 
Representative Data Reference 
“So I think one thing you do, is you have the good foundations laid. So 
you have excellent reporting, you have good communication, you have 
processes in place to manage safety and that’s a broad statement and 
there’s a lot to that and having all the procedures, the rules, 
expectations and all that stuff. People there to supervise when you’re 
having structure work, every kind of work that’s being done is 
supervised where people are competent, permanent work systems, you 
know this whole infrastructure, where you can say, boy you can, you go 
home in the day and you say, you know I have done really everything 
possible within my power to ensure that you know we’ve minimised the 
chance of accidents.”  
Respondent 9, 
O&G Upstream 
Page 7 
“So I educate them and explain it to them. When an incident happens 
we have the one, one, one rule. One day is where we announce that to 
all concerned, all company employees that an incident has occurred. 
Then in one week we issue a preliminary report, and then in one month 
we issue a full investigation report. So, they understand the sequence 
and as again part of education.”  
 Respondent 8, 
O&G Refining, 
page 7 
“Whatever we have you know, whatever…so we get good record, good 
achievements when we receive an award for safety. But if anything 
happens, you know, no one going to be blame no one. So that’s why 
we are very careful that we have to do whatever we do, follow up, train, 
awareness and continuous meetings and so on, just to avoid whatever, 
what can, could happen.”  
Respondent 
19, O&G 
Upstream, 
page 8 
“…..you know, lots of people tend not to be able to cope with 
communicating bad news upwards and the difficulty is that you know if 
I’m sitting there being told, now everything’s fine and I have a green, 
green risk register in front of me, some people are very comfortable and 
say fine…..”  
Respondent 
12, Aviation, 
Page 6 
“now it’s unfortunate that most, most organizations are driven by a 
reactionary motivator” and “….HSE is, is the first topic of discussion 
and usually the last topic of discussion in any Board meeting”  
Respondent 
22, Oil and 
Gas Upstream, 
Page 2 
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This is illustrated in Respondent 9’s quote in the table above. Building a 
strong culture requires good foundations with excellent communications and 
open reporting and strong systems and processes in place. Competent 
people are needed to work and supervise working within those open 
systems.  
 
Where it is clear that incidents are opportunities for learning and sharing that 
learning in order to avoid reoccurrences, this requires a mature 
organisational culture where the negative stigma associated to incidents is 
replaced with a structured and disciplined approach where the incident is 
communicated and the process of learning is undertaken. This is described 
well in Respondent 8’s quote give in table 6.3.  
 
The concept of “no blame” culture is one which industry has struggled with as 
discussed in the literature review.  
 
“But if anything happens, you know, no one going to be blame no one. So that’s why 
we are very careful that we have to do whatever we do, follow up, train, awareness 
and continuous meetings and so on, just to avoid whatever, what can, could 
happen.” (Respondent 19, page 8).  
 
But some respondents were acutely aware that individual psychologies could 
hinder the development of a safety culture. This involves difficulties people 
experience in communicating or receiving bad news. Compare Respondent 
12, from the Aviation industry: 
 
“…..you know, lots of people tend not to be able to cope with communicating bad 
news upwards and the difficulty is that you know if I’m sitting there being told, now 
everything’s fine…..” [Respondent 12, Aviation, Page 6]. 
 
With Respondent 22, from Oil and Gas Upstream, who observed: 
 
“now it’s unfortunate that most, most organizations are driven by a reactionary 
motivator” and “….HSE is, is the first topic of discussion and usually the last topic of 
discussion in any Board meeting” [Respondent 22, Oil and Gas Upstream, Page 2]. 
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That is, there are reasons for the inability to give or receive bad news, and 
this includes the profit motive, which may be the reason why people are 
reluctant to discuss or to hear about EHS issues. 
 
The need to avoid being blamed for accidents drives his company’s EHS 
culture. A balance is definitely required between holding people accountable 
for their actions, transparency but if this is in the context of a just culture and 
organisations where the rules and expectation for safe behaviours are clear, 
a “no-blame” culture can be created in which effective learning from 
accidents and incidents would be more readily facilitated.  
 
6.3.1.3 Changing the behaviours is key to changing the EHS culture 
 
Changing behaviours of employees and contractors is a challenging task. It 
takes time to change a culture within an organisation, and this should be 
appreciated. Many of the leaders interviewed appreciated that changing 
behaviours was critical to making that overall cultural change within the 
organisation. Some of these extracts are given in table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.4: Sub-Theme - Changing the behaviours is key to changing the EHS 
culture 
Representative Data Reference 
“Another program that we run is a behaviour based safety system and 
we were the second company in our industry to start using this. Our HSE 
manager at the time and I, were trying to figure out, how do we change 
behaviour. How do we change behaviour, well first, you measure it. So 
we started measuring behaviour and we gave, we come up with 10 
simple rules. These are our rules, we will never break these rules. And, 
they were very simple, don’t stand under a suspended load, don’t slide 
downstairs, very simple stuff. And, then we started to measure this, 
every day. A number of supervisors would just be observing and they’d 
mark down good behaviour, bad behaviour. So, we’d get a behaviour 
based score for the crew and then the 3 crews on the rig and then the 
whole rig. And, this was just another way to try to understand behaviour 
Respondent 
22, O&G 
Upstream 
page 9 
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and measure it. If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.”  
“They should, they must show their commitment towards, towards safety 
and it must be of course embedded in their, in their hearts that safety is 
a, is a very important ingredient or integral, integral parts of their, their 
work. And they cannot work without looking into safety. Again they look 
into er building up the culture of safety er they move into consultative 
approach to the employees convincing skills to convince that everybody 
must abide to safety. And again if requires disciplinary issues, actions, it 
has to be taken er but leaving things open and loose ends, safety 
is…safety is something that people are having difficulties to go with 
because the nature of human being, they like to er cut corners in order to 
achieve their goals and safety is the last thing they think about. So really 
it’s very important that er…we need to be always vigilant on the safety 
side. So have rules and regulations, implement them.”  
Respondent 
20, Power & 
Utilities, 
page 5 
“That then leads to some behavioural introduction in a way, where you 
start to get people engaged more in behavioural safety. So in our 
journey, we’re in the foothills of behavioural safety. A lot of front line staff 
are starting to go and do simple things like safe and unsafe behaviours 
auditing which they didn’t do 2 years ago but now they’re starting to do it. 
And they’re starting to get use to people asking them questions about, 
well you know, what job are you doing and how can it go wrong and how 
can you get hurt. Um and its early, early days, I wouldn’t say we’ve got 
quite yet to brother’s keeper. Where if 2 guys are working in the front line 
and one of them forgotten to put his hat on, will the other guy say, oop 
you’re not coming out with me until you’ve put your hat on and oop 
you’re not touching that machine until you’ve switched it off.”  
Respondent 
15, 
Shipping, 
page 5 
“We focused for decades on personal safety, and we’re getting pretty 
good in personal safety in providing the necessary procedures, 
hardware, whatever. And what’s come up in the last few years is process 
safety; we’re realizing that unless we get process safety under control 
we could have a serious personal incident”  
Respondent 
5, O&G 
Refining, 
Page 3 
 
Respondent 26 from the upstream oil and gas business explains that the 
change must be gradual and explains that the program cannot be a sudden 
change that will create a “big shock” as he describes it. He goes on to explain 
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that a sustained effort moving forward and injecting initiatives such as 
behavioural based safety programs are required.   
 
This view is further supported by an upstream oil and gas business leader 
who explains that their behaviour based safety program is fundamentally 
created a foundation of 10 simple rules which they call the golden rules. He 
adds that by creating these 10 rules, it is then easy through observation to 
measure compliance and adherence and thus manage behaviour and 
safety/EHS performance. He reinforces this widely accepted view that: 
 
“If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.” [Respondent 22, page 9] 
 
Even in the Power and Utilities industry the need for behavioural change 
programmes to create the safety and EHS culture is greatly appreciated. 
Changing the hearts of people to see safety and EHS as a very important 
personnel value as it is otherwise natural for them is explained by respondent 
20: 
 
“Again they look into er building up the culture of safety er they move into 
consultative approach to the employees convincing skills to convince that everybody 
must abide to safety. And again if requires disciplinary issues, actions, it has to be 
taken er but leaving things open and loose ends, safety is…safety is something that 
people are having difficulties to go with because the nature of human being, they 
like to er cut corners in order to achieve their goals and safety is the last thing they 
think about..” [Respondent 20, page 5].  
 
Respondent 15, from the Maritime and Shipping industry also talks about 
behavioural change to engage people in safety and describes it like others as 
a journey. He describes the change that has been brought about by 
formalised auditing, awareness and persons taking personal responsibility for 
safety which is changing cultures but yet recognising that it is a long journey.  
 
“That then leads to some behavioural introduction in a way, where you start to get 
people engaged more in behavioural safety. So in our journey, we’re in the foothills 
of behavioural safety”. [Respondent 15, page 5] 
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On the other hand there is also some feeling that the focus on personal 
safety has been overdone in a way and a call to return to process safety 
management which is more focused on engineering controls, mechanistic 
systems and standard operating procedures and safety integrity studies is 
required to create a safe working culture as well. This is illustrated by 
respondent 5 from the refining industry.  
  
“We focused for decades on personal safety, and we’re getting pretty good in 
personal safety in providing the necessary procedures, hardware, whatever. And 
what’s come up in the last few years is process safety; we’re realizing that unless 
we get process safety under control we could have a serious personal incident” 
[Respondent 5, O&G Refining, Page 3] 
 
Again, the key result area is well articulated in this last quote by respondent 
1, which suggests ultimately people must be motivated to operate safely to 
create the safety culture. 
 
“….EHS you know I suppose we are working on the culture….the software…I think 
that more important (i.e. than having certified systems)….You know they are a part 
of improving the safety culture…about buying you know people being safe because 
they want to be safe not because we told that you, you have to be. That I think 
needs work.” [Respondent 1, Oil and Gas, Oil Storage, Page 13]. 
 
6.3.1.4 General EHS Culture where EHS is a Value 
 
Those who regard EHS as arising out of a moral imperative connect EHS 
with  CSR and are very much consistent with the IOSH CSR guide to 
practitioners identify 5 main types of stakeholder including (1) Customers; (2) 
Employees; (3) Suppliers and Contractors; (4) Shareholders and (5) Society 
at large [Asbury and Ball, 2009].  
 
However, EHS Culture means that culture where EHS is a value. Table 6.5 
lists some examples of extracts of statements from the interviews conducted 
that relate to this. 
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Table 6.5: Sub-Theme - General EHS Culture where EHS is a Value 
Representative Data Reference 
“…..if you are the Manager of people, safety is about people whether 
they are customers, staff, whatever!”  
Respondent 
12, Aviation, 
Page 4 
“….and that the EHS culture that we strive to achieve within the 
organization is very correctly understood by them (i.e. the Board), 
communicated to all external agencies because that is the role of the 
Board”.  
Respondent 8, 
O&G Refining 
Page 1 
“….and our culture is so well developed and progressed in all 
aspects of EHS and its so prolific that the people understand it’s the 
core components of their job”  
Respondent 6, 
O&G, Oil 
Major, Page 
14 
“…..and it must be of course embedded in their, hearts that safety is 
a, is a very important ingredient or integral, integral parts of their, 
their work. And that they cannot work without looking into safety”  
Respondent 
20, Power and 
Utilities, Page 
2 
“Another program that we run is a behaviour based safety system 
and we were the second company in our industry to start using this. 
Our HSE manager at the time and I, were trying to figure out, how 
we change behaviour. How do we change behaviour, well first, you 
measure it. So we started measuring behaviour and we gave, we 
come up with 10 simple rules. These are our rules; we will never 
break these rules. And, they were very simple, don’t stand under a 
suspended load, don’t slide downstairs, very simple stuff. And, then 
we started to measure this, every day. A number of supervisors 
would just be observing and they’d mark down good behaviour, bad 
behaviour. So, we’d get a behaviour based score for the crew and 
then the 3 crews on the rig and then the whole rig. And, this was just 
another way to try to understand behaviour and measure it. If you 
can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.”  
 
Respondent 
22, O&G 
Upstream, 
Page 9 
“Safety is a culture you know, if you don’t have EHS culture within 
the company it doesn’t work. And how the culture will come? The 
culture will come from 2 things, people’s beliefs, how do their 
behaviour, sorry, not belief and behaviour (laughs) and the 
Respondent 
19, O&G, 
Upstream, 
Page 16 
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Representative Data Reference 
regulation. You have the right standard regulation and you have 
people which respect the standard regulation and it’s mixed together 
and this is the culture we’ll build. And what we can they see, they 
see the leader so here the leadership is important. Er…they will see 
their management and their leader.”  
 
This Aviation industry leader sees safety culture as arising from one’s 
obligations to other people, and said:  
 
“…..if you are the Manager of people, safety is about people whether they are 
customers, staff, whatever!” [Respondent 12, Aviation, Page 4].  
 
And here stakeholder communication is very important and demonstrated in 
the quote by Respondent 8. In fact this is seen as a role of the Board to 
communicate the culture of an organisation.  
 
“….and that the EHS culture that we strive to achieve within the organization is very 
correctly understood by them (i.e. the Board), communicated to all external agencies 
because that is the role of the Board”. [Respondent 8, O&G, Refining Page 1]. 
 
Another leader talks about a more inoculated culture within the organisation 
and one where EHS a core component of their every job which drives EHS 
as being a core value rather than just a responsibility and accountability.  
 
“….and our culture is so well developed and progressed in all aspects of EHS and 
its so prolific that the people understand it’s the core components of their job” 
[Respondent 6, O&G, Oil Major, Page 14]. 
 
This is also echoed by another leader from a different industry, the Power 
and Utilities when he says: 
 
“…..and it must be of course embedded in their, hearts that safety is a, is a very 
important ingredient or integral, integral parts of their, their work. And that they 
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cannot work without looking into safety” [Respondent 20, Power and Utilities, Page 
2]. 
 
The development of behavioural based safety programs in organisations has 
been something that many industries starting adopting in the past 10-15 
years. They saw that whilst systems, procedures and policies defined 
practices, the behaviours of employees and contractors defined performance 
at the end of the day.  This also helped make serious changes in the culture 
within organisations as described by Respondent 22 in table 6.5.  
 
To this end this particular next quote is from a CEO who won an international 
safety leadership award in 2012 explains very simply:  
 
“Safety is a culture you know, if you don’t have EHS culture within the company it 
doesn’t work. And how the culture will come? The culture will come from 2 things, 
people’s beliefs, how do their behaviour, sorry, not belief and behaviour (laughs) 
and the regulation. You have the right standard regulation and you have people 
which respect the standard regulation and it’s mixed together and this is the culture 
we’ll build.” [Respondent 19, O&G, Upstream, Page 16]. 
 
So the above examples (and there are many others) demonstrate that within 
a range of industries an appreciation of the culture of safety strongly exists. 
This strength of feeling emerged both explicitly and implicitly in many of the 
items of discussion during the interviews. Finally, the below quote also 
demonstrates the importance of stakeholder involvement to drive an EHS 
culture. 
 
“….there’s aspects of safety there’s aspects of trust, integrity and a lot of high level 
values which all employees should be aware of and we should embody in our 
behaviours. So that’s the kind of the covenant if you like that all employees should 
have to act with versus stakeholders to employees with business partners, suppliers 
to really make sure that we are acting in the right way”.[Respondent 6, O&G 
Refining, page 2].  
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6.3.1.5 Compliance & Consequence Management: 
 
Creating and sustaining an EHS Culture means that culture where EHS is a 
value that must be respected. In organisational cultures the people within the 
culture commit and thus adhere to a set of established values.  Therefore it is 
also difficult to manage and sustain an effective EHS culture without any 
consequence management. Table 6.6 lists some examples of extracts of 
statements from the interviews conducted that relate to compliance and 
consequence management.  
 
Table 6.6: Sub-Theme - Compliance & Consequence Management 
Representative Data Reference 
“You know fundamentally we believe we do not want to operate where 
people are not complying. And so you just have to have that 
commitment and they didn’t do this by, let’s do some calculations on 
budgets and rates of returns. It’s like no, we will not fundamentally, it’s 
our believe system is a philosophy judgment rather than a business 
judgment.”  
Respondent 9, 
O&G 
Upstream 
Page 7 
“So whoever we’re talking to whether it’s the press or it’s the board, 
number one on our agenda should always be, are we living up to our 
policy? Are we living up to our commitment? I think that’s a testament 
to the strength of our EHS culture at a management level or a senior 
management level”.  
Respondent 5, 
O&G Refining, 
Page 7 
“…..so we put in this program called Life Protection Rules where you 
look through the past history and say people died because they 
violated these rules, ok, these specific rules and so and its actually not 
a…and so therefore, you know there’s hundreds of rules out there, ok. 
But, if you comply with these nine rules and then, our people in the past 
complied with these nine rules, no one would have been killed. That’s a 
very powerful statement and so we have symbols for each of these 
roles, we have a video, we have really you know engaging animation 
for each of these roles. So they, you can cascade these out in every 
different language but you know something that, you know it really has 
an impression. It’s like, these rules will save your life, make sure you 
always follow these rules ok. And that kind of, brings those rules up to 
Respondent 9, 
O&G 
Upstream, 
page 8  
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Representative Data Reference 
a higher level of attention and engages people with mind ok, you 
know.”  
“You can almost say that you need a procedure for breathing but (ha 
ha ha) But if you’re digging a trench of a meter deep…I know it sounds 
to be a bit too much but basically that’s, that’s also requiring a method 
statement because it may also have a potential for somebody not 
seeing it and falling into it and breaking a leg or something like that. But 
every activity will have a method of statement, how you will be doing it, 
how you protect that, that activity er from causing an event, what 
measures will be done. And ensuring that, that is communicated and 
understood by the, by the, by the staff who will be doing that particular 
activity. And out will be also er…walking around showing the visibility, 
questioning the staff whether they really understand and they believe 
the risks associated with the activities they are actually doing and 
rewarding them where you feel that they are er…they are doing it not 
because it’s really a requirement but because they believe it.”   
Respondent 
14, 
Construction, 
page 8 
 
Whilst some respondents cited various reasons for having a safety/EHS 
culture which included pragmatic ones, such as avoiding prosecutions, but 
also more ethical ones. However, as explained by respondent 9:   
 
“You know fundamentally we believe we do not want to operate where people are 
not complying. ………., it’s our believe system is a philosophy judgment rather than 
a business judgment.” [Respondent 9, Page 7].  
 
And then proceeds to further explain that: 
 
“….So this is your license to save the company, if you don’t want to follow these 
rules, we don’t want you working here. So, you have the first warning and you get a 
formal warning letter. You have the second warning and after the third one you’re 
fired. And so, it’s a very clear expectation so, there’s a three strikes and you’re out.” 
[Respondent 9, Page 6]. 
 
The above statement highlights the ethical nature of EHS governance, which 
is described as a non-business judgement. However, respondent 5 promotes 
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a concept of setting a standard based on the policy and asking if the 
leadership and the organisation are living up to it.   
 
“So whoever we’re talking to whether it’s the press or it’s the board, number one on 
our agenda should always be, are we living up to our policy? Are we living up to our 
commitment? I think that’s a testament to the strength of our EHS culture at a 
management level or a senior management level”. [Respondent 5, Page 7] 
 
Going back to statement from Respondent 9 (page 8) from table 6.6; he 
explains that laying good foundations is very important and promotes the 
concept of reporting, communication and effective management processes. 
He also details in the same interview a formalised program – with rules that 
have been developed based on the historical trends in violations. Some 
significant analysis was undertaken by this organisation where they focused 
on the top 9 rules that prevent almost all major incidents. Whilst the role of 
learning organisations is discussed later in this very section, this is a very 
good example where learning from previous incidents has been analysed 
and information fed-back to create a safer system of work.  
 
In the construction industry, the prescriptive nature of work systems is more 
pronounced as respondent 14 (page 8), table 6.6 explains.  He establishes 
the critical importance of the use of method statements as an effective 
communication tool. He places emphasis also on the role of senior 
leadership being quite visible, asking questions about risks and getting and 
giving feedback as well as reward. It is quite significant for workers and 
operating staff to see senior leadership taking interest in their work, 
performance and their health, safety and wellbeing.  
 
There are a number of matters that this leader addresses in the above 
discussion which includes compliance, systems of work but also the kind of 
follow up and visible leadership required to create the very safety and EHS 
culture that are being developed.  
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6.3.1.6 Moving from High Risk to High Reliability Organisational EHS cultures 
 
The organisations covered in this research are inherently risky operational 
companies and operating in high risk environments. However, one of the key 
drivers to developing a sound EHS culture and having the right kind of 
communication to avoid incidents and crisis is through an organisational drive 
from moving towards higher reliability. Table 6.7 below presents a few quotes 
to demonstrate this. 
 
Table 6.7: Sub-Theme - Moving from High Risk to High Reliability 
organizational EHS cultures 
Representative Data Reference 
“I mean if we were selling fruit and vegetables in the street, the board 
would probably not take such an interest but when you get into the 
high hazard industry, by definition, one major incident could take the 
whole company under, depending on how it’s dealt with. And the sort 
of problem I’ve seen organisations struggle with is how do you cope 
with both ends of the spectrum. You’ve got the high frequency low 
impact events, you know, what’s our loss time injury, slips, trips, falls, 
driving safety. You’ve got all of that at one end of the spectrum. At 
the other end of the spectrum you’ve got the once every thirty years, 
major disaster, 50 people killed. And how does the board, you know 
some of the lessons BP learnt, well they were very, very good at 
slips, trips and falls, containment spills, loss time injuries. And then 
they had Texas city, on the back of piper alpha wasn’t theirs but it 
was the offshore version of piper alpha and they realised they were 
completely blindsided to the low frequency high impact events. They 
had no controls at any of the board meetings. It’s no good looking at 
the loss time injury rate to say is any of our refineries gonna blow up 
somewhere in the world. Um so I think, you know the board has to be 
the accountable body for starting everything going and too many 
times in history people have said, oh that’s the role of the safety 
department. But it can’t be and the more high hazard the industry or 
the more, you know in our case, 28% of the GDP of the country you 
know. 
 
Respondent 
12, Aviation, 
pages 1-2 
152 
 
Representative Data Reference 
“It is, it is changing all the time, it is changing all the time. It’s getting 
better I think all the time er…at all levels to be honest. Ya’ani, we 
started with this business where HSE was more than a policing 
function and then the, now it is, it has evolved and developed 
and…and I strongly believe it comes from the top, whether ya’ani, but 
where we consider the top this is another. The top basically I think 
the second in management of the company. They have to show a 
genuine interest in HSE er…they have to have a full understanding of 
HSE impact on the business to start with. In today’s world you know, 
we live in a small world because of er the technological advances in 
communication er… Reputation is extremely important er… 
Companies in our kind of industries, oil and gas, you know this is 
again a small world, it’s not…they live by their reputation. You can 
easily get out of business, run out of business if your HSE record is 
bad. Ok. And even as from we are contractors, we are not really oil 
Production Company but because we are in the oil and gas business 
we work in very sensitive areas. And nobody will let you get in an oil 
field to do work for them if they know your safety record is bad. You 
can cause them a disaster that will ultimately shut them down or 
cause them to lose billions of dollars. We are in this kind of industry 
where tolerance for low HSE standard is you know is not there”  
Respondent 
13, 
Construction, 
page 7 
“People development and, and you know, it’s about core values, it is 
about core values. So, if, if the elected leadership, it doesn’t, it can 
only be 1 or 2, but if they play their role, see safety as a core value, 
and that, and what that means, coz it’s easy to say safety first, they 
all do it, you can see stickers all over the place. But, it’s basically 
saying, you ask your organisation and until everyone gives you the 
same answer, you know, you haven’t communicated well and they 
don’t believe you. So, is safety, production, costs or reserves or 
something else, more important? If you ask me, I’ll tell you, if you ask 
my deputy, he should tell you the same answer. If you ask mangers 
sometimes you get different answers. Why? Because he’s under 
pressure and he’s told, now fix that and get that production on stream 
and you know, don’t worry about your helmet and don’t worry about 
this or that. Now, you got to deal with it right at the core, so, and 
Respondent, 
24, O&G 
Upstream, 
page 19 
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Representative Data Reference 
that’s a core value, becomes a core value. We have 3 statements of 
principles, key principles, 3 core values. One, is the general 
statement principles, how we work, ethically, fairly um we have, the in 
country value, how we focus on developing and delivering value to 
the country. Every tender board looks at, could we supply that locally, 
or can we develop that or can we, it’s not about discouraging 
international investors, in fact it’s a better track team, but how do we 
make it more sustainable. And, the third element is about safety, it’s a 
core value. If you get safety right, which is about leadership, 
ownership and efficiency of execution, if you get those 3 principles 
right and of course, by compliance with the rules, you’ll get your 
production right, you’ll get your business efficiency right, you’ll get 
everything else right.”  
 
Respondent 12 illustrates this issue of high reliability to meet high risk 
challenges effectively.  He addresses the issue from a business continuity 
issue where he cites that having one major incident can have devastating 
impact on the business. He articulates well the balance between the high 
frequency low impact events and the low frequency catastrophic events. He 
describes from previous incidents in another industry such as Oil and Gas 
have had a lasting damage impact on the whole company and industry and 
how the lack of Board leadership was now in hindsight clear.  
 
“Um so I think, you know the board has to be the accountable body for starting 
everything going and too many times in history people have said, oh that’s the role 
of the safety department.[Respondent 12, pages 1-2] 
 
Whereas, this respondent 13 (page 7), table 6.7 from the oil and gas sector, 
explains that the development of higher reliability systems comes through a 
stronger compliance function which is empowered and overseen by the top 
management. He positively remarks on the strong belief, interest borne as he 
sees it from a greater appreciation of the risks and impacts. He goes on to 
explain the impact on reputation and because the oil and gas industry is so 
integrated, even partners and contractors are scrutinised as their lack of 
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performance in safety can have devastating impacts on their principles and 
clients. He ends his quote with: 
 
“……..You can cause them a disaster that will ultimately shut them down or cause 
them to lose billions of dollars. We are in this kind of industry where tolerance for 
low HSE standard is you know is not there” [Respondent 13, page 7] 
 
And finally we see Respondent 24, (page 19) table 6.7; addressing this issue 
by highlighting that because supervisors and operational managers come 
under great pressure from production and financial targets, and thus the 
integration of safety in to the procurement of services is emphasized. He 
highlights three key principles: 
 
(1) Working fairly and ethically; 
(2) Delivering value to the country i.e. working sustainably and he explains that 
using local resources whilst developing them; 
(3) Safety is a core value. 
 
6.3.1.7 Culture development through learning organisations 
 
One of the key attributes identified by HSL (2008) was that high reliability 
organisations had a culture where they were actually learning organisations. 
The following quotes given in table 6.8 illustrate how senior leadership view 
learning and development as critical to a sound EHS culture.  
 
Table 6.8: Sub-Theme - Culture development through learning organizations 
Representative Data Reference 
“It hasn’t always been the case and you know I know there are 
organisations who when they have an incident don’t investigate, 
don’t take it seriously, um do not want the potential negative 
publicity of the story coming out you know. So, um I think the 
external scrutiny is probably necessary if you don’t have that 
internal discipline. If you’ve got the internal discipline and you’ve got 
enough people passionate about it and the integrity is there, I think 
it’s less important that the independent reporting lie if it’s the case.”  
Respondent 
12, Aviation 
Industry 
page 13 & 
17 
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Representative Data Reference 
(Page 13) 
…. “The learning from incidents er has made safe...made flying far 
safer than it ever has been. If you look at the track record, I think 
the airline industry is a very, very good example as is you know any 
form of transport that’s done on a mass basis. It’s a very, very good 
example of the continuous improvement that arises from the 
analysis…of accidents.” (Page 17) 
“We put a serious effort right from the beginning and safety is an 
item that we are discussing really regularly over here. Er…for us 
every meeting er on projects, not every meeting on projects, starts 
off with a, with a discussion, a detailed discussion on safety and 
having us over there, a safety moment where there is a...learning 
that is shared relevant to, to activities that could be, that could be 
coming up in time on that particular project. That’s part of the 
culture that we are instilling in the organisation.”  
Respondent, 
14 
Construction, 
page 3 
You know the first thing that the HSE manager of mine told me on 
my first day, he said, you know every rule is there because 
something went wrong in the past. And um it’s very sad but that’s 
how we learn apparently. But that’s to make sure that we learn then 
very quickly and it happens only once and then everybody is clear 
on that. But sharing on this, in this field is very important.”  
Respondent 
28, Oil and 
Gas , page 8 
“Secondly, awareness tools where you make awareness about any 
accident that happens elsewhere and educate your employees 
about it and you make sure that it shouldn’t happen er in your 
organisation. And also the tool that when you bring an equipment, 
new or moveable equipment, you make sure that it is to the highest 
standard that’s available, to protect people who are working on it.” 
Respondent 
18, page 8 
 
Respondent 12 (page 13), table 6.8 explains that the investigation of 
incidents is very important and the learning is very critical especially to 
maintain integrity through the scrutiny that is undertaken especially in 
investigations. And later also goes on to say: 
 
…. “The learning from incidents er has made safe...made flying far safer than it ever 
has been. If you look at the track record, I think the airline industry is a very, very 
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good example as is you know any form of transport that’s done on a mass basis. It’s 
a very, very good example of the continuous improvement that arises from the 
analysis…of accidents.” [Respondent 12, page 17] 
 
In contrast it is noteworthy that in the construction industry, the EHS culture 
is not as well established, with Respondent 14 (Page 3), table 6.8 from the 
construction sector saying that the safety and EHS culture is not as prolific 
and that time is required for there to be a culture where meeting start with 
safety talks and where there is effective learning and sharing lessons etc.  
 
Crudely, one interesting interviewee explains the development of rules and 
regulations that try to shape the EHS culture within organisations. 
Respondent 28 from the oil and gas storage industry explains from his 
experience, why these rules have been developed: 
 
You know the first thing that the HSE manager of mine told me on my first day, he 
said, you know every rule is there because something went wrong in the past. And 
um it’s very sad but that’s how we learn apparently. But that’s to make sure that we 
learn then very quickly and it happens only once and then everybody is clear on 
that. But sharing on this, in this field is very important.” [Respondent 28, page 8] 
 
It can be drawn from this that industry safety and EHS process, procedures 
and cultures have developed on the back end of incidents occurring and 
therefore this would lead us to appreciate that senior management’s and 
leadership’s role in investing organisational resources into investigations is 
notably important to both the organisation and the industry. It also highlights 
the importance for industry in sharing that same learning and development 
such that people adopt safer practices and are part of a more effective EHS 
culture. Finally this next quote demonstrates that at the operating level, 
training and awareness are all really very important: 
 
“Secondly, awareness tools where you make awareness about any accident that 
happens elsewhere and educate your employees about it and you make sure that it 
shouldn’t happen er in your organisation. And also the tool that when you bring an 
equipment, new or moveable equipment, you make sure that it is to the highest 
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standard that’s available, to protect people who are working on it.” [Respondent 18, 
page 8] 
 
6.3.1.8 Impact of the International Standards and the Size of Organisation 
 
Larger organisations are more exposed generally to criticism and scrutiny 
when it comes to EHS performance. Larger organisations tend to be driven to 
create a better safety/EHS culture and EHS performance due to this. Larger 
organisations either operate internationally or have international partners, for 
example.  
 
In a response from a leader in the oil and gas storage industry that deals with 
suppliers, charters, traders, ships and a variety of government regulators and 
authorities, he notes:  
 
“I know but there’s the part that is imposed on you and then there’s the part where 
it’s part of the culture part of the company. So I’m just saying that there’s only so 
much the government can do. Again it depends again on the maturity of the country. 
Some parts of the region you know there’s nothing that the government does to 
make sure that there’s a minimum standard of governance in terms of EHS.  But 
otherwise it’s, I don’t see a changing much. Meaning it’s the people again you know, 
if you can spread it slowly, and I think it happened over a very…very long period of 
time.  I mean look at …. The majors they obviously got their act together, not always 
you know. But you know them going into other subsidiaries and had get passed on 
slowly. so that way of spreading the culture I don’t think is going to change much. 
But it will happened slowly there not going to be a revolution that’s for sure. It’s 
going to evolve and it’s got to do.. it will always be tide back to profitably. The more 
money a company makes the more as time goes by the more it will look into these 
things. You know a bit more seriously, unfortunately that’s the case. I can tell a local 
company that used to run in order to sell rust buckets and whatever you know. Now 
it’s on the verge of getting listed and things like that. It all comes together cos you 
want to make the business bigger and then you need to go to the bans and the 
banks have standards. Because they don’t wanna be associated with something 
happening with you. So it’s back to how successful, how big the company is going to 
be. Small company always you gonna have problems with them.” (Respondent 1, 
Page 15-16) 
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So the impact of international standards and the role of what is commonly 
termed “best industry practice” should not be under-estimated. This section 
established eight sub-themes of the main theme developing a safety culture 
and communication. In the next sections we proceed to evaluate the other 
themes.  
 
6.3.2 EHS/Safety Leadership 
 
In general many of the leaders interviewed spoke openly about the 
importance of the BoD ‘setting a tone’ for EHS in their organization and 
reinforcing that through supporting the leadership and the organization as a 
whole. The analysis of the responses show that safety leadership related 
statements ranged between 38% and 11% with an average of 18 % in the 
transcript content analysis.  
 
In reviewing this Theme, further analysis establishes 5 sub-themes which are 
given in Figure 6.5 below: 
 
Key 
Theme
Sub-
Themes
EHS/Safety 
Leadership
1. Demonstrating 
Safety Leadership
2. Board Leadership vs 
Executive Leadership
3. Visible Leadership4. Making Safety/EHS a Core Value
5. Safety/EHS being 
driven from the top
 
Figure 6.5:Sub-themes established for EHS/Safety Leadership 
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This is one of the critical themes analysed as it is a key theme in this 
research work. In each of the following sub-sections each sub-theme will be 
briefly discussed and illustrated with some key examples. We have combined 
in this section the quotes under these 5 sub-themes established. The quotes 
are more closely analysed in the following sections.  
 
Table 6.9 – Safety Leadership Sub-Themes 
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
   
Demonstrating 
Safety 
Leadership 
“….what I see is that they are the leader they 
demonstrate to everybody first they have it, that 
culture they own it”. And “You see if your highest level 
in the company is your CEO and if the CEO is a strong 
believer in the safety leadership then it much easier to 
be driven down. If he takes that ownership and he has 
the leadership it much easier to set an example. He is 
an example.” 
 
Respondent 2, 
Oil and Gas, 
Storage, Page 
1 and Page 12 
“….a board member is not doing his job, if he is not 
interested in the HSE performance of the company coz 
it’s, it’s a key responsibility that, that he has. Sure, 
you’ll have some people who are more experienced 
and have had better insight but it has to go right, you 
know, right across the…In our business we make it 
that, everyone’s responsible for HSE. Er corporate 
support, my function, I still have a strong HSE er 
responsibility. I take, I attend high profile too as I go 
out in the field and talk to the staff, not in my line but 
as a member of the executive team. Er that’s because 
we share that responsibility and we share it as an 
executive team. The boards the same way, you can’t 
have someone who says, you know, it’s, you know, 
that’s his job. My job is the marketing…” 
 
 
Respondent 
26, Oil and 
Gas, 
Upstream, 
Page 16 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
Board 
Leadership vs. 
Executive 
Leadership 
“….Um the leadership they leave it to the er appointed 
management to do the leadership in that aspect. They 
have to separate themselves from leading the 
activities to directing the activities.” 
[Respondent 
18, Oil and 
Gas, Heavy 
Manufacturing, 
Page 1]. 
They’re probably not fully accountable and since 
they’re not going back to their own governments and 
reporting, I mean. But the minutes, the minutes are 
drafted, the minutes are circulated um and I’m sure, 
I’m sure whoever they report to, there is somebody 
there looking at it. So it’s not, it’s not just a lost piece of 
paper. So they’re driving it and their interest is there so 
I mean it’s not accounted from the top level and 
floating its way down. Um but we’re accountable in a 
sense that we’re an international governance and 
national laws and because we’re dealing with other 
countries outside Bahrain, they’re bringing it up, 
they’re bringing our standards up especially on the 
environment. 
 
Respondent 
17, 
Construction 
Page 4 
Visible 
Leadership 
“But every activity will have a method of statement, 
how you will be doing it, how you protect that, that 
activity er from causing an event, what measures will 
be done. And ensuring that, that is communicated and 
understood by the, by the, by the staff who will be 
doing that particular activity. And out will be also 
er…walking around showing the visibility, questioning 
the staff whether they really understand and they 
believe the risks associated with the activities they are 
actually doing and rewarding them where you feel that 
they are er…they are doing it not because it’s really a 
requirement but because they believe it.” 
Respondent 
14, 
Construction, 
Page 8 
“Really, weekly, the CEO at least once a week if not 
more. Only last week we had the HSE week which was 
done very quickly. And yet he was virtually going 
Respondent 
16, 
Manufacturing, 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
around the plant on a daily basis for at least an hour or 
two with area contracting, with employees talking to 
them, questioning them, discussing with them safety 
issues. Only safety he was not discussing anything 
else. When you have a driver like that, that shows 
everybody else how important safety is to the 
company not just him. And he’s the guy who’s the 
leader and everybody else will follow.”  
Page 2 
Making Safety 
a Core Value 
“….it’s about core values, it is about core values. So, if, 
if the elected leadership, it doesn’t, it can only be 1 or 
2, but if they play their role, see safety as a core value, 
and that, and what that means, coz it’s easy to say 
safety first, they all do it, you can see stickers all over 
the place. But, it’s basically saying, you ask your 
organization and until everyone gives you the same 
answer, you know, you haven’t communicated well 
and they don’t believe you. So, is safety, production, 
costs or reserves or something else, more important? 
If you ask me, I’ll tell you, if you ask my deputy, he 
should tell you the same answer. If you ask mangers 
sometimes you get different answers. Why? Because 
he’s under pressure and he’s told, now fix that and get 
that production on stream and you know, don’t worry 
about your helmet and don’t worry about this or that. 
Now, you got to deal with it right at the core, so, and 
that’s a core value, becomes a core value.”  
Respondent 
24, Oil and 
Gas, 
Upstream, 
Page 19 
Safety/EHS 
being driven  
from the Top 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…Well if they don’t then you don’t have the culture 
because particularly in this society such as the UAE, if 
the leadership doesn’t come from the top, it won’t just 
spring up somewhere. You might have um people who 
are enthusiastic about it but you certainly won’t get the 
lateral support of it broadly within the organization if 
you don’t get the absolute conviction from the top, that 
this is necessary. You know I think as a CEO of an 
organization, the way I would characterize this, um I 
Respondent 
12, Aviation, 
Page 2 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety/EHS 
being driven  
from the Top 
need to be ultimately accountable that everything is 
being done to minimize and control the risks that are 
inherent in a business like ours.”  
“They play a very important role for the EHS issues. 
For any, any business to be successful or 
implemented, the leadership is so important and 
commitment from the leadership demonstrate that. It 
becomes makes the EHS issue on the top of all 
agendas of the company and unless the CEO is 
committed and demonstrate that commitment to 
different parties of the organization er then EHS will 
always take a low profile. If, on the other side, if the 
management and company, headed by the CEO put a 
special emphasis and demonstrate that emphasis that 
the importance of EHS, into not only talking about it 
but er demonstrating the processes with the system, 
the procedures and the guidelines and so on, for 
people to implement, then it does not er do that. And, 
you know, EHS usually, it’s, it’s not sets of rules to do. 
More than that, it is a culture of the company behavior 
and so on. And it becomes a commitment from each 
individual to make EHS part of their day to day 
business. So, if that individual sees that there is no 
really commitment from the top management of the 
company, then they don’t think that seriously. On the 
other side, if they see that the top level of the 
management including the CEO and the management 
committees and so on, that they are committed to the 
safety issues so on, obviously that will reflect in his, 
taking that the EHS more serious in this business.” 
[Respondent 
29, Oil and 
Gas, 
Diversified, 
Page 1]. 
 
6.3.2.1 Demonstrating Safety Leadership 
 
EHS must be demonstrable. In fact by definition EHS leadership requires that 
leaders demonstrate commitment and this is something that leaders must 
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establish with their followers. The following two statements are explicit 
statements either about the BoD or when leaders were talking about 
themselves.  
 
“….what I see is that they are the leader they demonstrate to everybody first 
they have it, that culture they own it”. And “You see if your highest level in 
the company is your CEO and if the CEO is a strong believer in the safety 
leadership then it much easier to be driven down. If he takes that ownership 
and he has the leadership it much easier to set an example. He is an 
example.” [Respondent 2, Oil and Gas, Storage, Page 1 and Page 12]. 
 
So belief is an extremely important aspect and being able to create that 
demonstrable ownership leading to stewardship is critical. The following 
quotations from the interviews are a good example of taking personal 
leadership and expecting the same of others, especially the Board: 
 
“….a board member is not doing his job, if he is not interested in the HSE 
performance of the company coz it’s, it’s a key responsibility that, that he 
has.  
 
“……Er that’s because we share that responsibility and we share it as an 
executive team.” 
 
“The boards the same way, you can’t have someone who says, you know, 
it’s, you know, that’s his job. My job is the marketing…”  
 
[Respondent 26, Oil and Gas, Upstream, Page 16]. 
 
The above quotes clearly spell-out responsibility for both executive and board 
leaders.  
 
6.3.2.2 Board Leadership vs Executive Leadership 
 
In chapters 2 and 3 much discussion revolved around the shared and 
collective responsibilities and accountabilities of the executive management 
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team and the Board members. Others also debated the way that leadership 
they expected should be expressed, with EHS leadership being a particular 
task of the appointed management team: 
 
“….Um the leadership they leave it to the er appointed management to do the 
leadership in that aspect. They have to separate themselves from leading the 
activities to directing the activities.” [Respondent 18, Oil and Gas, Heavy 
Manufacturing, Page 1]. 
 
The view was however different to Respondent 17, (page 4), table 6.9 were 
he did not see the Board as fully accountable. This may also be related to the 
fact that this organisation is a Private Joint Stock Company where the 
shareholders are represented by different countries. His view seemed to 
place greater accountability on the CEO where the governance was more 
driven by international and national laws and regulations rather than direct 
Board action and expectations.  
 
Consistent with the literature review we see that Respondent 9, (page 2) 
explains that accountability is with the CEO and that the Board are 
accountable for setting the agenda and appointing the competent CEO to 
ensure safe and reliability in the company operations: 
 
“…You have to be careful with the words of accountability because if you’re 
the CEO, you are about the execution, so you have their ultimate 
accountability. So, and that’s your job and that’s your role. You know the 
boards not there day to day. So yeah, to use the word accountability that’s 
truly not the word you use, ok, because I think that CEO’s just by definition of 
the role the way I think about it is, hold somebody accountable for delivery. 
And so the board’s role is, they’re accountable for appointing a CEO who will 
be accountable for appointing the person, so they have the more 
accountability for the process and the selection of the people in the 
leadership who will be running the company.”  [Respondent 9, Oil and Gas, 
Upstream, Page 2]. 
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6.3.2.3 Visible Leadership 
 
This next quotation is a good example of an opinion that supports visible 
leadership in EHS which is critical. EHS/Safety leadership needs to be 
demonstrated and employees and company staff, even contractors must see 
the CEO and the leadership team practicing EHS quite visibly in terms of 
demonstrating their commitment.  
 
“But every activity will have a method of statement, how you will be doing it, 
how you protect that, that activity er from causing an event, what measures 
will be done. And ensuring that, that is communicated and understood by 
the, by the, by the staff who will be doing that particular activity. And out will 
be also er…walking around showing the visibility, questioning the staff 
whether they really understand and they believe the risks associated with the 
activities they are actually doing and rewarding them where you feel that 
they are er…they are doing it not because it’s really a requirement but 
because they believe it.” [Respondent 14, Construction, Page 8]. 
 
So the direct involvement, felt leadership on the ground is extremely 
important for various reasons that include viability to the workforce, seeking 
to understand the risks associated with the work activities, rewarding good 
practice and generally supporting the drive for EHS. This next example is 
again of visible leadership and is from a very large factory in Bahrain: 
 
“Really, weekly, the CEO at least once a week if not more. Only last week 
we had the HSE week which was done very quickly. And yet he was virtually 
going around the plant on a daily basis for at least an hour or two with area 
contracting, with employees talking to them, questioning them, discussing 
with them safety issues. Only safety he was not discussing anything else. 
When you have a driver like that, that shows everybody else how important 
safety is to the company not just him. And he’s the guy who’s the leader and 
everybody else will follow.” [Respondent 16, Manufacturing, Page 2]. 
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6.3.2.4 Making Safety/EHS a Core Value 
 
Making safety and EHS a core value is very important. Later on in this 
chapter we talk about how some leaders even said that EHS needs to be a 
business value driver too. So another good explanation of the realities that 
impact on safety performance and leadership is that unless EHS becomes a 
core value you will not have full engagement from all. This next quote 
elaborates on this: 
 
“….it’s about core values, it is about core values. So, if, if the elected 
leadership, it doesn’t, it can only be 1 or 2, but if they play their role, see 
safety as a core value, and that, and what that means, coz it’s easy to say 
safety first, they all do it, you can see stickers all over the place. But, it’s 
basically saying, you ask your organization and until everyone gives you the 
same answer, you know, you haven’t communicated well and they don’t 
believe you. ……”  
 
And after explaining that you need to have everyone in the organisation to 
understand the importance of safety and EHS along with production and 
costs etc., he states: 
 
 “Now, you got to deal with it right at the core, so, and that’s when a core 
value, becomes a core value.”  
 
[Respondent 24, Oil and Gas, Upstream, Page 19]. 
 
6.3.2.5 Safety/EHS being driven from the top 
 
Tribal dynamics is part of the inherent culture within the GCC. The leadership 
plays an important role in establishing the expectations and these are 
followed out of respect and belief that this traditionally more benevolent 
leader who usually exhibits some level of servant leadership traits and skills 
will be doing what is in the greater good of the organisation.  
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In this next quotation shows how powerful senior leadership belief and 
commitment is in the context of EHS within an organization: 
 
“…Well if they don’t then you don’t have the culture because particularly in 
this society such as the UAE, if the leadership doesn’t come from the top, it 
won’t just spring up somewhere. You might have um people who are 
enthusiastic about it but you certainly won’t get the lateral support of it 
broadly within the organization if you don’t get the absolute conviction from 
the top, that this is necessary. You know I think as a CEO of an organization, 
the way I would characterize this, um I need to be ultimately accountable that 
everything is being done to minimize and control the risks that are inherent in 
a business like ours.” [Respondent 12, Aviation, Page 2]. 
 
And finally, the quotation from Respondent 29 (Page 1), Table 6.9  brings 
together core aspects of EHS leadership; demonstrated commitment to EHS 
and placing emphasis on the importance of EHS; processes and systems 
and making it part of the business. The emphasis on that the commitment of 
every individual within an organisation is very much linked to the commitment 
that is seen from the top leadership is apparent. This can be further extended 
to include the Board leadership as well who set the expectations for many 
aspects of the organisation’s workings.  
 
6.3.3 Influence and Accountability 
 
The theme of influence and accountability is a central theme in this research. 
The average frequency of statements from all interviews was 13.5% with a 
maximum of 20% from a respondent from the Oil and Gas Storage Industry 
and 8% from a respondent from the Construction Industry. 
 
Four key sub-themes evolved from this qualitative analysis of the aspects 
that relate to influence and accountability and are given below in figure 6.6.  
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Key 
Theme
Sub-
Themes
Influence & 
Accountability
1. Notion of 
Accountability
2. Accountability cannot 
be delegated
3. Stakeholder 
Influence on 
Accountability 
4. Board 
Accountability
 
Fig 6.6: Sub-Themes established for Influence and Accountability 
 
Table 6.10: Influence and Accountability Sub-Themes  
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
   
Notion of 
Accountability 
“Well again, it’s the boards accountability is usually 
dictated by the company or the governments with that 
you’re working with. Er, if the government has no 
accountability for disasters, there’s, there’s no 
accountability, is there? If there’s no laws that dictate, 
that are enforced and of course in the Gulf there’s 
very little environmental laws, that are, as you 
probably are aware, that are enforced. So, where’s 
the accountability? It goes from country to country, 
Kuwait’s a great example.”  
Respondent 
22, Oil and 
Gas, 
Upstream, 
Page 3 
“The relation, the relationship I have with the 
chairman is, he says, I pay you the salary to take 
those accountabilities onto your shoulders. And I can 
obviously always turn to him for advice but the buck 
Respondent 
21, Oil and 
Gas, 
Upstream, 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
stops on my desk, not on his. That’s my job, that’s my 
duty.”  
Page 2 
Accountability 
cannot be 
delegated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Researcher:  If I were to ask you that question styled 
in, maybe a, you know, a bigger, in a company of, of 
your size. I mean, maybe because this is a maybe, a 
slightly smaller organization in a big sort of oil 
services Supply Company you know like the big, the 
big, you know, sort of, the high street names you 
know. Um do you, do you, do you see the same, do 
you see the same thing, I mean do you see… 
Respondent:  No, I would think, I would think when 
you get up to the, the super major sizes that they 
would have right up at board level. They would have 
that accountability, that there’s probably a, a… I would 
expect to see that one of those board of directors, one 
of the directors on the board would have that portfolio 
firmly in his hands and it would probably be the 
managing director, I would think. Which would be 
similar to, I think the way PDO structured. The 
portfolio of HSE I imagine is on their CEOs desk and 
he doesn’t delegate that to anybody else.”  
Respondent 
21, Oil and 
Gas, 
Upstream, 
Page 3 
Researcher: Yeah, I mean personally and also 
collectively as a group of people and individuals. What 
kind of accountability do they take lets God-forbid if 
for example you have a very serious incident which 
incapacitates the production for say 15 days 
Respondent: Ok. Now, the board, when it comes to 
the board being it EHS related, being it financial or 
otherwise they have personal accountability where 
each and every one of them if proven negligence, if 
there is clear proof of negligence or complacency or 
whatever’s been proven then they could individually 
be held accountable, be held to account legally 
individually and collectively but individually. And this is 
what’s happening at this moment and time…..” 
Respondent 
8, Oil and 
Gas, 
Refining, 
Page 5 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
 
 
 
Accountability 
cannot be 
delegated 
Researcher: So, it’s going up to the board level 
already. 
Respondent: Yeah, so 2011, unfortunate events, that 
was a previous board but it was all over the 
newspaper, the parliamentary investigation committee 
the first one was take work to the prosecution, 
prosecute the board. First recommendation, there 
were 15. The first one was, prosecute the board 
individually, like this. As simple as this. It’s a different 
world, a different ball game, now with the 
transparency, with the communication, with the media 
with the fact that everyone sees everything. You 
cannot afford not to be held to account. I think the 
communication world has made it in such a way that 
he automatically held to account whether you like it or 
not.  
Stakeholder 
Influence on 
Accountability 
“Well I think first and foremost my experience with 
working with boards is that they are ultimately 
accountable to members of the public, customers, 
employees. That the organizations of which they are 
the most senior representatives behave with diligence 
and um justify the confidence that participants in that 
company, be their customers, staff, shareholders, can 
be assured that they’ve got the confidence that the 
company is behaving with the utmost um… you know 
diligence in areas of health safety, security etc. And I 
think that ultimately they are accountable and if there 
are shortfalls, then they’re the people that ultimately 
be will be accountable and will take the consequences 
of incidents happening. You know when an incidence 
occurs its, the focus should be on the board, what has 
the board failed to do to ensure that the culture of the 
organization was taking the utmost care to ensure 
incidence like that shouldn’t and... shouldn’t happen.” 
  
Respondent 
12, Aviation, 
Page 1 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Board 
Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…So, it’s very evident that the board of directors has 
a key role in any form of governance in any major 
corporation to provide that scrutiny around all aspects 
of the corporation’s activities at a very high level to 
make sure that good governance is being maintained 
by the directors of the corporation specifically to 
health and safety. In our business it’s a prerequisite 
so the boards interest should be and is high in 
ensuring the goals that we have which become 
challenging, more challenging year on year because 
we want to get to zero incidents, zero injuries and 
zero fatalities. The board’s roles should be to have a 
pretty good understanding of why we are driving 
towards that, and it is to ensure the safety of 
individuals in the organization, to ensure consistency 
and performance and to protect assets and people 
frankly.”  
Respondent 
6, 
Diversified 
Oil and Gas, 
Page 1 
“So, when you say about responsibility we are all 
responsible, the board….. except when you say the 
board, the board is collective eh, in fact unfortunately I 
don’t have the luxury of taking responsibility in that 
sense, I am individually responsible whereas the 
board id the board – it is many individuals and in that 
sense again I would say I am a bit more involved….”  
Respondent 
1, Oil and 
Gas 
Storage, 
Page 3 
“the CE is ultimately responsible for the performance 
of the organization far as I can see. But the board has 
accountability that they must make sure that the 
direction they are providing is in line with that policy. 
They cannot give a conflicting message. There are 
times that decisions will need to be made at board 
level and if they’re not consistent with the EHS policy, 
if financial performance overrides environmental 
performance or safety performance then they should 
be accountable for that.”  
Respondent 
5, Oil and 
Gas -
Refining, 
Page 3 
“Researcher: “…. I’m asking this question in the sense Respondent 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Board 
Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
of, you know, I would like to know in your view, do you 
think that the accountability of the board, therefore, is 
being delegated to the CEO? 
Respondent:  No, no, accountability can’t delegate, 
responsibility can. So, the accountability always stays 
with the board. 
Researcher: Ok. 
Respondent:  And, if the CEO doesn’t perform well 
enough on safety, then get rid of the CEO. 
Researcher: Yeah. 
Respondent:  Yeah, so that’s their accountability. 
What they can do, is to, they can assign the 
responsibility for the execution and the er and good 
HSE practice in his organization. And clearly, and that 
to me, should be clearly delegated. I wouldn’t like to 
have board members involved in a, in the day to day 
running of the company, I don’t think that’s the er…” 
26, Oil and 
Gas -
Upstream, 
Page 5 
“Well, I think they should because it, it helps that 
whole line of management right down to the boots and 
gloves level. Um we have what we call our 
supervisors form, which we have every quarter. And 
it’s always my goal to have them attend at least one of 
them even if it’s just to simply to attend it and listen 
quietly in the background while we discuss the issues 
that are in hand to each one of those team leaders in 
the supervisors form. Um so, once again I, I think 
there’s a real need for them to try and stay connected 
with what the real issues are. And, as any good 
manager does whenever we have our board 
meetings, the very number one agenda item is always 
HSE first, to try to keep them connected with what’s 
going on, what are the issues, what is the actual er 
health of the, of the corporation itself entertaining 
those HSE goals.” (Page 2) 
Respondent 
21, Page 2 
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6.3.3.1 Notion of Accountability 
 
Considerable support for the notion of accountability of Boards is apparent, 
together with issues of apportioning that accountability. The comparison that 
one of the respondents explained compared the board member with a 
politician in the government and that kind of accountabilities they carry in 
terms of governance. He explains this becomes even more of an important 
issue when it comes to regions where the laws and regulations are not as 
strong. Let’s take for example: 
 
“Well again, it’s the boards accountability is usually dictated by the company 
or the governments with that you’re working with. Er, if the government has 
no accountability for disasters, there’s, there’s no accountability, is there? If 
there’s no laws that dictate, that are enforced and of course in the Gulf 
there’s very little environmental laws, that are, as you probably are aware, 
that are enforced. So, where’s the accountability? It goes from country to 
country, Kuwait’s a great example.” [Respondent 22, Oil and Gas, Upstream, 
Page 3]. 
 
The executive leaders of organisations seem to take greater accountability. 
In fact the accountability is very different and this CEO saw that actually in 
reality the accountability was his and not the Board (Chairman). They are 
there to guide and advise, but the accountability stays with the CEO: 
 
“The relation, the relationship I have with the chairman is, he says, I pay you 
the salary to take those accountabilities onto your shoulders. And I can 
obviously always turn to him for advice but the buck stops on my desk, not 
on his. That’s my job, that’s my duty.” [Respondent 21, Oil and Gas, 
Upstream, Page 2]. 
 
This is discussed further on in section 6.3.3.4.  
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6.3.3.2 Accountability cannot be delegated 
 
A further example from the CEO perspective of a relatively smaller Oil and 
Gas upstream organization operating in Oman is explored below:  
 
“Researcher:  If I were to ask you that question styled in, maybe a, you 
know, a bigger, in a company of, of your size. I mean, maybe because this is 
a maybe, a slightly smaller organization in a big sort of oil services Supply 
Company you know like the big, the big, you know, sort of, the high street 
names you know. Um do you, do you, do you see the same, do you see the 
same thing, I mean do you see… 
 
Respondent:  No, I would think, I would think when you get up to the, the 
super major sizes that they would have right up at board level. They would 
have that accountability, that there’s probably a, a… I would expect to see 
that one of those board of directors, one of the directors on the board would 
have that portfolio firmly in his hands and it would probably be the managing 
director, I would think. Which would be similar to, I think the way PDO is 
structured. The portfolio of HSE I imagine is on their CEOs desk and he 
doesn’t delegate that to anybody else.” [Respondent 21, Oil and Gas, 
Upstream, Page 3]. 
 
So clearly some leaders see that this accountability cannot be delegated and 
therefore CEOs would really need to have good reliable processes and 
competent managers to run those processes to prevent losses and EHS 
issues in general. But there are also completely different perspectives; here 
the leader talks about action being taken against Board Directors by the 
Government in an organization within the Industry.  This is demonstrated well 
in Respondent 8’s in table 6.10. He does describe an important case study: 
 
Respondent: Yeah, so 2011, unfortunate events, that was a previous board 
but it was all over the newspaper, the parliamentary investigation committee 
the first one was take work to the prosecution, prosecute the board. First 
recommendation, there were 15. The first one was, prosecute the board 
individually, like this. As simple as this. It’s a different world, a different ball 
game, now with the transparency, with the communication, with the media 
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with the fact that everyone sees everything. You cannot afford not to be held 
to account. I think the communication world has made it in such a way that 
he automatically held to account whether you like it or not. [Respondent 8, 
O&G, Refining, Page 5]. 
 
So clearly it must depend on what kind of organisation, the shareholding, the 
government rules and regulations in that particular state and so on. However, 
the above two examples show that there are leaders who feel that Boards 
are not really accountable except for appointing the right persons and 
monitoring company performance to others who feel that greater 
engagement and accountability is required as they can be prosecuted if they 
fail to do their job effectively.  
 
6.3.3.3 Stakeholder Influence on Accountability 
 
In more recent years and as discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, 
stakeholders can have an impact today on business in general. Whether 
these stakeholders are employees, shareholders, NGO’s or otherwise, they 
can all have a considerable influence on performance. Stakeholders expect a 
certain performance from companies and their leadership.  
 
In this example, the perspective from the aviation industry seems to take a 
clear stance and seems to address to a greater extent the stakeholder 
management. This can be seen in the quote from Respondent 12 in table 
6.10.  
 
“Well I think first and foremost my experience with working with boards is 
that they are ultimately accountable to members of the public, customers, 
employees. That the organizations of which they are the most senior 
representatives behave with diligence………….And I think that ultimately 
they are accountable and if there are shortfalls, then they’re the people that 
ultimately be will be accountable and will take the consequences of incidents 
happening” [Respondent 12, Aviation, Page 1]. 
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6.3.3.4 Board Accountability 
 
The perspective of the leadership within the Oil Majors seems to be clearly 
indicating the active responsibility of boards in playing a role in engaging with 
management and motivating them towards better and better performance.  
 
“…So, it’s very evident that the board of directors has a key role in any form 
of governance in any major corporation to provide that scrutiny around all 
aspects of the corporation’s activities at a very high level to make sure that 
good governance is being maintained by the directors of the corporation 
specifically to health and safety…..”. [Respondent 6, Diversified Oil and Gas, 
Page 1]. 
 
In the remaining part of this quotation (see table 6.10) the CEO explains that 
the board has an interest in setting higher standards to reach these 
challenging targets; should have a good understanding of what drives good 
performance; and ensures consistency and performance from the 
organisation.   
 
This next quotation indicates the perspective from another leader of a joint 
venture oil storage terminal. Here it is clear that the accountability and 
responsibility is upon him and that the Board of Directors are collectively 
responsible: 
 
“So, when you say about responsibility we are all responsible, the board….. 
except when you say the board, the board is collective eh, in fact 
unfortunately I don’t have the luxury of taking responsibility in that sense, I 
am individually responsible whereas the board is the board – it is many 
individuals and in that sense again I would say I am a bit more involved….” 
[Respondent 1, Oil and Gas Storage, Page 3]. 
 
This is consistent with Respondent 21’s response discussed in sub-section 
6.3.3.1. 
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In the next example, there is a clear message that the CEO is ultimately 
responsible, but that the Board must direct and when they make decisions 
which contradict the EHS policy of an organization, they should be ready for 
those consequences.  
 
“the CE is ultimately responsible for the performance of the organization far 
as I can see. But the board has accountability that they must make sure that 
the direction they are providing is in line with that policy. They cannot give a 
conflicting message. There are times that decisions will need to be made at 
board level and if they’re not consistent with the EHS policy, if financial 
performance overrides environmental performance or safety performance 
then they should be accountable for that.” [Respondent 5, O&G, Refining, 
Page 3]. 
 
Finally, another example from the upstream Oil and Gas Industry, where the 
leadership believes that delegation of responsibility is accepted but not the 
notion of the delegation of accountability.  
 
“Researcher: “…. I’m asking this question in the sense of, you know, I would 
like to know in your view, do you think that the accountability of the board, 
therefore, is being delegated to the CEO? 
Respondent:  No, no, accountability can’t delegate, responsibility can. So, 
the accountability always stays with the board. 
Researcher: Ok. 
Respondent:  And, if the CEO doesn’t perform well enough on safety, then 
get rid of the CEO. 
Researcher: Yeah. 
Respondent:  Yeah, so that’s their accountability. What they can do, is to, 
they can assign the responsibility for the execution and the er and good HSE 
practice in his organization. And clearly, and that to me, should be clearly 
delegated. I wouldn’t like to have board members involved in a, in the day to 
day running of the company, I don’t think that’s the er…” [Respondent 26, 
O&G, Upstream, Page 5]. 
 
178 
 
The above opinion on the Board action is consistent with the separation of 
roles and was mentioned as one of the key results areas (i.e. hiring, 
managing and firing the CEO) of Boards by Finkelstein and Mooney (2003). 
 
6.3.4 Monitoring EHS Performance 
 
As discussed extensively in the literature, monitoring organizational 
performance is one of the key responsibilities and fiduciary duties of a Board 
Director. In high risk/high reliability organizations, EHS performance 
monitoring is extremely critical. In general, there was a great deal of 
agreement in this context between almost all of the leaders interviewed. On 
analysis of this theme, 3 sub-themes emerged and are shown in Figure 6.7. 
 
Key 
Theme
Sub-
Themes
Monitoring EHS 
Performance
1. Effectiveness of 
Monitoring EHS 
Performance
2. Frequency of 
Monitoring EHS 
Performance
3. Expectation/
Standardisation from 
the BoD on Reports 
 
 
Fig 6.7: Sub-Themes established for Monitoring EHS Performance 
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Table 6.11: Monitoring EHS Performance Sub-Themes  
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
   
Effectiveness of 
Monitoring EHS 
Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Researcher:  so in terms of influence and 
directing performance of EHS, would you 
not agree it’s quite a difficult line to draw, 
isn’t it. 
Respondent:  I think because at the 
moment, from my limited experience, the 
boards have very little knowledge of the 
EHS side of the organization, they don’t 
focus on it that much. But I think recent 
times, especially in our industry, that’s 
being elevated.” 
[Respondent 5, 
Oil and Gas -
Refining, Page 
4]. 
This SVP was talking about the issue of the 
need for a re-focus on PSM indicators 
rather than personal safety statistics in the 
industry, he referred to the recent incidents 
in refining and fertilizer plants etc. “….The 
management team was actually flying to 
the rig to award er er to give a HSE award 
to the crew of the rig because they 
completed X amount of whatever hours, 
with the, with no empty eye or something 
like this. I don’t know the, I don’t recall the 
exact statistics. So, I think the industry has 
been so busy with the LTI, with all these 
statistics, number of misses. LTI gets 
reported against man-hours and that 
perhaps er there wasn’t emphasis as it 
should be on the big picture, on the 
process safety issues. What are the big 
things that can cause an explosion in the 
plant and that can take, that he can have in 
a, in a, in a drilling situation, you have a 
blowout situation eh. In a process plant you 
[Respondent 27, 
Oil and Gas - 
Upstream, Page 
7]. 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Effectiveness of 
Monitoring EHS 
Performance 
can have a major leak which will result in 
explosion. These are, these are the big 
issues as opposed to the LTI, this guy, you 
know, tripped and fell and he, he you know, 
broke his finger or a, or a hammer dropped 
on his foot and, and hurt his feet and he 
has you know, one half a day in the 
hospital. So, I think the industry is moving 
or should be moving or started to move 
towards looking at, that how it call process 
safety.  
Frequency of 
Monitoring EHS 
Performance 
Respondent: They actually get, they get a 
weekly, they get a weekly report which 
goes to the board and his Excellency the 
minister. It won’t contain just highlight of 
the business but we will include if there are 
any significant EHS issues in there. 
Researcher: That’s quite regular, one every 
week. 
Respondent: Very regular, every week… It 
goes to the chairman, board of directors 
and his Excellency. Its 2 pages only. So its 
2 pages, which I usually prepare and it is 
very similar to also, its 80% similar to what 
we issue, what we call management in 
news brief, to all company employees. So 
we tell them about what the progress in the 
marketing, what are our gross margins, 
what are our main events that we did, if 
there are any celebrations, EHS or 
otherwise and projections, just short 
projections. We also have a monthly report 
which is a more detailed report on the 
projects, on the progress.  
 
[Respondent 8, 
Oil and Gas -
Refining, Page 
9]. 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
Expectation 
/Standardization 
from the BoD on 
Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Respondent: yeah, no this is something 
they expect to and we do that on every 
board meeting. We start of by giving them 
part of the management report and the 
management update. It’s the update on the 
KPI’s that we have, that we have set for 
ourselves. So as you know we set targets 
and we set stress targets and we have the 
baseline. And we will report each, if it’s 
every quarter or if it’s every 2 months, 
whenever we have a meeting we update 
that information and present that to them. 
Just to give them a bird’s eye view of how 
we faired during the last period. And 
sometimes you will be way below the target 
by midyear, and sometimes you will you 
know in a negative way precede the target. 
And they will probably, we will wanna ask 
some more questions and might even ask 
for an investigation, a separate 
investigation that might be independent 
from the operation itself to have a look at 
that and report back to them. Either directly 
as board of they might do that through 
audit committee or some other committee. 
Researcher:  I mean you have one of the 
top ten oil storage companies in the world. 
Would you say that was standard practice 
in the industry? 
Respondent: I do believe so; I mean most 
of our competitors will report back to the 
board a lot of the figures that they get are 
safety and health related to their board of 
directors on a monthly, by monthly basis, 
which is usually the frequency of when the 
[Respondent 3, 
Oil and Gas - 
Storage, Page 
4]. 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Expectation 
/Standardization 
from the BoD on 
Reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
boards tend to meet. Every 6 to 8 weeks. I 
think also, to eer you know, being 
requested to benchmark information 
against competitors and provide that to the 
board to see how we’re doing versus peers 
in the industry and you know gives that, 
eerr, they can gage how we’re doing 
versus the others so gives them a comfort 
feeling, a comfort factor that we are 
performing or not performing. The 
information should be fed back to them on 
a continual basis, otherwise if we do it only 
once a year too much time will have then 
pass for them to be able to actually be 
effective as a board. So I think they need 
to, it’s the right of the board of directors to 
ask the management to give constant 
feedback or updates.”.  
“We have er…leading and lagging 
indicators, KPI’s, where we review every 
month as well as quarterly. We have a 
dashboard, we have a plant to our 
dashboard, and we have department of 
dashboards and that we use as a reference 
as a measure to drive through the safety.” 
[Respondent 16, Manufacturing, Page 5]. 
 
“Their rule as far as I can see is really 
setting clear expectations which are 
challenging and which are realistic in 
accordance with, with the industry norms 
and holding the management team 
accountable for delivering er…safety 
performance that is sustained the 
company’s reputation. So we do have 
[Respondent 14, 
Construction, 
Page 1]. 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Expectation 
/Standardization 
from the BoD on 
Reports 
specific targets that are set for us as an 
executive team and we have got to be 
reporting to the board every quarter, 
demonstrating that we are delivering er on 
these set targets.”  
“Researcher: Ok. Um how often and how 
and why do you update the board of 
directors on EHS performance in your 
organization and do they really expect any 
updates? 
Respondent:  Well to tell the truth it’s a little 
bit maybe embarrassing. We only update 
them usually when um unfortunately 
something goes wrong. Well touch on 
wood nothing really has gone wrong but 
like small incidences and these kind of 
things we do tend to inform them. But I 
mean we, perhaps I think what’s lacking 
um is that yeah, maybe they, a certain 
standard format or a better knowledge of 
how to communicate this to the board 
is...you know, a standard kind of thing 
would be quite er quite welcome, helpful.  
[Respondent 15, 
Shipping, Page 
3]. 
 
6.3.4.1 Effectiveness of Monitoring EHS Performance 
 
This sub-theme explores the effectiveness of monitoring performance. The 
Monitoring EHS performance aspect has already been defined, but it is 
critical to understand the significance of effectiveness on this. The following 
examples illustrate this well: 
 
“Researcher:  so in terms of influence and directing performance of EHS, 
would you not agree it’s quite a difficult line to draw, isn’t it. 
Respondent:  I think because at the moment, from my limited experience, the 
boards have very little knowledge of the EHS side of the organization, they 
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don’t focus on it that much. But I think recent times, especially in our 
industry, that’s being elevated.” [Respondent 5, Oil and Gas -Refining, Page 
4]. 
 
So in the above example, the root-cause of the issue is that Boards in the 
view of this leader lack critical understanding and knowledge and therefore 
even if they monitor they may not be able to add much value. In the next 
example, the leader talks about the issues facing the Oil and Gas industry 
with a lack of focus on Process Safety and instead a focus on reactive 
personal safety KPIs which are typically reported to the Board.  
 
“….So, I think the industry has been so busy with the LTI, with all these 
statistics, number of misses. LTI gets reported against man-hours and that 
perhaps er there wasn’t emphasis as it should be on the big picture, on the 
process safety issues. What are the big things that can cause an explosion 
in the plant and that can take, that he can have in a, in a, in a drilling 
situation, you have a blowout situation eh. In a process plant you can have a 
major leak which will result in explosion. These are, these are the big issues 
as opposed to the LTI, this guy, you know, tripped and fell and he, he you 
know, broke his finger or a, or a hammer dropped on his foot and, and hurt 
his feet and he has you know, one half a day in the hospital. So, I think the 
industry is moving or should be moving or started to move towards looking 
at, that how it call process safety. [Respondent 27, O&G,  Upstream, Page 
7]. 
 
This SVP was talking about the issue of the need for a re-focus on PSM 
indicators rather than personal safety statistics in the industry, he referred to 
the recent incidents in refining and fertilizer plants etc. So the Board in their 
helping to guide and govern, should in fact have sufficient understanding on 
what kind of indicators need to be reported and analysed. This does not 
require a great deal of technical knowledge but perhaps a broad 
understanding of the industry benchmarks for EHS in their particular line of 
business.  
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6.3.4.2 Frequency of Monitoring EHS Performance 
 
In an interesting discussion with a leader within the refining business, EHS is 
reported very frequently, to a very high level and contains EHS information to 
the Board. This is generally not an industry expectation.  
 
Respondent: They actually get, they get a weekly, they get a weekly report 
which goes to the board and his Excellency the minister. It won’t contain just 
highlight of the business but we will include if there are any significant EHS 
issues in there. 
Researcher: That’s quite regular, one every week. 
Respondent: Very regular, every week… It goes to the chairman, board of 
directors and his Excellency. Its 2 pages only. So its 2 pages, which I usually 
prepare and it is very similar to also, its 80% similar to what we issue, what 
we call management in news brief, to all company employees. So we tell 
them about what the progress in the marketing, what are our gross margins, 
what are our main events that we did, if there are any celebrations, EHS or 
otherwise and projections, just short projections. We also have a monthly 
report which is a more detailed report on the projects, on the progress. 
[Respondent 8, Oil and Gas -Refining, Page 9]. 
 
From the interviews conducted with various CEOs and senior leaders reports 
ranged from a weekly such as in this example above to every 3 months 
(quarterly). Many of the organisations have monthly reports to the board 
which are brief but contain some brief information regarding EHS, which 
includes performance indicators, any EHS events or initiatives conducted or 
otherwise incidents in the last reporting period. This is explained further in the 
next section too.  
 
6.3.4.3 Expectation /Standardization from the BoD on Reports 
 
In one interview where the focus was on Oil Storage and Movement, where 
effectively the companies provide a service to Oil Majors, Shipping 
Charterers and Oil Traders when asked about how often the BoD expected 
the periodic EHS reports from the CEO:  
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“….yeah, no this is something they expect to and we do that on every board 
meeting. We start of by giving them part of the management report and the 
management update. It’s the update on the KPI’s that we have, that we have 
set for ourselves. So as you know we set targets and we set stress targets 
and we have the baseline. And we will report each, if it’s every quarter or if 
it’s every 2 months, whenever we have a meeting we update that information 
and present that to them. Just to give them a bird’s eye view of how we 
faired during the last period.” 
 
He goes on further to explain: 
 
“I do believe so; I mean most of our competitors will report back to the board 
a lot of the figures that they get are safety and health related to their board of 
directors on a monthly, by monthly basis, which is usually the frequency of 
when the boards tend to meet. Every 6 to 8 weeks. I think also, to eer you 
know, being requested to benchmark information against competitors and 
provide that to the board to see how we’re doing versus peers in the industry 
and you know gives that, eerr, they can gage how we’re doing versus the 
others so gives them a comfort feeling,…………So I think they need to, it’s 
the right of the board of directors to ask the management to give constant 
feedback or updates.”. [Respondent 3, O&G, Storage, Page 4]. 
 
Even within Manufacturing, Construction and perhaps a little less so in the 
Shipping Industry (which is highly regulated internationally), reporting on EHS 
performance is both a standardized practice and an expectation for the board 
of Directors. This is illustrated in the following three examples: 
 
Manufacturing with leading and lagging indicators reported: 
 
“We have er…leading and lagging indicators, KPI’s, where we review every 
month as well as quarterly. We have a dashboard, we have a plant to our 
dashboard, and we have department of dashboards and that we use as a 
reference as a measure to drive through the safety.” [Respondent 16, 
Manufacturing, Page 5]. 
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Construction with setting specific targets and then quarterly indicators 
reported: 
 
“Their rule as far as I can see is really setting clear expectations which are 
challenging and which are realistic in accordance with, with the industry 
norms and holding the management team accountable for delivering 
er…safety performance that is sustained the company’s reputation. So we 
do have specific targets that are set for us as an executive team and we 
have got to be reporting to the board every quarter, demonstrating that we 
are delivering er on these set targets.” [Respondent 14, Construction, Page 
1]. 
 
Finally, the Shipping industry reporting lagging indicators if something goes 
wrong. In saying this it should be appreciated that a great deal of other 
reports goes to so many other agencies covering aspects including EHS 
matters: 
 
“Researcher: Ok. Um how often and how and why do you update the board 
of directors on EHS performance in your organization and do they really 
expect any updates? 
Respondent:  Well to tell the truth it’s a little bit maybe embarrassing. We 
only update them usually when um unfortunately something goes wrong. 
Well touch on wood nothing really has gone wrong but like small incidences 
and these kind of things we do tend to inform them. But I mean we, perhaps I 
think what’s lacking um is that yeah, maybe they, a certain standard format 
or a better knowledge of how to communicate this to the board is...you know, 
a standard kind of thing would be quite er quite welcome, helpful. 
[Respondent 15, Shipping, Page 3]. 
 
6.3.5 Risk Management 
 
The management of risk is one of the key success factors of a High 
Reliability Organization as discussed in Chapter 1. Exploring the viewpoints 
of leadership on this theme/element was very important and insightful and we 
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see that although different industries manage risk in a different way, they all 
manage risk nevertheless.  
 
Key 
Theme
Sub-
Themes
Risk 
Management
1. Risk Awarness
2. Risk Appreciation3. Risk Tolerance 
 
Fig 6.8: Sub-Themes established for Risk Management 
 
Table 6.12: Risk Management Sub-Themes  
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
   
 
Risk 
Awareness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…..I think they should insist because I personally 
as a board member would be very uncomfortable 
being accountable for something where I had 
absolutely no visibility to reassure me that my 
accountability was effectively mitigated. And I think 
a risk register is a symbol but it’s actually it should 
be the evidence of a greater level of process and 
understanding throughout the organization, that 
your risks are being effectively monitored and 
managed and you are being alerted when those 
risk profiles change. So I think definitely it’s a very 
good instrument. Um the only thing about a risk 
register is I would feel very, very uncomfortable if 
 Respondent 
12, Aviation, 
Page 7 
189 
 
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Risk 
Awareness 
risk registers are used as placebos to fob people off 
into a false sense of security you know. Here’s the 
piece of paper and you can see everything’s green 
so there’s not a problem you know. How valuable, 
how good is the process behind it really? Um so I 
think the board should not only insist that its 
accountabilities, there is visibility as to about how 
well its accountabilities are mitigated but also they 
should satisfy themselves that the processes that 
sit behind the information that’s reported through 
the risk register are really robust and accurate.”  
“I’m going to have to honestly reply that I have 
absolutely no idea of what conversations go on 
around risk management at the board level of our 
company. I’m not, I just, I would guess and that 
would be the wrong thing to do. Yes I mean they 
are talking about   safety so what I’m quite 
confident they are doing is talking about future 
trends, they are talking about major aspect of 
enterprise, risk management when they are looking 
at a pipeline of projects that goes out in 20, 30, 40 
years in our case when you talk about large 
upstream oil and gas projects, but again this is my 
uninformed view but basis of my knowledge of the 
company. That’s really where their view of risk 
management is.” 
Respondent 6, 
Diversified Oil 
and Gas, Page 
5 
Risk 
Appreciation 
“…..what they do can be very powerful in a 
symbolic way, that they care, that they take is 
seriously, that they know what the risks are for the 
people working in that company. They may not be 
involved in that directly – you know – but if they can 
appreciate the risks then they should that they 
know the risks and they can at a very broad level 
address these – and it can be a very powerful 
message that they send across to the organization.”  
Respondent 1, 
Oil and Gas 
Storage, Page 
1 
“We actually, we wrote, we derived the risk 
management er model and we present it to the 
board and the board endorsed it”. And also “….But 
this is how we do it, it’s er we did risk assessment 
Respondent 
20, Power and 
Utilities, Page 
4 & 8 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
for you. We have, we bought your assistant to, to 
record it and we do near misses and we keep 
updating ourselves. And also we exploring new 
risks so when, when a new substation comes and 
new overhead line comes, we say, what, what new 
risks we have. Also we have the obligations 
towards the, towards the general public, so we 
need to make sure that the general public is also 
safe and they don’t get harmed by our network.”  
Risk 
Tolerance 
“They have to show a genuine interest in HSE 
er…they have to have a full understanding of HSE 
impact on the business to start with. In today’s 
world you know, we live in a small world because of 
er the technological advances in communication 
er… Reputation is extremely important er… 
Companies in our kind of industries, oil and gas, 
you know this is again a small world, it’s not…they 
live by their reputation. You can easily get out of 
business, run out of business if your HSE record is 
bad. Ok. And even as from we are contractors, we 
are not really oil Production Company but because 
we are in the oil and gas business we work in very 
sensitive areas. And nobody will let you get in an oil 
field to do work for them if they know your safety 
record is bad. You can cause them a disaster that 
will ultimately shut them down or cause them to 
lose billions of dollars. We are in this kind of 
industry where tolerance for low HSE standard is 
you know is not there.”  
Respondent 
13, 
Manufacturing, 
Page 7 
 
6.3.5.1 Risk Tolerance 
 
Risk “tolerance” is a term commonly used in more recent years in the context 
of enterprise risk management as discussed in chapter 2. Similar to, and a 
less commonly used compared to risk appetite, risk tolerance defines the 
level of risk an organisation is willing to live with to conduct its business. In 
high risk industries some risks have to be accepted and mitigated to a “as 
low as reasonably practical” level. But it is the role of the Board to set that 
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tolerance level. This is from an interview with a leader in aviation, talking 
about the Board, also see table 6.12: 
 
“…..I think they should insist because I personally as a board member would 
be very uncomfortable being accountable for something where I had 
absolutely no visibility to reassure me that my accountability was effectively 
mitigated. And I think a risk register is a symbol but it’s actually it should be 
the evidence of a greater level of process and understanding throughout the 
organization, that your risks are being effectively monitored and managed 
and you are being alerted when those risk profiles change. 
…………………there is visibility as to about how well its accountabilities are 
mitigated but also they should satisfy themselves that the processes that sit 
behind the information that’s reported through the risk register are really 
robust and accurate.” [Respondent 12, Aviation, Page 7]. 
 
From the above the risk assessment and registry process is very significant. 
The Board therefore needs to understand not only the risks, but comfort 
themselves with the level of accuracy and effectiveness of the risk 
identification and assessment processes as well. This next example is a 
leader from the Oil and Gas: 
 
“I’m going to have to honestly reply that I have absolutely no idea of what 
conversations go on around risk management at the board level of our 
company. I’m not, I just, I would guess and that would be the wrong thing to 
do. Yes I mean they are talking about   safety so what I’m quite confident 
they are doing is talking about future trends, they are talking about major 
aspect of enterprise, risk management when they are looking at a pipeline of 
projects that goes out in 20, 30, 40 years in our case when you talk about 
large upstream oil and gas projects, but again this is my uninformed view but 
basis of my knowledge of the company. That’s really where their view of risk 
management is.” [Respondent 6, Diversified Oil and Gas, Page 5]. 
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6.3.5.2 Risk Appreciation 
 
Risk management is very much motivated by the appreciation of risk and the 
impacts that such risks that relate to EHS issues can have on an 
organisation. The Board and the executive management whilst may defer 
much of the actual detailed risk assessments to specialists within an 
organisation, need to have a certain level of understanding of such risks and 
more importantly what they need to do to direct the organisation to manage 
those risks through elimination and reduction strategies.   
 
“…..what they do can be very powerful in a symbolic way, that they care, 
that they take is seriously, that they know what the risks are for the people 
working in that company. They may not be involved in that directly – you 
know – but if they can appreciate the risks then they should that they know 
the risks and they can at a very broad level address these – and it can be a 
very powerful message that they send across to the organization.” 
[Respondent 1, Oil and Gas Storage, Page 1]. 
 
Furthermore, it must be appreciated that some management and board 
decisions in business may in fact create EHS risks either by directing new 
business ventures or processes or otherwise continuing certain risky 
operations. EHS risks can be varied in their nature ranging from legal non-
compliance to physical risks in the company operations on people, processes 
and assets which also lead to financial losses. 
 
In the Power and Utilities Industry, this next interview extract : 
 
“We actually, we wrote, we derived the risk management er model and we 
present it to the board and the board endorsed it”.  
 
And also: 
 
 “….But this is how we do it, it’s er we did risk assessment for you. We have, 
we bought your assistant to, to record it and we do near misses and we 
keep updating ourselves. And also we exploring new risks so when, when a 
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new substation comes and new overhead line comes, we say, what, what 
new risks we have. Also we have the obligations towards the, towards the 
general public, so we need to make sure that the general public is also safe 
and they don’t get harmed by our network.” [Respondent 20, Power and 
Utilities, Page 4 & 8]. 
 
This last quotation is interesting as it raises the issue of risk to the general 
public, so this can be considered a society impact risk as well. In all cases 
the leadership teams in organisations need to understand the risks which are 
involved.  
 
6.3.5.3 Risk Awareness 
 
Risk appreciation and risk awareness are very similar. These are created as 
sub-themes as risk awareness as the appreciation of risk is borne from the 
highlighting of these risks associated with the business and possible actions 
to be taken. But there needs to be a general awareness of the risks related to 
each industry. Board directors may sit on boards of various industries and 
therefore they must appreciate the differences of different types of EHS risks 
which pertain to each different industry. 
 
Finally, an extract from an interview from the Manufacturing Industry depicts 
the impact of reputation damage from incidents on the clients being the oil 
and gas industry in this case. Protecting company sustainability is a board 
director obligation and here this is highlighted in terms of the board members 
needing to have that awareness of the impact of untoward incidents.  
 
“And nobody will let you get in an oil field to do work for them if they know 
your safety record is bad. You can cause them a disaster that will ultimately 
shut them down or cause them to lose billions of dollars. We are in this kind 
of industry where tolerance for low HSE standard is you know is not there.” 
[Respondent 13, Manufacturing, Page 7]. 
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6.3.6 EHS Awareness, Knowledge and Competence 
 
Having the right level of awareness, knowledge and understanding of an 
industry and the HSE risks related to it is of critical importance. Some of the 
extracts in this section identify a highly sensitive and crucial question. How 
much can ultimately be expected from a Group of Directors who have only 
superficial understanding of EHS matters? 
 
Key 
Theme
Sub-
Themes
Knowledge, 
Awareness and 
Competence
1. General 
Awarness
2. Induction (On-
Boarding 
Programs)
 
 
Fig 6.9: Sub-Themes established for EHS Awareness, Knowledge and 
Competence 
 
Table 6.13: EHS Awareness, Knowledge and Competence Sub-Themes  
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
   
General 
Awareness 
 
 
 
“I can talk about my board. EHS isn’t high on 
their agenda, yet. We’re trying as an 
organization to get a more EHS aware, 
especially from process safety. And it’s 
interesting to see the Chairman now asking to 
Respondent 5, 
O&G Refining, 
Page 4 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
General 
Awareness 
be informed of process incidents. Which means 
he’s trying to understand is there an underline 
rumble he needs to be aware of. Is there a 
potential something coming. The board is 
ultimately responsible to the shareholder, right. 
Now for a NOC that shareholder is a 
government. But like in the west there are a lot 
of people that put their life savings into shares. 
So he should be accountable for, the Chairman 
should be accountable for everything that could 
be financial and sustainable performance of the 
organization. And to me an injury or a Lost 
Time Incident falls into that category. So I 
would like to say yes, but are we there? 
Probably not, because if you read Chairman 
reports how often do they start the report by  
say this is the safety performance of our 
organization” and…..  
“... it all comes back down to the risks 
associated with the business. I mean for them 
the ERM is key because that tells them the 
highest risks the organization is facing. And for 
them they then need to understand what the 
risks are so really that is the document I think 
would govern a lot of their risk assessment 
thinking. But they need to understand what the 
involve means…because sometimes in ERM 
we get a little technical, we might talk about, I 
don’t know, for us it’s not too… it’s the pipe 
lines and the non-availability of the lab and 
stuff.” 
Respondent 5, 
Refining, Page 19 
Induction 
(On-
Boarding) 
Programs 
“Yes, right at the beginning on the second 
month, their appointment.  Although half of 
them were already previous executives 
actually, in this company itself, but the other 4 
Respondent 8, 
Refining, Page 8 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Induction 
(On-
Boarding) 
Programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
were not. So we did actually conduct a 5 hour 
induction. Now the induction to be fair is not 
EHS induction only, it was kind of for the whole 
business. But we took part of that, probably 1 
hour on the EHS side, but then also we 
dedicated another 2 hours for the risk registers 
and in terms of our overall risk but then we 
touched on the EHS. This is the second thing. 
The third thing, in terms of educating and we 
did not because this is the familiarization, from 
thereon they have requested that on a 
quarterly basis they should have the safety 
statistics, the EHS statistics for the company 
and this is presented to them. What are loss 
times, no loss time, first aid, vehicle accidents 
and any major compliance to the environment if 
any? So, this they requested and it is part of 
there. But we did not have a very specific EHS 
familiarization per say so more of a continuing 
education. So ERM familiarization the initial 
short one as part of the overall and SHEQ 
moment and the quarterly safety statistics. 
That’s how we do that. And of course now, with 
the safety alerts and the incidents reporting 
that we involve them in.”  
“I mean for board um I mean you definitely 
really need to know the basics um and er you 
know, basically try to build on it. And if not, I 
think the company for example might have to 
um you know provide for example, training 
sessions er you know for the board to go 
ahead and attend to. At least for them to um 
you know expand, expand their knowledge in 
this particular field. But I don’t see that being 
done much. 
Respondent 15, 
Shipping, Page 7 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Induction 
(On-
Boarding) 
Programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Researcher: Do you think that that might 
happen in the future? 
Respondent:  I hope so. I mean from er…we, I 
will just give, home coming we haven’t done 
that yet, mainly because our board are quite 
very seniors in the government which they 
can’t you know take time or whatever to 
actually do such things. And like I said, some of 
the HSE’s are more specific rather than more 
general so I guess you start with the general 
and then maybe go to more specific. But I hope 
that, that starts soon, that we do that more 
often.”  
“So a new director will have to come to the 
company to spend a couple of days 
understanding the company from all aspects, 
its operation, its er procedure in the EHS. And 
that gives them an awareness and then they 
will see the company progress and benchmark 
reports about the other facilities. Thirdly, also 
um the government has been more proactive 
now in appointing directors who have 
knowledge and experience in the industry. For 
example, some of our board of directors has 
been CEO of organizations, similar 
organizations. So we have one who use to be 
um XXXX (Large Regional Minerals Company) 
president and now he’s vice president of XXXX 
(Large International Petrochemical Company) 
We have another one, at the moment he’s 
XXXX CEO in Saudi Arabia. We have one 
who’s working in petrol chemical industry in 
Qatar. We have one in the, who use to work in 
our organisation and became a director. So 
people are aware of it and those who are not 
Respondent 18, 
Manufacturing, 
Page 10 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Induction 
(On-
Boarding) 
Programs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aware of it, we take the initiative to also do an 
induction program to make them aware of.”  
“Researcher:  I want to ask you about the um 
the board of directors in general, as well. Do 
you feel that in organizations, they have 
sufficient basic awareness training in EHS and 
safety, you know, in the industries? I mean, the 
guys are all pointing on the board, do they 
have that minimum knowledge of, to contribute 
to the, you know, to the leadership issues, that 
we spoke in the earlier questions? 
Respondent:  I think, if the board is made up 
properly, I think they have expertise in all 
areas, not just finance. 
Respondent:  So, I think there has to be some 
operational er member that has the technical 
background and the understanding er to 
educate the other board members and add 
insight to any decision made within EHS. I think 
it’s very important 
Researcher:  Ok. 
Respondent:  I don’t think all board members 
would have that knowledge or capability but as 
long as you have sufficient er people at the 
table, yeah. 
Researcher:  But, one interesting thing then, I 
would ask, is that, you always say that, safety 
is common sense, right? So… 
Respondent:  It is, if you’re raised that way and 
it’s no common sense (respondent coughs) is 
it, in most environments. I think common sense 
is a, is a gift that usually comes from having a 
lot of accidents. (They all laugh)”  
Respondent 22, Oil 
and Gas, 
Upstream, Page 
15 
“Firstly, at a senior leadership level to 
understand again a cultural change if an 
Respondent 6, 
Diversified Oil and 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Induction 
(On-
Boarding) 
Programs 
organization hasn’t fully embraced the 
importance if they are in a high risk 
environment of focusing on the core aspects 
collectively as a leadership team of OEMS 
safety standards. That might be ways of driving 
out change but the fundamentals have to be 
understood by and believed in by those 
individuals appointed into their roles as board 
members and directors. You can’t half believe 
in it so maybe an elevated role can help lead 
the horses to water but the horses have to also 
know why they’re gonna drink.”  
Gas , Page 7 
“Um see I mean it’s, it’s a big subject when you 
look at HSE coz it covers a lot of, a lot of 
things. At what level is it supposedly 
acceptable? I mean I guess we have to first 
find out what is, I mean is it just general 
awareness is that, is that sufficient enough? 
Are we looking at for example um you know, to 
be a master at er I mean it really depends on 
what, what level are we looking at. Um I mean 
for board um I mean you definitely really need 
to know the basics um and er you know, 
basically try to build on it. And if not, I think the 
company for example might have to um you 
know provide for example, training sessions er 
you know for the board to go ahead and attend 
to. At least for them to um you know expand, 
expand their knowledge in this particular field.”  
Respondent 15, 
page 7 
 
6.3.6.1 General Awareness 
 
Having a good level of general awareness is important. The level of 
competence and knowledge is defined differently for board members and an 
executive management team to say EHS specialists. Nevertheless there is a 
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certain degree of understanding which is required in order for a board to 
exhibit that right level of understanding and appreciation of risk. This is 
critical for there to be support for requirements to reduce risk, not to make 
decisions or direct the organisation to do something that may create more 
risks and so on.  
 
 This is illustrated in the first example below expanded in table 6.13.  
 
“I can talk about my board. EHS isn’t high on their agenda, yet. We’re trying 
as an organization to get a more EHS aware, especially from process safety. 
And it’s interesting to see the Chairman now asking to be informed of 
process incidents. Which means he’s trying to understand is there an 
underline rumble he needs to be aware of. ………….. the Chairman should 
be accountable for everything that could be financial and sustainable 
performance of the organization. And to me an injury or a Lost Time Incident 
falls into that category. So I would like to say yes, but are we there? Probably 
not, because if you read Chairman reports how often do they start the report 
by  say this is the safety performance of our organization”  
 
And much later also in the same interview he explains that: 
  
“... it all comes back down to the risks associated with the business. I mean 
for them the ERM is key because that tells them the highest risks the 
organization is facing. And for them they then need to understand what the 
risks are so really that is the document I think would govern a lot of their risk 
assessment thinking. But they need to understand what the involve 
means…because sometimes in ERM we get a little technical, we might talk 
about, I don’t know, for us it’s not too… it’s the pipe lines and the non-
availability of the lab and stuff.” [Respondent 5, Refining, Page 4 and Page 
19]. 
 
This was one example of many and is used as a clear illustration. The next 
section focuses more on what organisations have been doing to create 
awareness and competency in the board directorship. 
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6.3.6.2 Induction (On-Boarding Programs) 
 
There are some efforts to present EHS awareness through combined Board 
Director Induction or on-boarding programs. Ultimately there is an 
expectation that they also develop an understanding and knowledge from the 
interactions with the Board as Directors: 
 
“Yes, right at the beginning on the second month, their appointment.  
Although half of them were already previous executives actually, in this 
company itself, but the other 4 were not. So we did actually conduct a 5 hour 
induction. Now the induction to be fair is not EHS induction only, it was kind 
of for the whole business. But we took part of that, probably 1 hour on the 
EHS side, but then also we dedicated another 2 hours for the risk registers 
and in terms of our overall risk but then we touched on the EHS. This is the 
second thing. The third thing, in terms of educating and we did not because 
this is the familiarization, from thereon they have requested that on a 
quarterly basis they should have the safety statistics, the EHS statistics for 
the company and this is presented to them. What are loss times, no loss 
time, first aid, vehicle accidents and any major compliance to the 
environment if any? So, this they requested and it is part of there. But we did 
not have a very specific EHS familiarization per say so more of a continuing 
education. So ERM familiarization the initial short one as part of the overall 
and SHEQ moment and the quarterly safety statistics. That’s how we do that. 
And of course now, with the safety alerts and the incidents reporting that we 
involve them in.” [Respondent 8, Refining, Page 8]. 
 
There is thus is a significant effort which is made in this organisation to 
provide a structured approach to giving the board directors enough 
knowledge and understanding of the business.  
 
The next example analysed is from the shipping industry. Again it seems that 
there is still a conviction that there may be a need to develop training and 
inducting of Boards on EHS matters, although shipping has had its fair share 
internationally of major EHS events with a lot of negative publicity: 
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“I mean for board um I mean you definitely really need to know the basics 
um and er you know, basically try to build on it. And if not, I think the 
company for example might have to um you know provide for example, 
training sessions er you know for the board to go ahead and attend to. At 
least for them to um you know expand, expand their knowledge in this 
particular field. But I don’t see that being done much. 
 
Researcher: Do you think that that might happen in the future? 
Respondent:  I hope so. I mean from er…we, I will just give, home coming 
we haven’t done that yet, mainly because our board are quite very seniors in 
the government which they can’t you know take time or whatever to actually 
do such things. And like I said, some of the HSE’s are more specific rather 
than more general so I guess you start with the general and then maybe go 
to more specific. But I hope that, that starts soon, that we do that more 
often.” [Respondent 15, Shipping, Page 7]. 
 
In manufacturing, the story seems somewhat different with formal induction 
and induction (on-boarding) programs structured to give directors the 
appropriate level of knowledge of the industry and the organization: 
 
“So a new director will have to come to the company to spend a couple of 
days understanding the company from all aspects, its operation, its er 
procedure in the EHS. And that gives them an awareness and then they will 
see the company progress and benchmark reports about the other facilities. 
Thirdly, also um the government has been more proactive now in appointing 
directors who have knowledge and experience in the industry.”  
 
And goes on to say: “ So people are aware of it and those who are not 
aware of it, we take the initiative to also do an induction program to make 
them aware of.” [Respondent 18, Manufacturing, Page 10]. 
 
One respondent from the Oil and Gas Upstream industry explains that the 
Board make-up should be done in such a way that you have the right 
expertise on the Board: 
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“Researcher:  I want to ask you about the um the board of directors in 
general, as well. Do you feel that in organizations, they have sufficient basic 
awareness training in EHS and safety, you know, in the industries? I mean, 
the guys are all pointing on the board, do they have that minimum knowledge 
of, to contribute to the, you know, to the leadership issues, that we spoke in 
the earlier questions? 
 
Respondent:  I think, if the board is made up properly, I think they have 
expertise in all areas, not just finance. 
 
And later also says: 
 
Respondent:  I don’t think all board members would have that knowledge or 
capability but as long as you have sufficient er people at the table, yeah. 
 
 [Respondent 22, Oil and Gas, Upstream, Page 15]. 
 
Somewhat consistent with the above example the following extract 
demonstrates the view on the collective wisdom of the Board and therefore a 
basic understanding, conviction and some knowledge is required.  
 
“Firstly, at a senior leadership level to understand again a cultural change if 
an organization hasn’t fully embraced the importance if they are in a high risk 
environment of focusing on the core aspects collectively as a leadership 
team of OEMS safety standards. That might be ways of driving out change 
but the fundamentals have to be understood by and believed in by those 
individuals appointed into their roles as board members and directors. You 
can’t half believe in it so maybe an elevated role can help lead the horses to 
water but the horses have to also know why they’re gonna drink.” 
[Respondent 6, Diversified Oil and Gas , Page 7]. 
 
Even with the last example Respondent 15, (page 7) in table 6.13, the 
challenge of undertaking the training is explained. Assigning the right level 
and it is a question of expanding their knowledge at the end of the day. 
Delivering to them an education session to give them the basic 
understanding is important.  
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6.3.7 Operational Excellence & Systems 
 
Operational Excellence and the development of EHS Management Systems 
in organizations have been at the forefront of many high risk/high reliability 
industries. The reasons have been simple, placing a management system in 
place helps bring about order and defines operating standards and envelops.  
 
Key 
Theme
Sub-
Themes
Operational 
Excellence & 
Systems
1. Operational 
Excellence
2. Systems 
Thinking
3. Beyond Legal 
Compliance 
4. Consequence 
Managment
5. Best Practice
 
 
Fig 6.10: Sub-Themes established for Operational Excellence & 
Systems 
 
Table 6.14: Operational Excellence & Systems Sub-Themes  
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
   
Operational 
Excellence 
 
 
 
 
“Respondent: Um. Crikey its gotta be at least, I 
think it was the XXXX prior to the XXXX and 
YYYY merger, so it goes back over a decade. 
Maybe more, I think it may be even 15 or 20 
years so the OEMS the operational excellence 
management system is a company proprietary 
Respondent 6, 
Diversified 
O&G , Page 9 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Operational 
Excellence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and as you have mentioned previously there are 
other parallel models in some of the other oil 
majors. So we have ten pillars or principles of 
operation of all excellence so these are ten 
guidelines which I think go back yeah its gotta 
be 10 to 15 years minimum I would say. So 
these principles of operational excellence will, 
Researcher: I’ve seen this in fact I’ve seen also 
companies like in Bangkok they got something 
else they’ve called it actually given it an Arabic 
name. They called it something but they not 
exactly the same but they’re very similar kind 
of……. 
Respondent: Yes so these are kind of ten 
tenants, principals. And then below that there’s 
again a proprietary system but there’s below 
that a series of high level processes and then 
below that a large series of sub processes up to 
about 46 which should group together all the 
key sets of aspects around dos and don’ts to 
make sure that we are operating safely, reliably 
and taking into account the health of individuals. 
So, that’s one of them, that’s the kind of primary 
system that is used in XXXX. Now, in sub 
systems at certain groups may or may not use, 
so as a I think I mentioned to you once before 
LPS which is the loss prevention system, now 
it’s not its XXXX pays to use that under license 
so the loss prevention system is U.S based. 
LPS inc. has developed and runs this tool. I 
think ZZZZ also uses LPS and so that focuses 
on preventative observations and measures to 
systematically review the business and by 
observing critical tasks that have well defined 
processes for them. You can look for potential 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Operational 
Excellence 
losses that might have occurred if somebody 
hasn’t followed the processes right. This could 
be driving a truck or it could be operating a drill, 
it could be moving a large piece of equipment 
and so by stopping and assessing the risk 
before you undertake that activity and going 
through the process and observing one another 
you kind of pre empty the risk that might 
happen. So that is how LPS is another tool 
that’s used and there are whole host of others 
that we deploy throughout the business but the 
key one as you said is the OEMS and it dates 
back I think10 to 15 years.”  
 
Systems 
Thinking 
“So I think one thing you do, is you have the 
good foundations laid. So you have excellent 
reporting, you have good communication, you 
have processes in place to manage safety and 
that’s a broad statement and there’s a lot to that 
and having all the procedures, the rules, 
expectations and all that stuff. People there to 
supervise when you’re having structure work, 
every kind of work that’s being done is 
supervised where people are competent, 
permanent work systems, you know this whole 
infrastructure, where you can say, boy you can, 
you go home in the day and you say, you know I 
have done really everything possible within my 
power to ensure that you know we’ve minimized 
the chance of accidents. You know based on 
the learning’s in the past but, but I think it’s 
every year you really can do a deep think and 
you say what additional things. You know, you 
want to keep things fresh, if you just put it in 
some program and then you just kind of rant 
every year, you won’t have excellence”  
 
Respondent 9, 
O&G, 
Upstream, 
Page 7 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
Beyond 
(Legal) 
Compliance 
“I can think of my time in ICI, where the 
corporate policies um… various industry 
committees were formed in the sort of days of 
the European Union coming around to 
harmonize what was the Shell standard, the BP 
standard and its now call the European 
directive. But each of those organizations had a 
pretty good process already going and in a way 
the legal agreement was let’s take the common 
elements and adopt that as the… and it was a 
minimum. So I think you know there’s a 
certainty that no organization should go below 
that, but not many organizations should be 
satisfied with knowing we just comply with the 
standard. In some areas it will be fine, er but it, 
you know it’s back to risk again. If your business 
hinges on surviving in this industry because it’s 
good at something, being at the minimum level 
is not where you want to be, it’s not the right 
place. But there are other areas where, ok, if we 
comply that’s fine, good. But we should never, 
not comply. Legislation is usually a few years 
behind industry anyway because the committee 
that then draws up the legislation is usually 
drawing on learning coming from industry.  
Respondent 
12, Aviation, 
Page 15 
Consequence 
Management 
“…We take consequence management very 
seriously, so, with the, we have 12 rules, 12 
safety rules, golden, high level golden rules, 
which are compliance, intervene and respect. 
So, compliance is about, know the rules and 
comply with them. Intervention is about, when 
you see something that’s not right, stop it, shut it 
down or if somebody’s crossing the road when 
they’re, you know, just stop it, so intervene.  
And respect is, respect er personal safety, the 
Respondent 
24, Oil and 
Gas, 
Upstream, 
Page 9 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
environment, you know, don’t damage the 
environment, whatever. So, those 3 are the 
critical core element, but then, there’s 12 
specific rules, golden rules, that in the research, 
are the cause of 97, 98 % of safety incidents in 
the oil and gas industry. And, there’s, 4 of them 
are driving related, very simple, seatbelts, don’t 
use your mobile phones, don’t exceed, don’t, 
don’t drink and whatever. A number are, 
process related, don’t go inside contained, work 
from heights without harness etc, etc. If you fail 
any one of those, 2 of them is instant dismissal, 
smoking and drugs and alcohol, on work, on 
site, you’re out. It doesn’t matter how important 
you are, you’re out. And then, if we have issues 
with the minister of manpower, the minister of 
labour, we deal with it but those are the rules. 
For the others, we have a, 3 strikes and you’re 
out.”  
Best Industry 
Practice 
“Well each, we have a HSE management 
system er which sets out the, the classic things 
about sort of, defines leadership role and gives 
recommendation on how to do that, systems 
and procedures um monitoring, reporting. So, 
the, the system is there, so you need a, a 
healthy robust system. And, in the XXXX Group 
Companies, we’ve got what are called, codes of 
practice, that are, that come from the Group and 
they were developed from er the best industry 
practice. So, they’ve, they’ve gone around to, to 
the bigger oil industry er operators, reviewed 
their systems, taken the parts they’ve liked from 
them, made it into an XXXX structure, which is, 
which is good. Um and so, our HSE 
management system complies with the XXXX 
Respondent 
26, Oil and 
Gas, 
Upstream, 
Page 11 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
code of practice. And, there, there are many 
codes of practice that determine how we’re 
going to, to operate. So, that’s our reference, 
we’ve built our management structures in there. 
Each year, we have um a HSE plan, where we 
itemize which activities that we think we need to 
undertake in that coming year and we monitor 
against that plan. That gives us the ability to 
change focus, as we see the need to. Um so, if 
we’re, if we see a rising road safety er 
frequency rate, then we will implement a 
program to, to, to reduce that er down. So, 
that’s, that’s the flex we, you give ourselves, we 
give ourselves.”  
 
6.3.7.1 Operational Excellence 
 
The most extensive example was chosen; Respondent 6, (Page 9) in table 
6.14. This is a CEO of a diversified international Oil and Gas business who 
developed and started using the Operational Excellence model some years 
ago. He explains that they developed 10 pillars or tenants as if they were 
“Ten Commandments”. These are supported by processes and sub-
processes which are owned within the organisation by senior managers.  The 
developed a proprietary system which was supported by a loss prevention 
system (LPS) and this helps all the businesses where very they operate in 
the world to deal with their risks and prevent any losses. Their OEMS system 
is applied throughout the organisations and integrates EHS within with all 
other processes and systems of work.  
 
6.3.7.2 Systems Thinking 
 
A system thinking approach is critical in any kind of high risk industry. These 
systems cover processes which include reporting, communications and the 
overall management of all the processes.  
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“So I think one thing you do, is you have the good foundations laid. So you 
have excellent reporting, you have good communication, you have 
processes in place to manage safety and that’s a broad statement and 
there’s a lot to that and having all the procedures, the rules, expectations 
and all that stuff” [Respondent 9, Oil and Gas, Upstream, Page 7]. 
 
He goes on to explain that we systems in place the infrastructure is built to 
prevent major incidents and again the notion of continual improvement is 
alluded to in this discussion and also with various CEOs. Some explained 
that any system you put in place needs to be able to improve itself.  
 
6.3.7.3 Beyond (Legal) Compliance 
 
Even in the aviation industry, leaders who pass through from one industry to 
another seem to bring good practices from adjacent industries like chemical 
and oil and gas. In this quote it is clear that driving and developing systems 
that go beyond legal compliance is critical. 
 
“I can think of my time in ICI, where the corporate policies um… various 
industry committees were formed in the sort of days of the European Union 
coming around to harmonize what was the Shell standard, the BP standard 
and its now call the European directive. But each of those organizations had 
a pretty good process already going and in a way the legal agreement was 
let’s take the common elements and adopt that as the… and it was a 
minimum. So I think you know there’s a certainty that no organization should 
go below that, but not many organizations should be satisfied with knowing 
we just comply with the standard. ……… But we should never, not comply. 
Legislation is usually a few years behind industry anyway because the 
committee that then draws up the legislation is usually drawing on learning 
coming from industry. [Respondent 12, Aviation, Page 15]. 
 
Legal compliance was seen by many leaders in the interviews as the bare 
minimum and many said also as discussed in other section son this chapter 
that in some jurisdiction there are very few regulations. Therefore, the 
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industry must create the standards for itself to ensure a good level of 
compliance is achieved that prevents incidents.  
 
6.3.7.4 Consequence Management 
 
In this next quote, this particular interview was highly informative and 
detailed. This is of an upstream company within the GCC whose concession 
area is larger than the UK and one in which the total driven miles/day of all 
the employees and contractors/subcontracts nearly amount to driving to the 
moon! This particular leader was very passionate, and in this dialogue he 
explains how management systems are not about the rules and regulations 
only, they are about consequence management which ensures compliance 
and systems effectiveness: 
 
“…We take consequence management very seriously, so, with the, we have 
12 rules, 12 safety rules, golden, high level golden rules, which are 
compliance, intervene and respect. So, compliance is about, know the rules 
and comply with them. Intervention is about, when you see something that’s 
not right, stop it, shut it down or if somebody’s crossing the road when 
they’re, you know, just stop it, so intervene.  And respect is, respect er 
personal safety, the environment, you know, don’t damage the environment, 
whatever. So, those 3 are the critical core element, but then, there’s 12 
specific rules, golden rules, that in the research, are the cause of 97, 98 % of 
safety incidents in the oil and gas industry. And, there’s, 4 of them are 
driving related, very simple, seatbelts, don’t use your mobile phones, don’t 
exceed, don’t, don’t drink and whatever. A number are, process related, 
don’t go inside contained, work from heights without harness etc, etc. If you 
fail any one of those, 2 of them is instant dismissal, smoking and drugs and 
alcohol, on work, on site, you’re out. It doesn’t matter how important you are, 
you’re out. And then, if we have issues with the minister of manpower, the 
minister of labour, we deal with it but those are the rules. For the others, we 
have a, 3 strikes and you’re out.” [Respondent 24, Oil and Gas, Upstream, 
Page 9]. 
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What can be clearly understood that whilst training, education and 
management support are very important, the need to dismiss persons who 
do not comply and commit multiple of unacceptable offenses is a very 
important aspect of effectively managing EHS performance. A fair yet firm 
system must be in place.  
 
6.3.7.5 Best Industry Practice 
 
In this last example, the perspective from Oil and Gas sector is once again 
illustrated, of a company that operates within large Oil Major Group. It has 
many shareholders who are Oil Majors and the leader here explains how the 
compliance is to the Group standards which are derived from international 
best practice, shareholder inputs and regulations within the state. He 
mentions towards the end of his quote that flexibility in the system is such 
that it allows them to re-focus on the EHS matters that need it at the time 
based on what it happening.  
 
“Well each, we have a HSE management system er which sets out the, the 
classic things about sort of, defines leadership role and gives 
recommendation on how to do that, systems and procedures um monitoring, 
reporting. So, the, the system is there, so you need a, a healthy robust 
system. And, in the XXXX Group Companies, we’ve got what are called, 
codes of practice, that are, that come from the Group and they were 
developed from er the best industry practice. So, they’ve, they’ve gone 
around to, to the bigger oil industry er operators, reviewed their systems, 
taken the parts they’ve liked from them, made it into an XXXX structure, 
which is, which is good. Um and so, our HSE management system complies 
with the XXXX code of practice. And, there, there are many codes of practice 
that determine how we’re going to, to operate. So, that’s our reference, 
we’ve built our management structures in there. Each year, we have um a 
HSE plan, where we itemize which activities that we think we need to 
undertake in that coming year and we monitor against that plan. That gives 
us the ability to change focus, as we see the need to. Um so, if we’re, if we 
see a rising road safety er frequency rate, then we will implement a program 
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to, to, to reduce that er down. So, that’s, that’s the flex we, you give 
ourselves, we give ourselves.” [Respondent 26, O&G, Upstream, Page 11]. 
 
Later on we also discuss how actually the international standards of practice 
are driving peer industries and different companies to perform to higher 
standards. In fact this factor is extremely important and can be considered as 
a theme of its own.  
6.3.8 Legal Imperatives for Safety 
 
In chapter 2, there was a detailed discussion on legal imperatives for EHS in 
organizations and how legal compliance matters have influenced the change 
in outlook on safety matters in industry at large. The average number of 
statements relating to safety/EHS in the interviews in between the 
established themes was only about 7.89%. And whilst it is true the legal 
compliance issues had a big impact on organizational focus on EHS, from 
the general feedback from nearly all respondents, regardless of industry 
sector, legal factors were matters which were important but did not seem to 
be the drivers for change.   
Key 
Theme
Sub-
Themes
Legal 
Imperatives fro 
EHS/Safety
1. Core 
Business 
Conduct 
Imperative
2. Basic 
Compliance
 
 
Fig 6.11: Sub-Themes established for Legal Imperatives for Safety 
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Table 6.15: Legal Imperatives for Safety Sub-Themes  
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
   
Core 
Business 
Conduct 
Imperative 
“…Well personally I don’t think, it shouldn’t be. It’s, 
it’s the, you know, it’s the… nature of the business 
first of all that… technically of any business today 
that EHS becomes a very er important element into 
any business conducted. So, it becomes a business 
requirement rather than a legal requirement. 
Obviously er there are certain issues that you know, 
may, in certain conditions become a legal. For 
example, now all year regulations that is being 
issued by the governments, all the environmental 
issues and so on. It may have a legal impact of 
course in case of fatality and definitely any accident 
that the company has, then it pulls er to a legal 
issues…”  
Respondent 
29, Diversified 
O&G, Page 5  
Basic 
Compliance 
“I think we operate in different locations, not only 
within this country but we operate in other countries 
where there is a different set of rules, different set of 
regulations and legislation. We’ve always ensured 
that minimum we meet the laws and regulations of 
the country which we operate in. but I think the 
company and with the support of the board has 
establish its own set of standards as well. And we 
take whichever is higher and we implement them. 
So if the company policy on certain instruction 
elements or operations elements is higher eternally 
than it is in some of the countries that we operate in 
then we use that. We will not go whatever the 
country requirements are and if the country laws 
obviously supersede and are a higher level we will 
implement those. So that tends to drive our costs a 
little bit up, but it ensures that we have a higher level 
of governance and operational integrity.”  
 
Respondent 3, 
O&G Storage, 
Page 5 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
“This is a fact of life er…ya’ani. This is why HSE 
standard are higher maybe in certain countries than 
others. What are the legal implications if you have 
an accident, what are the impacts on the business 
itself er…yeah it has to do with, with the er lot of the 
stuff whether it is legal or otherwise. And basically if 
you are in a business transporting oil and you can 
cause pollution that will cost you er… billions of 
dollars or whatever. And then yes, you will be 
worried about your bottom line, you will be worried 
about your business, you will be worried about 
sequences to whatever ya’ani, can happen as a 
result of poor HSE or…”  
Respondent 
13, O&G 
Storage, Page 
5. 
“This sort of the standard so that nobody can point 
the finger and say oh you broke the rules. In our 
company, again we believe that it is a key aspect of 
how we define our company so…You know we want 
the safety always to be of high standard. So the 
legal requirements are not the only thing driving us 
and we believe that it is part of our core business to 
do that safety in a good way and risk management 
overall.…” 
Respondent 
10, Heavy 
Construction, 
Page 6. 
 
6.3.8.1 Core Business Conduct Imperative 
 
In the first example, the leader talks of EHS as a core business conduct 
imperative and a business requirement as opposed to a legal requirement 
Refer to the quote from Respondent 29, Diversified Oil and Gas, 5 in table 6.15.  
 
Clearly there is a strong business and operational driver to comply with 
standards and regulations. However, the legal imperatives should not drive 
performance and there needs to be a greater driver. What is also highlighted 
that there are legal repercussions on organisations that operate and don’t 
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comply or otherwise even if they comply and have an EHS type incident, they 
would need to deal with the legal ramifications.   
 
6.3.8.2 Basic Compliance 
 
Compliance to local rules and regulations is seen as the bare minimum for 
EHS compliance but that they go beyond that with their Boards in order to 
aspire to higher and better standards, although it is recognized that this might 
drive the costs up at times but gives in return greater confidence to the 
stakeholders on business continuity and operating integrity.  
 
“….. We’ve always ensured that minimum we meet the laws and regulations 
of the country which we operate in. but I think the company and with the 
support of the board has establish its own set of standards as well. And we 
take whichever is higher and we implement them. So if the company policy 
on certain instruction elements or operations elements is higher eternally 
than it is in some of the countries that we operate in then we use that. We 
will not go whatever the country requirements are and if the country laws 
obviously supersede and are a higher level we will implement those. So that 
tends to drive our costs a little bit up, but it ensures that we have a higher 
level of governance and operational integrity.” [Respondent 3, O&G Storage, 
Page 5]. 
 
The perspective from another leader within the same industry is blunter and 
explains that the cost to the business of getting it wrong and not complying 
with the regulations may have grave consequences.  
 
“This is a fact of life er…ya’ani. This is why HSE standard are higher maybe 
in certain countries than others. What are the legal implications if you have 
an accident, what are the impacts on the business itself er…yeah it has to do 
with, with the er lot of the stuff whether it is legal or otherwise. And basically 
if you are in a business transporting oil and you can cause pollution that will 
cost you er… billions of dollars or whatever. And then yes, you will be 
worried about your bottom line, you will be worried about your business, you 
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will be worried about sequences to whatever ya’ani, can happen as a result 
of poor HSE or…” [Respondent 13, O&G Storage, Page 5]. 
 
And finally an example from the construction sector, see Respondent 10, 
Page 6, Table 6.15 where he is talking about the implications of non-
compliance to HSE standards and ending up in an incident. But more 
interestingly, how doing good safety for many reasons including legal 
compliance means good business.  
 
6.3.9 Reporting Structures and Hierarchies 
 
Reporting structures can have a great impact and the following 5 examples 
illustrate the differences between reporting lines within different industries in 
the GCC. The dialogue explains some of the meaning behind the structures 
and underlined as before are the critical statements in the discussion. Two 
sub-themes arise here which relate to direct and indirect reporting.  
 
Key 
Theme
Sub-
Themes
Reporting 
Structures and 
Hierarchies
1. Policy of 
Direct 
Reporting
2. Indirect 
Reporting
 
 
Fig 6.12: Sub-Themes established for Legal Imperatives for Safety 
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Table 6.16: Reporting Structures and Hierarchies Sub-Themes  
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
   
Policy of Direct 
Reporting 
“Respondent:  Of course, but he’s my 
responsibility, HSE is my responsibility. There 
can be a lot of shifting and influence given by 
operational people so, yes, the HSE manager 
reports directly to me. They have a primary 
reporting schedule that is a set scheme that goes 
to their superior which is the operation area 
manager here in Oman. And, we have HSE air 
personnel on the rigs, who report to the tool 
pusher but they’ll also directly report to their 
manager. So, if there’s a situation that arises that 
the operator, the man on the rigs, as well, you 
know, we can get by with just a…You know, we 
don’t even do it, they don’t follow policy, you 
know, they do something that’s a breach of our 
procedures. And it’s his responsibility if, after 
talking to the supervisor to call his manager and 
the manager calls me. And then we get it sorted 
out. 
Researcher:  I see, ok. 
Respondent:  But on the reporting it’s always 
been our policy, that the HSE manager as a 
straight line to the CEO”.  
Respondent 
22, O&G 
Upstream 6 
“Researcher:  Would you personally agree to 
have this EHS, this representative reporting to 
anyone other than yourself in the organization? 
Respondent:  No, no reporting to me directly. 
Researcher:  Ok. 
Respondent:  This is my perception because if, if 
I allow the position of the person to report to 
somebody else, I lose the grip of it. So I want to 
make sure that I’m on top of it.”  
 
Respondent 
20, Power 
and Utilities, 
5 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
Indirect 
Reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Researcher: with regards to…I mean... I think 
the structure in the organization here is the most 
senior representative doesn’t actually report to 
the head of the organization directly. Or is there 
some sort of hybrid system, or functional 
reporting? There is I think a functional reporting, 
because you have, I think, an EHS committee. 
Respondent: Yes, I mean we have. As you know 
we’re in the middle of operational management 
system implementation. At the moment we have 
maybe disjointed functions a little bit in…the fire 
and safety manage the health and safety, 
occupational health as well, or the organization. 
And they report to me. Our environmental affairs 
group report to a different GM. Both of us report 
to a deputy chief executive. So from an 
organizational point of view we haven’t combined 
all of these under one body. But structurally we 
do have an EHS committee which is chaired by 
the deputy chief executive who reports directly to 
the CE. And our current CE sits in on our EHS 
meetings as well. And our EHSC committee 
membership includes all the technical GMs, all 
the operational GMs plus subject matter experts. 
So we are bringing all the expertise into one 
body that reports to our DCE, and that was 
XXXX you heard speaking today. But 
structurally, organizationally, no we don’t. 
Formally we don’t, I don’t what you call it, but 
committee wise we do.”  
Respondent 
5, O&G, 
Refining, 8 
“Researcher: Do you think that there is, would it 
be an issue if he reported for example, to 
operations or do you think that he should report 
in your mind to the, to the CEO? 
Respondent:  I think he should as a corporate 
Respondent 
13, O&G 
Refining, 4 
220 
 
Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Indirect 
Reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HSE, he should report to the CEO. Um but again 
I think this is, you have to look at it by taking into 
consideration the organization structure of the 
company. This is important. It’s not enough to 
have corporate HSE er…basically the operating 
departments; the operations people should have 
HSE part of the organization. Er…it depends on 
the size of the company, the complexity of the 
operations, the…because if you have only HSE 
as a corporate ya’ani, people reporting to the 
CEO and they are a separate department in the 
company, they can never have enough focus on 
the different areas in the company ya’ani. Say 
offshore - we have 2 major operating 
departments. We have one in the yard, yard 
fabrication, which is a completely different 
business from offshore operations. And then you 
have er say er engineering er corporate HSE 
they cannot er…basically they are there to 
maybe provide certain guidance and provide for 
some training, provide for…But they cannot have 
the needed focus on these different areas and 
there should be HSE er… call maybe within each 
operating departing maybe reporting to the, to 
the corporate HSE and that’s fine er…But I see 
this is sometimes as a failure. You have, you 
have a unit HSE reporting to the CEO, they live 
on their own it’s a…” 
“Researcher: “I see, ok, alright. Um, you have an 
EHS department? 
Respondent:  We do, yes. 
Researcher: Er… I notice actually you have an 
independent also an occupational health er 
physician but er so you have an EHS department 
and does the EHS representative report to you or 
[Respondent 
13, 
Manufacturin
g, 4] 
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Sub Theme Representative Data Reference 
 
Indirect 
Reporting 
report to a, a different manager? 
Respondent:  No, um in my organization 
structure which is there, it is published er… we 
have, I have subsidiaries and I have general 
managers and under the general managers we 
have managers, so he reports to um our 
administration er managers. So the safety EHS 
manager reports to the administration. 
Respondent:  So, under administration we have 
the stores, purchasing, HR (human resources), 
training er medical and safety”.  
 
6.3.9.1 Policy of Direct Reporting 
 
In any organisation the flow of information up and down the organisation is 
dependent on various factors that include the level of transparency in the 
organisation’s culture, the processes of communicating information and data 
and the structure of the reporting hierarchies.  
 
The following is an example in which the direct reporting is stressed by this 
leader. An example here of a policy of direct reporting: 
 
“Of course, but he’s my responsibility, HSE is my responsibility. There can be a 
lot of shifting and influence given by operational people so, yes, the HSE 
manager reports directly to me.   
 
And then he further on goes on to state: 
 
“ But on the reporting it’s always been our policy, that the HSE manager as a 
straight line to the CEO”. [Respondent 22, Oil & Gas, Upstream 6]. 
 
It is interesting also that he explains the duel reporting system on sites, in 
which the EHS person is given the ability through very clear direct reporting 
to management especially when a risky situation arises.  
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6.3.9.2 Indirect Reporting 
 
Indirect reporting is generally done through another function or through 
another body. In this next example from refining an example of indirect 
reporting and reporting through a functional committee is described: 
 
“As you know we’re in the middle of operational management system 
implementation. At the moment we have maybe disjointed functions a little bit 
in…the fire and safety manage the health and safety, occupational health as 
well, or the organization. And they report to me. Our environmental affairs group 
report to a different GM. Both of us report to a deputy chief executive. So from 
an organizational point of view we haven’t combined all of these under one 
body. But structurally we do have an EHS committee which is chaired by the 
deputy chief executive who reports directly to the CE. And our current CE sits in 
on our EHS meetings as well. And our EHSC committee membership includes 
all the technical GMs, all the operational GMs plus subject matter experts. So we 
are bringing all the expertise into one body that reports to our DCE, and that was 
XXXX you heard speaking today. But structurally, organizationally, no we don’t. 
Formally we don’t, I don’t what you call it, but committee wise we do.” 
[Respondent 5, Oil & Gas, Refining, 8]. 
 
So interestingly in this discussion, it would seem that this leader felt that 
there was some degree of dysfunctionality as the management systems are 
being developed further. However, even then a structure in which EHS is 
discussed and led from a very high management team (the EHS committee) 
is a good example of indirect but functional reporting. An advantage of this is 
that all EHS matters are raised to the committee in which all other senior 
managers of the executive sit on and therefore the matters receive good 
attention from everyone.   
 
The next example illustrates the decentralized reporting structures required 
due to the nature of the business and the structure of the organisation: 
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“Researcher: Do you think that there is, would it be an issue if he reported for 
example, to operations or do you think that he should report in your mind to the, to 
the CEO? 
Respondent:  I think he should as a corporate HSE, he should report to the CEO. 
Um but again I think this is, you have to look at it by taking into consideration the 
organization structure of the company. This is important. It’s not enough to have 
corporate HSE er…basically the operating departments; the operations people 
should have HSE part of the organization. Er…it depends on the size of the 
company, the complexity of the operations, the…because if you have only HSE as a 
corporate ya’ani, people reporting to the CEO and they are a separate department in 
the company, they can never have enough focus on the different areas in the 
company ya’ani. ………… You have, you have a unit HSE reporting to the CEO, 
they live on their own it’s a…” [Respondent 13, O&G, Refining, 4]. 
 
Here this leader’s argument is that EHS should report to the CEO but 
because there are so many functions and that EHS should be part of the 
business. It is likely that here EHS is seen by this leader as a very 
operational function and therefore keeping a corporate function which is not 
involved heavily in operations may actually dilute its impact. 
 
In the following last two examples, EHS actually reports into an 
administrative function within this manufacturing company: 
 
“Researcher: “I see, ok, alright. Um, you have an EHS department? 
Respondent:  We do, yes. 
Researcher: Er… I notice actually you have an independent also an occupational 
health er physician but er so you have an EHS department and does the EHS 
representative report to you or report to a, a different manager? 
Respondent:  No, um in my organization structure which is there, it is published er… 
we have, I have subsidiaries and I have general managers and under the general 
managers we have managers, so he reports to um our administration er managers. 
So the safety EHS manager reports to the administration. 
Respondent:  So, under administration we have the stores, purchasing, HR (human 
resources), training er medical and safety”. [Respondent 13, Manufacturing, 4] 
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In this organisation, EHS is treated as an administrative shared services 
function. Here EHS is focused on conducting risk assessments, developing 
procedures and recommending mitigation measures and personal protective 
equipment. So the function in this organisation is less tactical and strategic 
and therefore the EHS manager reports to the head of administration. 
 
Finally an example from the power and utilities, explaining clearly why he 
believes as a CEO that EHS must report to him directly in the context of his 
EHS leadership: 
 
“Researcher:  Would you personally agree to have this EHS, this representative 
reporting to anyone other than yourself in the organization? 
Respondent:  No, no reporting to me directly. 
Researcher:  Ok. 
Respondent:  This is my perception because if, if I allow the position of the person to 
report to somebody else, I lose the grip of it. So I want to make sure that I’m on top 
of it.” [Respondent 20, Power and Utilities, 5] 
 
The power and utilities industry in the GCC is generally not as developed 
with respect to EHS as with high risk industry sectors. However, the impact of 
incidents in this industry in which workers work with very high voltage 
systems, transmission in remote areas and direct impact on workers, 
contractors and the general public makes some of this industry’s CEOs want 
to have a direct oversight of EHS matters.  
 
6.4 Future Outlook on EHS Governance 
 
Other than the themes which have been explored in the interviews with 
leaders, another semi-structured question which was asked towards the end 
of each interview was on future outlook and was asked to explore their 
viewpoints on what they felt would change in the next decade with respect to 
EHS leadership and governance. Most said that there will be further change; 
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some said the change will be small but almost all said that there would be a 
change and that that change has mostly started already.  
 
Some leaders such as one from the Oil and Gas industry was optimistic 
about change in the region especially with respect to compliance with best 
practices.  
 
“Researcher:  I want to ask you, I mean, in the last 10 years there’s obviously been 
more awareness with regards to HSE issues in your industry and in the oil and gas 
industry and this high risk industry in general. Do you think that the, the, this is like a 
steady change? Er do you think that it’s going to continue this way, in the next say 
10 years or is it just slacking off or have you reached the top or is it gonna start 
going down again or…? 
Respondent:  I think, I think a lot of it is going to happen, especially over here, is that 
the regulatory authorities are going to start using a bigger stick as they have done in 
other jurisdictions and that will probably continue to drive better compliance. And, 
certainly the S part, the safety part, I think is well and bred but if you come back to 
health and welfare of, of some of the crews, it’s awful. And, then if you come back to 
dear old mother earth, it’s shameful. And yet, the regulations are there already, even 
here in Oman they’re there. And, some of the things that you find, that we should be 
doing as an operating business line, talking XXXX wells in general, way, way, way 
off the mark because there’s no compliance issue, there’s no fines or penalties or 
people going to jail and things like that. So, I think that’ll be the next big shift over 
here, is that the, the ministries and the regulatory authorities and so on, will take 
more of this best practice from around the world and say, it’s about time we change 
gears, it’s not just a desert. 
Researcher:  Ok. So, there will be, there will be, probably a step change you 
expect? 
Respondent:  Oh, certainly the gradient will change.”  [Respondent 21, O&G, 
Upstream, Page 15]. 
 
Another leader from manufacturing stresses the changes happening socio-
politically and how those changes will bring about betterment in organizations 
with respect to social welfare and EHS.  
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“…..as you know the region is going through a lot of changes now and there is a lot 
of er pressure groups coming, similar to what is happening in the West. And there 
are changes, there is a parliament coming and emerging and there is a lot of people 
who are trying to drive the environment, the health of people, care as well as safety 
which is part of it. You see now on the papers, you cannot hide anything. If there is a 
small accident in a small plant then it’s all over the papers and it really gives a bad 
opposite, if you’re one of the organizations. Imagine if it’s one of the main er 
companies in one of the states or one of the countries so that doesn’t look good and 
now everybody is trying to drive that. So I think the change is coming, this is why 
we’re working ahead of it, to make sure that we are ready for it, if it happens”. 
[Respondent 16, Manufacturing, Page 7]. 
 
So there is a perspective that the social changes in the region will have a 
positive change impact on EHS in general and strongly related to corporate 
social responsibility drivers as it would seem. From a leader in the Aviation 
industry, greater accountability, awareness and investment into EHS is seen 
in the years to come, a positive outlook but unclear on how fast the change 
will be:  
 
“I think um from what I’ve seen so far, the really positive sides are, that there’s a 
general awareness um that um there needs to be leadership and guidance from the 
top. So, I think there’s awareness, I’m not sure, 100% sure, we know exactly, how to 
do that, but awareness leadership training, I can see a lot more investment um from 
the director’s perspective in…actually I think there needs, well first of all, there 
needs to be honesty, to say, actually we need to get our own backyard sorted out.” 
 
He goes on to say: 
 
“I think that there’s a, there’s a good story to come out of it because we are no 
longer sitting, you know, just ducking under cover and not doing anything about it, 
so, um where I, where I, the biggest thing for me, will be, the sign off, of 
accountability”. [Respondent 25, Aviation, Page 11]. 
 
One of the leaders from the  Oil and Gas marketing sector, explains that 
there has already been a great deal of change and that organizations must 
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make commitments now to save the greater costs of the future in this area of 
business: 
 
 ‘It has, it has changed and I have no doubt that the laws, regulations of the EHS will 
continue to be tougher and much harder, so I am personally even convinced that we 
whatever we want to do our business we want to conduct we have to build in all 
those expectations when it comes to standards. We should invest from now so later 
on it will not haunt us and it will be more expensive. So I am convinced that the level 
of EHS standard will rise in the future and it will be up to the European or the 
American standards. We are getting to that direction.’ [Respondent 4, O&G 
Marketing, Page 5]. 
 
This is interesting as he explains that the investment is required now to 
prevent future issues that may arise due to EHS issues. And this is a 
perspective more from a downstream marketing perspective as opposed to 
an upstream operations perspective.  
 
From the shipping industry, change is apparently coming from the greater 
need for transparency in the GCC. There is an expectation that the 
government will increase follow up on codes of conduct of senior persons 
and that regulations will become more enforced.  
 
“the changes er well transparencies er one of the biggest things that er…that is you 
know, that is basically highlighted at least here in Oman. Um for example er… there 
is like for example, transparencies is one of the biggest things in terms of corporate 
governance and in terms of how people interact and use their position to actually 
influence er certain, certain things. And us being a government owned company 
now our own government have realized that there has been a lot of this kind of 
things. Where people using a position to, you know, influence certain things, 
whether financially or you know, getting business for themselves. This is all to do 
with corporate governance and now they’re becoming more stringent in terms of, ok, 
showing what is your portfolio, how did you get this portfolio, as an individual? So I 
think it’s moving towards that direction of being more transparent and you know, 
um…having these other regulatory bodies to make sure that you are complying with 
these kind of things. [Respondent 15, Shipping, Page 8]. 
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Another final perspective offers the viewpoint that maturity levels have come 
about mainly from the separation of roles, and that the Board will have to 
better direct and ensure they do not interfere too much into the operations of 
the organization.  
  
“I don’t see it changing much, because of the fact, looking at the signs of board 
where they reached in terms of defining governors, and compliance. And having 
that, distinct from the daily executive management. I believe there has to be 
segregation. You cannot create too much grey area on this. ……” 
 
And he then goes on to describe the BoD involvement not recommending too 
much involvement in his mind: 
 
 But I don’t see the board getting more involved in the management as that would be 
a mistake. I think we are seeing the right balanced between the two.” [Respondent 
3, O&G, Storage, Page 8]. 
 
6.5 Emerging Themes/ Concepts   
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a process was followed to identify from the 
transcripts discussion points and statements from respondents, which may 
be linked to some new concepts or at least to ones which do not fall clearly 
within the 9 themes established through the Literature Review stage. This is 
significant for two key reasons. First of all, the literature and especially the 
anchor references focused on best practices either through developing codes 
or from recent informed opinions from experts and perhaps the views of 
leaders within organizations are different or there are perhaps other 
viewpoints which have not been considered. The second important reason is 
that this research has taken place in a different geographical location in the 
world to where many of the research and references into EHS 
leadership/governance has been and is evolving. Such viewpoints therefore 
provide a regional perspective on what is generally presented as an 
international set of best practices at times.  
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Through the process of extraction of statements which had the potential to be 
either an emerging theme or a sub-theme (i.e. can be classified under 
established themes) of established themes from the transcripts analysed, 10 
groups were created with the following headings and statements ranging 
from 3 to 14 per Group were collected. The 10 areas are listed as shown in 
Table 6.17. 
 
Table 6.17 Emerging Areas – Potential Themes 
No Area Title Description of Area No of 
S
tatem
ents 
E
xtracted 
N
o of 
P
otential 
E
m
erging 
N
o of 
E
m
erging 
sub-them
es 
1 Leadership 
Matters 
This is an area where 
statements relating to leadership 
in general were very strong, 
general leadership as opposed 
to only Safety Leadership 
Styles.  
 
6 1 1 
2 Strengthen the 
Role of 
Governance and 
Oversight – 
Potential 
Solutions Cited 
These are statements which 
related to strong views on roles 
and responsibilities of the BoD 
as opposed to executives, which 
related to outlook and critical 
factors related to oversight 
matters.  
7 4 3 
3 Key Challenges 
for the BoD and 
Current 
Realities 
What happens in reality with 
Boards and how it impacts on 
EHS governance matters.  
4 2 2 
4 Potential Issues 
for the Board 
Again realities currently existing 
that seem to make it difficult for 
real effective EHS leadership to 
emerge at times.   
 
7 4 3 
5 Suggestion – 
Analysis not 
monitoring 
Strong suggestion to the BoD to 
change current way of thinking 
or approach to EHS matters.  
 
2 1 1 
6 Alignment, 
Structure & 
Reporting Lines 
Matters related to organizational 
realties and facts that impact 
and be critical for the success of 
EHS leadership and 
9 7 2 
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No Area Title Description of Area No of 
S
tatem
ents 
E
xtracted 
N
o of 
P
otential 
E
m
erging 
N
o of 
E
m
erging 
sub-them
es 
governance. 
7 Suggestion – 
Perspective of 
Board 
Strong suggestion to the BoD to 
change current way of thinking 
or approach to organizational 
areas that relate to EHS.  
 
10 6 4 
8 Key Success 
Factors for 
Boards/CEOs 
for EHS 
performance 
What the Board should do to be 
a good EHS Board. 
 
 
 
4 2 2 
9 Industry 
Realities 
Industry specific or macro 
factors that need to be 
understood and appreciated as 
they have a significant impact of 
EHS leadership and 
Governance.  
 
14 10 2 
10 Holistic 
Organizational 
Matters relating 
to EHS 
Performance 
The function of EHS in an 
organization and other 
organizational matters that play 
a role in driving and maintaining 
changes. 
7 5 1 
 
Appendix K contains all the detailed tables containing the matrix against 
established themes and emerging themes.  
 
To cluster the newly emerging themes is a very difficult task as they do relate 
to each other very strongly. They have been listed below and are discussed 
in Chapter 7. However, in Appendix K, extracting from the interview data, the 
researcher clustered some of the key strong statements under some 
thematic areas (referred to in Appendix K as themes). This then allowed 
analysis to see which of the established themes the statements lent towards. 
Some statements created interesting concepts or ideas which were listed as 
emerging themes as they did not fall into any of the earlier established 9 
themes.  
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Figure 6.13: Process for establishing emerging thematic concepts and 
themes 
 
Through this process which is described in the flow chart above we establish 
some important findings which are very much related to the established 
themes but are significant enough to be discussed also separately as they 
have some bearing on this research.  Concepts which emerged included: 
 
Directing is a Passive Leadership Style. This means that Boards will have 
naturally a reactive leadership style. Thus all they can do is inspire and 
motivate the executive management team to be more proactive when 
addressing EHS matters. EHS leadership requires a proactive style and 
therefore the way that boards operate means that it is difficult for their 
leadership style to be proactive except if they focus more on understanding 
what the organisation is undertaking to create a proactive EHS culture; how 
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proactive key performance measures are being set for the organisational 
leaders to drive them to perform more proactively; and for the board, at a 
high level, challenge the organisation’s leadership to benchmark themselves 
(through their practices) with industry leader organisations and ones who 
have a very good EHS performance.  
Separation of Roles: To achieve real governance, there should be a clear 
distinction between managing EHS and directing EHS within an organization. 
This is discussed further on in section 7.4 in the structure of boards and their 
impact on EHS governance and leadership.  
EHS as Business Value Driver/EHS as a Sustainable Value Driver: EHS 
needs to be looked at as a business value driver. Thus like quality 
management, EHS management brings improvements in productivity, 
sustained growth and prevention of disruption to business. In high risk 
organizations it is also related to reliability which is a valuable trait for an 
organization. Provide stakeholders with a feeling of resilience. Moreover, 
sustainability gives organizations long-term sustained value overtime. As 
explained by Dermine (2011) when talking of the banking industries 
corporate governance standards: “In a world in which financial markets 
reward short-term reported profits, it is the responsibility of the bank’s board 
to take care of long-term value creation, even it that means hurting reported 
revenue and the share price in the short term. Executives should drive the 
business within regulations in accordance with the strategy and manner 
(ethics/culture) set and supervised by the board.” [Dermine (2011), Page 9]. 
Thus, leadership must embed EHS into the culture of an organization so it 
becomes part of the fabric of the organizations goals, objectives and beliefs. 
Alignment of Vision: It is critical for there to be alignment of vision between 
the Executive management and the Board on all EHS matters. There should 
be a clear alignment between the Board and the Executive Management 
Team in general and also specifically in EHS matters. 
EHS has Competing Goals with Commercial/Financial 
Drivers/Conflicting priorities in Business: It has to be appreciated that 
EHS will continue to struggle against at the very least short-term financial 
goals in organizations, especially for investment and policy issues that may 
be seen by operational and marketing staff as “restricting”. Some conflicting 
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priorities in business can have very negative effects on EHS. Leadership 
needs to assess and ensure that risks are not created and EHS in an 
organization is not compromised. An example of this is extending/stretching 
maintenance cycles on pipelines to keep them in service as long as possible, 
risking a possible failure in the line to gain greater short-term value and 
profits from the asset.  
Industry Driving Change and Focus: The industry in itself is driving the 
standards up as they compete. Safer and environmentally friendly operations 
have become a basic expectation from all stakeholders in all high risk 
industries. Good EHS means good business; therefore EHS should be 
especially in High Risk, High Reliability Organizations is becoming part of the 
businesses profile. The emerging global and regional influences and trends, 
international standards and regional practices continue to influence and 
motivate/drive change within organizations and their practices. This is in 
general but very much so also with EHS matters.  
Financial Investment is required for improving EHS Standards: It has to 
be appreciated that resources are required to ensure that EHS standards are 
kept at an acceptable level. The mind-set of leadership be it at the board or 
executive level should be that EHS is an investment as opposed to a sunken 
cost just to comply with regulations and standards.  
Analysis of Performance Vs. Monitoring Performance: Greater 
engagement and understanding of the reasons underlying the EHS 
performance be it good or bad is more important than just monitoring that 
historical last-quarter performance results. As the Board Members need to 
add value to the discussion on EHS with the executive team, they need to 
understand why the performance is the way it is rather than just what it is.  
Board Matters in General: Such as Board Structure; Having a structure that 
ensures objectivity; Structure less important than engagement of Board 
Members and the Board dynamics; Make up of Board ensuring there is a 
good mix and that there is Diversity of experiences and knowledge and that; 
whilst organizational maturity governs Boards at the end of the day the Board 
Oversight Role must be very strong. One particular aspect mentioned was 
the internal controls vs. regulation; i.e. having good governance through 
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internal management systems and processes should be the focus rather on 
compliance to regulations which is a given.  
Social Impact & Accountability: This was discussed in the literature review, 
but what was highlighted is the growing impact of socialization and social 
value contribution of organizations and corporations especially in the GCC 
states. This is consistent with the issues identified by Jamali et al (2010) (and 
others) regarding the lacking good practice corporate social responsibility 
governance in the profit making organizations as opposed to the not-for profit 
organizations, although their research focused on the medical services 
sector. The Business needs to take into account people’s needs for both 
external and internal customers (i.e. market and employees). 
Continual Learning Organizations: Learning and EHS awareness and 
competence should come from an environment of continual organizational 
learning going from top to bottom in an organization.  
Transparency: Transparency is key to having a healthy working relationship 
between all stakeholders including the workforce, the management team, the 
leadership team and the Board of Directors.  
Preparedness of Organizations – Resilience: Preparedness ensures both 
Business Continuity and Emergency and Crisis Response Planning. Whilst it 
is recognized in the interviews that focused efforts should be on prevention, 
being prepared is equally important.  
Ethics & Morality of Leadership: Whilst this may be a very straight forward 
point and there is great agreement on this, it is a very fundamental aspect of 
creating trust between stakeholders which is critical for a good safety culture.  
Independence and Strength of the EHS Function within Organizations: 
Within an organization, the EHS function must be independent of other 
functions and report to the right level of command in an organization, 
preferably the highest level within the organisation. 
 
6.6 General Data Analysis Conclusions   
 
In these two chapters 5 and 6, the data and data analysis has been 
presented. The inquiry using both methods produced a richer picture overall. 
The descriptive statistics were able to identify the areas/themes of most 
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importance/agreement (monitoring of EHS performance) and least 
agreement (risk management) with respect to board involvement in EHS 
governance.   
 
Likewise from the quantitative results the differences between perceptions 
between oil and gas and non-oil and gas sectors of industry revealed 
differences in approach and perception with respect to operational excellence 
and management systems and risk management.  
 
The qualitative review gave however this research significant depth of 
meaning and insights. Whilst many of the response on certain questions 
relating to the themes were expected, many leaders also added a great deal 
of insights into what was happening in their organizations and industry in 
general. The influencing factors or even themes that also emerged (whilst 
were also related to the themes that evolved from the literature review), gave 
insight into what was driving change and what was seen as important.  
 
The emerging themes described in section 6.5 were very interesting to 
analyse.  The discussion on board structure and its potential impact on EHS 
is given in the next chapter.  
 
6.7 Reflections of Researcher on Data Analysis using Mixed Methods 
 
The application of mixed methods research I found extremely useful. I 
enjoyed exploring the development of mixed methods research design as a 
methodology. The literature is relatively recent and I found that such a 
pragmatic approach can help in gaining greater access to different 
perspectives. What I also enjoyed is reviewing and comparing the data from 
both the qualitative and quantitative methods which were employed 
concurrently.  
 
I enjoyed developing the survey instrument and validating it through using the 
subject matter expert panel. Although by the time I developed the survey I 
had completed most of my literature review, I was motivated to continue 
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reading as a consequence of some of the dialogue that I had with those who 
helped me conduct the validation exercise. As I work in this field I also 
continued to refine the areas and questions I eventually used in the semi-
structured interviews. I was concerned at one point that I may get saturated 
with the data from the interviews, and although I undertook 29 interviews, I 
still feel I would have continued to enjoy the dialogue with these leaders on 
EHS leadership and governance matters.  
 
The mixed methods did help in giving in this research work greater context as 
exploratory research. The development of the quantitative survey was 
assessing comparatively perceptions of senior managers/organizational 
leadership to the emerging themes from the literature review. But greater 
insights were given by the quantitative enquiry.  
 
As far as instrument development is concerned, the use of the methods 
concurrently also served the quantitative method as a secondary validation, 
which will allow in the future for the refinement of the survey tool. I also 
believe that using mixed methods helped greatly in addressing the different 
research questions, aims and objectives more effectively.  The perception-
based survey enquiry using the quantitative method allowed for better 
understanding of perception of importance of the themes and degree of 
agreement, whereas the qualitative enquiry gave a richer and deeper picture 
and also explained why at times there are completely opposite perceptions 
from different survey participants when certain questions were asked. 
Regrettably, the nature of this research in terms of the number of senior 
leaders that can be accessed meant that I did not get enough quantitative 
data to run meaningful inferential statistics for analysis.  
 
I think I will continue to use mixed methods in future research where it may 
help in gaining insights where appropriate.  
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Chapter 7 –Discussion 
 
7.1 General Introduction 
 
The Gulf Corporation Council States (GCC) in the Middle East have seen 
great industrial and economic development over the past 60-70 years and 
whilst many industries are young relative to the many industries in the West, 
they have developed rapidly driven by a thriving dynamic oil-based economy. 
This research explored EHS leadership with respect to corporate governance 
in high risk and high reliability industries. Many of these industries as 
discussed in previous chapters are generally owned by state governments. 
Moreover, many of these industries are very important socio-economic 
entities with respect to these countries.   
 
The exploration using a concurrent mixed methods design was important to 
confirm the significance and importance of various themes and sub-themes 
that emerged from the literature search. It is maintained that much of this 
research in this area of EHS leadership in the context of corporate 
governance is relatively young (as discussed in chapter 2). Therefore at the 
outset of the data collection, it was considered likely that new themes or sub-
themes would emerge. The literature review was wide-based in that it 
reviewed both academic and professional publications which emerged from 
more Western and references. It was therefore imperative to seek to 
understand more how much these emerged themes were applicable to the 
GCC states. It was also equally important to seek from the viewpoints of 
senior leaders within these organizations if there were other important 
themes and areas to understand.  
 
In chapter 3, a model is presented based on the themes that emerged from 
the literature review. At a later stage and during the qualitative enquiry sub-
themes emerged under these key 9 themes and these have been extensively 
discussed in Chapter 6. Furthermore, after the qualitative analysis, a further 
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set of potential emerging themes from the interviews were also developed. 
These were then later incorporated, or in fact more accurately integrated in to 
the model initially developed. This model is presented in detail at the end of 
this seventh chapter. 
 
In this chapter the discussion is presented in five key sections. Initially the 
themes that evolved from the Literature review are discussed from the data 
collected and analysed. Subsequently, the key theme related sub-themes 
and also the emerging themes which evolved from the interviews with senior 
leadership are discussed. Thirdly, feedback on the impact of board structure 
on EHS leadership is then explored as it was felt that this was, in the context 
of corporate governance a significant matter to study. An emergent 
Contextual EHS Leadership and Governance Diagram is presented to 
explain the areas that emerged and more significantly later a model of EHS 
Leadership is then presented and discussed. This draws upon the initial 
conceptual diagram discussed in the introductory chapter and the Model 
post-literature review in chapter 3 of this thesis and it seeks to inform on the 
emerging areas of the diagram and model with the themes investigated 
through both the literature and the empirical components of the study. Some 
of the significant findings with respect to the future outlook of EHS leadership 
are also discussed.  
 
This final Model of EHS Leadership and Governance connects all the themes 
under groups and explains how these themes relate to each other and more 
significantly how they drive monitoring EHS performance and risk 
management.   
 
7.2 Exploring the Applicability of the themes that emerged from the 
Literature Review 
 
In this section the themes are discussed in order of their average frequency 
throughout the interviews. This section also explains the importance of 
understanding further the sub-themes that emerged from a more detailed 
interrogation of the qualitative data. This does not indicate their rank of 
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importance but identifies which themes may be more of an influencing effect 
on EHS leadership/governance matters in general.  
 
7.2.1 Developing Safety Culture and Communications 
 
A total of 7 sub-themes evolved from investigating this important theme. They 
include: 
 
• Leadership Creates a Culture and influences/sets agenda for change 
• Reporting, Transparency and “No-Blame” Culture 
• Changing the behaviours is key to changing the EHS culture 
• General EHS Culture where EHS is a Value 
• Compliance & Consequence Management: 
• Moving from High Risk to High Reliability organizational EHS cultures 
• Culture development through learning organizations 
• Impact International Standards and the Size of Organization 
 
The importance of understanding the sub-themes in all the analysis 
undertaken brings about both a greater understanding and appreciation of 
the matters that influence leaders in demonstrating actions within this theme. 
 
In contrast to the literature an EHS culture is seen as an organizational 
matter and the interviews showed many statements that related to; (1) A 
culture of rewarding safety; (2) no blame culture; (3) first item of discussion in 
a meeting; (4) behavioural based safety programs and so on. However, it 
would seem that whilst many of the senior leaders spoke about having a 
culture of EHS within their organizations, it is clear but for very few leaders 
from more internationally-based organizations, that this culture was being 
driven at their executive level rather than that the BoD.   
 
However, in saying this many leaders did say that the BoD were generally 
supportive of efforts that the executive management exerted towards 
developing a culture of safety and EHS. They set the overall direction for the 
organisation either directly (or explicitly through expectation setting) or 
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indirectly (more implicitly through seeing EHS matters as an integral part of 
performance). One matter which evolved from the interviews was the clear 
influence of international best practice standards especially in larger 
organisations which maybe based regionally but operating in a more 
international environment.  
 
7.2.2 Safety/EHS Leadership 
 
Under this theme and upon a closer interrogation of the data, 5 sub-themes 
evolving which included: 
 
• Demonstrating Safety/EHS Leadership 
• Board Leadership vs. Executive Leadership 
• Visible Leadership 
• Making Safety/EHS a Core Value 
• Safety/EHS being driven  from the Top 
 
It would seem that much of the Safety/EHS leadership seems to be mainly 
driven by the CEO and his executive team. Senior leaders saw, in general, 
the role of the BoD as being more supportive rather than directive when it 
came to EHS matters as they cited many examples of an operational nature. 
They reverted in many interviews to giving examples from the working level 
which seems to indicate that they see many aspects of EHS as operational 
rather than strategic. It also may mean that they found it easier to articulate 
examples of EHS matters more in an operational context. 
 
In saying this some recognized the power, especially within the GCC which 
has a very traditional tribal culture that the leadership words and actions went 
a very long way into influencing change. EHS culture and leadership are 
highly related and in many of the statements many leaders implied that good 
EHS leadership was demonstrated in an effective EHS culture; with 
transparency; high levels of commitment through visible leadership from 
managers and workers alike; a shared vision and belief in EHS as an 
important core organisational value throughout the organization and so on. 
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What is also fundamental is that it was recognized that EHS leadership 
played probably the single most important factor in creating a safe and 
reliable organization.  
 
7.2.3 Influence and Accountability 
 
More than half of the statements analysed in the interviews related to these 
three top themes, EHS Leadership, EHS Culture & Communications; and 
Influence & Accountability. Senior leadership expressed very strong views on 
this. Whilst many of them felt that ultimately they would be accountable for 
EHS incidents they did explain (and with some citing specific examples) that 
they would be held accountable for wilful negligence. In the survey two direct 
questions were asked: (Q6) Each Board Member needs to appreciate that 
their actions/decisions (where applicable) should reinforce the health and 
safety policies and statements with no contradiction and (Q7) The CEO/MD 
should reinforce directives given by the BoD even when they may not be 
aligned with the Health & Safety Policy.  
 
There was a marked difference with the level of agreement to Q6 and Q7 for 
the O&G Group where they were in agreement with the BoD having to 
appreciate their actions/decisions whereas there was less agreement with 
the CEO/MD accepting and reinforcing BoD directives which were not 
aligned with the policy.  That difference was not seen with the responses of 
the non-O&G Group. This may be better explained with the greater level of 
autonomy, empowerment and accountability that senior leadership feel in the 
Oil and Gas sector which is perhaps more self-regulated that other non-oil 
and gas industries such as shipping and aviation. Regrettably due to the 
relatively small sample size (30 respondents)  it was not possible to test 
significance using the t-test (comparing the means) between the two groups. 
 
In the interrogation of the qualitative date four sub-themes evolved under this 
theme emerged: 
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• Notion of Accountability 
• Accountability cannot be delegated 
• Stakeholder Influence on Accountability 
• Board Accountability 
 
Generally a good discussion emerges in many of the interviews which 
identify the great challenge of where accountabilities lie between the more 
“collective” board and the more “individual” CEO/MD. It is this grey area 
which makes this research so significantly important. In the making of high 
reliability organisations the clear partition of board and executive leadership 
actions is at the very foundation of this EHS leadership and governance 
debate.  
 
This is consistent with both the literature [Roy (2010); Kadir (2010); Ahmed 
(2008); Anderson (2008) and Roger et al (2009) etc] and the statements 
coming from the interviews where the research participants all indicated that 
accountability and responsibility was with the senior leadership including the 
BoD. However, this area remains somewhat grey as many senior leaders 
also saw ultimate responsibility/accountability with the CEO/MD. The 
differences in views are explained by three aspects: (1) BoD is responsible 
and accountable for governance as opposed to CEO/MDs who are 
responsible for action; (2) there are differences in opinion with respect to the 
board’s collective responsibility rather than individual responsibility (perhaps 
once again influenced by a more Eastern collective culture rather than a 
more individualistic Western one); and (3) many CEO/MDs expressed their 
discomfort with BoD members involving themselves with some of the “day-to-
day” decisions, therefore those who saw EHS more as an operational matter 
supported a clear distinction in the roles, especially when they also indicated 
that the BoD members did not understand enough about the business.   
Ultimately, one of the emergent aspects for the interviews, especially with 
respondents who supported a detached board structure (which will be 
discussed later on) is the separation of roles and delineation of the roles and 
responsibilities insisting more on the accountability of the CEO/MD and 
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limiting the accountability of the BoD to being effective in their “governance 
and oversight”.   
When contrasting influence and accountability with the legal imperatives for 
safety/EHS it is felt that these are strongly related and this will be discussed 
further. Ultimately influence and accountability seems to sit between setting 
performance standards and the heart of the conceptual diagram which is 
discussed in Figure 7.2. 
 
Moreover in the emerging model the relationship is explained by the fact that 
morality which is a personal factor interacts with legal imperatives for EHS 
which is a more socio-economic (external) factor on the organisation.  
 
7.2.4 Monitoring EHS Performance 
 
In Chapter 5 (table 5.2) the descriptive statistics showed that the 4 most 
agreed with questions (Q13, 23, 24 and 27) all had one common theme 
related to all of them which was Monitoring EHS Performance. It would seem 
with respect to the BoD almost all senior leadership agreed strongly on the 
core role of oversight through monitoring EHS performance.  
Upon further interrogation of the qualitative data, three sub-themes emerged: 
 
• Effectiveness of Monitoring EHS Performance 
• Frequency of Monitoring EHS Performance 
• Expectation /Standardization from the BoD on Reports 
 
From the interviews conducted more than 10% of the statements analysed 
for themes related to monitoring.  Boards are seen to be getting more and 
more involved today with growth in awareness of the importance and impact 
of EHS. In saying this many senior leaders even saw this role as limited due 
to the lack of knowledge and competence of directors in certain 
organizations. This it was very clear impacted on the “effectiveness” of 
monitoring. To say this is to say that many respondents explained that whilst 
boards monitored EHS performance, in them doing so they added limited 
value. 
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The general variation in reporting trends (frequency of reporting) within these 
industries and in fact within the same industries in the GCC vary from reports 
being issued weekly and a board meeting monthly to reports being issued 
monthly and board meeting taking place 2-4 times a year. The reporting is 
generally part of the practice of all senior leaders and their boards. This is 
seemingly an established culture and many leaders said that this was a 
standard practice in the industry to give the board some assurances through 
(mostly standardised) effective periodic reporting.  
 
From the discussion with leaders from the Oil and Gas sector, some 
commented on the importance to go back to process safety management 
related indicators rather than personnel safety indicators. They have 
recognized that the focus on lost time incidents and other such lagging 
indicators added less value to helping boards appreciate the level of effort 
and resources that are required to sustain high performance and lowered 
incidence rates. Some said that proactive key performance measures and 
what is termed “leading” indicators was much more important to link effort 
with higher EHS performance.  
 
It is to be appreciated here that boards in most organizations get involved in 
EHS when something goes wrong and they want to understand what went 
wrong and what is being done to both deal with the consequences and 
prevent reoccurrence; when they are asked to approve large budgets in order 
to spend to improve EHS or otherwise; when presenting performance data 
for the last reporting period. When there is focus on reactive KPIs rather than 
proactive KPIs the perception of EHS becomes somewhat of a negative 
issue focus area.  
 
This must change in the future because if the board is to play a more positive 
active role it has to play a more proactive role advising and supporting the 
executive leadership as noted by various scholars [e.g. Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse (2007); Nicholson & Keil (2004) etc.] It must also base its 
expectations of the executive on proactive performance in EHS and 
recognizing the efforts made in preventing incidents. On the other hand their 
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role must also be focused on motivating management in their development of 
organizational resilience, effective sustainable growth and more effective 
organizational EHS cultures through EHS leadership.   
 
7.2.5 Risk Management 
 
The common theme related questions most leaders disagreed with or least 
agreed with (Q12, 17, 20 and 21) are given in table 5.2, and related to risk 
management. As questions related to leadership and board risk management 
strategies and practices it would seem the differences in opinion and outlook 
when compared to the literature review emerging best practices [e.g. Delliote 
(2008); O’Conner (2012); Dufort (2) (2013) etc.] and this reflects the 
difference in the approach and practice of different industries in dealing with 
risk management and control. As discussed in Chapter 5 it would seem for 
the analysis of data that there may be currently greater understanding and 
acceptance of enterprise risk management models in the oil and gas sector 
as opposed to the other industries.  
 
Again this may be related to the fact that the oil and gas sector is more 
accustomed to being, due to the development of the industry over the years, 
more self-regulating compared to other industries especially the maritime and 
the aviation industries which are highly regulated and controlled. As such 
they developed their own internal risk management systems and were more 
comfortable with managing risk in the context of the board and executive 
management through high level enterprise risk management strategies and 
processes.  
 
When the respondent feedback was interrogated more closely three sub-
themes seem to emerge which include: 
• Risk Awareness 
• Risk Appreciation 
• Risk Tolerance 
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It would seem (logical) that boards are interested in risk and understanding 
how they are generally being managed. However, once again the impact and 
the normal or best industry practice, in that industry is what drives the risk 
management models. This is however highly dependent on the level of both 
risk awareness and appreciation.  
 
To this end and from the data collected and analysed it would seem that 
because EHS risks are technical in their nature, the engagement of BoD 
members in addressing or discussing those risks is not significant. However, 
when looking at the overall exposure of an organization, directors look to be 
comforted that a certain system is in place and functioning effectively to 
mitigate risks, be they EHS or otherwise.  
 
It would seem also when comparing this with the literature review on 
enterprise risk management (ERM), when EHS risks present themselves as 
credible business (and business continuity) risks a greater board interest and 
thus risk appetite is overtly expressed.  
 
7.2.6 EHS Awareness, Knowledge and Competence 
 
It is interesting to see that more than 50% of the respondents supported 
mixed board structures (where the CEO/executives are also board 
members). One of the key elements behind this was clearly that the leaders 
felt that this brought about greater alignment, and as will be discussed in 
greater length later, it is about the knowledge and competence on EHS 
matters that executive board members bring to the table which leaders felt 
was important. Two sub-themes came about in further analysis of the 
statements made during the interviews and these included general 
awareness and the induction (On-Boarding) programs that organisations 
provided or at least needed to provide to board directors.  
 
Consistent with Van der Westhuyzen (2012) who spoke about monitoring, 
control against set performance standards and expectations it would seem 
that a good number of leaders see the onus on their organisation to prepare 
247 
 
the board directors to understand their business . There is no doubt that 
knowledge and competence is required in both setting the performance 
standards and monitoring effectiveness. 
 
This must be a serious area of concern in this research as on the whole and 
regardless of which industry was being addressed, the level of EHS 
knowledge and competence with the directors was limited to the extent that, 
in the minds of the leaders, that they added limited value to the overall 
effectiveness of risk management, monitoring and advising on effective 
control. However, the industries are taking effective steps to address this by 
arranging for induction programmes for (at least) new directors which include 
detailed operational overviews and EHS in various organizations. Certain 
companies like one oil refining company went to the extent of running a one-
day workshop which had a significant component about EHS. 
 
Finally, it is important to appreciate that leaders recognize the need for 
knowledge and competence and even if the chairmen of boards do not 
directly ask for it, consistent with the above some of the senior leadership are 
proactively arranging for induction and awareness programs. And to this end, 
the fact that between 15-19% of respondents saw that board structure made 
little difference to EHS leadership; they supported this by saying that it was 
more dependent on the diversity and make-up of the board. Some of the 
leaders interviewed basically said that if you had directors who had some 
industry knowledge and an operational/EHS background, they would be able 
to contribute more effectively to EHS matters. This is discussed further on in 
this chapter.  
 
7.2.7 Operational Excellence & Management Systems 
 
In a similar way to the responses on risk management, the variation in 
responses apparent in the quantitative data analysis may be explained by the 
fact that this is viewed as more of an operational level matter rather than a 
strategic matter for the board.  
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Moreover, this is apparent in the significant difference when comparing the 
O&G and non-O&G industries. Once more this can be attributed to the fact 
that oil and gas is more self-regulating and that the development of a more 
mature EHS management systems aspiring to excellence was a result of 
more broader and general and less prescriptive laws and regulations (as 
compared to maritime, aviation and manufacturing or even the construction 
industries).  
 
However, as discussed in chapter 2 the development of management 
systems is critical to the development of high reliability organizations. 
Respondent 6 gave a very detailed explanation as to how his organization 
developed their operational excellence model over time and how it was built 
on a set of beliefs and principles. Interestingly in some organizations many of 
the EHS management systems are built on management system elements. 
They refer to them in different ways or call them different names. For 
example, VOPAK the Dutch-based oil and chemicals storage company calls 
them “Fundamentals”; Chevron the Oil Major calls them “Tenants”: Petroleum 
Development Oman (PDO), the Sultanate of Oman’s national oil company 
calls them their “Golden Rules” and the Dubai based diversified oil and gas 
company, the Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) refers to them as their 
“Principles” to name a few examples.  
 
Overall the qualitative interrogation of the data evolved five sub-themes: 
 
• Operational Excellence 
• Systems Thinking 
• Beyond (Legal) Compliance 
• Consequence Management 
• Best Practice 
 
Operational excellence was explained by means of an integrated 
management system which looks at asset integrity, operational discipline and 
high standards of embedded EHS processes and procedures. Here the 
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policy drives much of the management system elements founded very 
strongly as discussed in the literature review of fundamentally leadership. 
 
The systems thinking was related to organisations believing in a fully 
disciplined and structured approach towards implementing management 
systems that obviously due to the risks involved EHS. It is interesting to note 
that this systems thinking leads to a “beyond compliance” paradigm. It is 
based on setting an internal set of standards and working towards meeting 
them for the purpose of safe and reliable operations, rather than due to legal 
regulations and requirements.  
 
Moreover, generally with almost all of the senior leaders interviewed, the 
foundation to their EHS assurance came in the form of a management 
system of some sort. It is critical to note four very important aspects which 
came about from the interviews, in the sense they would most probably 
agree on: 
 
(a) Having processes and procedures in place was fundamental to having 
an effective EHS performance with none or fewer incidents; 
(b) Compliance to the rules, laws and regulations sets the minimum 
benchmark which you cannot go below. But your industry standards 
must be higher because they have the latest information drawing on 
the many lessons from industry; 
(c) Setting rules and standards within an organization creates the 
operating envelope for everyone to work within and just like a state 
sets rules and regulations to maintain law and order, an organization 
sets EHS policies and procedures to maintain operability, stay resilient 
and sustainable, especially if it is a high risk industry.  
(d) Larger organizations (Holding Corporations) have developed 
guidelines and codes of practice for all their operating units (affiliates) 
to bring about a good level of compliance and operating discipline with 
all of their operations.    
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But what was also emphasised is that excellent systems required a firm and 
fair consequence management process in which if people did not comply 
they were counselled, warned and fired. It was emphasised that without this 
systems could not achieve excellence.  
 
One important aspect in the development of management systems which we 
see is that the policies, procedures and guidance have become more 
dynamic in that it continually is upgraded and changes to meet with new and 
emerging risks. Best practice defined by industry benchmarks and practices 
drive much of the journey towards excellence. Excellence by definition 
means that compared to industry norms, organisations were not only meeting 
higher standards, but that they had systems in place that created continual 
improvement. Road safety is a case-in-point and was discussed by more 
than one senior leader, especially an issue in the Oil and Gas upstream 
sector where they explained how they have exerted a great deal of effort as 
an organization to study the underlying factors and through engineering, 
administrative, policy and procedural controls to eliminate the risks.  In the 
GCC, from discussing this issue with various leaders, poor road safety is the 
number 1 cause of fatalities in that industry.  
  
7.2.8 Legal Imperatives for Safety 
 
Regardless of which industry you belong to, senior leaders recognize the 
significance of the legal imperatives for safety and EHS. As discussed earlier 
there is an interesting relationship between legal imperatives and operational 
excellence & management systems and risk management. Clearly they are 
strongly linked as the management systems would be developed on the 
basis of the minimum legal requirements and as an assurance mechanism 
for the leaders that the procedures are in line with the legal requirements 
within a jurisdiction.  
 
In saying this leaders explained that they ensured that their organization 
applied whatever systems helped in making their operations effective, 
efficient and safe; ensuring only that they did not go below the legal 
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requirements. They said that legal aspects become extremely important after 
an accident or incident because in any major incident in which people lose 
their lives or are injured, the environment is damaged and/or assets are 
damaged; it has to be appreciated that it is as much an operational and 
financial, perhaps reputational loss as is a EHS or safety omission. Legal 
compliance is important in keeping a business healthy and running without 
losses. Two sub-themes emerged in this analysis which included: 
 
• Core Business Conduct Imperative 
• Basic Compliance 
 
Legal compliance was related in the interviews to business conduct. The 
leader’s moral duty to protect company employees was something that was a 
given from the responses of many leaders. But at a more basic level, 
compliance is critical to business from a “licence to operate” perspective.  
 
As discussed somewhat in the literature review is the fact that many of the 
legal debates suggest that there are two dichotomous approaches [reference 
to Grey (2006)] to the management of the legal non-compliance especially in 
occupational health and safety. The two schools of thought of either (i) self-
regulating for compliance or (ii) policing; it is not as clear when the 
discussions took place with the senior leaders if they saw this as just 
compliance and do not discuss such matters then it comes to the law. 
Perhaps this reflects the level of involvement that major industries, even if 
regionally owned, in the development of regulations and standards. As such 
the leaders did not see themselves and their organizations as stakeholders in 
these regulations as much as they saw themselves as just having to ensure 
they complied.  Industry generally in the GCC is not always consulted on 
laws, rules and regulations (by the regulator) as they may be for example in 
continental Europe. This is however, starting to change.  
 
With the above in mind, legal imperatives for EHS remain a compliance issue 
related to the organization’s license to operate. It is a bare minimum rather 
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than an aspect which drives best-in-class EHS leadership and organizational 
EHS cultures.  
 
7.2.9 Reporting Structures and Hierarchies 
 
Finally, the last theme seems to have been less important but also quite 
straight forward. Two sub-themes emerged from the qualitative review, being 
Policy of Direct Reporting and Indirect Reporting.  Clearly when asked the 
question on the reporting line of EHS managers/directors with respect to the 
senior leadership there were three types of generally varied responses: 
 
(1)  They must report to the CEO/MD directly – as some of them put it “I 
am ultimately responsible for EHS”; 
(2) They can report to one of the CEO/MD’s senior technical or 
operational executive management team, as they said they have a 
system and there is good transparency. 
(3) They have to really report to the CEO/MD because this sends a 
message to the whole company and the other executive that safety is 
at least at par with other aspects of company operations.  
 
Whilst reporting lines are an important aspect to understand and appreciate it 
can be said that the impact on EHS leadership as such is not as significant 
as with the other themes. But this might be dependent on the maturity of the 
or otherwise the current structure of an organization. Thus if an organisation 
has a mature operating system and the roles and responsibilities for EHS are 
clearly defined in all jobs other than only the EHS practitioner’s job then the 
reporting lines may have certain flexibility. Reporting lines are important to 
ensure that the correct information is received by the organisation’s leaders 
in an accurate and timely manner.   
 
To conclude here the issue of direct and indirect reporting of EHS depended 
on the governance imperative of the organisation’s structure when it came to 
EHS. The organisational leaders who seemed to see EHS as a more 
strategic or at least tactical matter preferred the direct reporting structures so 
253 
 
as it would seem that they wanted to lead EHS and be directly informed or at 
least place EHS in a level that others within the organisation appreciated that 
it was important to them.  
 
7.3 Exploring the Applicability of the themes/ideas that emerged 
from the Interviews Conducted 
 
As explained in Chapter 6 (section 6.5) various emerging areas through 
some of the statements were felt to be highly significant to the extent that 
they may very well be a theme in their own right. One of the primary 
objectives of this research was to ascertain if the emerging themes from the 
literature review were applicable, and also to understand what other 
important and influencing factors existed in the minds of the leaders. One 
clear drawback of much of the literature references which exist (which 
addresses EHS leadership) is that much of it has been a contribution of EHS 
practitioners, governance specialists, legal specialists and so on and whilst 
many perspectives were explored this remained limited in the sense that 
perhaps the senior leadership perspectives have not had a fair hearing. 
Whilst there have been publications which have gone through significant 
consultation with senior leadership [OECD (2012), IoD-HSE (2008) etc] as 
concluded by McDonald (2010), to cite one example, the disappointing reality 
is that the surveys conducted on UK directors on the HSE/IoD 2008 code 
over two years showed little improvement in awareness, readership and 
implementation of the code. So it may be argued that whilst they were given 
opportunities to review and comment, many senior leaders may not have 
invested the time to do so. Therefore, how much of their input guided these 
standards remains to be questioned.   
 
To this end, this research explored directly and through the qualitative inquiry 
what other emerging themes or ideas these leaders held. During the 
interviews the views raised have been varied and these were listed in 
Chapter 6 and are discussed in greater detail here.  
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Some leaders said that boards will have naturally a reactive leadership 
style as directing is a passive leadership style in which they will react to 
the information presented to them on performance. Thus all they can do is 
inspire and motivate the executive management team to be more proactive 
when addressing EHS matters. This is not so much a criticism as much as it 
is a reality which has evolved through the workings of boards. As discussed 
earlier some boards are more active and meet more frequently, and as such 
it is believed that those boards probably have a more directive and 
influential style. But as noted by Clarke (2012) effective safety leadership 
requires both transactional and transformational leadership styles to be 
effective.  
 
The separation of the roles of the board and the executive was argued by 
some leaders as being the only way to achieve real governance. There 
should be a clear distinction between managing EHS by the executive and 
directing EHS within an organization by the chairman and his/her board of 
directors. This is consistent with Millstein and MacAvoy (2003) who proposed 
a separation between the role of Board and Executive, a view shared with 
Nicholson & Keil (2004) and others.   
 
The concept of EHS being a Business Value Driver was discussed and 
many leaders explained that EHS needed to be looked at in a different way 
perhaps akin to quality management within organizations, EHS management 
in their minds brought about improvements in productivity, sustained growth 
and prevention of disruption to business. In high risk organizations it is also 
related to reliability which is a valuable trait for an organization which 
provides stakeholders with a feeling of resilience. As such some leaders 
therefore felt that embedding EHS as a Key Organizational Value Driver 
was required by the leadership so as for an EHS Culture to grow and an 
organization becomes part of the fabric of the organizations goals, objectives 
and beliefs. 
 
Thus in a very similar way EHS as a Sustainable Value Driver was also 
discussed and some leaders said that sustainability gives organizations a 
255 
 
long-term sustained value overtime which is one of the long-term objectives 
of a board. In a recent research presentation in India for the Oil and Gas 
Industry, research showed that “Governance sets a long term destination 
whereas leadership sets the road map for the set coming period under 
direction of BoD” [AlHashmi (2013)4, slide 14]. The sustained existence, 
operation and growth are all very important aspects of EHS assurance. As 
explained by Dermine (2011) when talking of the banking industries 
corporate governance standards: “In a world in which financial markets 
reward short-term reported profits, it is the responsibility of the bank’s board 
to take care of long-term value creation, even if that means hurting reported 
revenue and the share price in the short term. Executives should drive the 
business within regulations in accordance with the strategy and manner 
(ethics/culture) set and supervised by the board.” [Dermine (2011), Page 9]. 
 
On matters of EHS leadership effectiveness many senior leaders explained 
that it is critical for there to be alignment of vision between the Executive 
management and the Board on all EHS matters. This would naturally also 
deal with another important aspect or theme which emerged which is when 
EHS has Competing Goals with Commercial/Financial Drivers. It has to 
be appreciated that EHS will continue to struggle against financial goals in 
organizations, especially for investment and policy issues that may be seen 
by operational and marketing staff as “restricting”, and expenditure with 
returns very difficult to quantify in traditional financial return on investment 
terms. 
 
This in turn creates conflicting priorities in Business. Some conflicting 
priorities in business can have very negative effects on EHS. An example of 
this was deferring maintenance works on a pipeline to save costs, and the 
pipeline failing as a result of corrosion. Leadership needs to assess and 
ensure that risks are not created and EHS in an organization is never 
compromised. This is sometimes a challenge as even the most accurate 
quantitative risk assessments can be based on quite subjective assumptions 
due to the nature of risks which are related to failure rates of equipment (e.g. 
mechanical seal failure on a pump), natural factors (such as storms and 
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earthquakes etc.); and human factors (i.e. human error borne from another 
varied set of factors including lack of training, fatigue, underdeveloped safety 
culture etc.). 
 
A very clear factor which emerged from the discussions especially within the 
Oil and Gas upstream and the Aviation sectors was that it was a fact that 
Industry was in itself driving change and focus. The best practices employed 
as a result of lessons learnt from different incidents and accidents or as a 
result of more proactive technical research, and the basic fact that all these 
different companies compete with one another in delivering services and 
products to other business or to the public directly. All of this has had a 
profound introspective focus shift towards better EHS standards. In oil and 
gas for example a few of the leaders interviewed said that the focus of the 
industry on process safety management in recent years has come about as a 
result of recent international business crippling incidents which highlighted to 
management that they have been too focused on personal safety and have 
neglected plant and process (hardware) safety.  
 
Therefore the emerging global and regional influences such as trends, 
international standards and regional practices continue to influence and 
motivate/drive change within organizations and their practices. This is in 
general terms, but very much so with EHS matters. 
 
The amount and timeliness of financial investment which is sometimes 
required to improve EHS Standards has to be better appreciated by 
leadership at both the executive and board level. During the pilot work done 
and during a discussion with a senior legal advisor who participated in the 
pilot study, he had explained to the researcher that in the upstream oil and 
gas business where he came from if a CEO needed to spend up to 10 million 
US Dollars of an urgent safety or EHS issue, he had a blanket approval to do 
so as long as he was able to justify the expenditure at a later date to the 
BoD. He explained that whilst the delegation of authority for unbudgeted 
expenditures was only 1 million US Dollars in cases of EHS requirements the 
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board appreciated that resources needed immediate deployment and could 
not wait to prevent any incident or escalation of any incident.   
 
Monitoring EHS performance has been already discussed in the previous 
section. However, what was highlighted in the discussion with leaders was 
that the Analysis of Performance was hugely important by the board rather 
than just monitoring.  Greater engagement and understanding of the reasons 
underlying the EHS performance be it good or bad is more important than 
monitoring that performance. As the BoD needs to add value to the 
discussion on EHS with the executive team, they need to understand why the 
performance is the way it is rather than what it is.  
 
On board matters in more general terms the board structure that ensures 
objectivity and has the right level of knowledge and healthy working with the 
leadership teams was very important. The structure is seen by some to be 
less important than the engagement of board members and board dynamics. 
The makeup of the Board ensuring there is a good mix and that there is 
diversity of experiences and knowledge and that was supported by almost all 
respondents who probably saw that as the single most important aspect of 
board effectiveness in dealing with EHS matters.  Whilst organizational 
maturity governs boards at the end of the day the board oversight role must 
be very strong.  
 
The growing impact of Socialization and Social Value contribution of 
organizations and corporations is consistent with the issues identified by 
Jamali et al (2010) regarding the lack of good practice and corporate social 
responsibility governance in the profit making organizations as opposed to 
the not-for profit organizations. Although their research focused on the 
medical services sector, the matters related to Social Impact & 
Accountability have become important and in the GCC and the Arab world 
in general, this has become a matter of significant socio-political importance 
with a growing demand for governments to create employment opportunities. 
However another important aspect highlighted was the alignment of the 
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organization and the business and for them to take into account people’s 
needs for both external and internal customers. 
 
Learning and EHS awareness and competence should come from an 
environment of continual organizational learning going from top to bottom in 
an organization. Therefore the development of Continual Learning 
Organizations is very important which leverages on knowledge from its 
internal operations and lessons learnt as well as peer industries both locally 
and internationally.  
 
There should be a clear set of expectations for Safety and EHS at all levels 
starting from the board. Also leadership explained that good EHS means 
good business, therefore EHS should be, in the context of high risk, high 
reliability organizations, part of the business profile.   
 
Transparency is critical to having a healthy working relationship between all 
stakeholders including the workforce; the management team; the leadership 
team; and the board of directors. As discussed earlier some leaders 
explained that transparency creates that safe and reliable culture and that it 
was leadership who created that culture of transparency by being fair and 
just. This is also consistent with a great deal of safety leadership and culture 
research [Odea & Flin (2001); Conchie & Donald (2006); Carrol (2002) etc.]. 
For example the BP Texas Refinery Explosion Investigation yielded, Baker et 
al (2007), Page xii; in their report it states “A good PSM culture requires a 
positive, trusting and open environment with effective lines of communication 
between management and the workforce, including employee 
representatives”. 
 
Resilience is a very important aspect of high reliability. The level of 
preparedness of organizations to ensure both business continuity and 
emergency/crisis response planning was something that leaders said boards 
must expect of leaders of high risk organizations as a key expectation and 
objective. It was recognized in the interviews that focused efforts should be 
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on prevention, but being prepared to respond to incidents and having action 
plans in place was equally important.  
 
On compliance matters the oil and gas leadership seemed to talk more about 
the importance of internal controls and management systems.  Having good 
governance through internal management systems and processes should be 
the focus rather on compliance to regulations which is a given fact.  
 
Some leaders touched on the fact that ethics and morality of the 
leadership is significant. The leaders interviewed from the construction 
industries said that this was a very significant aspect as they were competing 
with other contractors who may not have such high levels of morality and 
who may not as such treat their workers as well to simply cut costs and be 
more competitive in tenders.  Whilst this may be a very straight forward point 
and there is considerable agreement on this, it is a fundamental aspect of 
creating trust between stakeholders which is critical for a good EHS culture. 
 
Finally the Independence and Strength of the EHS Function within 
Organizations was discussed by some leaders especially when it came to 
talking about reporting lines. The EHS function must be independent of other 
functions and report to the right level of command in an organization. 
Regardless if the functional manger reported to the CEO/MD or not, the focus 
should be on the independence of the function in the sense that it could 
highlight EHS risks and issues relating to those risks without other parts of 
the organization directly influencing, interfering or changing their 
assessments of risks and impacts.    
 
7.4 Exploring the Impact of the Board Structure on EHS Leadership 
 
The final question asked of the senior leadership during the interviews was 
board structure’s impact on EHS leadership and governance. As discussed in 
the literature review, board structure, make up and the relationship between 
the CEO/MD and the chairman and other board members were all 
highlighted as factors of success of the board. Therefore a hypothetical 
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question was asked of these leaders on their opinion on which board 
structure they felt was best for EHS leadership and governance?  
 
Figure 7.1 show the distribution of views of the question of what kind of board 
was hypothetically best in terms of leadership and governance of EHS in 
organisations. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Impact of Board Structure of EHS Governance and 
Leadership 
 
A total of five permutation answers were noted by the researcher. There have 
been various debates around board structure and its impact on board 
performance [Verdeyen and Van Buggenhout, 2003] and in this section we 
discuss the results with respect to this question in the context of EHS 
leadership. In response to this very question, it was interesting to note that 
the spectrum of opinions ranged greatly.  
 
Bennington (2010) explains that the key areas that should be considered 
when studying board effectiveness include the role, structure and 
composition of boards, as well as the processes and relationships of Boards.  
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Of the total respondents, 53.8% indicated a preference to a Mixed Board 
Structure in which the CEO was a Board Member but not the Board 
Chairman or Vice-Chairman. There were various reasons cited for this which 
included that they believed such a structure brought about better alignment 
between Executive Management and the Board Members; It enables the 
CEO and perhaps some executives (who may also be appointed to the 
Board) who are knowledgeable about the business to better contribute to the 
major decisions made which can impact on EHS and Safety. They said that 
there is a better chance for the BoD members to understand the implications 
of the decisions they make, especially commercial and expenditure related 
which can impact on EHS and Safety; and that in general terms you end up 
getting better engagement from both Executive Team and the BoD. 
 
This is probably consistent with the views expressed by Bennington (2010) 
and others such as Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) who explain that whilst 
collaboration is required between the Board and the CEO. The Board’s 
primary responsibility is to provide oversight, advice and monitoring of 
performance and when needed to counsel/discipline the CEO. More recent 
research however has indicated a changing landscape and boards playing a 
greater role as strategic partners working in collaboration with the 
management team and in fact as indicated by Bjork (2006) now a changing 
more collaborative leadership between Boards and CEOs especially in the 
health industry.  
 
There were also a relatively high proportion of respondents (23.1%) who 
supported the view of having a Detached Board in which the CEO and 
Executive Management only reported to the Board and were not members. 
They cited many reasons which included: that there must be a clear 
delineation of the roles and responsibilities between the Executive and the 
BoD and that the CEO is accountable for leading whereas the Board were 
accountable for directing EHS matters; that this maintains as they put it better 
“Corporate Governance and Oversight” especially for safety issues especially 
when there is a potential in an organization to have major incidents. They 
also said that ensured that the BoD makes more objective decisions as they 
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are not influenced too closely by more subjective decisions from the CEO 
and his team who may want to go ahead with a particular matter for a 
particular reason; and that this ensures that the BoD members remain as an 
independent directing and supervisory body.  
 
This quote demonstrates this viewpoint: “Yes, you must have that separation. 
I mean, governance is oversight, protection of the shareholders’ interests and 
the companies of long-range interests. Management is obviously focused on 
the next quarter, on the next year, they’re results driven. I think separation is 
good.” [Respondent 22, Oil and Gas, Upstream, Page 22]. 
 
Only around 12% of the respondents supported having an Executive 
Chairman Board in which the CEO and Chairman were one. They cited their 
reasons for supporting such a Board structure by saying: If EHS starts at the 
top, then the Chairman as the CEO will ensure EHS issues are dealt with no 
compromise. The also said that no issues with misalignment between BoD 
and Executive Team as they will be one and the same; and that the BoD 
would become very effective advisors for ensuring the decisions that are 
made are balanced when it comes to EHS issues. Bennington (2010) 
explains that “duality” of roles of a CEO also as a chairman has become quite 
a controversial issue although it is common (and thus an acceptable practice) 
in countries like the USA, Hong Kong, North Africa and the Arab World. 
Furthermore he adds: “Whilst agency theory views duality as inappropriate, 
as it reduces the monitoring role of the Board, stewardship theory views 
duality as removing any ambiguity about who is directing the organization 
and, thus, sees it positively” [Bennington, 2010, Page 321]. To this end, 
Olayiwola, (2010) indicated that Executive Duality should not exist and that a 
clear separation should pertain of the head of management and head of the 
Board. This to the extent that even an executive vice-chairman position 
would not be acceptable in the context of the banking industry to ensure 
effective governance and oversight.  
 
Some supported an either/or approach– i.e. both Executive and Mixed and 
Detached and Mixed models. However, interestingly 15.4% were of the 
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view that Board Structure made very little difference. This was for a few 
reasons cited such as: that safety and EHS is about responsibility and 
accountability so it is not the Board structure that will be the reason for better 
or worse safety leadership and culture within an organization; The 
performance of the Board in terms of EHS matters depends more on the 
optimum number of Board members who have varied experiences rather 
than structure; and that this depended more on the general diversity of the 
Board rather than the structure of the Board and that EHS was ultimately all 
about people. They also said that the board structure will continue to depend 
more on regulations and international best practice and Safety/EHS matters 
would be absorbed within those structures. 
 
Board structures are very much influenced by size and type of the 
organization as clearly expressed by a CEO of a Manufacturing Company 
who is also a corporate governance specialist, he explains: “Now when you 
speak about board structure you have to think about um it is a structure that 
has to be in compliance with the regulations and law for setting up the 
company”. [Respondent 18, Manufacturing, Page 13].  And also another 
aspect from a shareholder point of view was that they set up the board 
according to the size and type of function that the organization is doing, the 
following quote illustrates this: “So if you have a small organization which 
consists of 4 guys, you don’t have to go through the trouble of setting a whole 
full-fledged board” [Respondent 18, Manufacturing, Page 13]. This is to some 
extent also consisted by the views of Millstein & MacAvoy (2003) and Bauer 
& Schmidt (2008) etc.  
 
Finally, one respondent did express that Board Structure effectiveness 
depended more on the organization and the relationship dynamics between 
the CEO and the BoD [Respondent, 25, Aviation]. The Summary of all the 
findings on board structure is given in Appendix J.  
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7.5 Developing the Contextual Diagram of EHS Leadership in the 
context of Corporate Governance and EHS Leadership  
 
In chapter 1, a simple diagram representing the context of this research was 
presented showing the areas of EHS/Safety, Leadership and Corporate 
Governance. With the themes emerging from both the academic and 
practitioner knowledge of the researcher and now after undertaking this in-
depth mixed methods research, other themes and ideas have emerged. Thus 
the conceptual model is populated with the themes thus transforming it in to 
the Contextual diagram of EHS Leadership & Governance. The diagram 
is represented below in figure 7.2. An explanation follows.  
 
 
Fig 7.2: Contextual Diagram of EHS Leadership & Governance 
 
The model shows the three areas of the research. The challenge of this 
research has been to find the areas where these three spheres of knowledge 
and practice overlap. The model shows equal circles but this is misleadingly 
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simplistic as the reality is much more complex and thus in practice the circles 
may be different in their areas and degree of overlap. However, what we 
know well is that the areas of overlap between EHS and Leadership can be 
defined by the EHS/Safety leadership theories and models which have been 
explored mainly by EHS practitioners and perhaps industrial psychologists. 
The area of overlap between EHS and Governance is an area defined as 
compliance, whereas the area between governance and leadership can be 
defined as the performance standards which define how the board evaluates 
CEO/MD performance and initially sets expectations.  
 
The themes fall within different areas within this conceptual diagram. The 
themes as already explained in the above sections particularly and in the 
earlier chapters generally are distinct yet very much interconnected. They 
influence each other and drive one another’s importance and emphasis yet 
they can still be explored as exclusive themes as well. Because the subject is 
relatively complex with so many factors, and to better understand it 
holistically, an understanding of the themes and their positioning within the 
contextual diagram helps define the model that is presented further for the 
purpose and utility. 
 
Because of this complexity of this study due to the many themes (or factors) 
to be understood as a whole except very conceptually, by understanding 
where the themes lie in the diagram, we better understand the subject as a 
whole.  
 
The themes which are given in red are the themes that initially emerged from 
the literature review. We find that only one theme seems to sit comfortably 
within the very centre - notably the monitoring of EHS performance. Another 
three themes sit off the borders; safety culture and communications falls 
within the border between the centre and EHS leadership, distinct yet very 
much connected to EHS leadership and as discussed earlier in this chapter 
in fact culture can be said to be a product of that leadership. 
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Knowledge and Competence and Influence and Accountability also 
border the central overlap area with performance standards. Boards expect a 
certain level of influence on organizations workings and also expect that 
accountability is taken for the results whether positive or otherwise. The 
same goes for EHS knowledge and competence only here this is applicable 
as influence & accountability to both the executive and the board leadership.  
 
The other themes explored also fall within the other areas such as 
compliance; risk management and the legal imperatives for safety.  OE and 
EHS management systems also are within the area of compliance but due to 
the technical nature we see the overlap with EHS. This explains the 
significant variation that we saw earlier in the results with risk management 
and OE & EHS management systems between the respondents and also 
between the oil and gas and non-oil and gas industries. Whilst these fall 
within the compliance theme they are not within the zone of “performance 
standards setting” (i.e. the area between governance and leadership) so due 
to the current board’s nature and EHS knowledge and competence, they see 
these two themes being addressed by influence and accountability.  
 
With respect to EHS reporting structures and hierarchies, we saw 
differences in responses with reporting lines of senior EHS 
managers/directors within organizations sometimes reporting directly when 
senior leaders saw: (1) that they needed to be hands-on with EHS issues; (2) 
saw that it was important to promote the role of EHS in a message 
manifested by the direct reporting line to the top person within the 
organization or (3) where they saw that simply the reporting of EHS had to be 
direct to ensure speed and quality of reporting of information relating to EHS 
as a critical organizational matter. This is consistent with McLean (2003) who 
stressed that practitioner’s must report to the organizational leaders so that 
they may help in directly implementing their commitments but also as this 
reporting line in itself demonstrated to everyone within the organization that 
this position is a senior one, carrying equal importance to all the other 
operational, technical and financial functions. 
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On the other hand some other senior leaders interviewed saw that the 
reporting lines made little difference as long as there was a structure, strong 
procedures and management systems with responsible senior technical 
directors reporting to them, where EHS matters were raised through the 
operational and technical management layer. Overall, this theme is a matter 
of corporate governance.   
 
On reporting structures, some of the leaders interviewed felt that as long as 
there is an independent role for EHS within the organization, the reporting 
was a secondary consequence.  This emergent theme the researcher felt 
was within the border of compliance and governance. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the other emergent themes (shown in 
black) are also linked to one another and to the themes that existed at the 
start of the research. However, they have been developed through the 
iterative process undertaken to bring together common aspects of the string 
of ideas that emerged from reviewing the interviews undertaken. There is no 
right or wrong theme and they could have been combined in other ways. The 
researcher here used experience and reflective knowledge over 15 years of 
experience in the field of both EHS and management to bring these different 
ideas together to create these newly emerged themes.  
 
In saying this, they may not be themes but important matters to understand in 
this developing model. For example, much of the ideas that emerged from 
the interviews came from the reflections of senior leaders and 
notwithstanding the fact that much of the literature was developed by 
practitioners in various fields of knowledge such as legal, leadership, safety, 
EHS, governance and so on these themes or ideas are real. They are what 
senior leaders see and feel and have an impact on this whole notion of EHS 
leadership in the context of governance.  
 
With performance standards, the impact of conflicting organizational goals, 
impact of the standards within industry and the ethics, morality and corporate 
social responsibility were also aspects driven by the relationship and 
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expectations set by the board and the CEO/MD. The interviews very much 
revealed, especially when leaders were asked to comment on their future 
outlook on governance and EHS leadership, both internal and external 
drivers set an agenda and thus set the performance expectations from the 
executive management. A great deal of impact, it was discussed, has been 
the industry standards rise in the past few decades. This is particularly true 
with the oil and gas industry but more pronounced in the aviation sector.  
 
On corporate social responsibility at least three highly influential and senior 
leaders explained that the very viability and sustainability of their businesses 
in which the shareholders were governments was not possible within their 
organizations continuing to contribute to creating jobs for the nation’s 
workforce, socio-economic development through sponsorships; developing 
local talent; awarding contracts to local businesses and generally supporting 
society at large. This, the researcher felt, needed to be translated into 
performance expectations by the Board of the CEO/MD. Whilst it is related to 
EHS, especially when it comes to labour rights and environmental 
stewardship it is sufficiently distanced in the model to sit where it does under 
performance standards.  
 
Then, at the very heart of this contextual diagram sit many important ideas or 
themes that arose from the senior leaders’ qualitative inputs. Some of these 
themes are organizationally tactical and others the researcher views as 
highly strategic. The more organizational themes are those which related to 
transparency as a culture where there is open reporting and generally open 
communication systems without the fear of reprimand which is also linked to 
leadership and the creation of a just and fair culture as discussed in the 
literature [Refer to HSL (2011)]  high reliability organizations that have a Just 
Culture promoting transparency in reporting of incidents and improvements 
with a great balance between supporting the reporting culture and tolerating 
unacceptable behaviours.  
 
Also at the heart of the diagram the Ethics and Morality of leadership plays 
a very important role in EHS leadership and governance. EHS is mainly 
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about the protection of people, environment and assets and loss prevention. 
This does not always amount to pure financial rewards. In fact, sometimes 
operating in a risky way even if there is a high potential loss may mean very 
high returns, and without basic ethics and morality it may otherwise be 
justified to operate in an unsafe way as long as you do not get caught.  
 
Linked to EHS knowledge and competency at an organizational level is 
learning organization. This is also linked to safety culture and 
communications as well as transparency. Many interviews demonstrated that 
EHS and improvements that are being made in organizations was a long 
learning journey in which the whole organization including the board was on. 
In that journey continually learning was pivotal to improvement and the 
eventual running of operational excellent EHS management systems. 
 
Analysis of Performance may be combined with the Monitoring of EHS 
Performance theme and in the final model we see this as an outcome of the 
many themes and factors that have been extensively discussed. The themes 
were kept separate for the purpose of illustration that various senior leaders 
interviewed explained that boards should analyse performance and not just 
monitor. Their main arguments were that if the information presented was 
analysed they would be actually playing a more engaged role; effectively 
understand what is going wrong but also what is going right and thus better 
appreciate the efforts being exerted by the whole organization to  maintain a 
high level of performance.  
 
On Alignment of EHS goals with Business Goals this theme relates 
strongly to a consequential theme being developed which also resides in the 
heart of the diagram, which is making EHS an Organizational Value Driver. 
It was recognized by some of the senior leaders that this misalignment 
between EHS and business goals created the lack of Investment in EHS 
and also as discussed earlier created the Impact of Conflicting 
Organizational Goals. So in their own right these aspects or themes have a 
strong bearing on the model and thus perhaps when looking at solutions to 
improve governance and EHS leadership in organizations, these aspects 
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must be studied carefully and pragmatic solutions need to be presented. By 
making EHS a core business/organization value driver, its importance is 
presented to everyone within the organization including the board. Only here 
the board must drive this through setting an expectation of the organization to 
make EHS a core value. This is what the HSE-IoD (2008) best practice 
guideline explained about the BoD setting the tone for the organization and in 
doing so they were demonstrating their EHS leadership.  
 
Finally, there has been much discussed about high reliability organizations 
and their attributes and also sustainability in the literature review. During the 
interviews the overarching paradigm that was felt about EHS from the 
business leaders was based on having policies and systems in place to 
prevent incidents from occurring and being ready to deal with incidents when 
they do occur. Thus Business Resilience and Preparedness sits also in 
the heart of the diagram. In the context of high risk industries, to become high 
reliability organizations, business resilience and preparedness becomes a 
theme of central importance.  
 
7.6 EHS Leadership & Governance Model  
 
Figure 7.2 has helped in synthesising the data especially from the qualitative 
enquiry and thus brings together all the factors in the way of themes which 
have come from both the literature review and qualitative enquiry. The 
diagram is too fluid and fails to give us three fundamental requirements. The 
first is the relationship of the themes and factors with one another as they 
surely are linked and influence each other. Secondly from a very basic 
analysis the diagram is not able to arrange these factors into groups. Finally 
the conceptual diagram although places factors within the research areas 
explored it fails very much to link these factors in such a way to explain their 
ultimate impact on organisational EHS leadership and governance. So whilst, 
the researcher is confident that the diagram provokes further thought; creates 
an excellent foundation for debate; and most importantly in an abstract way 
positions these highly complex set of inter-related themes and concepts, 
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further to its creation a more meaningful and practical model has been 
developed.  
 
Figure 7.3 builds on the model given in Figure 3.1 on page 76 and defines 
the themes that emerged in the literature review as well as the themes that 
emerged in this qualitative research. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Model of EHS Leadership and Governance 
  
The themes have been grouped in to four key areas including Internal 
Organisational Factors; External Social, Political and Economic Factors; 
Personnel Leadership Factors and finally Enterprise Business Factors.  
 
As we have already explained the factors themselves already the researcher 
found that if the model presented in Chapter 3 is now revisited incorporation 
of the merging themes and a further appreciation of the factors is possible. 
To explain this we explain the key developments in what follows: 
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Internal Organisational Factors: 
  
The research confirms that leaders when probed on the three areas that 
evolved from the literature review which included Operational Excellence and 
Management Systems; Reporting Structures and Hierarchies; and Safety 
Culture and Communication they responded confirming their importance and 
in fact a total of 33 sub-themes evolved. However, this factor or theme on 
transparency evolved from the inferences from the data. These four factors 
have been classified or grouped under the internal organisational factors. 
 
External Social, Political and Economic Factors: 
 
Perhaps what was not fully appreciated when external factors where initially 
studied further to the literature review and what in fact the literature review 
failed to highlight is that the factors that related to business ethics; social 
responsibility and accountability and most significantly the influence of global 
(trends) practices and standards have a significant impact within the external 
factors. The legal imperatives for safety that much of the literature 
emphasised was important, is indeed important but may not be the most 
important external factor on business. This can be considered an important 
and significant contribution of this research. 
 
Personal Leadership Factors: 
 
Whilst 3 of the 4 factors in this emerged model existed in the original model 
in chapter 3, this research highlighted the influence of these 3 factors and 
highlighted the sub-themes under each theme which are important to 
understand. However, further to that morality came out also from the 
interviews as a critical personnel factor from many of the interviews. Morality 
is an internal factor which influences leader’s behaviour and whilst some 
(limited) literature mentioned the aspects of morality, there was not enough in 
the literature which truly highlighted its importance like through the interviews 
with these decision makers. 
 
273 
 
Enterprise Business Factors: 
 
The biggest contribution that this research highlighted, and possibly as a 
consequence of the disciplines that currently research and write in this space 
of EHS leadership and governance which the literature review was based on, 
is the impact of the enterprise factors. These business factors which were 
illustrated in the interviews which were in 3 key areas. EHS is seen by the 
leaders of high reliability organisations as a business value driver, EHS is 
simply good business in their minds. Moreover EHS matters need to be 
effectively aligned with the business goals and objectives and this is an 
important influencing factor, especially when one appreciated that at the very 
basic level, EHS provides a long-term sustained business imperative. This 
also leads to the fact that business continuity through reliance and 
preparedness for incidents is an important enterprise aspect to consider. 
Lastly, and a very important and refreshing view-point that many leaders 
expressed was that EHS they saw as an investment and thus it was 
important to invest in safety for the long-term healthy growth of the 
enterprise. This is opposed to the more published view of EHS being purely a 
cost of compliance.  
 
Monitoring EHS performance whilst being an established theme in the 
original model in chapter 3, what is significant is that further to the qualitative 
research undertaken it confirms this to be an outcome of the four thematic 
groups discussed above within the model established. Moreover, it is not 
simply the monitoring of EHS performance as much it is the monitoring and 
effective analysis of performance that was expected by the board that adds 
value to the mid and long term business value goals and objectives. Thus 
Board Directors must get more involved, and make a greater effort to 
understand reasons for EHS performance to guide and direct the executive 
managed effectively. Lastly the model describes that all these themes that 
relate to leadership, internal organisational, external business environmental 
and enterprise factors impact directly on risk management and can be thus 
predicators of effective risk controls that can in turn effectively ensure the 
long term sustainable growth of high-risk/high reliability organisations. What 
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the model also clearly demonstrates is that effective control can be achieved 
through effective monitoring, meaningful insights borne from a better holistic 
understanding of all the themes that relate on EHS leadership and 
governance leading to a more effective governance of EHS. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions 
 
8.1 General Conclusions 
 
The Gulf Corporation Council States (GCC) in the Middle East has seen 
significant and rapid growth in the past few decades. This has brought about 
energy intensive industrialization to a great scale mainly based on the by the 
oil and gas economy. Many of the large high risk organizations are state 
owned and play an essential socio-economic role in these States making 
their aspiration to being high reliability, safe and productive organizations a 
matter not only of economic interest but also of national interest.  
 
The literature review in this research discussed many diverse issues within 
the context of the research into EHS leadership in high risk, high reliability 
organizations from the context of corporate governance. Nine key themes 
emerged from the literature review and they were tested through using a 
concurrent mixed methods research design. All the themes seem to be 
important to understand and consider, with a few themes being more critical 
than others. The themes themselves do not all seem to fall neatly into the 
areas of contextual overlap between leadership, EHS and governance in the 
contextual diagram, but they have been grouped effectively in the model that 
has emerged from this research (Chapter 7, Figure 7.3). Some do such as 
monitoring (and analysis) EHS performance, and others are strongly 
connected to that central area such as Safety (EHS) Culture and 
Communications which it was recognized was driven (or at least a product of) 
by EHS leadership. Other areas such as Influence and Accountability and 
EHS Knowledge and Competence also sit somewhere between the central 
trio-overlap area and the performance standards and expectations by boards.  
 
The emerging themes which had a direct impact and which sit well within the 
central trio-overlap area include the impact of transparency; continual 
learning organizations and business resilience and preparedness. 
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These are significantly important organizational matters that need to be 
addressed to help support a strong EHS leadership structure where 
performance standards, compliance and EHS leadership models 
organizationally augment together. From a strategic perspective the 
alignment of EHS goals with the business goals in general borne from 
EHS being an organizational business value driver for a high risk/high 
reliability organization is imperative.  
 
From a board perspective also the analysis of performance when it comes 
to EHS within such risky organizations is critical to their appreciation of what 
creates this safe and reliable organization they are ultimately responsible for, 
especially over an extended period of time. This will hopefully make them 
appreciate why the timely investment into EHS is so important for sustained 
highly reliable and safe operations and thus profitability.  
 
Ethics and morality of leadership were seen to be strongly connected to 
EHS leadership and whilst these can be argued to be intrinsic human related 
aspects it is to be appreciated that ethics and morality are issues that relate 
to leadership in general and also specifically to EHS leadership. They are 
performance standard and board expectation related issues and part of what 
a board monitors in the CEO/MD is their behaviour and how moralistic and 
ethical it is. It is to be noted that business ethics is positioned under external 
factors as this has become a code of practice within industry and like other 
best practices it was felt it is thus an external factor.  
 
Other issues such as Operational Excellence and EHS Management 
Systems; Legal Imperatives for EHS and Risk Management as well as the 
emergent theme of the independent role of EHS within the organization all 
fall in the area of compliance. 
 
Finally the Reporting Structures and Hierarchies seem to be related to 
governance and generally organizational structures and as far as the leaders 
feedback was concerned had mixed feedback, some making a big difference 
of who the senior EHS resource reported too and with others making a small 
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difference or being of little significance. This theme thus sits between 
governance and the central zone.  
 
To this end, the most important question to be posed is what to call this zone 
in the middle which has significant bearing of all three areas of EHS, 
leadership and governance. To define the area, and given the complexity of 
the model in general, the researcher chose to develop a suitable descriptor 
for this zone by using the themes that are contained within and what needs to 
be created. Therefore a suitable definition or description of this zone is EHS 
Leadership Reliability - Through Alignment of Organizational Action, 
Business Value Drivers/Goals and Corporate Oversight. 
 
8.2 Summary of Conclusions on Research Questions, Aims and 
Objectives 
 
This research explored the perspectives of the senior leaders in high risk and 
high reliability organizations operating in the GCC region on EHS leadership 
and governance matters. This was done initially building on a conceptual 
understanding using key emerging themes from the literature review. It then 
tested levels of agreement on questions relating to these themes. The semi-
structured interviews also gave reasoning and richer understanding to the 
themes explored and also helped in effectively purging out other themes and 
perspectives which perhaps the literature did not mention in any significant 
way or did not consider as these evolved from the perspectives offered by 
organizational leaders directly.  
 
With respect to the aims and objectives: 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 addressed the current academic and organisational 
definitions and understanding of high reliability organisations, EHS 
leadership, corporate governance and risk management besides many other 
related topics including legal imperatives for EHS; EHS organisational culture 
developments; the relationship or impact of corporate social responsibility, 
social accountability on EHS and board dynamics in the context of high 
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risk/high reliability organizations. The review also allowed for an initial 
development of an early conceptual diagram which classified or grouped 
these themes together. It is worthy to note that actually the relationship 
between monitoring EHS performance and its impact on risk management 
was established at this early stage. The relationship of the other 7 themes 
was also established but as it would seem after the extensive interviews and 
survey data collection; another 8 themes emerged, 3 of which also allowed 
for the formation of another group called the Enterprise Business Drivers.  
 
The literature available was used to develop a basic framework of 9 key 
themes that emerged from current work around safety leadership and 
governance. These themes included: (1) EHS Knowledge and Competence 
(of CEOs and Directors); (2) EHS/Safety Leadership; (3) Risk Management; 
(4) Influence and Accountability; (5) Developing a Safety Culture and 
Communication; (6) Reporting Structure and Hierarchies; (7) Legal 
Imperative for Safety; (8) Operational Excellence & EHS Management 
Systems; (9) Monitoring of EHS Performance. These have been defined in 
chapter 3 and discussed throughout the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
 
The emerging themes included: (1) Transparency; (2) Business Ethics; (3) 
Impact of Global Trends and Standards; (4) Social Accountability and 
Corporate Social Responsibility; (5) Morality; (6) Investing in EHS; (7) 
Business Resilience and Preparedness; and (8) EHS as a Business Value 
Driver and Aligning EHS goals with Business Goals.  
 
The author developed a mixed methods design as a methodology which was 
the best method believed to investigate the current themes and evaluate if 
there are any other themes that exist with respect to EHS Leadership in the 
context of Corporate Governance. The mixed methods research design was 
used concurrently because of various reasons which included: (1) Allowing 
for greater context given that this was exploratory research the development 
of the quantitative survey was really to test and compare between the 
responses from senior managers. But this needed greater context and 
therefore the quantitative enquiry is used to gain understanding of the 
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differences between the perceptions on themes; (2) Giving the research 
greater utility value as a piece of engaged scholarship work of action-based 
management research. The mixed methods approach gives greater insights 
and findings which can be converted directly into workable solutions and thus 
recommendations for industry to take things forward; (3) Instrument 
development: Both survey questions and the semi-structured protocol related 
to the same emerging themes from the research, the use of the methods 
concurrently also served the qualitative method as a secondary validation, 
which in turn allows - at a later stage - for the refinement of the survey tool for 
future employment;  and (4) Allows the researcher to answer different 
research questions; (5) Enhancement: This research tries to best describe 
the area of contextual overlap between EHS, Governance and Leadership. It 
is through drawing conclusions from both sets of data that the researcher 
was able to enhance and better confirming findings with more confidence and 
also perhaps greater generalizability of the findings.   
 
These were discussed at greater depth in Chapter 4 and also the reasoning 
and rationale for a convergent parallel research design (has been referred to 
as concurrent mixed method design) is also discussed. 
 
Using the quantitative research methods the focus of senior leader’s 
perception on EHS from the corporate governance and performance 
perspective was assessed using the results from 30 panel-validated surveys. 
A comparison between the themes was undertaken and descriptive statistics 
were used to understand better the position of senior leaders with respect to 
the themes. A simple comparison also between oil and gas and non-oil and 
gas industry was undertaken successfully. These identified significant 
differences in perceptions/opinions of senior leaders between the two classes 
of industries on matters relating to risk management and operational 
excellence and EHS management systems.  
 
The use of qualitative methods (semi-structured interviews) to examine the 
rationale, reasoning and underpinning discourses of senior leadership with 
respect to EHS leadership and governance was a very significant 
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contribution to this research. The type and volume of rich data the 26 
recorded/transcribed interviews not only explained the views of leaders with 
respect to the literature-borne themes examined; this stage allowed for the 
emergence of other important themes based on the feedback on leaders 
directly.  
 
In the discussion chapter 7, the value and demonstrated utility of such an 
approach of using mixed methods research design and the combination 
qualitative and quantitative research methods in this exploratory research at 
the data analysis and discussion stages is shown. The discussion also 
demonstrates how these two methods of study provided for a better 
contextual understanding of senior leadership’s views on EHS governance 
within a fast changing and dynamic risk business environment assessing the 
dynamics of compliance, performance and sustained organisational growth. 
 
Whilst it is clear how this research contributes to the development of 
research in EHS leadership/governance studies in the GCC, with some 
further validation work and improvements to the quantitative survey 
instrument such findings along with further data collected will add value to 
other such industries in other regions in the world. Whilst the Middle East and 
the GCC region have their particular cultural differences, EHS and safety are 
universally important from a basic humanistic perspective. Some of the 
findings of this research may very well be generalizable even at this stage, 
yet in respecting the fundamentals of engaged scholarship, further validation 
would really be strongly recommended.  
  
In exploring the potential of developing a new framework for EHS Leadership 
and governance which helps explain the key components, the researcher has 
been able to develop the Contextual Diagram of EHS Leadership & 
Governance (see Chapter 7, Fig 7.2). The EHS Leadership & Governance 
Model (Chapter 7, Fig 7.3) may need further work and review but it forms a 
solid basis to build on. As is discussed later in this chapter, any further 
research, validation and review of the outputs of this research and the EHS 
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Leadership and Governance Model, will need the involvement of EHS 
specialists and senior leaders from high risk and high risk organizations alike.  
 
8.3 Academic Implications of this Management Research – 
Contribution to the Development of Theory 
 
Whilst much of the research done in this thesis is based on developing an in-
depth understanding of the relationship of EHS leadership in the context of 
corporate governance, there are several academic contributions that this 
research has made. They can be summarised as follows: 
 
8.3.1 Safety/EHS Directorship: From the literature review, very few 
references and academic research have addressed the issue of EHS 
leadership in the context of governance directly. Much of the research has 
looked at EHS leadership at an operational level and the impact mainly of 
business and site/company leadership, the impact of developing safety 
cultures within organizations and general research relating to studies of 
employee and supervisor/manager relationships. Much of this research has 
been by safety and behavioural scientists and some technical/engineering 
academic contributions. This research has approached the subject more 
holistically and did not look at safety and EHS leadership from the 
management perspective as much as it did more from a leader’s perspective.  
 
It is evident from the research data gathered from this study that not enough 
academic research has previously been undertaken into the impact of 
directorship action on an organizational executive leadership from an EHS 
perspective. In fact with the emerging themes and the Model (Fig 7.3) which 
evolved, it may be argued that the literature fails to focus on some very 
significant themes, due mainly to the lack of involvement of leaders in 
organisations and thus their perspectives and views are somewhat missing.  
 
8.3.2 Limited Perspectives - EHS & Governance: From the literature, the 
researcher struggled to find any meaningful academic references about 
corporate governance and safety/EHS. There are many references to 
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Corporate Governance and its legal related, financial performance related 
and from an organizational control perspective. There is not enough literature 
that currently exists that connects between EHS/safety and governance and 
therefore this work makes a significant contribution to that effect.  
 
8.3.3 Methodology: The research design selected (i.e. concurrent mixed 
methods research design) is not widely used (as explained earlier in Chapter 
4 less than 10% of mixed methods research). This study contributes to 
demonstrating the utility value of this research method highlighting how it can 
be useful in contributing to the advancement of knowledge. It also 
demonstrated that a positivist approach can be effectively employed to 
extract rich information from qualitative data sets especially when a large 
dataset exists to work with.  
 
8.3.4 Tool Development: The research design has allowed for the 
development of an effective survey for the purpose of this research. This 
instrument clearly needs further refinement and improvement in the future by 
(a) validating the questions further with a larger respondent population; (b) 
adding further questions that are linked and related to the themes that 
emerged from the feedback from the senior leadership interviewed; and (c) 
adding dynamic industry emphasis related questions and exploring where 
certain more specific questions that measure similar values can be used to 
reduce the effect of the potentially industry-bias questions.  
 
8.3.5 Further Academic Studies: There is much that can be gained from 
the academic enquiry into this subject which connects the various subjects of 
leadership, EHS and governance. It is hoped that this research into EHS 
leadership and how it has connected with the aspects of governance, board 
action and oversight will motivate others working in different fields to take this 
research further and also seek to develop new research into these connected 
fields of research.   
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8.4 Organizational Implications of this Management Research – 
Contribution to the Development of Management Practice 
 
Industrial accidents and incidents can cause serious losses including loss of 
life, serious injuries, asset destruction, environmental damages and 
significant economic loss. Researchers and practitioners alike have been 
working for years to try to find better ways to address major incidents and 
generally to control major accidents and incidents.    
 
The researcher believes that this exploration into EHS leadership in the 
context of the board action and governance and oversight contributes to a 
field of management research which needs to be developed further. Many 
references and many researchers and practitioners have agreed for so many 
years that EHS must start at the top of the organization and must be driven 
by leadership action and commitment. In fact some recent research talks 
about stewardship rather than even leadership which connect the facets of 
the different types of leadership in organizations.   
 
The way forward for effective research and practice is to seek to understand 
and educate directors on the issues of EHS in high risk organizations. With 
the various themes that were explored and that have emerged in this 
research, one factor does connect them all; they are not only about systems 
and practices but they are also about leadership action. Be it a matter related 
to risk management; operational excellence and EHS management systems; 
alignment of the business goals with EHS and making EHS a business value 
driver or otherwise – all of these themes and all the others will help transform 
organizations to become high reliability organizations. 
 
Leadership in the Middle East and the Arab World has been greatly 
influenced by the culture and religion within in the region. The collectivist 
culture of tribal leadership and on which the power lies at the top of 
hierarchies very much supports the changes that can come about through 
top leadership direction setting and action. The work of the board of directors 
and the chairman’s direction-setting strategies, performance measures, 
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setting and expectations of the CEO/MD therefore become of even greater 
importance and consequence.  
 
This work has been presented as it has developed over the past 3-4 years at 
various practitioner forums [Al Hashmi (2012); Al Hashmi (2013)1; Al Hashmi 
(2013)2; Al Hashmi (2013)3; Al Hashmi (2013)4; Al Hashmi (2014); Al Hashmi 
(2014)2]. The general interest and feedback from the delegates and fellow 
practitioners has been extremely positive. This has served to further motivate 
the research during the past 36 months.  
 
The senior leaders in the roles of CEO/MD need as much support as do the 
EHS practitioners and managers within an organisation from their leadership. 
This research shows that whilst the board plays a small role in developing 
procedures and policies directly, they have a significant role in three key 
ways: 
 
(1) Direct EHS Effectively: As part of setting the tone establish clearly 
the importance of EHS in high risk/high reliability organizations 
through the setting of performance standards and expectations of the 
executive management to have effective control in EHS matters. As 
such they must be clearly balanced with their direction to maintain 
sustained economic value returns to their shareholders whilst ensuring 
their stakeholder obligations are also sustained. This is particularly 
important as most of the corporations being addressed in this research 
play a significant role in socio-economic terms within the region. The 
balance between motivating the executive leadership to achieve 
higher economic returns and maintaining safe and reliable operations 
is of paramount importance.  
 
(2) Know EHS and Engage: As part of gaining a greater understanding 
the executive management need to learn more and raise their 
awareness as a governance body of the EHS issues within an 
organization in order to understand better performance from 
monitoring reports; appreciate the efforts being executed by the 
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organization to make it more safe, reliable and sustainable; 
understand fully the need for investment into EHS when these needs 
arise. They need to be able to see clearly if risks are being controlled 
effectively in a dynamic environment with constantly changing external 
and internal factors.   
 
(3) Support and Advise: As part of the leading role the BoD plays, it has 
to play a supportive role if it is to be fully effective. The directors have 
to be able to add value in either reviewing or when deciding on 
supporting executive management proposals. EHS is complex and 
sometimes whilst supporting a particular initiative that may make a 
great deal of sense commercially, operationally or otherwise, it may 
have significant EHS implications that need to be assessed. The 
board must be able to create an environment of knowledge sharing 
and transparency and play more a supportive and advisory role rather 
than a pure governance role. Whilst governance is a critical role they 
need to play, they can combine that role with engaging in constructive 
and informed dialogue with the executive management in which EHS 
is always a factor to be assessed when certain items are being 
discussed or decisions need to be made.   
 
The contribution that this work makes to management research and 
scholarship is made significant by the fact that there is little structured 
research on the subject of EHS leadership and governance in general. 
Moreover and specifically in the GCC where no in-depth studies have been 
found that relate directly to EHS leadership and EHS culture this has been 
very specific to particular organizations and many of these studies, or at least 
the details of these studies remains company confidential. Some practitioners 
and perhaps consultants have shared some work from work done within or 
for organizations but it lacks depth and the kind of scholarship or academic 
value that this study on the other hand provides.   
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8.5 Limitations of this Work 
 
The study scope of this engaged scholarship research has been a significant 
undertaking. Like any such research there are various challenges and 
limitations. Some of these limitations are related to the location of the 
research, some of them are related to the subject itself and its concomitant 
sensitivities and some are also related to the researcher himself.  
 
8.5.1 Limitation of Quantitative Survey Sample: A total sample of 30 
persons completed the surveys that were used in this research. This meant 
that the statistical analysis was not possible due to significant lower reliability. 
This was clearly discussed in Chapter 5. Given that this was a concurrent 
mixed methods research design and that the interviews were conducted 
immediately after administering the instrument, it would have been difficult to 
manage more than 30 interviews which in itself generated a sizable amount 
of data for the descriptive qualitative analysis.  
 
8.5.2 Duration of the Data Collection Stage: Given the fact that actual data 
collection could not start before Ethics Approval was received it was difficult 
to start communicating with potential respondents. Given the nature of these 
respondents as very senior persons, it was thus difficult to get appointments 
quickly and easily. This created a basic limitation and impacted the amount of 
time available to access various respondents. This limitation the researcher 
tried to overcome by collecting data from a large sample size for the 
qualitative analysis which it is felt added to the general richness of the 
analysis.  
 
8.5.3 Literature Review Sources: As discussed in this thesis, the literature 
about this subject of EHS leadership in the context of corporate governance 
is limited. Therefore the literature review was detailed on aspects which 
related to the subject in very large areas – the focus had to be on 
governance and EHS leadership and culture as opposed to researching for 
example all the different leadership models. Whilst this is seen as a potential 
limitation, the impact was mitigated by the fact that organizational EHS 
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culture and safety/EHS leadership was discussed at some length. The 
extracted themes came from some anchor references to bring about focus to 
the study which can also perhaps be seen somewhat as a limitation of the 
study.  
 
8.5.4 Scholar is an EHS Practitioner: As the researcher is an EHS 
practitioner, this may have influenced the analysis of the data as perhaps 
some degree of technical knowledge sometimes creates bias. The 
researcher sought to overcome this by exploring industries beyond oil and 
gas to be challenged by different perspectives; through the use of the 
quantitative tool, the statistics were used to try to more objectively review a 
topic which can be subjective and dependent on various factors; and the 
stages of initial literature research, instrument and interview protocol 
development, data collection and data analysis were done as discrete 
steps/stages to seek to maintain objectivity and focus without having one 
process of research influence the other.  
 
8.5.5 Scholar works as a Director of EHS Compliance in a Peer 
Organization: This limitation was difficult to overcome as this was related to 
the scholar’s profession. The only other choice was to understand this study 
only within the researcher’s employing organization, and this would have 
brought about even greater limitation at least with respect to the conclusions 
which would have been more of a single case study rather than a wider 
based piece of engaged scholarship. As discussed in the methodology, the 
use of the introduction letter; sharing the researcher’s profiles; giving out 
University business cards and co-signing the confidentiality statement from 
all the respondents helped to position the researcher more as a scholar 
rather than an employee of a peer organization.  
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8.6 Scope for Further Future Engaged Scholarship in the study of 
EHS Leadership and Corporate Governance in Organizations  
 
There is some scope for further development of this work. Such research 
opportunities are explored below. A further recommendation is that more 
practitioners should be encouraged and motivated to get involved in doctoral 
level research as it brings about enhanced knowledge, better understanding 
and greater depth of impact. The kind of work that can take place includes 
but is not limited to the following: 
 
(1) Development of the Survey Instrument: The Survey instrument can be 
further developed to include new questions based on the emerging 
themes. The current questions can also be further refined and further 
validated through more piloting and expert panel research. The survey 
as explained earlier could be refined to have general questions as well 
as other questions for particular leaders for certain industries. A larger 
population could then be targeted to run more detailed inferential 
statistical analysis.  
(2) Testing the Survey Instrument against other industries within other 
regions of the world. This would be interesting to see if similar results 
appear and thus one could start to draw more generalizable results. 
This would thus benchmark the model or allow for benchmarking of 
the model more globally.  
(3) Further validation of the model developed through focus groups with 
senior and experienced leadership to see their level of agreement with 
the logic on the placement of themes within the zones identified. 
(4) Development of a standard semi-structured interview to assess the 
level of maturity of the EHS leadership from a corporate governance 
perspective within organizations. As discussed earlier the questions 
can be further refined to address specificities of each industry type.  
(5) To present this research and further developments after the doctorate 
at forums such as Board Director Institute meetings and to company 
Boards around the GCC to raise awareness about the importance of 
EHS leadership.  
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Otherwise from a methodological perspective, the use of sequential mixed 
methods can be undertaken to see if a qualitative enquiry can help develop a 
structured survey instrument with a greater range of questions. From this 
viewpoint, the survey instrument could be developed independently to gauge 
the level of EHS leadership within organizations from the perspective of 
corporate governance.  
 
8.7 Final Personal Reflections of the Researcher 
 
The reflections presented in chapter 4 explained the learning for taking 
perhaps a positivist position with respect to methodology. However, at this 
point I feel strongly that the subject of EHS leadership in the context of 
corporate governance is highly complex even though I am satisfied that the 
emerging model contributes considerably to our understanding of the many 
factors that are at play. The model would still need further refinement in the 
future to understand the magnitudes of influence that each factor or theme 
has on the other and within the model more widely. 
 
I feel as a practitioner that this can only be validated through further in-depth 
research perhaps through a series of focus groups with EHS practitioners, 
corporate governance specialists but most importantly with business leaders. 
When senior leaders who occupy positions of CEOs and MDs are able to 
make sense of this model and recognize the factors, then the model can 
become more functional. 
  
Throughout my experience of working at the grassroots levels as a safety 
officer on a construction site, working as an environmental consultant 
conducting environmental and health and safety studies and as a EHS 
supervisor at a refinery I had grown frustrated with the perceived lack of EHS 
leadership as how I defined it in my mind at the time. Even now, as Director 
of EHS compliance in the largest Oil and Gas Company in Dubai, United 
Arab Emirates, the overall picture is not totally clear. I feel at least now I 
understand why, the whole matter of EHS leadership is not only complex, it is 
also dynamic and the factors and themes that are involved, are both 
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interrelated and evolving. Thus it is impossible to seek to understand any 
particular leadership action without understanding the organizational, 
governance and EHS imperatives at play at that time.  
 
I therefore cannot profess that I now know and fully appreciate the answers, 
even after this long journey of engaged research. I think that this is because 
to understand high reliability, you have to understand the factors which are at 
times universally logical yet may be in the context of space and time within 
that organization different. Then one must appreciate that EHS leadership 
does start at the top of an organization and must be driven in such a way that 
it creates effective EHS cultures, which balance between operability, 
organizational growth and development and economic prosperity. I now also 
better appreciate that perhaps the factors will change and as high risk 
organizations adopt more balanced approaches to enterprise risk 
management, operationally excellent systems and create through leadership 
actions EHS cultures which promote transparency and shared learning they 
will become highly reliable and thus sustainable.  
 
In my mind however, I have been deeply challenged as both an engineer and 
practitioner to step out of my paradigm of strong beliefs in systems, 
processes and procedures as the true assurance of creating high reliability 
organizations – especially as I function as a chief compliance officer for my 
organisation. I feel personally now, it is more to do with the dynamic 
relationship between the Board and the Executive Management team and the 
performance standards set by the Board of the CEO/MD. This dynamic 
relationship of the CEO/MD educating the Board on the enterprise specific 
risk management approach most suited to that business and likewise the 
Board playing a more supportive role and even when challenging the 
CEO/MD, the board must be both objective and progressive in their thinking.  
 
I have grown much more empathic as a practitioner as a consequence of this 
research to the position of the top person within an organization. They carry a 
very large burden especially in high risk organizations. They are expected to 
be stewards of EHS yet manage all the other organizational challenges and 
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expectations from the Board. To remain focused, balanced and even-handed 
in their leadership is not easy with clearly at time conflicting organizational 
priorities mainly borne from the motivation of the creation of higher economic 
value.  
 
I also feel going back to the concepts around corporate governance 
development (see Chapter 2) that the greatest challenge is to maintain 
reliability for the purpose of the generation of long-term sustained value. EHS 
is just a significant risk factor in that equation in high risk organizations. In 
some of my casual discussions with close colleagues of mine who work as 
EHS specialists within the industry, they have explained to me that their view 
on safety/EHS performance and where they see boards getting seriously 
involved is when the risk of loss is just too high to ignore. They explain this by 
citing the significant improvements in the aviation industry in the past 3 
decades.  
 
I am very proud of this work. I believe it will have a great impact in time to 
come to help demystify the complexities of EHS leadership in the context of 
governance. However, I also know that the work only begins when you are 
able to provide pragmatic solutions to improve EHS leadership actions. I 
have thus merely and only helped explain the question and that hopefully 
answers some of the question.   
 
Finally I feel a great deal of privilege, to have been given an opportunity as a 
practitioner to conduct such research at a professional doctoral level. I have 
over the past 4 years been presenting on milestones of my work and have 
received a great deal of fascinating feedback from fellow practitioners. Even 
some of the leaders I have interviewed were so supportive and positive about 
this research. They encouraged me tremendously and some have asked me 
to return to them so as to present the findings of this work to their boards and 
executive management teams. 
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To this end, I feel whilst this thesis might be completed at this juncture, to 
take this knowledge forward and further develop this work is no longer a 
matter of choice, not even a calling but a fundamental responsibility.      
 
 
END OF THESIS 
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Appendix A: Survey Question Statements and Corresponding Literature Review Themes 
 
No Question (Final Form) Lit Rev Reference Themes 
1.  The Board of Directors (BoD) needs to accept both formally and publicly their 
collective role in providing health and safety leadership in their organization. 
· Safety Leadership 
2.  The consultative process and communication of the Health and Safety Policy to all 
stakeholders is a key role of the BoD and not only the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
or Managing Director (MD). 
· Developing a Safety Culture and 
Communication 
 
3.  Health & Safety is the full line manager’s responsibility and accountability and not in 
any way the BoD. 
· Safety Leadership 
4.  The role of the BoD in Health & Safety leadership should be minimal; responsibility 
should only be with those who have an expertise in Health & Safety. 
· Safety Leadership 
5.  Each Board Member needs to accept their individual role in providing health and 
safety leadership for their organization 
· Safety Leadership 
6.  Each Board Member needs to appreciate that their actions/decisions (where 
applicable) should reinforce the health and safety policies and statements with no 
contradiction. 
· Influence and Accountability 
7.  The CEO/MD should reinforce directives given by the BoD even when they may not be 
aligned with the Health & Safety Policy.   
· Influence and Accountability 
8.  The BoD needs to ensure that board decisions are aligned where applicable to the 
health and safety policy statement. 
· Developing a Safety Culture and 
Communication 
9.  The CEO/MD must ensure that the Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) Policy and 
Management Systems of Business Partners are at a similar level of effectiveness as 
his/her own organization.  
 
· Developing a Safety Culture and 
Communication; Risk Management 
10.  The role of the BoD is to ensure that the CEO/MD demonstrates there are processes 
to maintain business relationships with other companies, organizations and service 
providers to ensure they have at least equally as effective EHS policies and 
· Risk Management 
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No Question (Final Form) Lit Rev Reference Themes 
management systems. 
11.  Safety Culture is a sub-set of the Health and Safety Department’s work and not the 
Organizational Working Culture. 
· Developing a Safety Culture and 
Communication 
12.  I would support the appointment of one of the BoD members as a “safety champion” 
as the “Health and Safety Director”. The champion may be the CEO/MD or even the 
chairman of the Board, but he or she should be assigned formally. 
· Developing a Safety Culture and 
Communication; 
· Influence and Accountability 
13.  The CEO/MD must ensure that the internal controls are set-up to ensure legal 
compliance to regulations, prevention of any EHS incidents and Company EHS 
performance remains effective.  
· Monitoring EHS Performance 
14.  The Senior EHS Manager/Director should report directly to the CEO/MD. · Influence and Accountability; 
Reporting Structure and 
Hierarchies 
15.  The EHS issues should be discussed in the Audit and Risk Committee of the Board. · Risk Management;  
· Monitoring EHS Performance 
16.  A separate EHS Risk Committee should be set up that focuses only on EHS Risks and 
Issues at the Executive Committee Level.  
· Risk Management;  
· Influence and Accountability 
 
17.  EHS Risk Committees should involve executive managers from the company but no 
Board Directors. 
· Influence and Accountability 
 
18.  As EHS issues have very little to do with future growth, EHS risk management should 
focus only on present risks and those arising from existing assets/operations. 
· Risk Management;  
· Legal Imperative for Safety 
19.  Executive management is principally accountable for setting an agenda to improve 
and maintain high standards of EHS and safety.  
· Safety Leadership;  
· Operational Excellence & Influence 
and Accountability 
20.  Executive management must not combine between the activities of the EHS risk 
management and the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) committees.       
· Risk Management;  
· Operational Excellence and EHS 
Management Systems 
322 
 
No Question (Final Form) Lit Rev Reference Themes 
21.  Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) should be managed at the Board Level and not 
the Executive Management Level in an Organization.  
· Influence and Accountability;  
· Risk Management 
22.  Board Directors must receive some formal basic awareness training in EHS and 
Safety.  
Training would typically include the obligations and responsibilities of company 
executive officers, employee rights to safe working environments, legal obligations etc. 
· EHS Knowledge and Competence 
23.  Board Directors must at least once a year review the EHS statistics, incident analysis, 
improvement programs and other critical information relating to safety culture 
development and related investments. 
· Monitoring EHS Performance 
24.  The BoD should expect that the CEO/MD has a dedicated quarterly meeting with all 
the senior managers and EHS specialists to review safety and EHS performance of an 
organization.  
· Influence & Accountability; 
Monitoring EHS Performance 
25.  The Company EHS Policy should be reviewed and endorsed by the Board of Directors 
before they are signed by the CEO/MD.    
· Influence & Accountability 
 
26.  The Board of Directors must push the CEO/MD and their team to apply a zero target 
for all EHS and Safety Key Performance targets regardless of historical data and 
performance. 
· Developing a Safety Culture and 
Communication;  
· Safety Leadership;  
· Influence & Accountability 
27.  The Board agenda must include EHS performance  issues to be discussed, even if 
briefly at every Board Meeting 
· Safety Leadership; 
· Operational Excellence; Monitoring 
EHS Performance 
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Appendix B: Survey Questionnaire – As Administered 
Name:…………………………………………    
 
Organization:…………………………………………    
 
E-mail Address:…………………………………………… 
 
Years of Experience - (in High Risk/High Reliability Organizations) =…………………… 
Are you a, please enter (Please tick one); 
 
(1) Senior Executive – General Manager 
(2) Managing Director/CEO 
(3) Board Director 
(4) Both a CEO/MD and Member of the Board of Directors   (If you are retired please 
respond with your last position) 
 
Sr. No Question (Final Form)  
1. 
 
The Board of Directors (BoD) needs to accept both formally 
and publicly their collective role in providing health and safety 
leadership in their organization. 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
2. The consultative process and communication of the Health 
and Safety Policy to all stakeholders is a key role of the BoD 
and not only the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Managing 
Director (MD). 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
 
3. Health & Safety is the full line manager’s responsibility and 
accountability and not in any way the BoD. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
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Sr. No Question (Final Form)  
4.. The role of the BoD in Health & Safety leadership should be 
minimal; responsibility should only be with those who have an 
expertise in Health & Safety. 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
 
5.. Each Board Member needs to accept their individual role in 
providing health and safety leadership for their organization 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
 
6.. Each Board Member needs to appreciate that their 
actions/decisions (where applicable) should reinforce the 
health and safety policies and statements with no 
contradiction. 
 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
 
7. The CEO/MD should reinforce directives given by the BoD 
even when they may not be aligned with the Health & Safety 
Policy.   
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
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Sr. No Question (Final Form)  
8. The BoD needs to ensure that board decisions are aligned 
where applicable to the health and safety policy statement. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
 
9. The CEO/MD must ensure that the Environment, Health and 
Safety (EHS) Policy and Management Systems of Business 
Partners are at a similar level of effectiveness as his/her own 
organization.  
 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
10. The role of the BoD is to ensure that the CEO/MD 
demonstrates there are processes to maintain business 
relationships with other companies, organizations and service 
providers to ensure they have at least equally as effective 
EHS policies and management systems. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
11. Safety Culture is a sub-set of the Health and Safety 
Department’s work and not the Organizational Working 
Culture. 
 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
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Sr. No Question (Final Form)  
12. I would support the appointment of one of the BoD members 
as a “safety champion” as the “Health and Safety Director”. 
The champion may be the CEO/MD or even the chairman of 
the Board, but he or she should be assigned formally. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
13. The CEO/MD must ensure that the internal controls are set-up 
to ensure legal compliance to regulations, prevention of any 
EHS incidents and Company EHS performance remains 
effective.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
14. The Senior EHS Manager/Director should report directly to 
the CEO/MD. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
15. The EHS issues should be discussed in the Audit and Risk 
Committee of the Board. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
16. A separate EHSEHS Risk Committee should be set up that 
focuses only on EHS Risks and Issues at the Executive 
Committee Level.  
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
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Sr. No Question (Final Form)  
17. EHS Risk Committees should involve executive managers 
from the company but no Board Directors. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
 
18. As EHS issues have very little to do with future growth, EHS 
risk management should focus only on present risks and 
those arising from existing assets/operations. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
19. Executive management is principally accountable for setting 
an agenda to improve and maintain high standards of EHS 
and safety.  
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
20. Executive management must not combine between the 
activities of the EHS risk management and the Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM) committees.    
 
    
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
21. Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) should be managed at 
the Board Level and not the Executive Management Level in 
an Organization.  
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
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Sr. No Question (Final Form)  
22. Board Directors must receive some formal basic awareness 
training in EHS and Safety.  
Training would typically include the obligations and 
responsibilities of company executive officers, employee 
rights to safe working environments, legal obligations etc. 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
23. Board Directors must at least once a year review the EHS 
statistics, incident analysis, improvement programs and other 
critical information relating to safety culture development and 
related investments. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
24. The BoD should expect that the CEO/MD has a dedicated 
quarterly meeting with all the senior managers and EHS 
specialists to review safety and EHS performance of an 
organization.  
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
25. The Company EHS Policy should be reviewed and endorsed 
by the Board of Directors before they are signed by the 
CEO/MD.    
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagr 
26. The Board of Directors must push the CEO/MD and their 
team to apply a zero target for all EHS and Safety Key 
Performance targets regardless of historical data and 
performance. 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
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Sr. No Question (Final Form)  
27. The Board agenda must include EHS performance  issues to 
be discussed, even if briefly at every Board Meeting 
 
 
 
Strongly Agree         
Agree          
Agree to Some Extent         
Partly Disagree   
Disagree;         
Strongly Disagree 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to this survey.  We will now conduct the interview.   
This can also be posted directly to me at the following address or scanned and sent back 
electronically to the following two e-mail addresses: 
 
Electronic Addresses: 
W.S.M.Banihashem@bradford.ac.uk  
wsg@enoc.com  
Postal Address: 
Eng. Waddah Ghanem 
ENOC House 1, Second Floor – Group EHSQ Compliance Directorate 
Oud Maitha; P O Box 6442, Dubai, UAE. 
Telephone: 0097150-4503538 
 
Regards, 
Eng. Waddah S. Ghanem Al Hashemi 
DBA Scholar – Bradford School of Management 
University of Bradford, United Kingdom. 
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Appendix C: Typical Information Sheet 
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Appendix D: Researcher’s Biography
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Appendix E: Typical Consent Form 
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Appendix F: Results of the Pilot Study – Working Question 
Statements & Themes 
Question Response 
on Themes 
from SMEs 
Theme from Lit 
Review 
The Board of Directors (BoD) needs to accept both formally and 
publicly their collective role in providing health and safety leadership 
in their organization. 
SL; I&A;  Safety Leadership 
The consultative process and communication of the health and Safety 
Policy to all stakeholders is a key role of the BoD and not only the 
CEO. 
SL; I&A;  Developing a Safety 
Culture and 
Communication 
 Health & Safety is the full line manager’s responsibility and 
accountability and not in any way the BoD.   
I&A Safety Leadership   
The role of the BoD in Health & Safety leadership should be minimal; 
responsibility should only be with those who have an expertise in 
Health & Safety. 
I&A; HSE-
K&C 
Safety Leadership  
Each Board Member needs to accept their individual role in providing 
health and safety leadership for their organization 
SL; MEHSP Safety Leadership 
Each Board Member needs to appreciate that their actions/decisions 
(where applicable) should reinforce the health and safety policies and 
statements with no contradiction. 
I&A; RM Safety Leadership 
The CEO should be clearly reinforcing the decisions made by the 
BoD even when they are not aligned with the Health & Safety Policy.  
I&A; RM; LIS Influence and 
Accountability 
The BoD needs to ensure that board decisions are aligned where 
applicable to the health and safety policy statement. 
I&A; RM; LIS Influence and 
Accountability 
The CEO must ensure that business relationships they have with 
other companies, contractors and service providers who have at least 
equally as effective EHS policies and management systems. 
RM; SL; I&A; 
OE&EHS 
Developing a Safety 
Culture and 
Communication & 
Risk Management 
The BoD must ensure that the CEO can demonstrate they have a 
process to maintain business relationships with other companies, 
organizations and service providers to ensure they have at least 
equally as effective EHS policies and management systems. 
RM  Risk Management 
The Board of Directors needs to ensure that the company managers 
and CEOs are involving their employees through various methods 
such as safety committees to improve the safety culture in their 
organization. 
RS&H; 
OE&EHS; 
I&A 
Developing a Safety 
Culture and 
Communication 
Safety Culture is a sub-set of the Health and Safety Department’s 
work and not the Organizational Working Culture. 
DSC&C Developing a Safety 
Culture and 
Communication 
The main driver for improving the Health and Safety for any Board 
Director should be the Legal Compliance aspect. 
LIS; SL Safety Leadership & 
Legal Impetrative for 
Safety 
Legal Compliance to HSE regulations is the principle responsibility of 
the Chairman of the Board of Directors through the Audit and Risk 
Committee 
LIS; SL Risk Management & 
Legal Imperative for 
Safety 
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Question Response 
on Themes 
from SMEs 
Theme from Lit 
Review 
The appointment of one of the BoD members as a “safety champion” 
or otherwise referred to as the “Health and Safety Director”. The 
champion can be the CEO or the chairman of the Board, but he or 
she should be assigned formally. 
SL; MEHSP; 
DSC&C 
Developing a Safety 
Culture & Influence 
and Accountability 
As HSE issues are principally operational, the CEO must ensure that 
the internal controls are set-up to ensure legal compliance to 
regulations, prevention of any HSE incidents and HSE performance 
through leading and lagging key performance indicators remains 
effective.  
SL; MEHSP; 
DSC&C 
Monitoring HSE 
Performance 
As HSE is an organizationally significant yet very specialist role the 
Senior HSE Manager/Director should only report functionally to the 
CEO. 
RS&H; 
OE&EHS; 
Reporting Structure 
and Hierarchies & 
Influence and 
Accountability 
The HSE issues should be discussed in the Audit and Risk 
Committee of the Board. 
MEHSP; RM Risk Management & 
Monitoring HSE 
Performance 
A separate HSE Risk Committee should be set up that focuses only 
on HSE Risks and Issues at the Executive Committee Level.  
MEHSP; RM Risk Management & 
Influence and 
Accountability 
HSE Risk Committees should involve executive managers from the 
company but no Board Directors. 
SL; I&A; 
MEHSP; RM 
Influence and 
Accountability 
As HSE issues have very little to do with future growth, HSE risk 
management should focus only on present risks and those arising 
from existing assets/operations 
RM Risk Management & 
Legal Imperative for 
Safety 
Executive management is principally accountable for setting an 
agenda to improve and maintain high standards of HSE and safety.  
SL; I&A; 
MEHSP 
Safety Leadership & 
OE & Influence and 
Accountability 
Executive management must not integrate between the HSE risk 
management and the enterprise risk management (ERM).    
RM; SL  Risk Management & 
OE 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) should be managed at the Board 
Level and not the Executive Management Level in an Organization.  
RM; I&A; SL Influence and 
Accountability & Risk 
Management 
The Chief Risk Officer (CRO) should report directly to the Board and 
not the CEO. 
RS&H  Influence and 
Accountability & 
Reporting Structure 
and Hierarchies 
Board Directors must receive some formal training in HSE and Safety. 
The training would typically include the obligations and responsibilities 
of company executive officers, employee rights to safe working 
environments and HSE risk management.  This should cover the 
basic legal obligations of organizations in terms of HSE.   
HSE-K&C HSE Knowledge and 
Competence 
Board Directors must at least once a year review the HSE statistics, 
incident analysis, improvement programs and other critical information 
relating to safety culture development and endorse investments and 
work plans and investments targeted for the same. 
MEHSP Monitoring HSE 
Performance 
The BoD must expect that the CEO has a dedicated quarterly 
meeting with all the senior managers and HSE specialists to review 
safety and HSE performance of an organization.  
MEHSP; 
I&A; SL; 
OE&EHS 
Monitoring HSE 
Performance & 
Influence and 
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Question Response 
on Themes 
from SMEs 
Theme from Lit 
Review 
Accountability 
The Company HSE Policy should be reviewed and endorsed by the 
Board of Directors before they are signed by the CEO/MD.    
SL Influence & 
Accountability 
In any incident involving either fatalities/serious injuries of employees 
and contractors or otherwise significant damage to assets and 
operations (including operating continuity), the Board of Directors 
must appoint an investigation team independent of the CEO and 
company managers.  
LIS; I&A Influence and 
Accountability & 
Legal Imperative for 
Safety 
A major HSE hazards risk register and the mitigation measures must 
be developed by the CEO/MD and their teams and presented at least 
annually to the Board of Directors. 
LIS; RM Monitoring HSE 
Performance & Risk 
Management 
Major investments that relate to urgent safety should be approved by 
the CEO if an immediate credible risk is highlighted with their team 
without having to revert for approval of the BoD regardless of the 
Delegation of Authority restrictions as long as a justification note is 
presented to them in due course for review and approval. 
LIS; RS&H; 
I&A; SL 
Safety Leadership, 
Influence and 
Accountability and 
Legal Imperative for 
Safety 
The Board of Directors must push the CEO and their team to apply a 
target zero for all EHS and Safety Key Performance targets 
regardless of historical data and performance. 
DSC&C; 
MEHSP 
Developing a Safety 
Culture, Influence and 
Accountability 
The Board agenda must include HSE performance  issues to be 
discussed, even if briefly at every Board Meeting 
DSC&C; 
MEHSP 
Safety Leadership, 
OE & Monitoring HSE 
Performance 
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Appendix G: SPSS Data Output File 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 
N     Valid 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
30 
5.70 
.596 
30 
4.97 
1.12 
30 
4.90 
1.29 
30 
5.00 
1.11 
30 
5.10 
.803 
30 
5.60 
.563 
30 
4.77 
1.27 
30 
5.50 
.682 
30 
5.13 
.730 
30 
4.77 
1.00 
Oil & Gas               
N 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
19 
21 
74 
19 
42 
31 
19 
36 
31 
19 
42 
26 
19 
58 
31 
19 
37 
58 
19 
37 
26 
19 
26 
63 
19 
47 
26 
19 
47 
16 
Non Oil & 
Gas       N 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
11 
9 
81 
11 
27 
45 
11 
36 
45 
11 
45 
54 
11 
54 
27 
11 
27 
73 
11 
27 
54 
11 
36 
54 
11 
45 
45 
11 
9 
45 
Agree %    
Strongly 
Agree  
Total %           
N = 30 
17 
77 
94 
37 
37 
74 
37 
37 
84 
43 
37 
80 
57 
30 
87 
33 
63 
96 
30 
37 
67 
30 
60 
90 
47 
33 
80 
33 
27 
60 
Oil & Gas 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
5.68 
.582 
 
5.00 
.882 
 
4.84 
.279 
 
4.68 
1.25 
 
5.11 
.875 
 
5.53 
.612 
 
4.47 
1.34 
 
5.53 
.697 
 
5.00 
.745 
 
4.68 
.946 
Non-Oil and 
Gas 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
5.73 
.647 
 
4.91 
1.51 
 
5.00 
1.48 
 
5.55 
.522 
 
5.09 
.701 
 
5.73 
.467 
 
5.27 
1.00 
 
5.45 
.688 
 
5.36 
.674 
 
4.91 
1.13 
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 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 
N     Valid 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
30 
5.30 
.702 
30 
4.47 
1.16 
30 
5.80 
.407 
30 
5.40 
.855 
30 
5.17 
1.117 
30 
4.97 
1.15 
30 
3.10 
1.44 
30 
5.03 
1.12 
30 
5.07 
1.01 
30 
3.97 
1.40 
Oil & Gas          
N 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
 
47 
36 
 
36 
21 
 
36 
31 
 
21 
60 
 
47 
37 
 
42 
37 
 
10 
26 
 
47 
26 
 
37 
37 
 
16 
37 
Non Oil & 
Gas  N 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
 
36 
54 
 
27 
18 
 
18 
81 
 
27 
63 
 
18 
63 
 
45 
36 
 
27 
 
27 
63 
 
36 
45 
 
54 
18 
Agree % 
Strongly 
Agree % 
Total %     N 
= 30 
43 
43 
86 
33 
20 
53 
20 
80 
100 
23 
60 
83 
37 
47 
84 
43 
37 
80 
26 
 
26 
40 
40 
80 
37 
40 
77 
43 
6 
49 
Oil & Gas 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
5.21 
.713 
 
4.58 
1.17 
 
5.79 
.419 
 
5.32 
.946 
 
5.16 
.834 
 
4.95 
1.17 
 
3.00 
1.49 
 
4.79 
1.18 
 
4.95 
1.12 
 
3.53 
1.38
9 
Non-Oil and 
Gas 
Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
5.45 
.688 
 
4.27 
1.19 
 
5.82 
.405 
 
5.55 
.688 
 
5.18 
1 .53 
 
5.00 
.1.18 
 
3.27 
1.42 
 
5.45 
.934 
 
5.27 
.786 
 
4.73 
1.10 
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 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 
N     Valid 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
30 
3.63 
1.56 
30 
5.33 
.606 
30 
5.87 
.346 
30 
5.77 
.504 
30 
4.90 
1.06 
30 
5.10 
.960 
30 
5.57 
.568 
Oil & Gas % 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
 
37 
5 
 
58 
37 
 
16 
84 
 
21 
79 
 
47 
21 
 
37 
42 
 
37 
58 
Non Oil & Gas % 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
 
27 
9 
 
45 
45 
 
9 
91 
 
9 
82 
 
64 
36 
 
36 
36 
 
36 
64 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
Total % 
33 
7 
40 
53 
40 
93 
13 
87 
100 
17 
80 
97 
53 
27 
80 
37 
40 
77 
37 
60 
97 
Oil & Gas 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
 
3.63 
1.57 
 
5.32 
.582 
 
5.84 
.375 
 
5.79 
.419 
 
4.63 
1.21 
 
5.11 
1.04 
 
5.33 
.612 
Non-Oil and Gas 
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
 
3.64 
1.62 
 
5.36 
.674 
 
5.91 
.302 
 
5.73 
.647 
 
5.36 
.505 
 
5.09 
.831 
 
5.64 
.505 
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Appendix H: Qualitative Analysis Tabulated Results 
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Summarised Emerging Theames 
and Other Strong Concepts 
27 Oil and Gas Upsteram 25th April 2013 21'25" AUH SVP 11 13 13 7 11 4 2 3 5 69 Mixed
(1) Process Safety Vs. Personal Safety; 
(2) Don’t Mix ERM and Safety RM
15.9 18.8 18.8 10.1 15.9 5.8 2.9 4.3 7.2 100
12
Transport -
Aviation
Airport 
Operations 
and Avaiation
10th January 
2013 01'19'47" DXB CEO/SVP 20 32 14 24 6 5 9 13 12 135 Mixed
(1) Transparancy is Key; (2) Board 
Structure dependant on Organisational 
Maturity; (3) Learning Org is very critical; 
(4) Getting Concensus is critical to 
alligement.
14.8 23.7 10.4 17.8 4.4 3.7 6.7 9.6 8.9 100
8 Oil and Gas
Midstream + 
Downsream 
Ops (Refining)
22nd January 
2013 56'47" BAH DCEO 23 20 12 11 21 2 6 8 12 115 Mixed
(1) EHS critrical to Business Continuity; 
(2) Good EHS = Good Business; (3) 
Impact of Media has been big on brining 
about Transparancy; (4) There is an 
Industry wide change taking place. 
20.00 17.39 10.43 9.57 18.26 1.74 5.22 6.96 10.43 100
9 Oil and Gas Upstream
7th February 
2013 47'15" AUH SVP 27 18 12 6 8 2 7 9 6 95 Mixed
(1) Reposrting Lines Vs Responsibility; 
(2) Transparancy has become a 
requirement in the industry; (3) Global & 
Regional Priorities for EHS; (4) 
Commercial Drivers can make 
businesses lose focus on Core Business
28.42 18.95 12.63 6.32 8.42 2.11 7.37 9.47 6.32 100
22 Oil and Gas Upstream 19th March 2013 53'39" OMAN CEO/SVP 14 29 12 8 10 5 7 11 13 109
Detached 
Board
(1) Cost of EHS - It is expensive; (2) Their 
should be a motivation for Safety; (3) the 
BoD plays a role in Governnace and 
oversight only. 
12.84 26.61 11.01 7.34 9.17 4.59 6.42 10.09 11.93 100
29 Oil and Gas
Diversified 
Midstream + 
Downsream 
Ops (Refining)
10th Auguest 
2013 25'42" DXB CEO 12 9 5 2 7 1 8 3 4 51 Mixed
(1) BoD must play a strong oversight role; 
(2) Teir has to be full allignement between 
BoD and EXCOM especilly on safety 
matters; (3) EHS is a Business Driver; (4) 
There is a strong influancing role when 
you have international partners
23.53 17.65 9.80 3.92 13.73 1.96 15.69 5.88 7.84 100
19
Energy - Oil 
and Gas Upstream 14th March 2013 35'41" BAH CEO 8 13 6 10 5 3 2 6 8 61 Mixed
(1) Primary Role of the BoD is Corporate 
Governanace and Oversight; (2) Mixed 
BoD creates better alligenment and 
levearges knowledge of all the members.
13.11 21.31 9.84 16.39 8.20 4.92 3.28 9.84 13.11 100
5 Oil and Gas
Diversified 
Midstream + 
Downsream 
Ops (Refining)
21st January 
2013 01'08'20" BAH SVP 27 34 15 15 11 7 4 7 20 140
Executive or 
Mixed
(1) Huge impact of Global Incidents on 
shaping the industry attention to EHS; (2) 
EHS has matured more than CSR., 
although EHS is a subset of CSR; (3) 
Sustainability of the bussiness is related 
to EHS performance; (4) EHS should 
report into a technical function - makes 
more sense and then functionally into a 
senior committee with CEO; (5) Main 
issue is with adjacent industries not 
complying and caring so much about 
EHS/Safety - i.e. O&G do, but 
construction dont care about having high 
standards; (6)Primary Role of the BoD is 
Corporate Governanace and Oversight 
19.29 24.29 10.71 10.71 7.86 5.00 2.86 5.00 14.29 100
21
Energy - Oil 
and Gas Upstream 19th March 2013 40'22" OMAN CEO 9 13 8 4 6 1 5 6 5 57 Mixed
(1) The Industry as a whole has a culture 
which influances the company EHS 
culture; (2) EHS culture is self-driven and 
is related to good workmanship, and 
proffetionalism - this drives a good EHS 
culture. 
15.79 22.81 14.04 7.02 10.53 1.75 8.77 10.53 8.77 100
340 
 
 
 
1
Energy - Oil 
and Gas
Oil Storage 
and Movement 
(Mid-stream) 11th Dec 2012 56'23" Singapore GM 18 10 11 8 8 1 4 4 5 69 Executive 
(1) Supports having a champion of the 
BoD; Make up of the BoD is a significant 
factor to them adding value from a Safety 
Leadership perspective; (3) BoD have 
reactive leadership; (4) They naturally 
focus on Commercial and Finanacial 
Issues; (5) EHS has to be a very 
independant Function; (6) EHS is not a 
key driver - CSR can impact but requires 
a change in awarness. 
26.09 14.49 15.94 11.59 11.59 1.45 5.80 5.80 7.25 100
6
Energy - Oil 
and Gas
Diversified 
Midstream + 
Downsream 
Ops (Refining)
23rd January 
2013 40'38" DXB
CEO and 
Country 
Chairman 18 21 19 17 18 0 7 20 11 131 Mixed
(1) Goverance Role of BoD;(2) 
Prepardness for Recovery from Incidents 
is Key - BoD must ensure that 
organisations have the light level of 
prepardness; (3) There has to be a 
compliance culture; (4) Must have a 
culture of continuos learning; (5) Setting 
high safety Stnadrds is required.
13.74 16.03 14.50 12.98 13.74 0.00 5.34 15.27 8.40 100
4
Energy - Oil 
and Gas
Diversified 
Midstream + 
Downsream 
Ops 
(Marketing) 7th January 2013 15'02" DXB MD 9 9 4 4 9 2 7 4 3 51 Mixed
(1) Good EHS from the Board must come 
with a strong vision; (2) Must drive a 
compliance Culture.
17.65 17.65 7.84 7.84 17.65 3.92 13.73 7.84 5.88 100
20
Power and 
Utilities
Power and 
Utilities 
Services 
Provider 20th March 2013 31'57" OMAN CEO 24 21 13 9 9 3 8 12 5 104
Board 
Structure 
Makes No 
Difference
(1) Embedding EHS into the Business; (2) 
In terms of Risk Mnaagment there has to 
be very strong allignement between CEO 
and BoD; (3) CEO has the greatest 
Impacton EHS as it is leadership by 
example.
23.08 20.19 12.50 8.65 8.65 2.88 7.69 11.54 4.81 100
3
Energy - Oil 
and Gas
Oil Storage 
and Movement 
(Mid-stream) 9th January 2013 31'11'' DXB MD 15 5 15 2 14 2 7 9 6 75
Detached 
Board
(1) Streghten the Role of Goverance and 
Oversight; (2) Maintain a very independent 
Role; Sepration of roles is critical; (3) 
Transprancy is key to success of the 
BoD/CEO dynamics. 
20.00 6.67 20.00 2.67 18.67 2.67 9.33 12.00 8.00 100
14
Heavy 
Manufacturing
Construction 
(On and 
Offshore) 6th March 2013 24'44" AUH SVP 8 19 5 9 5 3 4 7 5 65
Board 
Structure 
Makes No 
Difference
(1) BoD ensures tjrough oversight a 
susutained EHS performance of an 
organisation; (2) EHS has a critical 
Impact on Business Continuity; (3) 
Continual Learning - Learning 
Organisation. 
12.31 29.23 7.69 13.85 7.69 4.62 6.15 10.77 7.69 100
16
Heavy 
Manufacturing Smelters 14th March 2013 12'40" BAH SVP 15 6 3 2 7 3 3 1 3 43 Mixed No significant input. 
34.88 13.95 6.98 4.65 16.28 6.98 6.98 2.33 6.98 100
15
Transport - 
Shipping
Oil Tankers - 
Shipping 10th March 2013 22'20" OMAN DCEO 6 11 10 1 6 2 6 6 10 58
Detached 
Board
(1) Tgransparancy is Key; (2) There has 
to be a long-term outlook to the 
organisation; (3) BoD have to set the 
expectations clearly for EHS and 
otherwise. 
10.34 18.97 17.24 1.72 10.34 3.45 10.34 10.34 17.24 100
13
Heavy 
Manufacturing
Construction 
(On and 
Offshore) 6th March 2013 23'45" AUH SVP 12 10 8 10 3 4 8 2 3 60 Mixed
(1) BoD focus is genrally on financial 
issues and a slight focus on EHS; (2) 
Transparancy is very imporatnt; (3) 
Industry itself is setting the tolarance 
levels and not so much the BoD. 
20.00 16.67 13.33 16.67 5.00 6.67 13.33 3.33 5.00 100
24
Energy - Oil 
and Gas Upstream 20th March 2013 56'52" OMAN CEO 29 38 28 18 19 8 15 21 9 185
Board 
Structure 
Makes No 
Difference
(1) BoD should ask for not typical 
monitoring data and see performance as 
much as they should be looking at the 
trends in performance; (2) Culture of Self 
Regulation is very important to innoculate; 
(3) EHS has to relate to the needs of 
people - it has to be alligned effectively; 
(4) BoD has to look at EHS performance 
from a Social Impact perspective - how it 
impacts socity at large not only the 
organisation; (5) Contradicting Priorities 
and Business pressures can have a very 
negative impact on EHS focus; (6) 
Keeping Systems Simple and Efective. 
15.68 20.54 15.14 9.73 10.27 4.32 8.11 11.35 4.86 100
341 
 
 
 
28
Energy - Oil 
and Gas
Oil Storage 
and Movement 
(Mid-stream) 4th March 2013 33'32" FUJ GM 11 15 13 6 17 3 6 6 8 85
Detached 
Board
(1) Transparancy is Key; (2) BoD has to 
be a very supportive body; (3) It is 
imporatant that a culture on continual 
learning exisits.
12.94 17.65 15.29 7.06 20.00 3.53 7.06 7.06 9.41 100
18
Heavy 
Manufacturing Smelters 14th March 2013 38'26" BAH CEO 18 9 10 8 13 7 16 8 7 96
Board 
Structure is 
dependant on 
the 
organisation 
Type and size
(1) BoD is directing as opposed to 
leading; (2) Organisation must add value 
socially to a country it is operating in; (3) 
Size of organisation governs the reporting 
lines for EHS persons.
18.75 9.38 10.42 8.33 13.54 7.29 16.67 8.33 7.29 100
26
Energy - Oil 
and Gas Upstream 25th April 2013 37'51" AUH SVP 23 17 19 9 16 14 5 13 1 117
Detached 
Board
(1) Clear definition of responsibilities and 
accountabilitiers of the BoD and the CEO 
are very imporatant; (2) Cannot delegate 
the accountability - it stays with the BoD - 
they only delgate responsibility and they 
have a strong oversight; (3) It is very 
important to have allignement of vision 
and goals; (4) Detached BoD is more 
objective and will not interfere in 
operations - their input will stay strategic. 
19.66 14.53 16.24 7.69 13.68 11.97 4.27 11.11 0.85 100
23
Energy - Oil 
and Gas
Midstream and 
Upstream 19th March 2013 29'48" OMAN
DCEO + 
BoD 
Member 12 19 19 11 12 3 9 6 11 102
Does not 
support 
Executive 
Board but 
rathers 
Detached or 
Mixed.
(1) Safey and Corporate Governance 
Overlap strongly; (2) The standards which 
are set are dynamic and that’s the 
challenge; (3) Morality is very imporatant 
to consideer in this discussion of BoD 
and CEO behavior when it comes to 
safety; (4) There are strong finincail 
implications for safety; (5) Reporting lines 
highly depenadant on the naturae of teh 
business and the risks involved; (6) Legal 
is not a driver it is a strong influenacing 
factor and implications for compliance; (7) 
Diversity of the BoD is very imporatant to 
get better EHS governance; (8) Diversity 
is key more than Board Structure. 
11.76 18.63 18.63 10.78 11.76 2.94 8.82 5.88 10.78 100
2
Energy - Oil 
and Gas
Oil Storage 
and Movement 
(Mid-stream)
24th December 
2012 21'03" DXB GM 8 15 11 5 3 3 4 6 5 60 Executive 
(1) Allignement of the vision is very 
critically important; (2) Give the top guy 
the full ownership for Safety - BoD is an 
advisory body
13.33 25.00 18.33 8.33 5.00 5.00 6.67 10.00 8.33 100
25 Aviation 
Avaition 
Operations 
and Navigation
31st February 
2013 31'34" DXB GM 10 15 16 9 9 6 4 8 8 85
Board 
Structure 
Makes Little 
Difference
(1) There is a string and direct impact of 
BoD behavior on the safety culture - 
absolutely critical; (2) HROs - focus on 
the core business and thus the core 
business risks; (3) We have to 
understand that unless the EXCOM is 
pushing hard the BoD, they will develop 
an appetite for risk; (4) Avaiation Indusrty 
are focused heaivly on internal controls 
and governance rather than regulations; 
(5) BoD must understand the finaincail 
impact of risk managment; (6) Avaiation 
focus has been greatly on process safety 
rather than personal safety; (7) Need to 
understand Human Factors carfully; (8) 
Board Structure does not matter - it is 
more about preperation and engegemnet 
of the CEO and BoD in matters. 
11.76 17.65 18.82 10.59 10.59 7.06 4.71 9.41 9.41 100
10
Heavy 
Manufacturing
Construction 
(On and 
Offshore)
21st January 
2013 33'30" BAH DGM 13 17 16 14 9 1 11 8 12 101 Mixed
(1) Supports having a champion of the 
BoD; (2) Commercial and Financial 
Focus detracts BoD from focusing on 
Safety; (3) EHS is about Ethics and 
Humanism; (4) Operational vs. strategic - 
industry accepts that the BoD are not 
technical so their input in EHS matters is 
limited. 
12.87 16.83 15.84 13.86 8.91 0.99 10.89 7.92 11.88 100
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Totals 400 438 317 229 262 95 174 207 197 2319
% Totals (Av) 17 19 14 10 11 4 8 9 8 100
% Totals (Cumm) 18 19 14 9 12 4 8 9 9 100
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Appendix J: Board Structure Feedback Summary 
Board Structure best for 
Safety Leadership 
Percentage of 
Total 
Respondents who 
support this type 
of Board Structure 
Cited Reasons for why the support their 
view on Board Structure 
Mixed Board Structure (CEO is 
a Board Member but not a 
Chairman or Vice Chairman) 
53.8% The respondents supporting this Board 
Structure cited: 
(1) It brings about better alignment 
between Executive Management and 
the BoD; 
(2) Gives the CEO and some executives 
who are knowledgeable about the 
business to better contribute to the 
major decisions made which can 
impact on EHS and Safety; 
(3) There is a better chance for the BoD 
members to understand the 
implications of the decisions they 
make, especially commercial and 
expenditure related which can impact 
on EHS and Safety; 
(4) You end up getting better engagement 
from both Executive Team and the 
BoD. 
 
 
Detached Board Structure (CEO 
is not a Board Director) 
23.1% The respondents supporting this Board 
Structure cited: 
(1) There is clear and delineation of the 
roles and responsibilities between the 
Executive and the BoD. CEO is 
accountable; 
(2) Maintains as they put it better 
“Corporate Governance and 
Oversight” especially for safety issues 
where they can be major incidents; 
(3) Ensures that the BoD makes more 
objective decisions as they are not 
influenced too closely by subjective 
decisions from the CEO and his team 
who may want to go ahead for a 
particular reason; 
(4) Ensures that the BoD members 
remain as an independent body.  
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Board Structure best for 
Safety Leadership 
Percentage of 
Total 
Respondents who 
support this type 
of Board Structure 
Cited Reasons for why the support their 
view on Board Structure 
Executive Board (CEO and 
Chairman are one person) 
11.54% The respondents supporting this Board 
Structure cited: 
(1) If Safety starts at the top, then the 
Chairman as the CEO will ensure 
safety issues are dealt with no 
compromise! 
(2) No issues with misalignment between 
BoD and Executive Team; 
(3) BoD become very effective advisors 
for ensuring the decisions are made 
are balanced. 
Executive or Mixed Board 
Structure supported 
3.8% As above 
Detached or Mixed Board 
Supported 
3.8% As above 
 
Board Structure Makes Little 
Difference 
15.4% The respondents supporting this Board 
Structure cited: 
(1) Safety and EHS is about responsibility 
and accountability so it is not the 
Board structure that will be the 
reasons for better or worst safety 
leadership and culture within an 
organization; 
(2) It depends more on the optimum 
number of Board members who have 
varied experiences; 
(3) It depends more on the diversity of the 
Board rather than the structure of the 
Board – EHS is all about people; 
(4) The Board structure will continue to 
depend more on regulations and 
international best practice and 
Safety/EHS matters would be 
absorbed within those structures.  
Board Structure Depends on 
Organization 
3.8% The Board structure depends on the 
organization and the impact on safety 
leadership depends on that organization rather 
than the Board structure. The Board structure 
is related to the types of shareholding and 
general leadership.  
Note: data from 26 respondents.  
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Appendix K: Emerging Themes Matrix Tables 
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e  Emerging Theme
Strengthen the Role of Governance and Oversight – 
Potential Solutions cited:
·         Maintain a very independent Role and therefore the 
separation of roles is critical. Seperation of Roles
·         BoD ensures through oversight a sustained EHS 
performance of an organization.
Monitoring EHS 
Performasnce
·         EHS has a critical Impact on Business Continuity. 
Therefore EHS is a Business Driver. BoD must 
appreciate that Sustainability of the business is related to 
EHS performance.
EHS as a Business Value 
Driver
·         There has to be a long-term outlook to the 
organization rather than a short term view of things 
especially when they relate to EHS and sustainability of 
operations. 
EHS brings Sustainable 
Value
·         Some CEOs/MDs support having a champion of 
the BoD but this was more the minority. Safety Leadership
·         There has to be full alignment between BoD and 
EXCOM especially on safety matters. Getting consensus 
is critical to alignment. 
Allingement of Vision of 
EHS matters
·         We have to understand that unless the EXCOM is 
pushing hard the BoD, they will develop an appetite for 
risk Risk Management
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 Emerging Theme
Leadership Matters:
·        Safety Leadership Style has to be through Leading
by Example – CEO has the greatest Impact on EHS as it
is leadership by example. Ssfety Leadreship
·        As the BoD have an oversight role, it is expected
that their leadership will be a reactive leadership style. 
Directing - Passive 
Leadership Style
·        Alignment of the vision between CEO/MD and the
BoD is very critically important.
Developing a Safety 
Culture + Communication
·        EHS culture is self-driven and is related to good
workmanship and professionalism - this drives a good
EHS culture. Leaders need to be able to nurture this within 
their organizations.
Developing a Safety 
Culture + Communication
·        There should be a motivation for Safety. This is the
role of the Leadership team – to create that motivation for
employees. Safety Leadership
·        There is a strong and direct impact of BoD
behavior on the safety culture - absolutely critical. Observed Leadership 
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Key Challenges for the Board and Current Realities: 
·        BoD focus is generally on financial issues and a
slight focus on EHS. They naturally focus on Commercial
and Financial Issues given their role as shareholder
representatives. 
Commercial/Financial 
Drivers Compete for EHS 
issue-attention/Conflict
·        The standards which are set have to be dynamic
and performance related and that’s the challenge as thus
a deeper understanding of risks and risk control
strategies is required of the BoD members. 
Operational Excellence & 
Risk Mangement
·        It is critical to embed EHS into the Business. It is
sometimes difficult to do this as these needs time and
culture change within an organization. 
Embedding EHS as a Key 
Organisational Value 
Driver
·        BoD members don’t always have enough basic
awareness and information that will allow them to add
value in terms of delivering advise and oversight to
matters which may be related to EHS. Sometimes this is
because they are not even from that industry. 
EHS Knowledge and 
Competence
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Potential Issues for the Board:
·         Contradicting/Conflicting Priorities and Business 
pressures can have a very negative impact on EHS focus
Conflicting Priorities is 
negative on EHS
·         Mixing ERM and Safety RM may cause dilution of 
the focus on EHS. Risk Management
·         Industry itself is setting the tolerance levels and not 
so much the BoD. This creates a challenge for the BoD as 
they must try to understand why the industry shifts are 
such, especilly if they are not experienced in that industry. 
Industry Driving Change 
and Focus 
·         Clear definition of responsibilities and 
accountabilities of the BoD and the CEO are very 
important.
Influence and 
Accountability
·         Cannot delegate the accountability - it stays with the 
BoD - they only delegate responsibility and they have a 
strong oversight
Influence and 
Accountability
·         Commercial Drivers can make businesses lose 
focus on Core Business
Commercial/Financial 
Drivers Compete for EHS 
issue-attention/Conflict
·         Cost of EHS - It is expensive even if it is an 
investment into something that can or cannot happen. 
Financial Investment for 
EHS issues required
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Suggestion - Analysis not only monitoring: 
·         BoD should ask for not typical monitoring data and 
see performance as much as they should be looking at 
the trends in performance. 
Analysis of Performance  
vs. Monitoring 
Performance only
·         They should make sure that the management are 
keeping systems simple and effective and not too 
complex. Operational Excellence
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Alignment, Structure & Reporting Lines Related:
·        Size of organization governs the reporting lines for
EHS persons
Reporting Structures and 
Heirachies
·        It is very important to have alignment of vision and
goals
Allingement of Vision of 
EHS matters
·        Some suggested that a detached BoD is more
objective and will not interfere in operations - BoD input
will stay strategic. 
Board Structure stay 
detached
·        Board Structure does not matter - it is more about
preparation and engagement of the CEO and BoD in
matters
Board Structure not as 
important as engagement 
of BoD/CEO
·        Reporting lines highly dependent on the nature of
the business and the risks involved. Risk Management
·        Makeup of the BoD is a significant factor to them
adding value from a Safety Leadership perspective. Make up of Board
·         Diversity of the BoD is very important to get better 
EHS governance. Diversity is key more than Board 
Structure
Board Diversity is very 
important
·         Board Structure dependent on Organizational 
Maturity
Org Maturity should 
govern Board Stucture
·         The BoD plays a role in Governance and oversight 
only but it must be must be a strong oversight role.
Oversight Role must be 
strong from BoD
·         Primary Role of the BoD is Corporate Governance 
and Oversight Oversight Role from BoD
·         Mixed BoD creates better alignment and leverages 
knowledge of all the members
Board Diversity is very 
important
·         Reporting lines don’t always define the 
responsibility lines. Again it is transparency and better 
communication systems which are critical. Transparancy
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Suggestion - Perspective of Board:
·        BoD has to look at EHS performance from a Social
Impact perspective - how it impacts society at large not
only the organization. 
Social Impact & 
Accountability of 
Organisations
·        BoD has to be a very supportive body to the
management team. Safety Leadreship
·         BoD should be directing as opposed to leading. 
Directing - Passive 
Leadership Style
·        In terms of Risk Management there has to be very
strong alignment between CEO and BoD. The primary
role of the BoD is Corporate Governance and Oversight.
Allingement of Vision of 
EHS matters
·        Good EHS from the Board must come with a strong
vision
Developing a Safety 
Culture + Communication
·        It is important that the Board ensures that a culture
of continual learning exists
Continual Learning 
Organisations
·        BoD have to set the expectations clearly for EHS
and otherwise. The Governance Role of BoD needs to be
established and explicit.
Clear Expectations for 
Safety (EHS)
·         Safety and Corporate Governance Overlap strongly Operational Excellence
·        Legal imperatives for EHS are not a driver for
compliance of the BoD but it is a strong influencing factor
and implications for compliance can be very serious. It is
the bear minimum that needs to be in place but should not
be the benchmark. 
Legal Imperitive for 
Safety
·         HROs – must continue to focus on the core 
business and thus the core business risks and not be 
distracted by other matters. 
Good EHS - Focus on Core 
Business
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Key Success Factors for Board/CEO EHS
Performance:
·        Transparency is Key; Transparency has become a
requirement in the industry; Transparency is very
important; Transparency is key to success of the
BoD/CEO dynamics.  Transparancy
·        Give the top guy the full ownership for Safety - BoD
is an advisory body. Give full delegation and make them
accountable for performance. Monitor and guide the
management team. 
Safety Leadership & 
Influence & 
Accountability
·        There has to be a compliance culture and the
setting high safety Standards is required. Board and
Management must drive a compliance culture within the
organization. This will eventually develop a Culture of Self-
Regulation which is very important to inoculate. 
Developing a Safety 
Culture + Communication
·        Preparedness for Recovery from Incidents is Key -
BoD must ensure that organizations have the light level of
preparedness
Prepardness of 
Organisations
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Industry Realities:
·         The Aviation industry has been very focused on 
Process Safety as opposed to Personal Safety. This has 
been as some see it the opposite in the Oil and 
Gas/Process Industries. Re-focus on PSM
·        Operational vs. Strategic - industry accepts that the
BoD is not technical so their input in EHS matters is
limited. 
EHS Knowledge and 
Competence
·        Commercial and Financial Focus often detracts the
BoD from focusing on Safety and EHS matters. 
Commercial/Financial 
Drivers Compete for EHS 
issue-attention/Conflict
·        BoD must understand the financial impact of risk
management Risk Management
·        Aviation Industry are focused heavily on internal
controls and governance rather than regulations
Internal Controls vs. 
Regulation
·        Impact of Media has been big on bringing about
Transparency Transparency
·        Aviation focus has been greatly on process safety
rather than personal safety Focus of PSM
·         Need to understand Human Factors carefully Human Factors Impacts
·         EHS is about Ethics and Humanism. Thus Morality 
is very important to consider in this discussion of BoD and 
CEO behavior when it comes to safety Ethics & Morality
·         There are strong financial implications for safety Financial Implication for 
Safety
·         There is a strong influencing role when you have 
international partners. Likewise one of the main 
challenges also is with adjacent industries not complying 
and caring so much about EHS/Safety - i.e. O&G do, but 
construction don’t care about having high standards
Influenace of 
International Partners is 
Positive
·         There is a huge impact of Global Incidents on 
shaping the industry attention to EHS. There is an Industry 
wide change taking place
Industry Driving Change 
and Focus 
·         The Industry as a whole has a culture which 
influences the company EHS culture
Industry Driving Change 
and Focus 
·         There are both Global & Regional Priorities for 
EHS which are emerging. 
Emerging Global and 
Regional Influences
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Holistic Organizational Matters Relating to EHS 
Performance:
·         Continual Learning - Learning Organization and you 
must have a culture of continuous learning 
Continual Learning 
Organisations
·         EHS has to be a very independent Function
Best Practice for 
Indepndance of EHS 
Function
·         EHS has to relate to the needs of people - it has to 
be aligned effectively;
Allignement with People 
Needs
·         Good EHS = Good Business Operational Excellence
·         EHS has matured more than CSR., although EHS 
is a subset of CSR EHS is not a key driver - CSR can 
impact but requires a change in awareness
Social Impact & 
Accountability of 
Organisations
·         Organization must add value socially to a country it 
is operating in
Social Impact & 
Accountability of 
Organisations
·         EHS should report into a technical function - makes 
more sense and then functionally into a senior committee 
with CEO
EHS should be reporting 
to Technical Functions
 
 
 
 
 
